By order dated 29.7.98, this Court directed that the second appeals would be taken up today for formulation of substantial questions of law after hearing Mr. G. Chakravorty, learned counsel for Mantala Tea Co Ltd, the respondent No. 1. 2. Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 submitted that section 101 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short CPC), expressly provided that no second appeal would lie except on the ground mentioned in section 100, CPC, and section 100, CPC provided for second appeal only on the ground that a substantial question of law was involved in the case. He referred to the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 100, CPC, to show that the memorandum of appeal will have to precisely state the substantial questions of law involved in the appeal. He further argued that sub-section (4) of section 100, CPC, further provided that when the High Court was satisfied that a substantial question of law was involved in any case, it would formulate that question. According to Mr. Chakravorty, therefore, a second appeal could be entertained at the stage of admission only if the High Court was satisfied that a substantial question of law was involved in the case and also formulated that question. He further submitted that sub-section (5) of section 100, CPC, provided that the second appeal would be heard on the question so formulated by the High Court. Proviso to sub-section (5) of section 100, CPC, however, states that nothing in the said sub-section would take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it, if it was satisfied that the case involved such question. Mr. Chakraborty vehemently argued that the words “any other substantial question of law” in the proviso to sub-section (5) of section 100, CPC, clearly indicated that some substantial question of law ought to have been formulated by the High Court at the time of admission of the appeal under sub-section (4) of Section 100, CPC. According to Mr. Mr. Chakraborty vehemently argued that the words “any other substantial question of law” in the proviso to sub-section (5) of section 100, CPC, clearly indicated that some substantial question of law ought to have been formulated by the High Court at the time of admission of the appeal under sub-section (4) of Section 100, CPC. According to Mr. Chakravorty, since the High Court has not yet formulated any substantial question of law in the present batch of second appeals, resort cannot be taken to the proviso, to sub-section (5) of section 100, CPC, to formulate any other substantial question of law at this stage when the appeals are being heard and the second appeals will have to be dismissed. In support of the said submission, Mr. Chakravorty relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Kshitish Chandra Purkait vs. Santosh Kumar Purkait, (1997) 5 SCC 438 ; Banarsi Das vs. Brig Maharaja Sukhjit Singh, (1998) 2 SCC 81 and Donyanoba Bhaurao Shomade vs. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor, AIR 1999 SC 864 . He also cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramchandra Keshov Adhe vs. Govinda Joti Chavare, AIR 1975 SC 915 , for the proposition that where the power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, that must be done in that way and not at all and other methods are unnecessary and forbidden. 3. Mr. Chatterjee, learned counsel for the appellant in Second Appeal No. 5 of 1998, however, submitted that by order dated 13.2.98 passed in the said second appeal, the High Court after being satisfied that a substantial question of law arose for consideration, entertained the second appeal by admitting the appeal and this is not a case where no substantial question of law was at all formulated by the High Court at the time of admitting the appeal on 13.2.98. He further referred to the order dated 30.4.98 passed by this Court wherein the prayer of the appellant that all other questions raised in the memorandum of appeal be allowed to be raised in the second appeal was allowed. Mr. Chatterjee, however, submitted that despite the said orders dated 30.4.98 and 13.2.98, the Court can always reformulate the substantial questions of law involved in the appeal more precisely and accurately at the time of hearing of the appeal. 4. Mr. Mr. Chatterjee, however, submitted that despite the said orders dated 30.4.98 and 13.2.98, the Court can always reformulate the substantial questions of law involved in the appeal more precisely and accurately at the time of hearing of the appeal. 