Judgment : The defendant in O.S.No.105 of 1983 on the file of the Subordinate Judges Court, Madurai is the appellant in the second appeal. The respondent herein filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of two items of properties, namely, two cents in R.S.No.79/9 and 1 acre, 39 cents with well in R.S.No.51/2 situate in Vanjinagaram Village in Melur North Panchayat Union within Dindigul registration District on the following averments: Suit items originally belonged to the family of the appellant. The properties went out the family pursuant to some court sale in E.P.No.227 of 1978 in O.S.No.121 of 1968 on the file of the District Munsifs Court, Melur. The court auction purchaser one Meyyappa Chettiar sold the properties to the respondent on 211. 1971 for R.1,500. The appellant had been nurturing a desire for a long time to get back the properties by means fair or foul. Item No.1 though registered as nanja where few crops were raised was a house site. As regards item No.2, the appellant had properties on the west and the north and there was also copious supply of water in the well in item No.2. The appellant wanted the respondent to sell the properties to him. Respondent refused. On 11. 1981, while the respondent was doing agricultural operations, the appellant with his henchmen interfered in the possession of the respondent necessitating his filing O.S.No.607 of 1981 before District Munsifs Court, Melur. He also filed I.A.No.727 of 1981 and obtained an order of injunction against the appellant. At the time of filing the present suit, injunction was still in force. Because of this, the appellant set up his tenant one Mahalingam to give trouble to the respondent. A complaint was given by Mahalingam under Prevention of Atrocities (Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe) Act before the Special Magistrates Court, Madurai. This petition was dismissed on 19. 1982. In the suit O.S.No.607 of 1981, the appellant had been taking time for filing written statement and ultimately filed the written statement setting up an agreement of sale dated 13. 1980 between the respondent and the appellant. Those averments in the written statement were all false. He stated in the written statement as if the respondent had agreed to sell the properties to the appellant for Rs.3,350 and on 13. 1980 a sum of Rs.1,350 was paid as advance. 1980 between the respondent and the appellant. Those averments in the written statement were all false. He stated in the written statement as if the respondent had agreed to sell the properties to the appellant for Rs.3,350 and on 13. 1980 a sum of Rs.1,350 was paid as advance. The appellant also set up a fraudulent sale deed dated 212. 1981 as if it had been executed by the respondent. It was recited in the sale deed that on the date of execution of the sale deed, Rs.1,500 was paid and the balance of Rs.500 was agreed to be paid on the date of registration. The market value in the sale deed was given as Rs.6,800 and the property was to be sold for only Rs.3,350 which itself would show that the sale set up on 212. 1981 was fraudulent. The signature of the respondent had been forged and the appellants own men were made to attest. The appellant appeared to have presented the document for registration before the Sub Registrar on 14. 1982. A notice was issued to the respondent who appeared before the Sub Registrar and he denied having executed any document. The respondent had no need to sell any property. The Sub Registrar having refused, the appellant had applied to the District Registrar, Dindigul. The respondent was summoned and before the District Registrar, the recital in the documents was concealed from his sight and only portions containing the respondents signatures were shown and the respondent had to admit his signature on the basis of which the document was registered. Merely because the respondent had admitted his signature in the document, it could not be considered to be a true document. The application given by the respondent to the District Registrar for comparison of his admitted signature with his signature in the sale agreement and the sale deed was rejected. Again in O.S.No.607 of 1981, in the counter, in the I.A. and in the written statement, it was stated that possession had been handed over to the appellant on the date of the agreement. This would show that the agreement and the sale deed were not true documents. No notice demanding registration was given by the appellant. The value given was very low. The total value would be Rs.15,000. No proper enquiry was conducted by the District Registrar. Possession of the properties had always been with the respondent. This would show that the agreement and the sale deed were not true documents. No notice demanding registration was given by the appellant. The value given was very low. The total value would be Rs.15,000. No proper enquiry was conducted by the District Registrar. Possession of the properties had always been with the respondent. Since the appellant was seeking rights in the suit property, the present suit had been filed for declaration of title or in the alternative for cancellation of sale deed dated 212. 1981. 2. Theappellant resisted the suit contending inter alia as follows: Since the suit properties were ancestral properties of the appellant, he was anxious to get them back and negotiated with the respondent and pursuant to such negotiation on agreement was entered into on 13. 