Judgment :- 1. The landlords are the revision petitioners. They sought the eviction of the respondent/tenant under Section 14 (l)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, for demolition and reconstruction. 2. The contents of the petition are as follows: The property belongs to the petitioners, is of an extent of 22 grounds 1000 sq.ft. of land with a main building consisting of ground floor and first floor, servant quarters-cum-garage, watchmans quarters; comprised in Rs.No. 126/3 & 14 in Block No. 21 Nungambakkam. It is situate 150 ft. from Nungambakkam High Road. The property was let out to the respondent on a monthly rental of Rs.5,750, and the respondent is running a school mainly for the expatriates in the premises. There was an earlier petition filed in R.C.O.P.No.844of 1982 by the revision petitions for fixation of fair rent at s.26,356 per month. The authorities fixed the fair rent at Rs. 19,897.60 with effect from 16.2.1982. At the time of filing the R.C.O.P. the matter was pending in C.R.P. No. 5082 of 1983 in this Court. The property is situate in a residential-cum-commercial locality. In and around the petition premises multi-storeyed buildings have come up. The petitioners in order to cope-up with the development in the area and to have better utilization and better income, and considering the location and extent of the property have decided to put-up multi-storeyed buildings in the property. They sent a letter on 6.3.88 calling upon the respondent herein to deliver vacant possession of the premises by the expiry of 31.4.1988. The letter was acknowledged by the respondent on 30.3.1988.There was no reply sent nor was the demand complied with. The petitioners bonafide require the premises for the purpose of developing the property by erecting his Product is Licensed to multi-storeyed superstructures by demolishing the present structures. They have the necessary wherewithal to finance the construction of the proposed multi storeyed buildings in the property. The eviction of the respondent is therefore sought. 3. The respondent filed a counter to the following effects the petition has been filed because of a misunderstanding between the previous chair person and the first petitioner. The allegation that there are multi-storeyed buildings around the petition premises is false. The eviction of the respondent is therefore sought. 3. The respondent filed a counter to the following effects the petition has been filed because of a misunderstanding between the previous chair person and the first petitioner. The allegation that there are multi-storeyed buildings around the petition premises is false. It is also not stated in the petition that the petitioners have means to put up the building, that they cannot let in evidence to fill up the lacuna. They have not even said that they have applied for demolition and reconstruction. Therefore the requirement is not bonafide. The maintenance of the building is done by the respondent. Ever since the commencement of the tenancy, the petitioners never came forward for the maintenance of the building and respondent/school itself had been maintaining and colour washing every year and even as and when necessary and the same is in good condition. The notice sent by the petitioners had been misplaced and that was why reply could not be sent. The building itself had been leased- out for running a school and it cannot be converted into a multi-storeyed building. There are about 500 students studying in the school and if eviction is ordered, the respondent and the students would be put to much hardship. 4. The second petitioner and one Selvarajan were examined as P.Ws.l and 2 and Exs.P.l to P.20 were marked on their side. On the side of the of respondent one Swaminathan was examined as R.W.1 and one Srinivasan as R.W.2. The respondent has marked Exs.R.l to R.4. 5. The learned X Small Causes Judge (Rent Controller), Chennai, framed the necessary points for consideration and held that the requirement of the petitioners was not bona fide, that they had not taken any steps for getting any plan approved by the authorities concerned that serious hardship would be caused to the respondent if eviction was to be ordered. The Rent Controller also found that the application for eviction had not been filed on the ground that the building was in a dilapidated condition, and that therefore the petitioners were not entitled to an order of eviction. 6. The appeal filed by the petitioners in the R.C.A.No.386 of 1992 was dismissed by the IV Small Causes Judge (Appellate Authority), Chennai, on 22.4.1994 confirming the decision of the Rent Controller. As against this, the present C.R.P. has been filed. 7. 6. The appeal filed by the petitioners in the R.C.A.No.386 of 1992 was dismissed by the IV Small Causes Judge (Appellate Authority), Chennai, on 22.4.1994 confirming the decision of the Rent Controller. As against this, the present C.R.P. has been filed. 