4. Mr. BK Goswami, learned counsel for the appellant in Second Appeal No. 7 of 1998 and Mr. DR Choudhury, learned counsel for the appellant in Second Appeal No. S of 1998, stated that the orders dated 19.2.98 passed in the said second appeals would show that the High Court admitted the appeals after being satisfied that the same substantial questions of law on which Second Appeal No. 5 of 1998 had been admitted also arose in the Second Appeal Nos. 7 of 1998 and 8 of 1998, Mr. Goswami cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Panchugopal Baruah vs. Umesh Chandra Goswami, (1997) 4 SCC 713 , for the proposition that after the Amendment Act of 1976, the High Court could entertain a second appeal if the appeal involved a substantial question of law specifically set out in the memorandum of appeal. He contended that the memorandum of appeal in Second Appeal No. 7 of 1998 would show that substantial questions of law have been raised in the second appeal. Hence at the time of admitting the appeal, it has the duty of the High Court to have formulated the substantial questions of law raised in the memorandum of appeal and in case the High Court has not precisely formulated the said substantial questions of law, the appellant cannot be made to suffer on account of such mistake on the part of the High Court. He also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kshitish Chandra Purkait vs. Santosh Kumar Purkait (supra) for his submission that formulation of substantial question of law by the High Court under sub-section (4) of section 100, GPC, is for the purpose of giving a fair and proper opportunity to the respondent consistent with the principles of natural justice. According to Mr. According to Mr. Goswami, therefore, so long as a substantial question of law actually arises in a given case the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear a second appeal and all that was required was that the High Court should formulate the substantial question of law giving due opportunity to the respondents before or at the time of hearing of the second appeal. Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the appellant in Second Appeal No. 8 of 1998, adopted the aforesaid arguments of Mr. Goswami. 5. Section 100, CPC, is quoted herein below: “100. Second Appeal (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial questions of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial questions of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: Provided that nothing in the sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.” Sub-section (1) of section 100, CPC, made it clear that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. Therefore, once the High Court is satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of law, an appeal can be entertained by the High Court under section 100, CPC. Therefore, once the High Court is satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of law, an appeal can be entertained by the High Court under section 100, CPC. In other words, the existence of a substantial question of law is the sine qua non of the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 100, CPC. This has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Panchugopal Barua vs. Umesh Chandra Goswami (supra) and reiterated in the subsequent decisions in Kshitish Chandra Purkait vs. Santosh Kumar Purkait (supra), Banar&I Dass vs. Brig Maharaja Sukhjit Singh (supra) and Donyanoba Bhaurao Shemade vs. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the parties. Of course, in Kshitish Chandra Purkait vs. Santosh Kumar Purkait (supra), the Supreme Court also held that it was the duty cast upon the High Court to formulate the substantial question of law involved in the h case even at the initial stage. So also in Donyanoba Bhaurao Shemade vs. Maroti Bhaurao Mamor (supra), the Supreme Court observed that a mere look at the provisions of section 100, CPC, shows that the High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 100, CPC, only on the basis of substantial question of law which is to be framed at the time of admission of the second appeal. By the two decisions, therefore, the Supreme Court made it clear that at the time of admission of the appeal, the High Court should frame substantial question of law which arises in the case. But this does not mean that if a substantial question of law has not been specifically formulated by the High Court at the time of admission of the appeal, the High Court would cease to have jurisdiction to hear and decide the second appeal under section 100, CPC. Conversely, when the High Court entertains a second appeal on being prima facie satisfied that a substantial question of law arises for decision and also formulates that substantial question of at the time of admission of the appeal, the High Court can after hearing the respondents in the second appeal dismiss the appeal after recording a finding that no substantial question of law has arisen for decision of the Court. The basis of jurisdiction of the High Court under section 100, CPC, is the existence of substantial question of law in the case and before exercise of the said jurisdiction the High Court will have to formulate specifically the substantial question of law arising in the case and give an opportunity to the respondents to argue that no-such question arose for decision in the case. This conclusion would be clear from a joint reading of sub-sections (1), (3), (4) and (5) of section 100, CPC. 6. On a perusal of the order dated 13.2.99 passed in Second Appeal No. 5 of 1998, 1 find that the learned Judge has observed. “I have gone through the judgment passed by the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court. It appears