1980. Rs.1,350 was paid as advance and the balance of Rs.2,000 was agreed to be paid within two years and the sale to be completed. Possession was given to the appellant on the same day. At the instigation of his son Veerakali, the respondent filed a suit before the District Munsifs Court, Melur and obtained an interim injunction. There was a panchayat thereafter and the respondent agreed to complete the sale. The sale deed was executed on 212. 1981. On the date of execution of sale deed, the respondent was paid Rs.1,500. He also agreed to receive the balance of Rs.500 at the time of registration, He further agreed to withdraw O.S.No.607 of 1981. But at the instigation of his son, refused to register the document and to withdraw the suit. Neither was done. Having accepted before the District Registrar that he signed the sale deed, it was not open to the respondent to go back on that. Only on his admission, the document was registered. The respondent was estopped. The suit itself was not maintainable against an order directing registration. The civil court had no jurisdiction to review the same. Possession was given to the appellant, but on the basis of the injunction obtained in O.S.No.607 of 1981, he was trying to interfere with the appellants possession. The well in the second item of the suit property was in a dilapidated condition. The price fixed for the suit property was correct and the suit was liable to be dismissed. 3. Possession was given to the appellant, but on the basis of the injunction obtained in O.S.No.607 of 1981, he was trying to interfere with the appellants possession. The well in the second item of the suit property was in a dilapidated condition. The price fixed for the suit property was correct and the suit was liable to be dismissed. 3. The other suit O.S.No.607 of 1981 was transferred to the Subordinate Judges Court, Madurai and renumbered as O.S.No.317 of 1983. The averments in the plaint in that suit are identical. The defence of the appellant is same. That suit is for declaration and injunction. 4. The learned Subordinate Judge on the basis of the pleadings, framed necessary issues in the two suits. There was a joint trial. Exs.A-1 to A-23 were marked on the side of the respondent. Respondent was the sole witness on his side. Exs.B-1 to B-5 were marked on the side of the appellant. The appellant besides examining himself as D.W.1, examined three other witnesses as D.Ws.2 to 4. Learned Subordinate Judge on an analysis of the oral and documentary evidence accepted the case of the appellant and rejected the case of the respondent and by his judgment dated 17. 1985 dismissed both the suits. 5. The appellant filed appeals A.S.No.102 of 1986 against the decision in O.S.No.105 of 1983 and A.S.No.103 of 1986 against the decision in O.S.No.317 of 1983 to the Principal District Judges Court, Madurai. The learned District Judge allowed appeal A.S.No.102 of 1986, set aside the dismissal of the suit in O.S.No.105 of 1983 and decreed it. So far as A.S.No.103 of 1986 against O.S.No.317 of 1983 was concerned, learned District Judge dismissed the appeal holding that the relief prayed for by the respondent had been granted in the other suit and therefore it was not necessary to grant the same relief and so holding he dismissed the appeal A.S.No.103 of 1986. As against the decision in A.S.No.102 of 1986, appellant has filed the present second appeal. 6. At the time of admission, the following substantial questions of law were framed for decision in the second appeal: .• (1) Is not the respondent/plaintiff estopped from questioning the genuineness of his signature when the same has been admitted before the District Registrar, Dindigul, on similar grounds. 6. At the time of admission, the following substantial questions of law were framed for decision in the second appeal: .• (1) Is not the respondent/plaintiff estopped from questioning the genuineness of his signature when the same has been admitted before the District Registrar, Dindigul, on similar grounds. .• (2) Whether the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit for declaration to set aside the validly passed orders of the District Registrar. .• (3) Whether the lower appellate court was right in setting aside the valid sale dated 212. 1981 under Ex.B-4. .7. Mr.V.Balasubramanian, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the respondent had admitted his having executed the document sale deed marked as Ex.B-4 before the District Registrar and the District Registrar having found on enquiry that the document had been validly executed, had directed registration and this question cannot be reopened by means of a suit in the civil court. Learned counsel further submitted that the respondent had admitted his having executed the document before the District Registrar and it was not open to him to plead the case of forgery before the civil court or to attempt to prove that the signatures in the sale deed were not his. Learned District Judge has proceeded on misconception in law and facts. He had relied on the opinion of handwriting expert and finding that the signatures in the sale deed were not the respondents 8. As against these contentions, Mr.T.M.Hariharan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent vehemently submitted that the respondent was an illiterate and the onus was entirely on the appellant to show that the sale deed had been executed by the respondent and this onus had not been properly discharged by the appellant and the lower appellate court as the final court of fact had found that the respondent had not executed the sale deed and sitting in second appeal this finding could not be interfered with or disturbed by this Court. 