S. P. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) THE insurer/ appellant feeling aggrieved by the award dated 7. 11. 1994 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Shivpuri in the proceedings under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (old Act) has approached this court by means of this appeal seeking redress praying for the setting aside of the same and the dismissal of the claim petition. The present appeal had been presented in this court on 13. 2. 95. ( 2 ) WE have. heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned counsel representing the contesting respondents. ( 3 ) TAKING into consideration the nature of the controversy involved in all these appeals, they had been heard together and are being disposed of by a common order. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel representing the claimants-respondents has raised a preliminary objection to the effect that this appeal had been presented much beyond the prescribed period of limitation without there being any application for seeking the condonation of delay in its presentation and without furnishing any explanation whatsoever for the same and as such it is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone without going into the merits. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant has urged that although no application seeking condonation of the delay in filing the appeal has been filed yet it has been pointed out in ground (e) of the memo of the appeal that since the certified copy of the impugned award had been delivered to the appellant company on 8. 12. 1994, the appeal had to be taken as presented within the period of limitation prescribed therefor and in this view of the matter, the question of moving an application seeking condonation of delay did not arise. ( 6 ) WE have considered the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant heavily relied upon the endorsement on the order-sheet of the aforesaid Tribunal dated 7. 11. 1994 to the effect that copy of the award had been received by the appellant on 8. 12. 1994. ( 8 ) IN the present case, what we find is that the Tribunal had given its impugned award on 7. 11. 94. 11. 1994 to the effect that copy of the award had been received by the appellant on 8. 12. 1994. ( 8 ) IN the present case, what we find is that the Tribunal had given its impugned award on 7. 11. 94. The order-sheet of that date maintained by the Tribunal shows that on the aforesaid date the counsel for the appellant was present and the judgment giving the award had been pronounced in his presence. A copy of the impugned award supplied to the appellant by the tribunal has been filed along with the memo of appeal. ( 9 ) AS has already been noticed hereinabove, the appeal was presented in this court on 13. 2. 1995. The limitation for filing the appeal against the award which stands prescribed is only 90 days from the date of the award as stipulated under section 173 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1988' ). The appeal when presented was, therefore, obviously barred by time. ( 10 ) THE provision contained in section 168 (2) of the Act of 1988 provides that the Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver the copies of the award to the parties concerned expeditiously and in any case within a period of fifteen days from the date of the award. The award in the present case had been delivered on 7. 11. 1994 in the presence of the counsel for the parties and the order-sheet maintained by the Tribunal indicates that the original award had been kept in the record of the claim Case No. 41 of 1989 which was the leading case and the photocopy of the said order was placed on the claim case giving rise to this appeal. ( 11 ) THE assertion made in ground (e) of the memorandum of appeal to the effect that the certified copy of the award was delivered to the appellant company on 8. 12. 1994 is not supported by any affidavit. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the copy of the award could not be supplied on the date when the award had been given. 12. 1994 is not supported by any affidavit. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the copy of the award could not be supplied on the date when the award had been given. In fact, the statutory provision mandates that the Tribunal could not withhold the supply of the copy of the award beyond a period of fifteen days from the date of the award as stipulated in section 168 (2) of the Act of 1988. In this view of the matter, the appellant cannot derive any advantage from this fact that the Tribunal had delivered the appellant company certified copy of the award on 8. 12. 1994 as it was open to the appellant to receive the copy whenever it liked. The obligation cast upon the Tribunal under the provision contained in section 168 (2)of the Act of 1988 is to the effect that it shall arrange to deliver the copies of the award to the parties concerned expeditiously and in any case within a period of fifteen days from the date of the award. ( 12 ) THE expression 'arrange to deliver the copies of the award' as used in section 168 (2) of the Act of 1988 only stipulates that the Tribunal shall keep the certified copies of the award ready for being delivered to the parties concerned. Obviously it is for the party concerned to receive the copy of the award. It may choose to receive it on any date of its choice. Once the copy of the award is made ready for delivery, it is the date on which the copy of the award is made ready for delivery which is material and not the date on which the copy of the award is actually received which is left to the discretion of the concerned party. The appellant has not come up with any allegation that the copy of the award could not be made ready or made available for deliverv on the date when the award was pronounced or within the period stipulated therefor. It is not the case of the appellant that copy of the award was made available for delivery on 8. 12. 1994. In such a circumstance, the fact that the appellant received the copy of the award on 8. 12. 1994 is of no consequence whatsoever. It is not the case of the appellant that copy of the award was made available for delivery on 8. 