from the judgment of the first appellate Court that question of jurisdiction was discussed at length. But no decision was given by the first appellate Court and I am of the opinion that this question requires examination by this Court. As regards interpretation of section 29 of the SFCA and section 69 of the TP Act, I am of the opinion that the matter requires examination as it will substantially affect the rights of the parties. Accordingly, I am of the view that the appeal should be admitted. The appeal is admitted and would be heard on the questions of law as discussed above.” Thereafter on 30.4.98, the learned Judge considered the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that detailed question of law had been formulated in the memorandum of appeal which may also be permitted to be agitated at the time of hearing of the second appeal and passed an order to the effect that the said prayer was allowed and that apart from the questions already settled on 13.2.98 at the time of admission of the appeal, the appellant was allowed to agitate the substantial questions of law as mentioned in the memorandum of appeal. In Second Appeal Nos. 7 of 1998 and 8 of 1998, the learned Judge passed orders on 19.2.93 to the effect that the same questions of law on which Second Appeal No. 5 of 1998 had been admitted by the Court also arose in the said two cases and accordingly directed that the appeals be admitted and connected with Second Appeal No. 5 of 1998. 7. 7. It is clear from the aforesaid order dated 13.2.98 and 30.4.98 in Second Appeal No. 5 of 1998 and the order dated 19.2.98 in Second Appeal Nos 7 of 1998 and 8 of 1998 that this Court after being satisfied that substantial questions of law arose for decision in the appeals admitted the appeals and farther observed that the appeals would be heard on the points raised in the second appeals. It is, however, true that the Court on its own did not formulate the substantial questions of law and instead admitted the appeal on the substantial questions of law as formulated by the appellants in the memorandum of appeal. But the fact that the Court has not specifically formulated substantial questions of law for decision in these appeals does not show that the substantial questions of law did not arise for decision in these second appeals. 8. As has been held above, the basis of jurisdiction of this Court under section 100, CPC, is the existence of substantial question of law. So long as such substantial question of law existed in the case, the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 100, CPC, to entertain and decide the second appeal was not taken away. for the purpose of giving proper opportunity to the respondent however the substantial question of law will have to be precisely formulated. 9. After hearing Mr. Chatterjee, Mr. Goswami and Mr. ChoUdhury, learned counsel for the appellants and after perusing fhe memorandum of appeal in the three appeals, I formulate the following substantial questions of law which arise for decision in the three second appeals. (1) Whether the learned Courts below committed error of law in holding that the suit was within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned Munsiff ? (2) Whether the first appellate Court ignored material and relevant evidence such as the letter dated 5th January, 1977 of the plaintiff Ext 14 in coming to the conclusion that the sale of the industrial unit of the plaintiff by the defendant No. 1 to the defendant No. 2 was arbitrary, unfair and contrary to the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Mohesh Chandra vs. Regional Manager, UP Financial Corporation, AIR 1993 SC 935 ? (3) Whether on the facts as established before the Courts below, the conclusion of the Courts below that the sale of the industrial unit of the plaintiff by the defendant No. 1 to the defendant No.2 was arbitrary, unfair and contrary to the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Mohesh Chandra vs. Regional Manager, UP Financial Corporation, AIR 1993 SC 935 is correct? (4) Whether on the facts as established before the Courts below, the Court could interfere with the sale of the industrial units of the plaintiff by the defendant No. 1 to the defendant No.2 under section 29 of the STC Act, 1951 in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court that the power of judicial review in such matters is limited? (5) Whether the Courts below were correct in law in determining the rights of the parties under the mortgage deed dated 7th April, 1969 and under sections 58 (e) 69 and Other relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act? (6) Whether the Courts below could have under law granted the relief of declaring the sale deed dated 24.3.77 void on the plaintiff depositing the amount of Rs. 12.75 lakhs and the relief of restoration of possession? 10. Notwithstanding the aforesaid formulation of substantial questions of law, it will be open for the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, Mr. Chakravorty, to argue that the second appeals do not involve such substantial questions of law. 11. List this case tomorrow for hearing.