RONOJIT KUMAR MITRA, J. ( 1 ) THE Court : In this application the petitioners had prayed for a direction on the Sikkim Bank Limited to allow the petitioner to withdraw, from its account No. 178 maintained with the bank, a sum of Rs. 40 lac for payment of wages of its workers, and also for necessary directions on the Reserve Bank of India for the release of the moneys in that regard. The facts of the case in short would appear to be that the company had been wound up by an order of the court, and in an application by some of the creditors of the company a scheme was sanctioned by this court by an order dated June 16, 1989 and the committee of management assumed the responsibility of running the business of the company. By an order dated March 11, 1994 the Supreme Court directed the committee of management to deposit a sum of Rs. 8 lac every month with the Registrar, Original Side of this court. The committee of management was replaced by another committee by an order dated December 13, 1994, and this order had been affirmed by the court of Appeal, as far as the appointment of the new committee of management was concerned, by its order dated September 21, 1995. The new committee of management has been running the business of the company since, and the Sikkim Bank Limited was the banker of the Company. The major withdrawals in the account were for the purpose of fortnightly payment of wages of the workers. The aggregate amount of such fortnightly wages ranged between Rs. 55 and Rs. 65 lac. By a Notification dated March 8, 1999 the Joint Secretary, Government of India had forwarded to the petitioner an order of moratorium in respect to Sikkim Bank Limited, effective on and from March 8, 1999 upto June 5, 1999. By reason of the moratorium the petitioner was unable to pay the fortnightly wages of the workers and as a result the business of the company was threatened with disruption of its workers and consequently every likelihood of closure of the business of the company. By reason of the moratorium the petitioner was unable to pay the fortnightly wages of the workers and as a result the business of the company was threatened with disruption of its workers and consequently every likelihood of closure of the business of the company. ( 2 ) IT was submitted by counsel for the petitioners that since its appointment the business of the company was being run efficiently and satisfactorily, and that large sums of money had been deposited in its account with the bank in addition to the regular monthly payments of Rs. 8 lac to the Registrar, Original Side of this court in compliance with the order of the Supreme Court. He contended that the Notification declaring the moratorium was not an Act of the Parliament nor had it been placed before the Parliament or obtained its sanction, and that therefore it did not and could be considered to have the similar effect of a Statute and accordingly could not be allowed to create any impediment which had in fact been the effect of its issuance, in the compliance of the order of the court, by which the petitioner was running the business of the company. At best he argued, the Notification was an executive fiat which in no way could prevent the performance of an order of the court. According to him, this was a case where the court should consider the theory of social-justice, and afford the highest priority to facilitate the payment of the lawful wages of the workers, as otherwise the workers some 500 strong, with their families, would face starvation and a possible law and order situation in the State. He stressed on the bonafide of the petitioners in that, the prayer was for the release of money payable to the workers only, while the petitioners took upon themselves the heavy task of arranging funds to meet the day to day expenses of running the company. He argued that once the company was in liquidation by an order of the court, there could be no interference in respect to the assets or the affairs of or relating to the company, without prior leave of the court which made the winding-up order and that no such leave had been obtained by the Central Government in issuing the Notification. He submitted that the company was being run in implementation of an order of the court, with an intent to rehabilitate the company, and the executive could not be issuing a fiat or in any other manner interfere with and stop the implementation of the order of court. He placed section 5 of the West Bengal Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act 1972 and argued that in the Notification under the Act, it had been specifically mentioned that it would over-ride an order of the court, but in the Notification before this court, there was no such provision and therefore the running of the business could not be disturbed by reason of the moratorium ordered in the Notification. In support of his submissions he cited and relied on the decisions reported in 60 Comp. Cases 526, 89 Comp. Cases 658, 72 Comp. cases 429 and 1999 (1) H. C. Notes 81 (15th April Issue ). ( 3 ) COUNSEL for the workers adopted the submissions of the counsel for the petitioners, and in addition cited and relied on the decision reported in 1987 (2) SCC 588 . He contended that subsistence of the workers was of the paramount interest to the law courts, and payment of wages to workers ranked highest in priority. ( 4 ) THE application was misconceived and not maintainable, contended by the counsel for the Sikkim Bank Limited, because the Notification being there, no such application would lie before the courts of law. The petitioners, he submitted were at liberty to approach the appropriate forum and if so advised, seek to strike down the Notification and the declaration of moratorium. According to him it was significant, that no such prayer had been made in the petition before this court, as in law no such prayer could be made. He cited and relied on the decisions reported in 89 Comp. Cases 438 (Del) and 89 Comp. Cases 462 (SC) and submitted that the Supreme