Judgment : Defendant in O.S.No.435 of 1984 on the file of First Additional Sub Court, Madurai is the revision petitioner. 2. An ex parte decree was obtained by plaintiff directing defendant to execute sale deed in favour of plaintiff. Though attempt was made to have the ex parte decree set aside, the same was not successful. The decree became final. 3. As per the decree dated 3. 1986, two months time for depositing the balance sale consideration was given. The same was not deposited, and hence plaintiff moved I.A.No.361 of 1990 to extend the time under Sec.148 of Code of Civil Procedure. It was stated in that application that even though there was direction to deposit the balance sale consideration within two months since the defendant moved an application under O.9, Rule 13 petition to have the decree set aside, he was under the bona fide belief that he need deposit the amount only on finalisation of that proceedings. It is also said that the said application was allowed on terms and finally it was dismissed only because petitioner herein did not comply with the terms. The finality was reached only when defendants application was finally dismissed. The amount has been deposited within reasonable time thereafter. He wanted extension of time till the date of deposit. 4. The said application was seriously opposed by petitioner and by the impugned order lower court overruled the objection and allowed extension of time. 5. I heard the counsel on both sides. 6. In Ramankutty Guptan v. Avara Ramankutty Guptan v. Avara Ramankutty Guptan v. Avara (1994) 2 S.C.C. 642 the amount was deposited while second appeal was pending and even no application was filed for extension of time. Even though deposit was not made in terms of trial court decree, Honourable Supreme Court did not interfere with the discretion exercised by the lower court. In that case their Lordships have held that if application is filed under Sec.28(1) of the Specific Relief Act, the court can exercise discretion as to whether to allow extension or to rescind the contract. 7. In Sardar Mohar Singh v. Mangilal (1997)9 S.C.C. 217 their Lordships have held that principle of Sec.5 of Limitation Act has no application while seeking extension of time under Sec.148 of Code of Civil Procedure. In paragraphs 3 and 4 of the judgment, their Lordships have held thus: “3. 7. In Sardar Mohar Singh v. Mangilal (1997)9 S.C.C. 217 their Lordships have held that principle of Sec.5 of Limitation Act has no application while seeking extension of time under Sec.148 of Code of Civil Procedure. In paragraphs 3 and 4 of the judgment, their Lordships have held thus: “3. Shri. R.S.Suri, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that in view of the inordinate delay of 7 1/2 years in making the application and in view of the finding given by the executing court that no proper explanation was given by the respondent for the delay, the execution court as well as the High Court committed an error of law in directing extension of time there being no proper explanation. The High Court also was wrong in its conclusion that the decree can be treated to be a preliminary decree and, therefore, the direction can be granted in the final decree. It is also contended that the court has no power to extend time. We do not find force in any of these contentions. It is seen that Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short” the Act“) gives right to the judgment-debtor to file an application to rescind the contract. It reads as under: ”28(1) Where in any suit a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property has been made and the purchaser or lessee does not, within the period allowed by the decree or such further period as the court may allow, pay the purchase money or other sum which the court has ordered him to pay, the vendor or lessor may apply in the same suit in which the decree is made, to have the contract rescinded and on such application the court may, by order, rescind the contract either so far as regards the party in default or altogether as the justice of the case may require.“ 4. From the language of Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.28, it could be seen that the court does not lose its jurisdiction after the grant of the decree for specific performance nor it becomes functus officio. From the language of Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.28, it could be seen that the court does not lose its jurisdiction after the grant of the decree for specific performance nor it becomes functus officio. The very fact that Sec.28 itself gives power to grant order of rescission of the decree would indicate that till the sale deed is executed in execution of the decree, the trial court retains its power and jurisdiction to deal with the decree of specific performance. It would also be clear that the court has power to enlarge the time in favour of the judgment-debtor to pay the amount or to perform the conditions mentioned in the decree for specific performance, in spite of an application for