JUDGMENT 1. - The instant writ petition has been filed for seeking direction to the respondents to accept the application form of the petitioner for appointment to the post of Teacher Grade III in pursuance of the Advertisement dated 13-6-1998 (Annexure 4). 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the respondents issued the advertisement dated 13-6-98 for inviting applications for the said posts. The application had to be submitted by 27-6-98 and the interviews etc. were to be held on 29th and 30th June, 1998. The requirement under the said advertisement had been that a candidate must not be below 18 years and above 33 years of age on 1-1-98. 3. Petitioner filed the writ petition at a very belated stage, i.e. on 22-8-98, after about two months of the conclusion of the interviews etc. on the ground that the State Government had issued a Notification on 29-6-1998, enhancing the age by two years and, thus, the respondents be directed to consider his candidature. 4. It is settled proposition of law that selection process comes into existence by issuance of the advertisement and if the Rules are amended subsequent to the date of advertisement, the vacancies cannot be filled-up as per the amended rules and the same have to be filled-up as per the law existing on the date of advertisement. (Vide Y. V. Rangaiah v. J. Srinivasa Rao, AIR 1983 SC 852 ; A. A. Calton v. Director of Education, AIR 1983 SC 1143 ; P. Mahendran v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1990 SC 405 ; and State of Rajasthan v. R. Dayal, (1997) 3 JT (SC) 198 . In Gopal Krishna Rath v. M. A. A. Baig (dead) by Legal Representative, (1999) 1 SCC 544 : ( AIR 1999 SC 2093 ) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if the eligibility criteria is changed after last date of submission of the applications, as provided in the advertisement, it would not affect the selection process/recruitment which had already commenced unless the criteria (eligibility) changed is made applicable with retrospective effect covering selection process in question. Thus, if the notification for enhancing the age has been issued subsequent to the date of advertisement, the posts must be filled-up as per the old eligibility criteria. 5. Thus, if the notification for enhancing the age has been issued subsequent to the date of advertisement, the posts must be filled-up as per the old eligibility criteria. 5. Petitioner's claim is that his Date of Birth is 15-10-1961 and as per the Government Notification dated 29-6-98, the age has been enhanced by two years, meaning thereby that in General Category, a candidate could have applied upto the age of 35 years and as petitioner belongs to other backward classes, two years' further relaxation was permissible for him and; thus, he was entitled to be considered up to the age of 37 years and, therefore, his application. should have been entertained as he was below 37 years of age on 1-1-1998. His further grievance is that for some reasons, the posts had not been filled up in the years 1995, 1996 and 1997 and, thus, respondents were bound to split the vacancies arising in those years and giving the weightage to the candidates who were eligible on the said dates as the law requires determination of vacancies year-wise. 6. The advertisement was issued by the respondents on 13-6-98. The last date for submit- ting the applications was 22-6-98. Interviews were held on 29th and 30th June, 1998. The petitioner submitted the application form on 1-8- 98. The writ petition has been filed before this Court on 22-8-98. Petitioner has not explained the reason for delay and Mr. P. P. Choudhary could not point out as to how the petition could be entertained at such a belated stage, particularly in view of the fact that petitioner has not stated anywhere in the petition that the selection process had not been completed. It has also not been stated whether select list has been declared and if so, on what date; whether the selections had already been made and appointments have been offered to the successful candidates; whether petition can be entertained without impleading the successful candidates. The petitioner is admittedly guilty of delay and laches. In a particular case, the delay of even one day will be fatal while approaching the writ Court though there is no law of limitation applicable in writ Court as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sudama Devi v. Commissioner, (1983) 2 SCC 1 : ( AIR 1983 SC 653 ) . In a particular case, the delay of even one day will be fatal while approaching the writ Court though there is no law of limitation applicable in writ Court as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sudama Devi v. Commissioner, (1983) 2 SCC 1 : ( AIR 1983 SC 653 ) . In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 : ( AIR 1998 SC 3222 ) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a party, who is not prosecuting his case most diligently, is not entitled for the relief as the delay would defeat the cause of justice. 7. If the selections have already been made, the successful persons are necessary party and without impleading them, the petition cannot be entertained. (Vide Ishwar Singh v. Kuldeep Singh, 1995 Suppl (1) SCC 179; Bhagwanti v. Subordinate Services Selection Board, Haryana, 1995 Suppl (2) SCC 663 ; Central Bank of India v. S. Satyam (1996) 5 SCC 419 ; J. Jose Dhanapaul v. S. Thomas, (1996) 3 SCC 587 ; Arun Tewari v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh v. AIR 1998 SC 331 ; and Azhar Hasan v. District Judge, Saharanpur, (1998) 3 SCC 246 : ( AIR 1998 SC 2960 ) . 8. There is no force in the contention of Mr. Choudhary that notification issued by the State Government on 29-6-98 will override the statutory rules and there is no requirement of amending the statutory Rules for enhancing the age, as it is settled proposition of law that executive instructions cannot amend or override the statutory provisions. The statutory rules can only be amended by adopting the procedure of amendment (Vide Constitution Benches judgment of the Supreme Court in B. N. Nagrajan v. State of Mysore, AIR 1966 SC 1942 ; and Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1910 . Similar view has been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Naga People's Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India, (1998) 2 SCC 109 : ( AIR 1998 SC 431 ) ; Dhan Raj v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (1998) 4 SCC 30 ; Abraham Jacob v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 65 : ( AIR 1998 SC 1011 ) ; Tika Ramji v. State of U.P., AIR 1956 SC 676 ; and P. D. Agrawal v. State of U.P., AIR 1987 SC 1676 ; and Dr. Rita Bhandari v. State of Rajasthan, S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4392/1991, decided on 30-3-1998 . 