9. Learned counsel also submitted that the lower appellate court had accepted and acted upon the report of the finger print expert and found that the execution of Ex.B-4 had not been proved, that the appellants case regarding possession had been negatived on the conflicting pleas raised by him in the earlier and the later suits and the deposition of his witnesses, the infirmities in which had been discussed in detail. 10. 10. The trial court found that the respondent had not pleaded that he had poor eye sight nor did he put forward this defence before the District Registrar. Before the District Registrar, he accepted his signature in Ex.B-4, but before the court he disputed his having given such a deposition before the District Registrar. D.Ws.2 and 3, attestors to Ex.B-4 and D.W.4 scribe had spoken to the fact that the respondent alone gave details for the sale deed; that at the time of execution the appellant had the necessary amount; that it was only the respondent who postponed the registration saying he had some other urgent work on that day and he also demanded an extra amount of Rs.500 for completing the sale. The trial court also reasoned that the respondent had admitted that there was a panchayat after the filing of the suit; that he had been summoned for the panchayat when according to him he signed in blank white papers. So far as the non-withdrawal of the case as set out in the sale deed was concerned, the trial court observed that it was not material as registration had not taken place. Ultimately the trial court held that there was no reason to hold that the sale deed was not executed by the respondent notwithstanding some inconsistencies in the oral evidence of the defence. So far as the experts evidence was concerned; the trial court observed that it was only to assist the court and it was not conclusive particularly when the respondent himself had admitted his signature in Ex.B-4. On the valuation given and the price actually stated to have been paid by the appellant, the trial court was of the view that the two need not match each other, that in 1971 the respondent had purchased the properties for Rs.1,500 and in 1980-81 the price had been fixed at Rs.3,350 it was more than twice the value. The trial court further noticed that the respondent had mentioned two names Surulimalai and Singarajan as having been summoned for having talks before the Panchayat and these two persons had not been examined by the respondent. The trial court consequently dismissed the two suits. .11. The lower appellate court relied more on the improbability of the coming into existence of the agreement for sale Ex.B-3. The trial court consequently dismissed the two suits. .11. The lower appellate court relied more on the improbability of the coming into existence of the agreement for sale Ex.B-3. The lower appellate court also felt that under O.23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of agreed terms there could have been a compromise decree that the appellant had been merely taking time and filing written statement on 29. 1982; that Ex.B-3 recited that possession was given on that day while Ex.B-4 sale deed stated that possession was given on the date of sale and that the inconsistent versions could not be reconciled. The lower appellate court further observed that the appellant had given inconsistent versions with respect to his tenant Mahalingam. If really as claimed by the appellant possession of the property had been given to him on the date of Ex.B-3 namely 111. 1981 then in the proceedings before the criminal court the statement of Mahalingam to the effect that when he was drinking water from the respondents well the respondent referred to Mahalingams lower caste and made derogatory remarks may not be correct. In the plaint the respondent had stated that at the instigation of the appellant, Mahalingam had given the complaint and in the written statement the appellant had stated that it was not true to say that he instigated Mahalingam. However, in the evidence before the court the appellant had stated that Mahalingam was not his tenant. This inconsistency, according to the learned District Judge, was to get over the admission by Mahalingam that the second item of the suit properties belonged to the respondent. 12. As regards price, the lower appellate court found that in 1971 under Ex.A-12, the suit properties had been mortgaged to one Meenakshi Achi for Rs.3,000. That the price for the property in 1971 itself should have been thrice that amount namely Rs.9,000 and the appellant claiming to have purchased the property for Rs.3,350 was highly improbable. So far as the signatures in Ex.B-4 are concerned, the lower appellate court those to rely on the denial of the respondent as also opinion of the expert and his evidence to the effect that the signatures in Ex.B- 4 sale deed were different from the admitted signatures of the respondent. So far as the signatures in Ex.B-4 are concerned, the lower appellate court those to rely on the denial of the respondent as also opinion of the expert and his evidence to the effect that the signatures in Ex.B- 4 sale deed were different from the admitted signatures of the respondent. Learned District Judge also pointed out that there were several discrepancies in the oral evidence on the side of the appellant. Learned District Judge further observed that the respondent was an