JUDGMENT This is an application under Article 227 of the Constitution being directed against the revisional order passed under Section 115A of the Code of Civil Procedure passed by the 5th Court of Additional District Judge, Alipore dated 10th December, 1998 in C.R. No. 132 of 1998 reversing that of order No. 12 dated 6.3.98 passed by the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sealdah in Title Suit No. 91 of 1996. The original order being order No. 12 passed by the trial Court arises out of a petition under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The revisional petitioner is a monthly tenant in respect of an area measuring about 5,760 Sq. ft. together with appertainances at a monthly rental of Rs. 3,801/- payable according to English calendar month. The plaintiff-opposite party instituted Title Suit No. 91 of 1996 before the trial Court against the revisionist petitioner praying, inter alia, for a decree of ejectment and delivery of khas possession in respect of the suit property as delineated in Schedule ‘A’ to the plaint and also the common passage as described in Schedule 'B' and for a decree of recovery of substantial amount on account of enhanced Corporation charge and surcharge. The said suit has been filed on the basis of a complaint containing numerous alterations. 2. The defendant-petitioner on receipt of the summon of the said suit entered appearance and filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The connected petition under Section 8 has been enclosed to the revisional application and the copy of the indenture of the lease dated 7th April, 1982 has also been enclosed. A specific reference was made to para 7 of the aforesaid deed of lease and remittance of arbitration was sought for in view of Arbitration Clause being inserted in the instrument of lease covered by paragraph 7 thereof. A specific reference was made to para 7 of the aforesaid deed of lease and remittance of arbitration was sought for in view of Arbitration Clause being inserted in the instrument of lease covered by paragraph 7 thereof. The relevant averment about Arbitration Clause in Paragraph 7 is reproduced hereunder :- “In case of any dispute or difference between the parties hereto as to the true meaning or construction of these presents or any matter relating thereto or any matter incidental thereto and arising out of and in relation to this lease, such dispute or difference shall be referred to the arbitration of two Arbitrators due to be appointed by the lessors and another to be appointed be the lessee and such arbitration will proceed according to the provisions of the India. Arbitration Act, 1940 or any statutory modifications of reenactment thereof for the time being in force.” 3. The trial Court by order No. 12 has allowed the petition under Section 8 of the said Act on contest. Being aggrieved by the same, the learned District Judge of 24-Parganas was approached under Section 115A of the Code of Civil Procedure and the same was ultimately assigned to the 5th Court of Additional District Judge and on a contented hearing, the revisional Court has allowed the revisional application by setting aside the order passed by the trial Court. The challenge thrown in the instant proceeding under Article 227 in centered round about the validity or otherwise of the order impugned as passed in the revisional forum. 4. Mr. Roychowdhury the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has drawn attention to this Court to the provisions as incorporated in Section 8(1) of the present Act of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and a further reference was made that before a judicial authority where as action is brought in a matter which is the subject-matter of an arbitration agreement shall if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statements on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration. Mr. Roychowdhury has drawn much stress on the verb used as ‘shall’ in Section 8(1) and he has submitted that reference of the matter to arbitration when other pre-requisite conditions are fulfilled is obligatory, on the Court. According to Mr. Mr. Roychowdhury has drawn much stress on the verb used as ‘shall’ in Section 8(1) and he has submitted that reference of the matter to arbitration when other pre-requisite conditions are fulfilled is obligatory, on the Court. According to Mr. Roychowdhury while contrasting the said provision under the earlier law enumerated in 1940 Act, he has submitted that there a reference is discretionary and optional for the Court. Now, the discretion has been supplanted to the level of obligation by way of mandate cast on the Court. According to him, the Court is left with no other alternative but to refer the matter to arbitration. In support of the said submission Mr. Roychowdhury has referred to the case of (1) Wimco Limited v. Sambhu Dayal Gupta & Ors. reported in 1997 (2) CWN page 160 and he has submitted by placement of reliance on the aforesaid decision that under Section 8 of 1996 Act makes the said power obligatory. A further reference was made to another unreported decision dated 2.12.98 in the case of (2) Arun Kumar Roy & Ors. v. Renu Bala Paul & Ors. and according to Mr. Roychowdhury, the said judgment also speaks in issue about the element of obligation which is crept in the body of Section 8 of the Act. So far as citation of unreported decision is concerned there is a reference about the sustenance of maintainability of application for non-compliance with the provisions of Section 8(2) of the Act where an opinion has been expressed by the learned Judge that the plaintiff having admitted the existence of the agreement and annexed a copy of the same with the plaint, there is no necessity of producing the original agreement or a certified copy thereof along with the application under Section 8(2) of the Act. Mr. Dasgupta, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite party, has draw attention to the provisions of Section 8(2) itself and he has pinpointed his submission that application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. According to Mr. Dasgupta, the same cannot be detracted from in terms of the procedure as laid down under the Act and Mr. Dasgupta has expressed about the efficacy of the opinion of the learned Judge and he has joined issue with the same. Mr. According to Mr. Dasgupta, the same cannot be detracted from in terms of the procedure as laid down under the Act and Mr. Dasgupta has expressed about the efficacy of the opinion of the learned Judge and he has joined issue with the same. Mr. Dasgupta has referred to a comparable situation where presentation in appeal certified copy is not enclosed but the contesting respondent admits the copy to the enclosed as correct then also the compliance of procedural formality cannot be dispensed with. However, this Court takes note of the said argument advanced by Mr. Dasgupta but does not want to express any opinion at this stage as it is not directly related to the questions involved in the present controversy. 