Judgment : The tenant in R.C.O.P.No.3 of 1998 on the file of the Rent Controller, District Munsif Court, Sivagiri is the revision petitioner. The petition was filed on 21. 1993 and renumbered as R.C.O.P.No.3 of 1998. The landlord sought eviction of the tenant on the ground that the schedule building which is non-residential in nature is required for bona fide occupation of his son who is a Medical Practitioner. The landlord son has completed his medical education and has to conduct a clinic in the scheduled premises. .2. Thereafter an amendment application was filed seeking eviction on the ground that the tenant had defaulted in paying the rent. After taking evidence the Rent Controller held that the landlord is not entitled to get possession on the ground that his son requires the scheduled premises for his own occupation. The reason for holding the claim is not bona fide was at the time when the landlord was examined he stated that his son is employed at Ajmeer and is residing there with his family. In regard to the claim for eviction on the ground of default in the payment of rent, the Rent Controller held that even though such a claim was made by the landlord in the notice itself, the non-payment for years together will an amount to wilful default though the same was not a ground for eviction initially. It is further found by the rend controller that amendment application was filed in the year 1997 and even at that time the tenant did not tender rent and the amount was deposited only one year after. Hence the Rent Controller held that the tenant was indefault in paying the rent and the same is wilful. Eviction is ordered. 3. Against the order the tenant filed C.C.A.No.18 of 1998 on the file of Rent Control Appellate Authority, principal Sub-Court, Tenkasi, The appellate authority also confirmed the finding of the Rent Controller that the tenant is liable to be evicted on the ground of willful default. Before the appellate authority the landlord filed an application to receive additional evidence and contended that he is entitled to eviction on the ground of bona fide occupation also. The additional evidence was proceedings of the Government whereby the resignation of petitioners son was accepted by the Government. Before the appellate authority the landlord filed an application to receive additional evidence and contended that he is entitled to eviction on the ground of bona fide occupation also. The additional evidence was proceedings of the Government whereby the resignation of petitioners son was accepted by the Government. Argument was taken by the appellate authority that in view of the subsequent event, the disqualification for getting eviction for own occupation is now removed and his son has now ceased to be a Government servant therefore he requires the scheduled building for his occupation i.e., for conducting the clinic in the scheduled premises. The additional evidence was accepted and the appellate authority held that the landlord is entitled to get eviction on the ground of bona fide own occupation also. 4. The said findings are challenged in this revision under Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act of 1960 .5. Even though the power under Sec.25 of the Rent control Act is more than Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, still this Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence as if it is a second court of first appeal. If the view expressed by the authorities below are reasonable and such a view is also possible on the available materials, simply because another view can be taken will not be a ground for interference under Sec.25 of the Act. If the authorities below have taken into consideration all relevant materials and has also followed settled legal principles as uninitiated by the Supreme Court or by this Court, then the revisional powers are not to be exercised. 6. With this limitation in power under Sec.25, I had to consider whether the decision of the authorities below is in any way irregular, improper or illegal under Sec.25 of the Act. 7. Landlord claimed eviction on the ground that his son requires the schedule building for his own occupation, he wants to conduct a clinic he being a qualified medical practitioner. 8. It is admitted on both sides the son is not having any non-residential building of his own and he is depending on his father for getting an accommodation for the said purpose. 8. It is admitted on both sides the son is not having any non-residential building of his own and he is depending on his father for getting an accommodation for the said purpose. When the landlord feels that his son must be provided with an accommodation for running a clinic, the said requirement can never be termed as lacking any good faith merely because the tenant takes contention that there is no good faith in the contention. When the landlord comes and states before court that his son who is a medical practitioner wants to run a clinic and also satisfy the statutory grounds the court can presume that the claim is made bona fide. 9. The Rent Controller dismissed that application only on the ground that the son has got employed in Rajasthan during the period. As I said earlier eviction petition was filed on 21. 1993. At that time, petitioners son has already qualified as a Medical practitioner and thereafter he joined the Diploma Course in Psychiatry Medicine at Madras. He joined for the diploma course only in August, 1993 and the same was completed in August, 1995. The petition which was initiated in January, 1993 did not see the light of the day till 11. 