Court had affirmed in the latter decision, the finding of the Delhi High Court reported in the earlier decision where the Division Bench dismissed the writ petition and held that courts would not question the reasons for the action of the Reserve Bank of India. Cases 438 (Del) and 89 Comp. Cases 462 (SC) and submitted that the Supreme Court had affirmed in the latter decision, the finding of the Delhi High Court reported in the earlier decision where the Division Bench dismissed the writ petition and held that courts would not question the reasons for the action of the Reserve Bank of India. Indeed the bank had written to the Reserve Bank of India in favour of the petitioners but it was submitted on behalf of the bank that if wrote under duress and coercion, and that the text and the tone of the letter made that fact quite apparent. According to him the word 'instrument' in section 45 (1) of the Banking Regulation Act 1949 would include an order of the court and in support he cited and relied on the decision reported in AIR (1966) SC 856. The non-obstante clause contained in section 45 came into effect in 1960 he argued and being more recent than that contained in section 446 of the Companies Act, the provisions in section 45 would prevail, and he relied on the decision reported in AIR (1977) SC 265 in support of his submissions. ( 5 ) IN terms of section 45 sub-section (14) of the Banking Regulation Act 1949, as contended by the counsel for the Reserve Bank of India, the declaration of the moratorium was strict in accordance with the law, and could not be in conflict with any of the provisions of the Companies Act. According to him the decisions which had been cited by counsels who were opposing the moratorium, were all in relation to a moratorium of the company which was in liquidation and therefore the courts had considered the matter of priority of payment among creditors. In the instant case the moratorium had been declared in respect to the bank, he submitted, and that the business of the bank was not being monitored by court and the question of priority of payment if at all would be among depositors of the bank and not the creditors of the company, and such priority had never been, as in law it could not be, sanctioned by any court even on the basis of the theory of social justice. The Central Government was represented in court, and adopted the submissions of both the bank and the Reserve Bank of India. The Central Government was represented in court, and adopted the submissions of both the bank and the Reserve Bank of India. ( 6 ) THE Notification dated March 8. 1999 had been issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division), "in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act 1949 (10 of 1949) ??? under sub section (1) of that section ??' In the Notification there was the order of moratorium. For the sake of convenience sub sections (1) and (2) of section 45 of the Act are set out herein below:"45. Power of Reserve Bank to apply to Central Government for suspension of business by a banking company and to prepare scheme of reconstruction or amalgamation. (i) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this part or in any other law or (any agreement or other instrument ). For the time being in force where it appears to the Reserve Bank that there is good reason so to do, the Reserve Bank may apply to the Central Government for an order of moratorium in respect of (a banking company ). (2) The Central Government, after considering the application made by the Reserve Bank under sub-section (1), may make an order of moratorium staying the commencement or continuance of all sections and proceedings". ( 7 ) THE Central Government issued the Notification, clearly on the strength of the statutory power and authority which had been bestowed on it by the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. Argument, insisting that in order to have statutory effect, the Notification ought to have the sanction of the Parliament upon being placed before the House, would appear to be without any basis whatsoever and quite unacceptable. In the Bench decision of the Delhi High Court reported in 89 Comp. Cases 438 and affirmed by the Supreme Court in its decision in 89 Comp. Cases 462, writ petitions, against moratorium imposed on the petitioner-banks under section 45 (2) of the Banking Regulation Act 1949, were dismissed, and the courts held that having regard to the purpose of a moratorium, the petitioners could not claim a right to be heard prior to the passing of an order under section 45 (2 ). According to Their Lordships in the Delhi High Court. According to Their Lordships in the Delhi High Court. ( 8 ) "the "good reasons" required by section 45 (1) in the application by the Reserve Bank of India would necessarily be concerned with (a) public interest, (b) interests of depositors, (c) securing proper management of the banking company or (d) interest of banking system of the country as a whole, what is relevant for the main purpose, namely, the introduction of a scheme, is necessarily relevant to the imposition of a moratorium as well, which is a means to an end, namely, the finalisation of the scheme itself. " The petitioners, before Their Lordships were the banks, in respect to which the Central Government had made the order of moratorium, and they had challenged the moratorium and prayed to be allowed to carry on business as banking companies. The application before this court was made on behalf of a depositor, which did not challenge the moratorium of the Notification but prayed for relaxation of the moratorium to the extent of allowing it to withdraw a sum of Rs. 40 lac. The money to be withdrawn was alleged would be utilised for the payment of the fortnightly wages of the workers of the depositors but the prayer in the petition it allowed would in effect be setting aside the moratorium in respect to the petitioner, and allow the preferential payment to a depositor. It was quite obvious that there was