Chief Executive Officer, Sangli Zilla Parishad v. Panchaxari Sidlingappa Mogali
1999-01-18
T.K.CHANDRASHEKHARA DAS
body1999
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT - T.K. CHANDRASHEKHARA DAS, J.:---This matter emerges from the dismissal of the respondents from the services of the petitioner. He was dismissed mainly on the allegation of misappropriation of Rs. 6,600/ and after a disciplinary enquiry was conducted against him by the petitioner. During the disciplinary enquiry, it is alleged that the respondent made a statement on 17-2-1988 pleading guilty of the charges. On receipt of this letter, Enquiry Officer without proceeding further and to record evidence to establish the guilt of the respondent, found that he was guilty. The respondent therefore, was dismissed, from the service on the basis of the enquiry report. This order was challenged by the respondent before the Labour Court, Sangli as Complaint (U.L.P.) No. 261/88. On going through the records and appreciating the materials and circumstances, the Labour Court has found that so called statement whereby the respondent has admitted the guilt appears to be extracted by the Enquiry Officer without any other collateral or corroborating evidence. Labour Court seems to have felt that it is not safe to dismiss the employee only on the basis of the statement extracted during the enquiry. The Labour Court has considered circumstances and conduct of the respondent. It found that before and after recording that statement the respondent was keenly contesting the matter and in that circumstances, the petitioner ought to have adduced evidence to bring home the guilt of the respondents. The Labour Court therefore, set aside the order of dismissal and ordered reinstatement with full back wages of the petitioner. 2. It the meantime, the petitioner retired and it is to be worked out the amounts due to him as if he was continuing in service. The Revision was filed by the petitioner against the order of reinstatement of the respondent as R.A. (U.L.P) 117/93 in the Industrial Court of Maharashtra, Kolhapur. The Revisional Court also found that the conclusion reached by the Labour Court was proper and legal. By appreciation of evidence and material on record, the Revisional Court found that there was no infirmity in the order passed by the Labour Court. Against this order, the petitioner filed this writ petition. 3. I heard Counsel Mr. Malvankar for the petitioner and Kanetkar for the respondents. On going through the orders and materials involved in this case, I find that no interference is called for by this Court.
Against this order, the petitioner filed this writ petition. 3. I heard Counsel Mr. Malvankar for the petitioner and Kanetkar for the respondents. On going through the orders and materials involved in this case, I find that no interference is called for by this Court. The learned Counsel for the petitioner. Mr. Malvankar tried to impress upon me that the conclusion arrived at by the Labour Court and Industrial Court was erroneous on facts. I am afraid whether this contention can be entertained to interfere with the orders passed by the courts below in exercise of powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It was held as back as in 1958 by the Supreme Court that even erroneous conclusion cannot be interfered by this Court unless that error amounts to failure of justice. The Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 398 in (Nagendra Nath Bora and another v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam and others)1, has laid down norms within which this Court should exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In para 26 of the judgement in that decision, the Supreme Court has held: "But the question still remains as to what is the legal import of the expression 'error of law apparent on the face of the record'. Is it every error of law that can attract the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court, to quash the order impugned? This Court, as observed above, has settled the law in this respect by laying down that in order to attract such jurisdiction, it is essential that the error should be something more than a mere error of law; that it must be one which is manifest on the face of the record. In this respect, the law in India and the law in England are, therefore, the same. It is also clear, on an examination of all the authorities of this Court and of those in England, referred to above, as also those considered in the several judgments of this Court, that the common-law writ, now called order of certiorari, which was also adopted by our Constitution, is not meant to take the place of an appeal where the statute does not confer a right of appeal.
Its purpose is only to determine, on an examination of the record, whether the inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or has not proceeded in accordance with the essential requirements of the law which it was meant to administer. Mere formal or technical errors, even though of law, will not be sufficient to attract this extraordinary jurisdiction." 4. As I pointed out earlier, the contention of the petitioner's Counsel cannot be accepted, as I cannot reappreciate the evidence and upset conclusion as arrived at by the lower authorities. I find no legal error on the face of the order passed by the lower authorities. There are enough materials before the authorities to arrive at their conclusion. Whether such conclusions on the basis of such materials are sufficient is not at all the concern of this Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 5. In the result, no interference is called for. Writ petition dismissed. No orders as to costs. C.C. expedited.