7. Mr.T.R.Rajagopalan, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for Mr. Balachander for revision petitioners, submitted that the property in question is a very substantial property, that the petitioners are entitled to utilise the property for better returns, that the case of the respondent that there are no multi-storeyed buildings around the petition premises is not true, that the respondent has not established that there is some oblique motive for seeking the eviction of the respondent, and that plan and permit are not immediately necessary for the purpose of seeking eviction under Section 14(1) (b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to The Act). The learned Additional Advocate General further submitted that the case under Section 14 (1)(b) of the Act had been clearly made out and the petitioners are entitled to an order of eviction. He also relied on the following decisions in support of his submissions (1) Vijay Singh v. Vijayalakshmi Ammal, 1996 (II) CTC 586 : 1996 (6) SCC 475 . (2) A. Lakshmanan v. Kanniammal @ Pattammal, 1995 (1) L.W. 632 . (3) S.P. Sabura Begum v. M.K. Thangavelu, 1997 (I) CTC 95 (4) National Studios Etc., v. Prema Kalyanasun-daram, 1997 (3) LW 269 (5) Md. Gani v. S. Rathanavel, 1994 (2) LW 472 and (6) A.S. ShaikFathima v. Omer Cloth Strores, 1985 (98) LW 311 . 8. Per contra, Mr. S.B.S. Raman, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the authorities below have rejected the case of the revision petitioners on grounds other than set down in P.Orr & Sons case, 1992 (2) LW 547 that the revision petitioners have not shown their means and the returns filed by them only show their rental income, that as regards location there is vital admission by P.W.I that there are no proper pleadings taken, that according to P.W.I the petitioners want to put up 1 + 3 for which as per the rules and regulations there would not be any frontage. The learned counsel further submitted that in every one of the decisions, relating to Section 14(1)(b) of the Act, there is a finding that the building is old. The learned counsel further submitted that in every one of the decisions, relating to Section 14(1)(b) of the Act, there is a finding that the building is old. The learned counsel also submitted that the requirement of finding, regarding age and condition of the building, has not been negatived by Vijay Singhs case, 1996 (6) SCC 475 . He also relied on the following judgments - (1) S.Raju v. K. Nathamani, 1998 (3) L.W. 214, (2) S.P.Sabura Begum v. M.K.This Thangavelu, 1997 (l) CTC 95 and (3) S.Kuttappan (Died) v. Civil Advocates Clerks Association Rep. by its President, 1998 (1) MLJ 260. 9. The learned Additional Advocate General in reply submitted that the earlier proceedings for fixation of fair rent, would clearly show that the building is in a dangerous condition and requires demolition and reconstruction. In support, the learned Additional Advocate General relied on Exs.P.15andP.18. 10. It is necessary to refer to the earlier proceedings for fixation of fair rent. In those proceedings the petitioners herein contended that the building was fifty years old. While the Engineer, examined on the side of the respondents/tenant, in his report stated that the building was more than sixty years old and in the oral evidence he has stated that it was more than seventy years old. The authorities fixed the age of the building at fifty years in the year 1982 when the petition for fixation of fair rent, was filed. Ex.P.16 is the Judgment of the Appellate Authority in the fair rent proceedings. The Appellate Authority has concluded that there was some evidence to show that the building was put up in the year 1931 or 1932. If that is taken as the year of construction, the present age of the building is 68 years. Ex.P.15 is the summary of evidence in the previous proceedings, as regards the condition of the building the Engineer has mentioned about it. In the report, he has spoken about the cracks in the wall at the terrace in several places, and the report of the Engineer is Ex.P.17. The tenant itself had written about it in Ex.P.18 dt.21.3.88. It will be necessary to extract the contents of Ex.P.18. It is from the Honorary Secretary of the Management Committee of the respondent/school addressed to the first petitioner. The tenant itself had written about it in Ex.P.18 dt.21.3.88. It will be necessary to extract the contents of Ex.P.18. It is from the Honorary Secretary of the Management Committee of the respondent/school addressed to the first petitioner. It runs as follows: "I, wrote to you on the 20th January regarding the repairs to, and exterior re-decoration of, the property housing Harrington House School. A copy of my letter As we have received no reply to our request we propose to proceed with the re-decoration and repairs, the cost of which will be deducted from rent due, if we do not hear from you within 30 days of the date of this letter. Furthermore it is imperative that the repairs to the verandah of the above mentioned property are undertaken without further delay as the said verandah is now in a dangerous state of disrepair." From the above, it is not difficult to conclude that the building satisfies the requirements for demolition and reconstruction on the respondents own showing. 