9. It is most unfortunate that the petitions are being filed in the Courts without proper pleadings and adducing any evidence to substantiate the pleadings. In Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1988 SC 2181 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under (para 13) : "In our opinion, when a point, which is ostensibly a point of law is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or the counter-affidavit, as the case may be, the Court will not entertain the point. There is a distinction between a hearing under the Code of Civil Procedure and a writ petition or a counter-affidavit. While in a pleading, i.e. a plaint or written statement, the facts and not the evidence are required to be pleaded. In a writ petition or in the counter-affidavit, not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it. (Emphasis added) 10. Similar view has been reiterated in Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, (1998) 4 SCC 387 : ( AIR 1998 SC 1608 ) ; National Buildings Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan (1998) 7 SCC 66 ; and Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani, (1999) 1 SCC 141 ( AIR 1998 SC 3012 ) . 11. In the instant case, the Government Notification dated 29-6-1998, on which the entire case is based, has not been filed nor it is produced in the Court at the time of hearing. In absence of such material, the writ petition itself cannot be entertained and such vague pleadings make the petitioner disentitled for any relief. 12. In Re : Sanjiv Datta (1995 AIR SCW 2203), the Apex Court has also observed as under (Para 11) : "Some members of the profession have been adopting perceptibly casual approach to the practice of the profession as is evident from...... the filing of incomplete and inaccurate pleadings..... 12. In Re : Sanjiv Datta (1995 AIR SCW 2203), the Apex Court has also observed as under (Para 11) : "Some members of the profession have been adopting perceptibly casual approach to the practice of the profession as is evident from...... the filing of incomplete and inaccurate pleadings..... and the failure to remove office objections........they do not realise the seriousness of these acts and omissions. They not only amount to the contempt of the Court but do positive disservice to the litigants and create embarrassing situation with Court leading to avoidable, unpleasantness and delay in disposal of matters. This ougurs ill for the health of our judicial system." (Emphasis added). 13. Most of the cases are being filed in most casual manner by pleading vaguely and if Courts start initiating contempt proceedings, the Court would have no other business except to call the petitioner in exercise of the powers under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and innocent petitioners may plead that they cannot be held responsible for the pleadings made by their counsel. Thus, such a course is not warrant. However, filing of petitions in such a cavalier and casual manner is deprecated. 14. Even if all the above issues are ignored and the matter be considered on merit even then I am very much doubtful that petitioner has any case. Mr. Choudhary states that the vacancies had not been filled-up in 1995, 1996 and 1997, therefore, the vacancies must have been splitted. Petitioner's Date of Birth is 15-10-1961. As per the provisions of Rule 265 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996, a candidate for direct recruitment must not have attained the maximum age of eligibility on 1st January following the last date fixed for receipt of the application. There must be a analogous provision to this in the old Rule, though nothing is clear from the pleadings. Thus, in general conditions, the petitioner became over-aged on 1-1-94. Even if two years' relaxation for candidates belonging to other backward classes had been granted at that time, he could have become over-aged on 1-1- 96 and even if the extension of two years, as provided under the so-called Notification dated 29- 6-1998 is given, he would become over-aged on 1-1-1998. The vacancies had been advertised on 13-6-1998 and the last date for submitting the applications had been 27-6-98. The vacancies had been advertised on 13-6-1998 and the last date for submitting the applications had been 27-6-98. In view of the statutory rule, the petitioner must be below 37 years of age on 1-1-999. It appears to have wrongly been mentioned in the advertisement that a candidate should be of maximum age on 1-1-1998. The Authority might have issued a corrigendum subsequently which petitioner has not filed along with the petition. Moreover, it is settled proposition of law that all this type of circulars have to be read in consonance with the statutory rules. (Vide Union Territory of Chandigarh Administration v. Managing Society, Goswami UDSDC, (1996) 7 SCC 665 : ( AIR 1996 SC 1759 ) . The Court cannot issue any direction contrary to law (vide Union of India v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd., (1996) 4 SCC 453 : ( AIR 1996 SC 3285 ) ; State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra (1996) 9 SCC 309 ; and vice Chancellor v. Dr. Anand Prakash Mishra, (1997) 10 SCC 264 . 15. Thus, it is clear that petitioner was within the age limit, as per the Rules, only up to 1-1-96 and he could have applied for the post in 1995 if the posts were advertised. He cannot be permitted to agitate that as the vacancies had not been advertised in 1995 and had the vacancies been splitted year-wise, he could be permitted to appear in the test in 1998 for the vacancies which arose in 1995. Such an argument cannot be accepted in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in J. & K. Public Service Commission v. Dr. Narendra Mohan (1994) 4 SCC 630 : ( AIR 1994 SC 1808 ) , wherein the Court observed as under (para 12 of AIR) : "It is difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Rao to adopt the chain system of recruitment be notified each year's vacancies and for recruitment of the candidates found eligible for the respective years. It would be fraught with grave consequences. It is settled law that the Government need not immediately notify vacancies as soon as they arose. Rao to adopt the chain system of recruitment be notified each year's vacancies and for recruitment of the candidates found eligible for the respective years. It would be fraught with grave consequences. It is settled law that the Government need not immediately notify vacancies as soon as they arose. It is open, as early as possible, to inform the vacancies existing or anticipated to the Public Service Commission for recruitment and that every eligible person is entitled to apply for and to be considered of his case for recruitment provided he satisfies the prescribed requisite qualification. Pegging a recruitment in chain system would deprive all the eligible candidates as on date of inviting applications for recruitment offending Articles 14 and 16." 16. Same view has been taken by this Court in Kumari Luni Jogesh v. State of Rajasthan, 1998 Raj LW 1735 . 17. Thus, in view of the above, the petitioner cannot claim any relief whatsoever. The petition is devoid of any merit and accordingly dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******