12. 1994. In such a circumstance, the fact that the appellant received the copy of the award on 8. 12. 1994 is of no consequence whatsoever. ( 13 ) IT may, however, be noticed that the provisions contained in rule 242 of the Madhya Pradesh Motor Yan Niyam, 1994, clearly stipulate that the appellant is required to annex along with the appeal, the certified copy of the award sought to be impugned. In the present case, neither the certified copy of the award annexed along with the appeal nor the order-sheet maintained by the Tribunal nor any other material placed on record can lead to an inference that the certified copy of the award was not available and could not be delivered on 7. 11. 1994. There is nothing to indicate that at least up to 15. 11. 1994, the copy of the award was not ready for delivery to the parties or the appellant. In this connection, it may further be noticed that the order-sheet maintained by the tribunal clearly indicates that photocopies of the award had been prepared and placed on the record of each claim case arising out of the same accident. ( 14 ) WE are clearly of the opinion that in case for any reason the aggrieved party is unable to get the certified copy of the award from the Tribunal on the date when the award was delivered, it is incumbent upon it to establish this fact from cogent evidence, which should be brought on record indicating that either the Tribunal was unable to supply the certified copy of the award on the date when the award had been delivered or on subsequent dates and had failed to comply with the mandatory requirements envisaged under section 168 (2) of the Act of 1988 or there was sufficient cause which prevented the appellant to take delivery of the award on its being made available which may be considered for condoning the delay in the presentation of the appeal exercising the jurisdiction contemplated under the proviso to section 173 of the Act of 1988. ( 15 ) IN the present case, what we find is that the appellant has neither filed any affidavit nor has filed any such material which could lead to an inference that the tribunal was unable to provide the certified copy of the award to the appellant either on the date on which the award had been pronounced or within the period stipulated therefor under section 168 (2) of the Act of 1988 or there was any sufficient cause which prevented the appellant from taking delivery of the certified copy of the award when it was made available. ( 16 ) THIS court in its decision in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Govind Singh, 1997 (1) MPWN SN 14, had observed that the order-sheet maintained by the Tribunal is presumed to have been correctly written, and, even if the said order-sheet was not signed by the said advocate, it would not imply that the name of the counsel appearing in the case was wrongly mentioned in the order-sheet. ( 17 ) THE ratio of the decision in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Govind singh, 1997 (1) MPWN SN 14, rendered by a Division Bench of this court indicates that the knowledge of the award has to be imputed on the aggrieved party which is represented by a counsel and whose presence was noted in the order-sheet when the award was dated, signed and pronounced. ( 18 ) IN the present case, therefore, it stands established that the appellant had received the knowledge of the award on 7. 11. 1994 itself. No effort was made by the appellant to file the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. No explanation worth the name has been furnished which could constitute sufficient cause for condonation of the delay. In fact, what is apparent is that the appellant has been thoroughly negligent and even did not care to apply for the certified copy of the award in spite of having known the fact that the award had been pronounced by the tribunal in the presence of its counsel. This appeal is pending since 1995 and the appellant did not even care to move an application seeking condonation of delay in filing this appeal and the assertion made in ground (e) of the memo of appeal was not supported even by any affidavit. This appeal is pending since 1995 and the appellant did not even care to move an application seeking condonation of delay in filing this appeal and the assertion made in ground (e) of the memo of appeal was not supported even by any affidavit. ( 19 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant has faintly urged that since the appeals had been admitted for hearing by a Division Bench of this court vide the order dated 15. 3. 1995, the delay even if it be there in the presentation of the appeal it should be taken to have been impliedly condoned. This contention is totally misconceived. The order admitting the appeal is an ex pane order. It cannot be taken to prevent the respondent from raising the preliminary objection in regard to the entertainability of the appeal. Further the provision contained in section 173 of the act of 1988 permits the entertainment of the appeal presented beyond the period of limitation prescribed only if the High court is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. We are of the view that this satisfaction must be recorded in an order. We are further of the view that the legislative intent underlying the provision in question does not contemplate an implied condonation of delay. It must be an express one contained in an order passed after affording a reasonable opportunity to the contesting respondent of being heard in opposition to the prayer for condoning the delay. It is, therefore, obvious that an implied condonation of delay in the presentation of the appeal is not contemplated under the aforesaid Act. The contention urged is not at all acceptable. ( 20 ) TAKING into consideration the totality of the circumstances, we are inclined to accept the preliminary objection which is hereby sustained. ( 21 ) THIS appeal in the circumstances is dismissed holding it to have been presented beyond the prescribed period of limitation without there being any explanation making out a sufficient cause preventing the appellant from filing the appeal within the time prescribed. Appeal dismissed. .