no provision of law, as there could very well be none, which would entitle the petitioners to obtain either of the orders. There was no denial by the petitioners as appeared from submissions made by counsel on their behalf as to the validity, legality or the sufficiency of either the notification or the imposition of the moratorium. ( 9 ) MAIN thrust of the arguments by counsel for the petitioners, as I understood, was that in the circumstances the predicament and the plight of the 500 workers and their families ought to be of paramount consideration before this court, and in that light and on the strength of the numerous decisions of the law courts based on the theory of social-justice, this court would allow the petitioners' prayers. The theory of social-justice was not unknown to the courts of law in this country. The theory of social-justice was not unknown to the courts of law in this country. The theory has been considered by the Hon'ble Judges whenever there was a need and where Their Lordships found it necessary so to do. Plain meaning of the words social-justice it would primarily convey, that justice which would be dispensed with a view not merely to benefit an individual or any particular class of people but the community at large. In other words, the courts would need to the cry of the society and the need of the hour and interpret the law to afford appropriate relief though such relief should never be in derogation of any substantive law of the land. In our country, as on date, there was no scope for judge-made law, yet in their interpretations of the law The Hon'ble Judges have always given due consideration and have granted appropriate relief in situations emergent and pressing concerning the country's trade, commerce, industry, education and all such other matters which related to the life and existence of the people of India and which would be beneficial to the nation at large. Would it therefore be at all reasonable or just to allow the deviation in the moratorium as had been prayed for by the petitioners, which of course was not permissible in law? If an order was made, primarily it would enable a depositor, to withdraw money in preference to the other depositors on the allegations that the petitioners were unable to pay the fortnightly wages of the workers. Was there any reason to allow preferential payment, when the plights of the other depositors could be equally or more cogent and imperative? Where was the scope of any consideration of the theory of social-justice in the present facts and circumstances where only the petitioners would benefit at the prejudice of the community of the depositors of the bank. The petitioners did not disclose before this court as what funds it had at its disposal, not was any case made out as to why they would not be able to acquire funds to pay the workers though they were confident of obtaining funds to run the day to day business of the company. The required relaxation of the moratorium if allowed would in effect be solely in the interest of the petitioners. The required relaxation of the moratorium if allowed would in effect be solely in the interest of the petitioners. The petitioners had by choice taken on the responsibility to pay the workers and the petitioners would have to decide as to how best they would meet their obligation. Claiming to be entitled to preferential payment in the circumstances on the pretext of the workers not receiving their fortnightly wages, I am afraid was less than bona fide and was contrary to all principles of law and consideration of the theory of social-justice was hardly warranted. The petitioners surely could not claim to be a society as understood in the theory of social-justice. As I have observed earlier regarding preferential payment, no justice would be meted out either to the society or to the depositors of the bank. ( 10 ) IN those circumstances I would be inclined to find, that the arguments by counsel for the petitioners that by issuing the Notification, the moratorium had created an impediment in the implementation of an order of this court and also that the petitioners could not be restrained from withdrawing money from the bank by reason of an executive fiat which was without leave of the court under section 446 of the Companies Act, was quite superfluous and the actual facts and circumstances of the case had been confounded. On the plea of social-justice, the substantive law of the land and the principles of law laid down by the law courts of this country cannot and ought not to be driven to the back seat. The Rule of law, the spinal chord of any social system, must enjoy paramount respect. Theory of social justice has always been in the considerations of the law courts and always to reinforce the application of the substantive law and never in derogation. ( 11 ) THE theory of social-justice if at all was to be considered in the present case then it must be in favour of the Notification which had issued the order of moratorium. The order had been made because the financial position of the bank had so deteriorated that there was every likelihood of its defaulting to make payment of deposits which would mature in the then near future. The order had been made because the financial position of the bank had so deteriorated that there was every likelihood of its defaulting to make payment of deposits which would mature in the then near future. The Central Government in the course of governance, considered it expedient and imperative for the protection of the interests of the depositors, the public at large and the interest of the banking system of the country as a whole. Such acts of the Government were in the greater interest of the nation. It was the duty of the citizen to co-operate, even if such co-operation required restraints and forbearance for a while. The moratorium was to continue till June 5, 1999, which was less than fortnight as of date. For those reasons this application is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.