11. It is contended by Mr. Raman learned counsel for the respondent, that there are no pleadings and in the absence of pleadings no relief whatsoever can be granted. In support of his contention he relies on a judgment reported in Vimal Aammal v. C. Suseela, 1990 (2) MLJ 127 . In that case Hadi, J has held following the earlier decisions that no amount of evidence can be looked into on a plea which was never put forward. 12. In Madavan v. Kannammalm, 1989 (1) MLJ 136 : 1992 (2) LW 274 Srinivasan, J. as the Learned Judge then was has stated the principle as follows:- " The principle that it is not open to a plaintiff to abandon his own case and claim relief on the basis of the defendants case can be invoked only in cases where the plaintiff having failed to prove the case with which he approached the court seeks to rely on the pleading of the defendant to secure a relief and not to cases where the plaintiff prays for relief on the basis of facts established by the record in the case though they are at variance with his pleading........... It cannot be disputed that courts of law have the power to grant decrees which would be warranted by the facts of the case when such facts have been established by indisputable records even if they were not exactly pleaded by the parties." 13. Hadi, J, in Rajeswari v. Dhanammal, 1994 (1) MLJ 401 has referred to this principle and followed the same and has observed as follows:- "there is no bar for granting relief based on the said evidence (and not the pleading) of the other party, viz., the plaintiff, even though the said evidence is at variance with the defendants original plea in the written statement. Further since the abovesaid evidence given by the landlady is actually an admission by her regarding the nature of the lease, there can be no bar for entertaining the abovesaid application by the defendant for purchasing the demised property pursuant to Sec.9 of the Act. So, the lower appellate court has erred in having held that the abovesaid application itself is not maintainable, without taking note of the legal position enunciated in the abovesaid Madhavan v. Kannammal, 1990 (2) L.W. 274 and also the law that a party could be given relief based on the categorical admission of the other party in the witness box. vide: also Narayan v. Gopal, A.I.R. 1960 SC 100." 13. The above decisions, in my view, completely answer the objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent as to the inadequacy or want of pleadings in the present case. From the records in the previous proceedings between the parties, it is amply demonstrated that the building is nearly-70 years old, and that it is dilapidated and there is no bar for invoicing Section 14(1) (b) of the Act subject to the other conditions required, to be satisfied for invoking Section 14(1)(b) of the Act. From the records in the previous proceedings between the parties, it is amply demonstrated that the building is nearly-70 years old, and that it is dilapidated and there is no bar for invoicing Section 14(1) (b) of the Act subject to the other conditions required, to be satisfied for invoking Section 14(1)(b) of the Act. Section 14(1)(b) runs as follows: "Recovery of Possession by Landlord for Repairs or for Reconstruction - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, but subject to the provisions of Sections 12 and 13, on an application made by a landlord, the Controller shall, if he is satisfied- (a)xxxxx (b) that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building sought to be demolished, pass an order directing the tenant to deliver possession of the building to the landlord before a specified date." Section 14(2)(b) is also required to be extracted: - "(2) No order directing the tenant to deliver possession of the building under this section shall be passed - (a)xxxxxxxxx (b) on the ground specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) unless the landlord gives an undertaking that the work of demolishing any material portion of the building shall be substantially commenced by him not later than one month and shall be completed before the expiry of three months from the date he recovers possession of the entire building or before the expiry of such further period as the Controller may, for reasons to be recorded in writing allow." 14. Before referring to the various decisions under Section 14 (l)(b) of the Act, we may at once note that what is highlighted is the bona fide requirement of the landlords. In my view, that will be the ultimate test for invoking Section 14(1)(b) of the Act. 15. There are atleast three streams of decisions under Section 14 (l) (b) of the Act. The extreme view was taken in R.P.Daniel v. N. Daniel, 1967 (1) MLJ 110 : 82 LW 137 which postulated that the only requirement of Section 14(1)(b) is the honest desire of the landlord to demolish the building and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the old building sought to be demolished. There is nothing in the language of this clause to warrant the view that the building should be old and decrepit. 