5. Mr. Roychowdhury has also drawn the attention of this Court to the provisions of Section 5 of the present Act and he has contended that in view of non-substantive clause as mentioned in the said section, the matters governed by this part no judicial authority shall intervene except so provided in this part. Mr. Roychowdhury while assailing the revisional order has also referred to Section 16 of the present Act and according to him that in view of the provisions of Section 16 which is an arbitral tribunal which can answer questions relating to its assumption of jurisdiction or invocation thereof but here the revisional Court being a Court of civil adjudication has tried co decide it and according to Mr. Roychowdhury the same is neither comprehended nor covered by the ambit of Section 16. Mr. Roychowdhury has submitted that in view of such, Paragraph 7 being inserted in the body of the instrument of Lease, the Court is left with no other option but to make reference of the matter in arbitration in terms of Section 8 in view of the obligation cases on the same as a mandate emanates on the statute. A reference was also made by Mr. Dasgupta, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite parties from an averment made from the enclosure appended to the revisional application where it has been stated that the said agreement was not signed by the defendant voluntarily and according to Mr. A reference was also made by Mr. Dasgupta, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite parties from an averment made from the enclosure appended to the revisional application where it has been stated that the said agreement was not signed by the defendant voluntarily and according to Mr. Dasgupta, if the allegation is that the instrument is not the resultant effect of volitional act of the party then the party should not be allowed to take advantage of the references of arbitration as the said party cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate simultaneously as the same will be marked by inconsistency of the conduct. 6. Mr. Roychowdhury has the occasion to refer to the case of (3) Shankarlal Laxminarayan, Rathi v. Udaisingh Dinkarrao Rajurkar reported in AIR 1976 Bombay 237, and has submitted that if there is a particular statute which confers power on the statutory authority and by virtue of an agreement between the parties, it is not open for the parties to confer such power upon any other person including an arbitrator. Mr. Roychowdhury has compared the provisions of C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses sad Rent Control Order (1949) with those of the provisions of the West Bengal Premise. Tenancy Act and according to Mr. Roychowdhury in view of the non-obstantive clause being superadded to Section 13(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, no decree for eviction can be passed unless the Court concerned is satisfied about the existence of such grounds and no authority except the Court on confirmation of satisfaction about the existence of grounds can pass such a decree. Therefore, according to Mr. Roychowdhury, such exception can be made only in case of Rent Control Legislation which is guided by statute which may take any volitional role of the parties by submitting themselves to agreement of appointment of arbitrator to have their controversies resolved. This Court is not concerned very much with regard to determination of that question as it has not been contended by Mr. This Court is not concerned very much with regard to determination of that question as it has not been contended by Mr. Roychowdhury that in view of the language of Section 5 of the present Law of Arbitration and he has also referred to the repealing section being Section 86 of the Act and he has also drawn the attention of this Court under Section 85 thereof and according to his contention that the instant case being a case under the Transfer of Property Act which is under general law, therefore the Arbitration Act will prevail. Mr. Roychowdhury was also referred to the object of the Arbitration sad Conciliation Act and according to him the basic object us to amalgamate, namely, the arbitral awards domestic arbitration awards and international arbitral awards and according to him, the present law has been enacted by way of adaptation of the Geneva Convention. According to Mr. Roychowdhury, learned Advocate for the petitioner, the same should be taken note of and it should be given a broad-based effect prevailing over the general law namely, the Transfer of Property Act. 7. Mr. Dasgupta learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite parties has drawn the attention of this Court from Paragraph 7 of the Instrument of Lease, and according to him, the expressions used in Paragraph 7 are omnibus in nature which only relate to matters incidental or arriving out of the lease and as such, according to Mr. Dasgupta, the terms of the reference of arbitration in Paragraph 7 of the lease agreement are neither clear nor categorical. 8. Mr. Dasgupta in support of his submission has referred to the case of (4) Atin Bose v. Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd reported in AIR 1983 Calcutta 376 and he has drawn the attention of this Court particularly to Paragraph 13 and it has been opined there that from the entire clause as a whole one cannot but find it difficult the clear meaning as to the applicability of the arbitrations clause in respect of the disputes which have been raised in the plaint, it cannot but be read as a vague clause and as such vocable and not enforceable arbitration clause. In any event the arbitration clause can be read without attaching any meaning to the expression "and many articles of conditions thereto", even then the rest of the arbitration clause must be read as limited to interpretation of the clauses contained in the contract and accordingly, the expression "such disputes and differences of opinion" has been used in connection thereof. In the opinion of the Court, the disputes which are subject-matter of legal proceedings being the plaint hereof cannot be covered by the said arbitration clause contained in the said contract. Mr. Dasgupta has drawn inspiration from the citation of the said judgment and he has also pointed out in similar vein that the expressions “as they are couched in stereotype language” do not indicate particular reference to any specific issues giving indication of the dimension to pinpoint the dispute or difference and as such vague allegations loosely made in omnibus type cannot constitute the ingredients of foundation of allegations of difference for remittance before the Arbitrator. Mr. Dasgupta has also submitted that the aforesaid Clause (7) is bereft of the mandatory foundation which is required therein that parties will themselves be bound by the result of the arbitration. The said averment is not there, according to Mr. Dasgupta. Mr. Dasgupta has next referred to the decision in the case of (5) Anderson Wright Ltd. v. Moran and Co. reported in AIR 1955 SC 53 and in the said judgment it has been pointed out that inter alia amongst others that the party is read, and prepared to satisfy the Court that at the commencement of the proceeding that he would abide by the result of the arbitration. A further reference was made a contemporaneous decision of the apex Court reported in the case of (6) K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi & Others reported in AIR 1998 SC 1297 , where it bas been pointed out by placement of reference on the said decision that agreement must contain the terms that parties will abide by the result of the arbitration agreement and they will follow the arbitration award as scrupulously as possible. According to Mr. Dasgupta, absence of such a salient feature in the agreement makes its look laconic in character. 9. Mr. According to Mr. Dasgupta, absence of such a salient feature in the agreement makes its look laconic in character. 9. Mr. Dasgupta has also drawn the attention of this Court from the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and he has referred from Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act which contemplates inter alia amongst others that where a lease to immovable property has been determined by forfeiture for non-payment of rent a lessor sues to eject the lessee and at the time of hearing of the suit if the lessee pays and tenders the lessor the rent in arrear or furnishes security, to the Court, then the Court may in lieu of making a decree for ejectment pass an order relieving the lessee against forfeiture. According to Mr. Dasgupta, the said provision makes it clear about the role of intervention by the Court and even in cases coming under Section 114A of the Transfer of Property Act role of the Court is contemplated. According to Mr. Dasgupta, the Court cannot be conceived of as synonymous to as that of the Arbitrator and the functions which are designated in the Transfer of Property Act under Section 114 thereof in favour of the Court, cannot be delegated to the Arbitrator. According to Mr. Dasgupta, said assumption of jurisdiction of the functions of the Court by the Arbitrator are not contemplated. While dealing with the impugned order though contentious and counter-contentions have been made and this Court forms the impression that the order impugned passed by the revisional Court, is not articulately written but the sum and substance of the question is as to whether the functions likely to be performed by the Court as contemplated by Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act are capable of being transmitted to the Arbitrator and the Arbitrator can take charge of the entire hog of materials to be decided in a proceeding either under Section 114 or under Section 114A of the Transfer of Property Act. Further, it appears from the submissions of Mr. Further, it appears from the submissions of Mr. Dasgupta that Clause (7) of the arbitration clause does not pinpoint the range of difference and what is the actual difference between the parties which is capable of being referred to the Arbitrator for adjudication as Paragraph 7 of the Instrument of Lease is couched in a language of general pattern of omnibus nature with ambiguity which is also denuded of vital elements that the parties will be bound by the result of arbitration with regard to difference which are required to be articulately projected in the matter the paragraph containing a concise statement of the reference of arbitration. As such, for the reasons as indicated hereinbefore, namely, that the terms as paraphrased in Paragraph 7 of the Instrument of Lease are vague and they do not pinpoint the points of differences between the parties not they are indicative of vital elements required to be incorporated in an agreement of arbitration. It also transpires that some of the functions which are delegated to the Court in terms of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be allowed to be taken away by the Arbitrator because the entire range of dispute which is forecast even by a statute which is dubbed by Mr. Roychowdhury as general law but still for some functions they are to be discharged by the Court, the same cannot be taken over by the Arbitrator particularly in the wake of controversy, emanating from the store-house of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act where strict construction of stipulation of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act and the role of the Court is required to be deciphered from plain reading of the language of the same. 10. In view of the reasons as stated above, this Court is not in a position to interfere with the conclusion of the revisional Court and as such the pres eat petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India stand dismissed on contest. 11. It is, however, made clear that any of the observations made by this Court will not affect the merits of the trial Court as the matter is allowed to be proceeded with the trial Court. Office is directed to supply urgent xexox certified copy of this order to the learned Advocates for both parties.