illiterate and the appellant had not discharged the onus of proof. Learned Judge also accepted the case of the respondent that he was made to sign certain papers on the representation that they were required for settling the case. The lower appellate court also referred to stamp papers of the agreement Ex.B-3 standing in somebody elses name for reaching the conclusion that the sale deed Ex.B-3 was concocted and ante dated. The lower appellate court has also relied on the judgment in Sayyapparaju Surayya v. Koduri Kondamma , (1949)2 MLJ. 684 and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Nagubai Ammal v. B.Shama Rao Nagubai Ammal v. B.Shama Rao Nagubai Ammal v. B.Shama Rao , A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 593 and also the decision of the Patna High Court in Rajendra Singh v. Ramganith Singh , A.I.R.1954 Pat. 556 for rejecting the case of the appellant and holding in favour of the respondent and decreeing the suit. 13. The Sub Registrar in the instant case refused to register the documents under Sec.73(1) of the Indian Registration Act (hereinafter referred to as “The Act”). The appellant applied to the District Registrar in order to establish his right to have the document registered. The procedure to be adopted is provided by Sec.74 of the Act. Sec.74 of the Act runs as follows: “ Procedure of Registrar on such application: In such case, and also where such denial as aforesaid is made before a Registrar in respect of a document presented for registration to him, the Registrar shall, as soon as conveniently may be, enquire… .(a) Whether the document had been executed; .(b) Whether the requirements of the law for the time being in force have been complied with on the part of the applicant or person presenting the document for registration, as the case may be so as to entitle the document to registration.” 14. The two criteria to be satisfied are: (1) Whether the document has been executed and (2) Whether the requirements of law have been complied with so as to entitle the document for registration. In the enquiry, the registrar should not only be satisfied that the part in question had signed the document, he should also come to the conclusion that the signature had been affixed by the party after understanding the contents and the terms of the documents. The Registrar should summon the witnesses required by the petitioner to prove execution. Under Sec.75 of the Act, if the Registrar finds that the document has been executed and that the requirements have been complied with he shall order the document to be registered. Now the question is what is execution. In Sayaparaju Surayya v. Koduri Kondamma Sayaparaju Surayya v. Koduri Kondamma Sayaparaju Surayya v. Koduri Kondamma , (1949)2 MLJ. 684 the facts are as follows: “Plaintiffs husband presented a document for registration. Registration was refused. Appeal to the District Registrar was dismissed. A suit was filed under Sec.77 of the Act. In that case, there was absence of thumb impression in the stamp papers which were five in number. Only Nishani (mark) was there. In the last sheet alone which was a brown paper the defendants thumb impression was found. In the recitals in the document the description of the property was repeated more than once in order to bring over the matter to the last page. There was only one attestor examined and the other attestor and the scribe were not examined. The evidence of attesting witness was found to be wholly interested and not worthy of credence. They accepted the finding of the subordinate Judge in that case that the refusal by the District Registrar to register the document was in order as it had not been proved that the document was executed by the excutant”. 15. As to what amounts to execution, the Bench referred to the judgment of the Privy Council in Puran Chand Nahatta v. Monmotho NathMukerjee Puran Chand Nahatta v. Monmotho NathMukerjee Puran Chand Nahatta v. Monmotho NathMukerjee, (1927)54 MLJ. 473: 55 I.A. 81: I.L.R. 55 Cal. 532 and after quoting the words of the Privy Council defined the expression persons executing vis-a-vis the expression person signing - the person executing enters into an obligation under the instrument. 473: 55 I.A. 81: I.L.R. 55 Cal. 532 and after quoting the words of the Privy Council defined the expression persons executing vis-a-vis the expression person signing - the person executing enters into an obligation under the instrument. The Bench observed that the admission of execution therefore must amount to an admission that the person admitting entered into obligation under the instrument; in other words that she had executed the document signed it as a sale deed, mortgage deed or a lease deed as the case may be. .16. The facts of the above case warranted a decision as to whether the plaintiff in that case had established that the defendant had executed the document attributed to her. On an enquiry, the District Registrar found that the document had not been executed by the defendant and refused registration. The facts in the present case are totally dissimilar. This is a case where the respondent admitted execution before the District Registrar. .17. It has been held in Ramamurthi v. Jayalakshmi Ammal , (1991)1 L.W. 391 as follows: .