16. The same view has been expressed in a number of decisions later on in V.P.Selvaraj v. Narsimha Rao, 1969 (I) MLJ 587 : 82 LW 137, Bharat Trading Company v. Shanmughasundaram, 1982 (1) MLJ 94 : 97 LW 166. Arumugam v. Srinivasan, 1982 (2) MLJ 298 : 95 LW 328. and Kanakavalli Ammal v. V. Sundaram, 1984 (I) MLJ 310 : 98 LW 311. 17. In Arumugams case, 1982 (2) MLJ 298 : 95 LW 328 the landlady wanted to pull down a fairly recent construction. It was held that she could do provided it was bona fide. 18. The above decisions have been characterised by the Supreme Court in P.Orr & Sons case, 1990 (2) L.W. 547 : 1991 (1) SCC 301 as having taken an extreme view. 19. The next line of decisions has taken the view that the present condition of the building and the extent to which it could stand without immediate demolition and reconstruction are relevant considerations in Mehsin Bhai v. Hale & Company, G.T. Madras, 1964 (2) MLJ 147 : 77 LW 194. The said decision further stated as follows: "What the section really contemplates is a bona fide requirement, that necessarily implied that it is in the interests of the landlord to demolish and reconstruct the building, and that the fact that the building is old is not merely a pretext for advancing the application, with the object of evicting the tenant, application, with the object of evicting the tenant, and of obtaining higher rentals..." 20. The above observations were quoted with approval in Metalware & Co., etc. v. Bansilal Sharma & Co etc., 1979 (3) SCC 308 : 92 LW 38 (SC) (Short Notes) 21. The above observations were quoted with approval in Metalware & Co., etc. v. Bansilal Sharma & Co etc., 1979 (3) SCC 308 : 92 LW 38 (SC) (Short Notes) 21. In K. Ramachandra Rao v. Krishna Swami Iyengar, 1976 (1) MLJ 267 : 89 LW 127 it was held by A.Varadarajan, J, (as the learned Judge then was; - " In my view, it is not possible to hold that the requirement of a landlord who has no doubt the means and has obtained the necessary licence from the, concerned authorities is bona fide where his case in the: petition for eviction is that the building is old and in a dilapidated condition and that he therefore requires it for purposes of immediate demolition has not been substantiated but has been found to be otherwise in that the building has been found to be in a sound condition although it is about 50 years old " 22. In K.P. Lonappan and Sons v. S. Mohamed Iqbal, 1981 (1) MLJ 386 : 94 LW 282 P.R. Gokulakrishnan, J (as the learned Judge"then was) held that the existing condition of the building is a relevant factor for coming to the conclusion that the building requires demolition and reconstruction. 23. In Mahboob Badsha v. M.Manga Devi, 1965 (2) MLJ 209 : 78 LW 286 K.S.Ramamurthi, J, had this to say - - " .... In my opinion the proper view to take of this provision is that whenever the condition of the building is not such as to require immediate demolition the case of the landlord should be scrutinised to find out whether he bona fide intends to immediately demolish the building or whether the provision is invoked merely with a view to evict the tenant. According to the learned Judge, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in P.Orr & Sons case, 1992 (2) LW 547 condition of the building is one of the important factors only, but, not a vital consideration. 24. In Panchammal Narayan Shenoy v. Basti Venkatesha Shenoy, 1970 (1) SCC 499 , which arose under the Mysore Rent Control Act, it was held that the condition of the building was not a relevant factor. 24. In Panchammal Narayan Shenoy v. Basti Venkatesha Shenoy, 1970 (1) SCC 499 , which arose under the Mysore Rent Control Act, it was held that the condition of the building was not a relevant factor. This decision was distinguished by the Supreme , Court in P.Orr & Sons case, 1992 (2) LW 547 by saying that the case arose under the Mysore Act which with was not in pari materia with the Madras Act. 25. In K.JSivalingam v. S.Guruswamy, 1983 (2) MLJ 85 : 96 LW 114, the same view as taken in Mahboob Badshas case, 1965 (2) MLJ 209 , was taken by the learned Judge, that the condition of the building need not be such that there is an imminent threat of the same crumbling down in the near future. 26. In P.Orr & Sons (P) Ltd. v. M/s Associated Publishers (Madras) Ltd., 1992 (2) LW 547, as we are aware, it has been held that the condition of the building is not only one of the various circumstances to be taken into account, but, it is the essential condition, in the absence of which it will not be possible for the landlord to prove is bona fide requirement. 