Judgment 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Second Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras, in C.C.No.3293 of 1985 dated 29.12.1987 acquitting the responents 1 and 2. 2. The case of the prosecution is that the respondents who are the principal employers of the factory M/s.Irish Engineering Industries Private Limited did not file the returns in time which attracts the offence under Sec.85-E of the Employees State Insurance Act. 3. The trial court, after trial, on consideration of the evidence let in by the prosecution acquitted the respondents 1 and 2 mainly on the following two grounds: (i) Instead of filing prosecution for the offence under Sec.85-E, the complaint ought not to have been filed under Sec.85-G. (ii) Under Sec.86 no prosecution under the Act shall be instituted except or with the previous sanction of the Insurance Commissioner. 4. Mr.Dasaratharaman, learned counsel, representing Mr.Rajamanickam, appearing for the appellant, contends that both the grounds are not valid in law, inasmuch as the complaint containing the averments attracting the offence under Sec.85-DE of the Act was filed and the said accusation was proved by adducing the evidence to the effect that the returns were not filed in time and that the adding of Sec.86 of the Act which is not a relevant section, is only purely a mistake and that would not in any way affect the prosecution case. He would also submit that in respect of the offence under Sec.85-E of the Act, there are sufficient materials to hold that the said offence was proved. It is also pointed out by him that Sec.86 does provide that the institution of the prosecution case should be only after obtaining the previous sanction of the authority. In the instant case, there is no dispute that the complaint was filed along with the said sanction, and the same had been spoken to by P.W.2. The non-marking of the said document would not affect the cognizance and the consequent trial and, therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. 5. Though notice was served on the respondents, no counsel appeared on their behalf. 6. I have carefully gone through the judgment and considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant. 7. The non-marking of the said document would not affect the cognizance and the consequent trial and, therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. 5. Though notice was served on the respondents, no counsel appeared on their behalf. 6. I have carefully gone through the judgment and considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant. 7. The trial court was only called upon the answer the question, whether offence under Sec.85-E of the Act which is the failure to file returns in time is made out or not. 8. Instead of answering the said question, the trial court went beyond the scope by observing that adding Sec.85-G would be fatal affecting the prosecution case. This, in my view, is patently wrong. Therefore, the said finding is liable to be set aside. 9. Yet another ground on which the judgment of acquittal is challenged is that the sanction, admittedly, obtained and enclosed along with the complaint, was not marked. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant would cite a decision rendered in, (1998)1 M.W.N. (Crl.) 281, to show that mere non-marking of the said sanction cannot be a ground for acquittal and the trial court shall give further opportunity for the prosecution to adduced additional evidence by marking the said sanction which is very much available in the court records. 11. Though in the said decision, the matter was remitted back for enabling the prosecution to mark the said sanction, in my view even that remitting in this case is not necessary, in view of the fact that reading of the working of Sec.86 would go to show that the prosecution has to be instituted along with the sanction. Therefore, in the absence of any dispute with reference to the existence of the sanction, I am of the considered opinion that the non-marking of the sanction cannot be a ground for rejecting the entire case of prosecution. 12. Of course, it is true that in cases like Prevention of Corruption Act etc. the relevant sections would provide that no cognizance shall be taken by the court concerned without the sanction. In those cases, sanction is marked, In the instant case, the wording containing in Sec.86 is clearly different, inasmuch as the section provides the duty of the prosecution to obtain sanction before institution. the relevant sections would provide that no cognizance shall be taken by the court concerned without the sanction. In those cases, sanction is marked, In the instant case, the wording containing in Sec.86 is clearly different, inasmuch as the section provides the duty of the prosecution to obtain sanction before institution. Therefore, the failure by the prosecution to mark the said sanction which is available on the record cannot be a ground to throw out the case of prosecution. However, it may be proper in appropriate cases, to mark the said sanction, when it is available in court, in the event of any question raised with reference to the validity of sanction. There is no question arises in this case with regard to that. Therefore, in my view, the finding given by the trial court with reference to the non-marking of the sanction does suffer from illegality and so, the same is liable to be set aside. 13. As pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant, in the decision in Bhagirath Kanoria v. State of Madhya Pradesh Bhagirath Kanoria v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1984)4 S.C.C. 222 it has been held that the proceedings in a welfare legislation likethe one, under consideration cannot be evaded by putting forth technical objections especially, when the said objection would not go to the root of the matter. In fact, as indicated above, there is no question raised in this case with reference to the jurisdiction of the sanction of the authority. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the findings rendered by trial court with reference to the grounds for acquitting accused-respondents 1 and 2, would suffer from perversity and illegality and consequently, the same are liable to be set aside. 14. However, I do not propose to impose conviction on the respondents for the reason that the said offence took place in 1984 and the judgment was rendered by trial court on 29.12.1987. In view of long lapse of 12 years, I do not find any reason either to remit back the matter for fresh consideration or to impose conviction except to point out the illegality in the impugned judgment rendered by the trial court. 15. With the above observation, this appeal is disposed of.