1998. Therefore the landlords son thought of getting some employment and he got employment in the Railways and also got employment as a Railway doctor. Merely because the son got employment during the course of proceedings or that he want to have the P.G. course also during that time, cannot be taken to conclude that the building is not required for the occupation of the petitioners son. His bona fide is now proved whereby that immediately after the decision of the Rent Controller his son resigned his job and is now without any employment. It is also clear from the above conduct of the landlords son that his post-graduate education during 1993 August and thereafter taking an employment was only temporary and that his intention was to conduct a clinic in the schedule premises. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Ramkubai (Smt) deceased by Lrs. v. Hajmimal Dhokalchand Chandak Ramkubai (Smt) deceased by Lrs. v. Hajmimal Dhokalchand Chandak Ramkubai (Smt) deceased by Lrs. v. Hajmimal Dhokalchand Chandak , (1999)6 S.C.C. 540 the same question came for consideration. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Ramkubai (Smt) deceased by Lrs. v. Hajmimal Dhokalchand Chandak Ramkubai (Smt) deceased by Lrs. v. Hajmimal Dhokalchand Chandak Ramkubai (Smt) deceased by Lrs. v. Hajmimal Dhokalchand Chandak , (1999)6 S.C.C. 540 the same question came for consideration. There also the building was sought to be evicted for the requirement of landlord son who was not employed at the time when the eviction petition was filed. In view of the pendency the litigation the son got employment as a contractor in a construction field. In view of his employment as a contractor the Rent Controller as well as the Hon’ble High Court held that the requirement pleaded has ceased to exist or has not bona fide. This finding of the authority below was set aside by the decision of the Supreme Court. In paragraph 10 His Lordship has held that: “The second reason given by the appellate court is that at the time of filing of petition the son of the landlady was unemployed but later on he started working as a contractor in a construction field, so he did not really want to run a kirana shop in the suit premises. The appellate court was of the view that had he really intended to take up kirana business he would not have started a business like that of a contractor. The third reason given by him is that the landlady was a partner, after the death of her husband, in the kirana business run her husbands brother. It was also noted that another son of the landlady is in possession of another shop and doing kirana business and thus the family is engaged in doing kirana business in two shops and if Bhikchand wanted to do kirance business he could have joined the existing business. From this the appellate court concluded that the landlady did not require the suit premises for establishing Bhikchand in kirana business. The learned counsel for the respondents strongly supported these reasons. It is correct that Bhikchand was unemployed on the date of filing of the suit but he could not be expected to idle away the time by remaining unemployed till the case is finally decided. It has already taken about 25 years. The learned counsel for the respondents strongly supported these reasons. It is correct that Bhikchand was unemployed on the date of filing of the suit but he could not be expected to idle away the time by remaining unemployed till the case is finally decided. It has already taken about 25 years. Therefore, we do not think that taking up contractor work, in the meanwhile, will militate against his carrying on the business of kirana which is his family business, which was carried on by his father and is being carried on by his brother independently. The facts that the landlady during her lifetime was a partner in the firm carrying on Kirana business and her elder son is carrying on kirana business do not disentitle Bhikchand to establish his own business. We are not impressed by the other reasoning and conclusion of the appellate court which are confirmed by the High Court. In our view, none of the reasons leads to the inference that Bhikchand did not intend to start the family kirana business, so relief cannot be denied to the landlady to recover the suit premises for personal requirement of Bhikchand to establish kirana business independently.” In fact the Rent Controller order was not correct and the same was corrected by the appellate authority. The additional evidence let in was only to show that the claim still subsists and the same is made with bona fide. The appellate authority accepted the additional evidence and held that the claim of the landlord is bona fide. 10. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submits that there is no evidence to show that his son his going to start a clinic though he has resigned. I do not find any merit in the submission. The landlord is none other than the father of the medical practitioner and it is for his requirements, the building is sought to be evicted. It can be assumed that the landlord knows the requirement of his son and it can be presumed that only on the basis of the requests of the son, the landlord should have made an application. If the son is not requiring the schedule premises he need not have resigned the job and he has also need not have insisted for the landlord to produce the acceptance of resignation letter by the authorities before the appellate authority. If the son is not requiring the schedule premises he need not have resigned the job and he has also need not have insisted for the landlord to produce the acceptance of resignation letter by the authorities before the appellate authority. The very fact that the landlord was in a position to produce the order of the Government accepting the resignation shows that his son has forwarded the same to produce in court so that he can make use of the building for running a clinic. The order of the appellate authority is therefore correct. 