D.N. Chowdhury, J — The reference under section 256 (1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 raised at the instance of the assessee revolves roundthe time limit for completion of assessment and reassessment as enjoined in section 153 (1) (b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 pertaining to the assessment year 1985-86 and the accounting year ending on 31.3.85. 2. In the course of assessment, the Assessing Officer asked the assessee to explain certain Bank deposits, Bank accounts, fixed deposits and investments in respect of properties those stood in his name and in the name of his wife and children. He was also required to produce the names of the creditors from whom he had taken loans. Summons were issued to the creditors some of whom were interrogated/examined by the Assessing Officer on the 8th of March, 1988. The Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee had various Bank deposits in his name which were not explained. The Assessing Officer mentioned some of those transactions. Under the normal course, the assessment was to be completed on or before 31.3.88 in terms of section 153'(1) (a) (iii) of the Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer, however, held the opinion that the assessee was at fault for the concealment of his income thereby making him liable under section 271 (1) (c) of the Act. 1961. The Assessing Officer completed the assessment on 313.89 after making additions of various amounts,under the head 'other sources'. The assessment was assailed in appeal on the ground that the assessment was barred by limitation and that there was no material of whatsoever manner in the possession of the Assessing Officer to hold that the case fell within the rigours of section 271 (1) (c) of the Act, 196L The appellate authority accepted the contention of the assessee and held that the assessment was barred by limitation and that the provision of section 153 (1) (b) of the Act, 1961 was not applicable. On appeal by the Revenue, the appellate Tribunal held that the assessment was not barred by limitation and that provisions of section 153 (1) (b) read with section 271 (l)(c)oftheAct, 1961 were applicable to the case'. The appellate Tribunal distinguished the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Surajpal Singh (108 ITR 746), which was relied upon by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), on facts. The appellate Tribunal distinguished the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Surajpal Singh (108 ITR 746), which was relied upon by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), on facts. The Tribunal held that till 28th of March, 1988 no proper explanation was given/filed by the assessee in respect of the deposits. The Tribunal after evaluating the materials on record, found that since no materials were produced before the Assessing Officer explaining the amounts/accounts as indicated by the Assessing Officer, extension of limitation under section 153 (1) (b) read with section 271 (1) (c) of the Act, 1961 was permissible and accordingly, directed the Assessing Officer to pass a fresh order after giving opportunity to the parties. The assessee not being satisfied with the order of the appellate Tribunal, made the reference application under section 256 (1) of the Act, 1961 to draw up a statement of the case and to refer the two questions indicated in the application to the High Court for its opinion. The appellate Tribunal reframed the questions and accordingly made the following reference: “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the provisions of section 153 (1) (b) of the IT Act, 1961, read with section 271 (1) (c) were applicable and that the extended period of limitation of 8 years was available to the Assessing Officer and in that view in holding that the assessment made on 31.3.89 was not barred by limitation under section 153 (1) (a) (iii) of the Act”. 3. Mr. R. Gogoi, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the assessee, referred to the statutory provisions pertaining to assessment and submitted that the statute has provided the procedure for assessment and also set out the time limit for completion of assessment and reassessment. Assessments are to be made within the period delineated by the statute. Extension of the period is permissible only under the exceptions set out by the statute. Mr. Gogoi, the learned Senior counsel, referred to the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 153 of the Act, 1961 and submitted that on the face of the admitted facts borne out by the records, the authority was duty bound to complete the assessment within the normal period. Mr. Gogoi, the learned Senior counsel, referred to the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 153 of the Act, 1961 and submitted that on the face of the admitted facts borne out by the records, the authority was duty bound to complete the assessment within the normal period. The department did not have any material in its possession to extend the limitation in aid of clause (b) to sub-section (1) of section 153 of the Act, 1961. Mr. Gogoi, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant/applicant, in support of his contentions referred to the Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Surajpal Singh, reported in 108ITR 746. The learned senior counsel submitted that the Assessing Officer in the instant case deliberately allowed the four years period to elapse without any positive action and thereafter in a most illegal fashion, sought to avail the exceptions contained in section 153 (1) (b) (iii) of the Act, 1961. Referring to the materials relied upon by the Assessing Officer, Mr. Gogoi, the learned senior counsel, submitted that those materials were not sufficient to extend the period of limitation. 4. Mr. U. Bhuyan, the learned standing counsel appearing on behalf of the Revenue, strenuously opposed the plea of the assessee and submitted that there was no illegality or impropriety on the part of the Assessing Officer in taking aid of clause (b) to sub-section (1) of section 153 of the Act, 1961. The learned counsel for the Revenue, referred to the order dated 28th March, 1988 passed by the Assessing Officer and submitted that in the absence of any explanation of whatsoever manner, the Assessing Officer has had no alternative but to extend the period of limitation for assessment in aid of clause (b) to sub-section (1) of section 153 of the Act, 1961. On facts, the decision referred to in Surajpal Singh (supra) is not applicable to the case in hand, contended Mr. Bhuyan, the learned Standing Counsel for the Revenue. 5. Parliament showed its concern for expeditious disposal of the assessment proceedings and for that purpose a time limit for completion of assessment and re-assessment has been set out in section 153 of the Act, 1961. Bhuyan, the learned Standing Counsel for the Revenue. 