JUDGMENT This is an application for stay in connection with a pending appeal of the operation of the order dated 20th May, 1999 passed by the learned Trial Judge in A.S.T. No. 1875 of 1999. From Annexure 'C' appended to the connected petition it appears that order No. 280/MA/O/C-4/1M-4/99 dated 17th May, 1999 issued by the Deputy Secretary, Department of Municipal Affairs, Writers’ Building, Calcutta for appointment of an Administrator in South Dum Dum Municipality was under challenge and the learned Judge was pleased to stay the operation of the said order. The order which is under challenge before the writ Court is enclosed to the petition for stay which is appended as Annexure ‘A’. From the perusal of the said Annexure ‘A’ it appears that certain Municipalities have been mentioned in the table appended therein and it has been, further mentioned that after expiry of the period the Municipalities will stand dissolved with effect from the date mentioned therein and the Government will appoint the Officers named in Col. 5 thereof as Administrators of the concerned Municipalities. 2. Mr. Chatterjee, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants/petitioners before us have assailed the ex parte ad-interim order of stay of the operation of the order impugned vide Annexure-A, firstly on the ground and according to him that the order of stay granted by the leaned Judge is having a laconic lack. According to Mr. Chatterjee even an ex parte order is required to be backed up by, reasons so that the consideration weighing with the leaned judge can be deciphered from the perusal of the order. Apart from making such preliminary, submission Mr. Chatterjee has also submitted with regard to the analysis and analogous provision as contemplated under Order 39 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and according to him that even before granting ad-interim order of stay the requisite formalities are neither adhered to nor the presence of criteria in favour of grant of ad-interim ex parte order was recorded therein. Mr. Chatterjee his perhaps relied on the well-known decision of (1) Chaddha's case reported in 1993 (3) Supreme Court Cases page 161 and (2) Stanley Morgan's case reported in 1994 (4) SCC page 226. This Court before considering the said submission has been confronted with a major plank of the submissions canvassed by Mr. Mr. Chatterjee his perhaps relied on the well-known decision of (1) Chaddha's case reported in 1993 (3) Supreme Court Cases page 161 and (2) Stanley Morgan's case reported in 1994 (4) SCC page 226. This Court before considering the said submission has been confronted with a major plank of the submissions canvassed by Mr. Chatterjee as according to Mr., Chatterjee the provisions enumerated under Article 243-U of the Constitution operates as a bar for passing the impugned order which is under challenge before us. A reference was made to the said provisions which has been quoted herein :- “Article 243-U(1)-Every Municipality, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force shall continue for 5 years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer, provided the Municipality shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before dissolution.” 3. According to Mr. Chatterjee, the portion which is circumscribed under a coverage being preceded by, and followed by, namely the expression "unless sooner or dissolved under any law for the time being in force and according to him the proviso superadded to Article 243-U(1) will come into play only when the case relates to earlier dissolution of the Municipality and not otherwise. According to Mr. Chatterjee Article 243-U(1) will indicate without any ambiguity that the longevity of Municipality or its life time is limited upto expiry of 5 (Five) years from the date of the first meeting of such Municipality, According to Mr. Chatterjee in view of the constitutional embargo no fresh lease of life can be given to such Municipality beyond the said period of time. It has been further submitted by Mr. Chatterjee that though not admitting but even assuming that there is any element of contradiction between the constitutional provision and the provisions as enumerated in State law, there is no iota of doubt that provisions contained under the constitutional law will prevail over the State law and such provisions under the State law cannot but be relegated to the background. 4. In the wake of the said submission Mr. Chatterjee has also referred to some of the salient provisions of the West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993 and reference was made to Section 14(2) of the said Act which according to him is in parity with the provisions of the Constitution. 4. In the wake of the said submission Mr. Chatterjee has also referred to some of the salient provisions of the West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993 and reference was made to Section 14(2) of the said Act which according to him is in parity with the provisions of the Constitution. The proviso superadded to Section 14 (2) will come into play according to Mr. Chatterjee in case of earlier dissolution before the expiry of the period of its longevity which is limited to five years as per constitutional mandate. Thereafter, reference was made to the provisions contained under Section 26 of the said Act and it has been contended that in terms of what modalities as envisaged under Section 26 and in general in terms of Chapter-4 of the Act, the same is required to be conducted. This Court was also reminded of the provision of Section 14(4) which, inter alia, provides that if it is not for any reason possible to hold the general election of a Municipality before the expiry of the period of five years specified in sub-section (2), the Board of Councillors shall stand dissolved on the expiration of the said period and, therefore, the provisions of Section 431 shall apply mutatis mutandis. In the wake of that this Court has the occasion to glance to the provision of Section 431 of the Act and so far as the sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 431 are concerned with regard to negligence in performance duty or something, which is analogous to other charges but same will become applicable only, when the question of dissolution arises before the expiry of the period of five years. According to Mr. Chatterjee if dissolution takes place coinciding with the expiration of five years, then Clauses 1 and 2 of Section 431 shall have no scope to play and sub-section (3) of Section 431 will automatically come into play and in terms of the said provisions the Administrators will be required to be appointed. It has been further highlighted by Mr. Chatterjee that unless the same is allowed to be done lifter the expiry of the period it will result in creation of vacuum as neither the old members of the Council of Municipality can function nor the new vacancies are filled up till the new elections are over. It has been further highlighted by Mr. Chatterjee that unless the same is allowed to be done lifter the expiry of the period it will result in creation of vacuum as neither the old members of the Council of Municipality can function nor the new vacancies are filled up till the new elections are over. Unless the Administrator is allowed to be appointed, the entire activities of day to day operation of the Municipality will come into a grinding halt. Therefore, Mr. Chatterjee tried to justify Annexure ‘A’ appended to the writ petition in terms of Section 14(2)(3), Section 26 and Section 431(3) of the West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993 read with mandatory provisions of Article 243-U of the Constitution. 5. This Court has heard the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents with attention. The learned Advocate appearing for the respondents has drawn attention of this Court to the proviso superadded to Article 243-U of the Constitution and it has been contended that the said proviso postulates that the Municipality will be required to give a reasonable opportunity to hear before dissolution. According to the subjective opinion formed by this Court the said proviso is required to be read in consonance with the inbuilt exception contained in Article 243-U of the Constitution, namely, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force and the same has nexus of relevance with each other. It is difficult for this Court to take into account the effect of the proviso independent of the consideration of the context which has been pinpointed under the inbuilt exception as inhered in itself. This Court also finds that there is consistency with regard to the provisions as aforementioned in West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993 and the constitutional provisions and, as such in the light of the constitutional mandate and even if the impugned order is to be judged by the touchstone of the State Legislation, namely, West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993 we cannot agree with the sustainability of the order impugned and we are accordingly of the view that such ad-interim ex parte order for the reasons aforementioned cannot be sustained. 6. Accordingly, the order impugned is set aside and the appeal is taken up as on day's list and the same is allowed. 6. Accordingly, the order impugned is set aside and the appeal is taken up as on day's list and the same is allowed. A prayer for stay has been made but we do not consider it expedient to grant any order of stay as according to us no question of general law of public importance is involved in this case. Urgent xerox certified copy, if applied for, be supplied expeditiously.