27. In Annamalai Nadar v. Thangamaney, 1991 (2) LW 609 it has been held by a Bench of this Court that the condition of the building need not have deteriorated to such an extent that it would crumble down at any time. It is enough, if the requirement is bona fide for the timely, genuine and direct purpose of demolition and reconstruction. 28. In P.Orr & Sons case, 1992 (2) LW 547, the Supreme Court referred to Prabhakaran Nair v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1987 (100) LW 987 : 1987 (4) SCC 238 and observed that in the construction of Sections such as Sections 10 and 14 of the Act, the Court must be guided by the overriding legislative objectives articulated in the Preamble to the Act, that is "the control of rents of such buildings and the prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom in the State of Tamil Nadu". 29. 29. In Mohamed Gani v. S. Rathinavel, 1994 (2) LW 472 , Abdul Hadi, J. referred to P.Orr & Sons case, 1992 (2) LW 547 and relied on it and observed as follows - "Age of the building is not a vital factor if really the condition of the building otherwise warrants demolition and reconstruction." 30. In A.Lakshmanan v. Kanniammal alias Pattammal, 1995 (1) LW 632 . AR.Lakshmanan, J observed that the intention of the landlady must be genuine. The building need not be old or dilapidated." 31. After all the above decisions the Supreme Court in Vijay Singh v. Vijayalakshmi Ammal, 1996 (II) CTC 586 : l996 (6) SCC 475 : 1997 (1) LW 218 has veered round to strike a balance and tabulated a set of criteria and they are as follows: (1) Bona fide intention of the landlord far from the sole object only to get rid of the tenants (2) the age and condition of the buildings, and (3) The financial position of the landlord to demolish and erect a new building according to the statutory requirements of the Act. The Supreme Court has hastened to add that these are some of the illustrative factors before an order is passed under Section 14(l)(b) of the Act. No court can fix any limit in respect of the age and condition of the building. That factor has to be taken into consideration along with other factors." In a way the extreme view postulated in P.Orr & Sons case, 1992 (2) LW 547 has not been accepted by the Supreme Court in Vijay Singhs case, 1996 (II) CTC 586. 32. In S.Thangaswamy v. R. Vinayakamurthy, 1996 (II) CTC 105 AR. Lakshmanan, J. has observed as follows; "...Section 14(1)(b) of the Act is not rendered inapplicable merely because building is not old or dilapidated, but is in good condition. In other words, if the intention of the landlord is proved to be genuine, and not spurious or specious the landlord would be entitled to obtain an order for eviction under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act, whether or not the condition of the building not being sine qua non for such eviction .... the means of the landlord to carry out the work of demolition and reconstruction is a relevant factor to be taken note of by this Court and considered while testing his bona fides. the means of the landlord to carry out the work of demolition and reconstruction is a relevant factor to be taken note of by this Court and considered while testing his bona fides. In my opinion, in order to satisfy the test under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act, the condition of the building need not have deteriorated to the extent of the building being in danger of crumbling down but the condition must be such as to indicate a bona fide requirement for the timely, genuine and direct purpose of demolition and reconstruction." 33. In Venugopal v. Fathima Beevi, 1996 (2) L.W. 772 , an identical view has been taken. 34. In S.P.Sabura Begum v. M.K. Thangavelu, 1997 (I) CTC 95 , K.Govindarajan, J, has referred to the previous two decisions and also Vijay Singhs Case, 1996 (2) CTC 586 and held that the condition of the building need not be dilapidated or dangerous and that the intention should be genuine and not spurious or suspicious. 35. In National Studios, Etc., v. Prema Kalyanasundaram, 1997 (3) L.W. 269, S.S.subramani. J. has gone to the extent of saying that the bona fide requirement and landladys requirement for demolition and reconstruction are mutually exclusive grounds. If the claim is bona fide and the landlord gets possession, it is for her to to decide whether she should demolish it, repair it or make use of it after making some adjustments. The learned Judge has referred to a number of decisions arising under the Madras Act, Madhya Pradesh Act and Kerala Act. The learned Judge has further observed following Ramachandran v. Kasim Khaleeli, 1965 (I) MLJ 78 : 1964 (77) LW 362, that partial demolition is demolition. The learned Judge also referred to S.A.Henry v. J. V.K. Rao, 1971 (2) MLJ 297 : 84 LW 523 wherein it was held that all that Sec, 14 (1)(b) requires is a demolition followed by structural alterations by way of construction so as to give a new face to the form and structure of the premises. The structural alterations in the premises should be such that the original building has completely lost its identity Kannappa Pillai v. Venkataratnam, 1965 (2) MLJ 144 : 78 LW 363. 