rescission of the decree having been filed by the judgment-debtor and rejected. In other words, the court has the discretion to extend time for compliance of the conditional decree as mentioned in the decree for specific performance. It is true that the respondent had not given satisfactory explanation of every days delay. It is not, unlike Sec.5 of the Limitation Act, an application for condonation of delay. It is one for extension of time. Under these circumstances, the executing court as well as the High Court had exercised discretion and extended the time to comply with the conditional decree. Accordingly, we do not find any valid and justifiable reason to interfere with the order passed by the High Court confirming the order of the executing court when in particular, the High Court has further enhanced a sum of Rs.16,000 to compensate the petitioner for loss of enjoyment of the money. The said amount is given to the respondent in a sum of Rs.16,000 rightly for the reason that parties contracted for non-performance of the contract. They quantified the damages at Rs.2,000 for 8 years. The court has given Rs.16,000 obviously in terms of the contract. “ [Italics supplied] 8. A similar view was also taken in the decision reported in Md.Alimuddin v. Waizuddin Md.Alimuddin v. Waizuddin Md.Alimuddin v. Waizuddin (1998)9 S.C.C. 108 . 9. They quantified the damages at Rs.2,000 for 8 years. The court has given Rs.16,000 obviously in terms of the contract. “ [Italics supplied] 8. A similar view was also taken in the decision reported in Md.Alimuddin v. Waizuddin Md.Alimuddin v. Waizuddin Md.Alimuddin v. Waizuddin (1998)9 S.C.C. 108 . 9. In the very recent decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in V.S.Palanichamy Chettiar Firm v. C.Alagappan V.S.Palanichamy Chettiar Firm v. C.Alagappan V.S.Palanichamy Chettiar Firm v. C.Alagappan (1999)4 S.C.C. 702 in para.17 of the judgment their Lordships have held thus: ”…Merely because a suit is filed within the prescribed period of limitation does not absolve the vendee-Plaintiff from showing as to whether he was ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement and if there was non-performance, was that on account of any obstacle put by the vendor or otherwise. Provisions to grant specific performance of an agreement are quite stringent. Equitable considerations come into play. The court has to see all the attendant circumstances including if the vendee has conducted himself in a reasonable manner under the contract of sale. That being the position of law for filing the suit for specific performance, can the court, as a matter of course, allow extension of time for making payment of balance amount of consideration in terms of a decree after 5 years of passing of the decree by the trial court and 3 years of its confirmation by the appellate court. It is not the case of the respondent decree-holders that on account of any fault on the part of the vendor judgment-debtor, the amount could not be deposited as per the decree. That being the position, if now time is granted, that would be going beyond the period of limitation prescribed for filing of the suit for specific performance of the agreement though this provision may not be strictly applicable. It is nevertheless an important circumstance to be considered by the court. That apart, no explanation whatsoever is coming from the respondent decree-holders as to why they did not pay the balance amount of consideration as per the decree except what the High Court itself thought fit to comment which is certainly not borne out from the record. Equity demands that discretion be not exercised in favour of the respondent decree-holders and no extension of time be granted to them to comply with the decree. Equity demands that discretion be not exercised in favour of the respondent decree-holders and no extension of time be granted to them to comply with the decree. “ [Italics supplied] 10. Taking into consideration the law stated above, I do not think that any interference is called for in this revision petition. It is settled law that court got power to extend the time. In this case petitioner himself moved an application to have the decree set aside as I.A.No.230 of 1986. In fact, that application was allowed on terms. Petitioner was directed to deposit cost within a particular time as condition precedent for allowing that application. Only because petitioner did not comply with the terms, his application happened to be dismissed. Within a reasonable time after disposal of their application, present application was filed for extension of time. When respondent says that he was under bona fide belief that deposit need be made after disposal of setting aside the application and court also found that there are reasons to set aside the decree though on terms, it cannot be said that there is no sufficient cause for extension of time. Lower court is therefore justified in allowing the application. 11. In the result, the revision petition is without any merit and the same is dismissed. No costs.