“The execution of a document is not mere signing of it. It is a solemn act of the executant who must own up the recitals in the instrument and there must be clear evidence that he put his signature in a document after knowing fully its contents. The executant of a document must, after fully understanding the contents and the tenor of the document, put his signature or affix his thumb impression. In other words, the execution of a document does not mean merely signing but signing by way of assent to the terms of the contract of alienation embodied in the document.” 18. On the material placed before him and as a result of his enquiry under Sec.75(1) of the Act, the District Registrar found that the document had been validly executed and it had to be accepted. In my view, it was not open to the court to go into the question as to the execution of the document, that the respondent was illiterate or that he did not know what he had signed. The Registrar was performing a solemn duty. The Registration did not depend on the executants consent but on the Registrars finding that the document had been executed. This is a case where the Registrar found that the person had admitted to his having executed the document. The Registrar was performing a solemn duty. The Registration did not depend on the executants consent but on the Registrars finding that the document had been executed. This is a case where the Registrar found that the person had admitted to his having executed the document. Only in suits arising under Sec.75, the court is concerned that whether the documents had been executed and whether the requirements of law etc., laid down in Sec.74 of the Act have been satisfied. In my view, the scope of the present suit should have been confined to the validity of the document and not to its due execution. Having admitted his execution, it was not open to the plaintiff to reopen the question as to due execution. The lower appellate court had conducted a roving enquiry into factum of execution of the sale deed. 19. This is a case where the decision of a Bench of this Court in Madhavakrishnan v. S.R.Sami Madhavakrishnan v. S.R.Sami Madhavakrishnan v. S.R.Sami , (1980)2 MLJ. 398 would come into play. It has been held in that case after referring to a couple of English decisions as follows: “The general rule of law is that a party of full age and understanding is normally bound by his signature to a document whether he reads it or understands it or not. Equity does not save people from the consequences of their own folly but will save them from being victimized by other people. But, if however, a party has been misled into executing a deed or signing a document essentially different from that which he intended to execute or sign, he can plead non est factum in an action against him and the deed or writing is completely void in whomsoever hands it may come. The doctrine of non est factum does not apply unless there is a misrepresentation inducing a mistaken belief as to the class or character of the supposed document and not a misrepresentation simply as to is contents. On the other hand, a mistake as to the contents of a deed or document is not sufficient.” In the present case the onus had been wrongly cast on the appellant to prove execution of the document. The execution was a matter of admission by the respondent and the District Registrar having found that the respondent had executed the document, directed registration. The execution was a matter of admission by the respondent and the District Registrar having found that the respondent had executed the document, directed registration. On this aspect nothing further remained. 20. When the respondent had admitted his signature in Ex.B-4 it was an unnecessary exercise to have even referred to the experts opinion which was to the effect that the signatures in Ex.B-4 were not those of the respondent. It was not open to the lower appellate court to have relied on the experts opinion in the context of the present case. No doubt, it is true that the Registering Officers finding under Sec.74 of the Act as to the due execution of the document is not that of a competent court but only of an Executive Officer invested with a quasi judicial function and that cannot bar a suit under Sec.31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 for the cancellation of the document. 21. Eventhe Patna High Courts decision in Rajendra Singh v. Ram Ganith Singh Rajendra Singh v. Ram Ganith Singh Rajendra Singh v. Ram Ganith Singh , A.I.R. 1954 Pat. 556 talks about execution as consisting of signing a document written out, read over and understood and it does not consist in merely signing a name upon a blank sheet of paper. The lower appellate court clearly erred in letting its approach clouded by the improbability of Ex.B-3 agreement coming into existence. 22. In my view some sanctity must be attached to the duty performed by the District Registrar. This should be particularly so when only against an order of refusal by the District Registrar to register a document, a suit to set it aside or for a direction to the Registrar to register the document, is provided under Sec.77 of the Act. So far as direction for registration is concerned, the civil court is not expressly given powers under the Act to adjudicate upon what the Registrar has done. In Sec.31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1863, a provision for cancellation of a written instrument by the civil court is given to have the written instrument adjudged void or voidable at the instance of the person aggrieved. Even here, it is not specifically mentioned that a document which had been accepted as having been duly executed by the Registrar could be reopened on the ground that there was no execution. Even here, it is