36. In Balasubramaniam v. Gulab, 94 (1981) LW 102: ILR 1981 (3) Mad 44, MD.Gani v. S. Rathinavel, 1994 (2) LW 472 and National Studios etc. The structural alterations in the premises should be such that the original building has completely lost its identity Kannappa Pillai v. Venkataratnam, 1965 (2) MLJ 144 : 78 LW 363. 36. In Balasubramaniam v. Gulab, 94 (1981) LW 102: ILR 1981 (3) Mad 44, MD.Gani v. S. Rathinavel, 1994 (2) LW 472 and National Studios etc. v. Prema Kalyanasundaram, 1997 (3) LW 269, it has been held that want of sanctioned plan or Lack of preparation for the work of demolition and reconstruction by itself cannot negative the bona fides of the landlord and that the production of plan and Licence is not a condition precedent for getting an order of eviction. 37. In S. Raju v. K.Nathamani, 1998 (3) LW 214 after an exhaustive analysis of the case law on the subject, S.S.Subramani, J. has observed as follows; " Eviction to be ordered not only if the building is dilapidated and dangerous but also where the building is old and unsuitable to the surroundings of the schedule building. Keeping the building in the old condition is a burden for ever to landlord. Tenants may be satisfied with the present state of the building since they pay only nominal rent, but Rent Control Legislation is beneficial to both landlord and tenant. It is enough if the landlord shows his capacity to raise the necessary funds and that he has other properties which he can sell to raise necessary funds. If these statutory conditions are satisfied, the landlord is entitled to an order under Section 14(1)(b). 38. In Vasantha Leela v. Vadivelu Chettiar, 1998 (III) CTC 467 , A. Raman, J. dealing with a case under Section 14(1)(b) has observed that the location in an important locality of the town and the desire of the landlord to pull down the building and put up a multi-storeyed building for getting better income from the property cannot be put against the landlord in an application under section 14(l)(b) of the Act. The learned Judge has further held that the appreciation value of the property and the demand for building both residential and non-residential the expansion of commercial activities have all to be taken into account in deciding such an application. The learned Judge has further held that the appreciation value of the property and the demand for building both residential and non-residential the expansion of commercial activities have all to be taken into account in deciding such an application. The case of such a petitioner that if the property is demolished and if a new building is put up it would fetch greater income cannot said to be a fanciful claim or a claim having a tinge of mala fide. 39. In Rookshana Nazir v. Shauka Thulla, 1998 (III) CTC 687 , K.Govindarajan, J, has held after referring to a number of authorities on this question that unless the condition of the building is established that it is in a dilapidated condition the landlord is not entitled to sustain the petition under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act, cannot be accepted. 40. It should also be noticed that there is an inbuilt safeguard in the Act itself in the shape of Section 16 that in case pursuant to an order of eviction under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act, the landlord acts contrary to the undertaking given by him under the proviso to Section 14(l)(b) and does not demolish the premises, the tenant can approach the authorities under the Act for repossession of the building. 41. On a conspectus of the several decisions referred to above, the present position, with regard to Section 14(l)(b) of the Act is as follows: (1) There must be a bonafide intention of the landlord and the intention should be far from the sole object only to get rid of the tenants . (2) The age and the condition of the building should be such as to warrant demolition and reconstruction, and (3) The financial position of the landlord to demolish and erect a new building according to the statutory requirements of the Act. The factor relating to the age and the condition of the building has to be taken into consideration alongwith the other factors and a conclusion has to be reached by the Rent Controller. 42. In P. Orr & Sons case, 1992 (2) LW 547 the Supreme Court observed that the Controller asked himself the wrong question and did not think that the condition of the building was relevant and he disregarded the clear admission of the landlord and other witnesses as regards the sound condition of the building. 