5. Parliament showed its concern for expeditious disposal of the assessment proceedings and for that purpose a time limit for completion of assessment and re-assessment has been set out in section 153 of the Act, 1961. In order to expedite disposal of the assessment proceedings during the relevant time, amendment was made by the Finance Act, 1968 effecting phased reduction in the time limit from four years to two years as indicated in sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of clause (a) to sub-section (1) of section 153 of the Act, 1961. However, in those cases wherein the assessee has made concealment of particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income, as mentioned in section 271 (1) (c) of the Act, 1961 a longer time period is prescribed in view of the fact that such enquiry at the assessment stage would likely to consume more time and accordingly, a longer time limit for completion of such assessment is prescribed. In aid of the aforesaid provisions, the Assessing Officer is armed with the jurisdiction to prolong the assessment on fulfillment of the conditions set out in clause (b) to sub-section (1) of section 153 of the Act, 1961. The poweu is not arbitrary. The Assessing Officer can stretch the period of limitation of being satisfied, on the materials on record, about the necessity of invoking section 271(1) (c) of the Act, 1961. It is no doubt true that the powers conferred on the Assessing Officer is not arbitrary power. It has to be exercised only when condition(s) set out in clause (b) to sub-section (1) of section 153 of the Act, 1961 is/are satisfied. But no such issue arises in the present matter. In the case in hand, the Assessing Officer provided opportunity to the assessee to give explanations for the various amounts of deposits and for the withdrawals in the names of the assessee, his wife and children (sons). In those circumstances, the Assessing Officer noted in his order dated 28.3.88 about his satisfaction for extending the period of limitation. The Tribunal accepted the finding of the Assessing Officer. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the Assessing Officer acted illegally in extending the period of limitation of assessment. In those circumstances, the Assessing Officer noted in his order dated 28.3.88 about his satisfaction for extending the period of limitation. The Tribunal accepted the finding of the Assessing Officer. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the Assessing Officer acted illegally in extending the period of limitation of assessment. The assessment was made on 31.3.89, ie, within the period of eight years and in the circumstances the assessment made on 31.3.89 could not be said to be barred by limitation. The decision in Surajpal Singh (supra) has no application in the case. In the aforesaid case Surajpal Singh (supra), the assessee did offer an explanation. That apart, the material particulars required for exercise of the power under section 153 (1) (b) was non existent. The decision of this Court in Smti Savitri Rani Malik vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in 186 ITR 701, also does not come to the aid of the assessee. In the aforesaid case (of Savitri Malik), the assessee was not made aware of the move of the Revenue authority to take the case out of the normal period of limitation in the absence of any notice within the period of limitation. Confronted with this situation, Mr. R. Gogoi, the learned senior counsel for the applicant/appellant (assessee) submitted that it was incumbent on the part of the authority to inform the assessee about the discovery of concealment of income within the normal period of limitation and the said fact being evident from the record, it is a fit case in which this Court should call for supplementary statement of the case. The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the assessee submitted that in order of answer the questions referred to it satisfactorily, it is necessary to have additional materials included in the statement of the case and accordingly, this Court should issue appropriate direction in that behalf to submit a supplementary statement of the case. In support of his contention, Mr. Gogoi referred to two decisions of the Supreme Court in New Jehangir Vakil Mills Ltd vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay North, Kutch and Saurashtra, reported in 37 ITR 11, and in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay vs. Scindia Steam Navigation Co Ltd, reported in 42 ITR 589. In support of his contention, Mr. Gogoi referred to two decisions of the Supreme Court in New Jehangir Vakil Mills Ltd vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay North, Kutch and Saurashtra, reported in 37 ITR 11, and in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay vs. Scindia Steam Navigation Co Ltd, reported in 42 ITR 589. In our view, the aforesaid decisions need not detain us since the question now sought to be raised on the issue of notice, was neither raised before the appellate Tribunal, nor was the same considered by it. In New Jehangir Vakil Mills Ltd (supra), the Supreme Court held that the scope of reference under section 66 (2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 was co-extensive with that of the one under section 66 (1) of the Act, 1922 and, therefore, the Court (High Court) had no power or jurisdiction under section 66 (2) to travel beyond the ambitNof section 66 (1). Under both the provisions, it is only the question of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal that could be referred; that the object of section 66 (4) of the Act, 1922 wafc to enable the Court to obtain additional statement of the case only for the purpose of deciding questions referred under sections 66 (1) and 66 (2) and no investigation could be ordered in respect of new questions which were not and could not be the subject matter of reference under section 66 (1) or 66 (2) of the Act, 1922. The Supreme Court in Scindia Steam Navigation Co Ltd (supra), summed up its discussion on the issue in the following manner: “(1) When a question is raised before the Tribunal and is dealt with by it, it is clearly one arising out of its order. (2) When a question of law is raised before the Tribunal but the Tribunal fails to deal with it, it must be deemed to have been dealt with by it, and is, therefore, one arising out of its order. (3) When a question is not raised before the Tribunal but the Tribunal deals with it, that will also be a question arising out of its order. (4) When a question of law is neither raised before the Tribunal nor considered by it. It will not be a question arising out of its order notwithstanding that it may arise on the findings given by it. (4) When a question of law is neither raised before the Tribunal nor considered by it. It will not be a question arising out of its order notwithstanding that it may arise on the findings given by it. Stating the position compendiously, it is only a question that has been raised before or decided by the Tribunal that could be held to arise out of its order.” 6. Section 66 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 is projected in section 256 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Section 66 (4) of the Act, 1922 is found in section 258 of the Act, 1961. The power under section 258 of the Act, 1961 though wide in nature, there are inherent limitations also. The High Court in exercise of its advisory powers is not to send back a case to the Tribunal to ascertain fresh facts and to embark upon a fresh line of enquiry. The High Court's power under section 258 of the Act, 1961 is not to be exercised for providing one more chance to the party(ies) to establish its case by a fresh and divergent evidence with a different colour. The question that was canvassed in this proceeding was neither raised before the Tribunal, nor the Tribunal considered the same. 7. For the reasons stated above, we answer the reference in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, there shall however be no order as to costs.