K.T.THOMAS, J. (1) THE appellant has been convicted under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (for short "the Act") and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. He filed an appeal, but the High Court dismissed the appeal by confirming the conviction and sentence. Hence, he has come up to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution by special leave. (2) THE appellant was the Supply Inspector in the Department of Food and Civil Supplies in the State of Uttar Pradesh. On 11-8-1977 a trap was arranged on the information furnished by PW 1, a fair price shop dealer in sugar, who told the Vigilance Authorities that the appellant was demanding Rs.200 as bribe. It is the prosecution case that the trap became successful and the marked currency notes were recovered from the left pocket of the appellant. (3) THE main point canvassed before us is that no sanction has been accorded by the competent authority for instituting the prosecution and therefore the Special Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence at all. Though this point was raised before the High Court it was curtly skipped off with the following observations: "THIS is irrelevant for the present case because for trial of offence under Section 5(1)(d) of the Act, sanction is not necessary. Section 6 only prohibits commencement of trial for offence punishable under Section 161 or Section 164 or Section 165 IPC or under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3)(a) of Section 5 of the Act without sanction. The present case is under Section 5(1)(d) and hence it is immaterial to find out as to who was the appointing authority of the accused appellant." (4) IT is conceded that the aforesaid reasoning is fallacious for there is no offence under Section 5(1)(d) unless the same is read with Section 5(2) of the Act. So the prosecution is actually for the offence under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Act. It is a requirement under Section 6 of the Act that "no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under subsection (2) of Section 5 of this Act, except with the previous sanction of the authority competent to remove him from his office" (words which are not material for this case have been omitted). It is a requirement under Section 6 of the Act that "no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under subsection (2) of Section 5 of this Act, except with the previous sanction of the authority competent to remove him from his office" (words which are not material for this case have been omitted). It is conceded that the authority competent to remove him is the authority which has appointed him. (5) LEARNED counsel for the respondent State contended that the competent appointing authority to appoint is Supply Inspector during the relevant time was the District Magistrate. In support thereof an affidavit has been filed sworn to by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Fatehgarh District, U.P. stating that "ACCORDING to Rule 18 of the U.P. Food and Civil Supplies (Supply Branch) Subordinate Service Rules, 1980, on the relevant time i.e. 11-8-1977 (the date of incident), the District Magistrate was the appointing authority for the post of Supply Inspectors". (6) BUT learned counsel for the appellant contended that whatever be the position in 1977 the appellant was in fact appointed by the Commissioner of Civil Supplies and therefore the sanction should have been granted by the Commissioner. He produced a copy of the order of promotion/appointment to the post of Supply Inspector dated 19-4-1973. It clearly shows that it was the Commissioner who passed the order promoting the appellant from a cadre of Clerk to the cadre of Supply Inspector. Though a contention was raised that it does not reflect the order of appointment but only promotion. We are of the view that the promotion was only a source through which appointment to the cadre was made. If actually the appellant was appointed by the Commissioner it is a different matter that the District Magistrate also had the authority to appoint. (7) "APPOINTING authority" is interpreted in Rule 2 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. That definition is extracted below: "2. If actually the appellant was appointed by the Commissioner it is a different matter that the District Magistrate also had the authority to appoint. (7) "APPOINTING authority" is interpreted in Rule 2 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. That definition is extracted below: "2. In the rules, unless the context otherwise requires, (a) Appointing authority, in relation to a government servant, means (I) the authority empowered to make appointments to the Service of which the government servant is for the time being a member or to the grade of the Service in which the government servant is for the time being included, or (II) the authority empowered to make appointments to the post which the government servant for the time being holds, or (III) the authority which appointed the government servant to such Service, grade or post, as the case may be, or (IV) where the government servant having been a permanent member of any other Service or having substantively held any other permanent post, has been in continuous employment of the Government, the authority which appointed him to that Service or to any grade in that Service or to that post, whichever authority is the highest authority;" (8) THE position is now clear that even though the District Magistrate was also an appointing authority, as the appellant was in fact appointed by the Commissioner, who is admittedly a higher authority than the District Magistrate, the Commissioner is the appointing authority so far as the appellant is concerned. (9) IF that be so, the appellant is entitled to contend that the sanction to prosecute him in this case should have been passed by the Commissioner and not by the District Magistrate. The sanction issued by the District Magistrate is not a sanction in the eye of the law as the said authority was incompetent to accord sanction for prosecution under the Act concerning the appellant. (10) IT is unnecessary to go into the other merits of the case as we hold that want of sanction would totally exclude the jurisdiction of the Special Judge under the Act of 1947 from taking cognizance of the offence. In the result we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and also the conviction and sentence passed on him.