42. In P. Orr & Sons case, 1992 (2) LW 547 the Supreme Court observed that the Controller asked himself the wrong question and did not think that the condition of the building was relevant and he disregarded the clear admission of the landlord and other witnesses as regards the sound condition of the building. Having held that the condition of the building is a basic and essential requirement of Section 14(l)(b), the Supreme Court upheld the contention of the tenant that the crucial condition for demolition was absent and therefore the order for eviction couLd not be sustained. 43. Much water has flown under the bridge since then and if the factors set out by the Supreme Court in Vijay Singhs case, 1996 (II) CTC 586 are present and if the Court is satisfied that the requirement is bonafide, then the petition for eviction under Section 14 (1)(b) has got to be granted. 44. In the instant case, from the materials on records it is found that the building was put up in the year 1931 or 1932. It is nearly 10 years. As regards the condition of the building the tenants own Engineer has in the previous proceedings between the parties spoken to the cracks in the walls and terrace in several places and water marks. The tenant himself has written to the landlords about the condition of the building that the verandah was in a very bad shape and that the building required extensive repairs; it was under Ex. P. 18 . It can therefore be safely con-cluded that the condition and the age of the building satisfy the requirements set down by the decisions of the Supreme Court and our Court. 45. It has already been noticed that the petitioners cannot be faulted for alleged lack of pleadings in the present petition . Exhibits marked in this case clearly show that in case the Court is to hold that the landlords are entitled to an order under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act, there are enough materials to substantiate the same . 46. Then let us go to the means of the landlords . As regards the means, it is now settled law that the owner need not jingle coins Rukmaniammal v. Izuddein, 1983 (1) MLJ 186 : 96 LW 145 and A. Lakshmanan v. Kanniammal alias Pattammal, 1995 (1) LW 632 . 46. Then let us go to the means of the landlords . As regards the means, it is now settled law that the owner need not jingle coins Rukmaniammal v. Izuddein, 1983 (1) MLJ 186 : 96 LW 145 and A. Lakshmanan v. Kanniammal alias Pattammal, 1995 (1) LW 632 . The various exhibits relating to the wealth Tax assessment of the petitioners clearly show that they are in a position to raise the funds for putting up a multi-storeyed building in the property. 47. It has been held in S. Raju v. K. Nathamani, 1998 (3) LW 214 that for the purpose of proving his bona fides the landlord need only to show that he has got capacity to raise necessary funds. The capacity in the instant case of the revision petitioners cannot at all be doubted particularly having regard to the location of the property and the extensive properties owned by them. So far as the production of plan and licence is concerned, it has already been noticed that non-production cannot be put against the landlords and the Court can take Judicial notice of the fact that even if a plan is filed in the Court at the time of eviction petition, that cannot remain valid till the possession of the building is obtained by the landlords . The second petitioner as P.W.l, has also spoken to the fact that for getting sanction from M.M.D.A. a sum of Rs.2 to 2.5 lakhs and a similar sum to the Corporation would be necessary and the sanction if obtained would be valid to only for two years and they may have to shell out again for the plan and permits. As regards the contention that the building regulations would not permit putting up of 1 +3, it is for the petitioners to satisfy the authorities on this aspect and if warranted to reduce the number of floors. The claim under Section 14(1)(b) cannot be rejected on this score. 48. Having regard to what is stated above, I am satisfied that a case has been made out for 14(1) (b) and the authorities below have clearly erred in rejecting the claim. The claim under Section 14(1)(b) cannot be rejected on this score. 48. Having regard to what is stated above, I am satisfied that a case has been made out for 14(1) (b) and the authorities below have clearly erred in rejecting the claim. This Court is entitled under Section 25 of the Act to interfere in view of the non- application by the authorities of the proper test in dealing with the application under Section 14(l) (b).They have also not taken into consideration the various precedents on the point. I am not reappreciating the evidence. I am only holding that on the materials placed before the authorities an order under section 14(1)(b) for eviction of the respondent should have been a matter of course. 49. For all the reasons stated above, C.R.P. stands allowed. There will be an order of eviction against the respondent, however, the respondent is granted six months time to quit and deliver vacant possession subject to the filing of an affidavit of undertaking with the usual default clause within a period of two weeks from today. No costs.