11. The other ground for eviction is default in payment of rent. .12. The landlord admitted that till the month of Aani in 1993 rent was paid and thereafter the rent was defaulted. By virtue of the amendment, the landlord contended that from July, 1993 rent has not been paid. As against the said contention, the revision petitioner alleged the rent was being paid to the agent of the landlord and he has received rent till May, 1993. The agent instructed to send the amount of rent directly to the landlord and based on that instruction money order was sent to the landlord directly which was refused to be accepted by him. It is also contended that when eviction petition was filed no claim was made to get eviction on the ground of default in the payment of rent. Since the landlord himself has refused to accept rent, he cannot be termed as a wilful defaulter. 13. It is true that when eviction petition was filed in 1993, there was no claim for eviction that the tenant was a willful defaulter. On that date i.e., on 21. 1993 the landlord also did not have a cause of action to claim eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent. it is admitted that till June, 1993 the rent is paid. There is no cause of action for the landlord to initiate proceedings for eviction on the ground of willful default. 14. An amendment application was filed in the year 1997 seeking eviction on the ground of wilful default. The application was filed as I.A.No.25 of 1986 and allowed on 11. 1997. In that amendment eviction is claimed that tenant has defaulted in payment of rent from July, 1993. 14. An amendment application was filed in the year 1997 seeking eviction on the ground of wilful default. The application was filed as I.A.No.25 of 1986 and allowed on 11. 1997. In that amendment eviction is claimed that tenant has defaulted in payment of rent from July, 1993. Even though an amendment application was filed in 1996 no attempt was made by the tenant to pay rent. The amendment was allowed on 19. 1997. Even then the tenant did not think of performing his contractual as well statutory obligations. Only when the matter came for trial the tenant thought of a depositing the amount in court. From the conduct of tenant it is clear that the tenant did not want to pay rent. .15. It is true that the landlord did not receive the rent when the same was sent by money order. Merely because the landlord refused to receive the rent for one month that does not follow the tenant need not perform his statutory obligations. According to him, amount has been deposited in a bank in his own name. He only showed his readiness to deposit the amount without actual tender. If the landlord has refused to accept rent, the tenant is entitled to invoke the provisions of Sec.8 of the Rent Control Act and could have deposited the amount in court. He could have asked the landlord to name the Bank in which the amount is to be deposited and if still landlord is not cooperating with him, he could have filed an application under Sec.8(5) of the Act and sought permission of the Rent controller in depositing the amount in court. He also could have moved an application before the Rent Controller while eviction proceedings are pending seeking permission to deposit. He also could have afforded this amount to the counsel for the landlord before the Rent Controller. The reason for refusing to receive the rent sent by M.O. is refusal is the pendency of rent control petition. 16. It is to overcome the laches on the part of the tenant the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the amendment application should not have been allowed. The argument is Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to allow the amendment. 17. I do not find any merit in the submission, In the decision reported in G.Jayapandian v. P.C.Manickam G.Jayapandian v. P.C.Manickam G.Jayapandian v. P.C.Manickam , (1996)1 MLJ. The argument is Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to allow the amendment. 17. I do not find any merit in the submission, In the decision reported in G.Jayapandian v. P.C.Manickam G.Jayapandian v. P.C.Manickam G.Jayapandian v. P.C.Manickam , (1996)1 MLJ. 350 . I had an occasion to consider the same question and I have held that the Rent Controller has jurisdiction to allow amendment. In the decision I have held: “When an Act or Rule confer certain powers on the authorities concerned, it does not follow that those are the only powers that could be exercised by them. It cannot be expected that the powers exercised by the tribunals (like the Rent Controller) should always be enumerated. All future contingencies cannot be exhausted while drafting a statute or rule. It is in that view, we have to consider whether a tribunal can exercise a power which is not specifically excluded. When a tribunal is more or less a court and is discharging judicial functions, even though it is a creature of a statute, unless it is specifically prohibited, we have to presume that the tribunal also will have the same powers as a court and it can discharge those functions as well.” The same view is also expressed by my learned brother judge S.M.Abdul Wahab in the decision reported in S.Venkatachalam v. M.Sambamurthy S.Venkatachalam v. M.Sambamurthy S.Venkatachalam v. M.Sambamurthy , (1997)2 MLJ. 426 . 18. Even without amendment, the court can take note or subsequent events could be seen from the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in P.Sriramamurthy v. Mrs.Vasantha Raman P.Sriramamurthy v. Mrs.Vasantha Raman P.Sriramamurthy v. Mrs.Vasantha Raman , (1997)2 MLJ. (S.C.) 46. In this case eviction was sought on the ground of wilful default and the different user. During the pendency of the appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court the landlord wanted the building for personal requirement which is not even pleaded. The Hon’ble Supreme Court took note of subsequent events and directed the tenant to surrender vacant possession. Their Lordships held that the court can mould the reliefs taking into consideration the subsequent events. 19. In view of the settled legal position, I do not think that any ground is made out for interference under Sec.25 of the Rent Control Act. Consequently C.R.P. is dismissed, however without any order as to costs. C.M.P.No.19851 of 1999 is also dismissed.