not specifically mentioned that a document which had been accepted as having been duly executed by the Registrar could be reopened on the ground that there was no execution. It is only under these circumstances I am inclined to take the view that some sanctity should be attached to the registration ordered by the District Registrar. The District Registrar exercised quasi judicial functions while examining the question whether the document had been executed. This can be looked at from another point of view also. Sec.114, Illustration (e) of the Evidence Act enjoins the Courts to presume certain judicial and official acts as having been regularly performed. The District Registrar in the instant case was exercising quasi-judicial functions and it must be held that he had done it properly and that he had reqularly performed it. Unless it is established that he had not performed his judicial or Official Act regularly, the position regarding due execution of the document should be held to be final. 23. Inthe instant case, it has not been shown by the respondent, that the District Registrar did not perform his functions properly by adducing any acceptable evidence. His case was that he signed some white papers in the Panchayat. He also mentioned the names of two persons Surulimalai and Singaraj as having been summoned to talk before the Panchayat but he did not choose to examine them in the proceedings. Thus the onus of proof has not been discharged for discrediting Ex.B-4 sale deed. It has therefore to be held that Sec.84 is a document validly executed. 24. The next question will be whether, the respondent would be entitled to say that he had been forced to sign Ex.B-4 sale deed. The circumstances relied upon by the lower appellate court for discrediting Ex.B-4 are that in 1971 the suit property had been mortgaged to one Meenakshi Achi for Rs.3,000 and the alleged agreement between the parties for selling the property by the respondent to the appellant for Rs.3,350 could not be true and was highly improbable. On the other hand, the trial court has observed that in 1971 the respondent had purchased the property for Rs.1,500 and 10 years therefrom in 1980-81, the price had been fixed at Rs.3,350 more than twice the price for which the respondent bought the property in 1971. On the other hand, the trial court has observed that in 1971 the respondent had purchased the property for Rs.1,500 and 10 years therefrom in 1980-81, the price had been fixed at Rs.3,350 more than twice the price for which the respondent bought the property in 1971. The trial court was perfectly justified in holding that the price fixed at Rs.3,350 as reasonable. When the parties had agreed. On the price and the respondent had executed the sale deed, in my view it was not open to the respondent to rely on the alleged unfairness in the price. The onus of proof was entirely on the respondent and he had not discharged the same. The respondent has not established that there was any misrepresentation inducing mistaken belief in him as to the class or character of the supposed document. The respondent had no consistent stand with regard to the signatures in Ex.B-4. His stand was that he was summoned by the District Registrar, that the recitals in the document were concealed from his sight and only portions containing his signatures were shown and he had to admit the signatures. However, when he had admitted his signature, there was no question of the District Registrar entertaining any application for comparison of his admitted signature with his signature in the sale agreement and the sale deed. The whole exercise in having the assistance of a hand-writing expert was totally uncalled for and the lower appellate court clearly erred in making comparison of signatures admitted by the respondent to be his signatures with certain other undisputed signatures of the respondent and concluding that the signatures in the sale deed were not the signatures of the respondent particularly when the respondent had admitted his signatures in the sale deed. It is not the case of the respondent that he signed the sale deed on any misrepresentation. When once we find that it was not open to the respondent to dispute his signatures in Ex.B-4 sale deed in view of the other finding regarding the adequacy of the sale price the lower appellate court clearly erred in reversing the decision of the trial court. Consequently the first substantial question of law raised is answered in favour of the appellant and against the respondent. Consequently the first substantial question of law raised is answered in favour of the appellant and against the respondent. As far as the second substantial question of law regarding jurisdiction of the civil court is concerned, it is not necessary to give a finding. The third substantial question of law is answered in favour of the appellant. The second appeal shall stand allowed. No costs. It is represented by Mr.T.M.Hariharan, learned counsel for the respondent, that in spite of his several letters and telegrams to his party, there has been no response to the offer of Rs.25,000 made on behalf of the appellant in full quits of the claim between the parties. This is recorded. In case, at any future point of time, the respondent shows any willingness to receive the amount in full satisfaction, the appellant will oblige him by paying the amount and it is also open to the parties to further negotiate and arrive at any increase in the amount. The second appeal shall, stand allowed. No costs.