JUDGMENT - A.V. SAVANT, J.:---Heard both the learned Counsel. Shri Shirodkar for the petitioner and Smt. Tahilramani, P.P. for the respondents. 2. This petition is filed by Aslam Mohd. Merchant claiming to be the brother of Iqbal Mohammed Memon (for short "detenu") against whom an order of detention has been passed on 2nd September, 1994 by the Secretary to Government of Maharashtra in exercise of his powers under section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (for short, "P.I.T. N.D.P.S Act"). Admittedly the order of detention is not yet served on the detenu who is abroad and is not prepared to come to this country and have the order of detention served on him. The petitioner has prayed for two reliefs (i) quashing of the order of detention dated 2nd September, 1994 issued against the detenu Iqbal Mohd. Memon and (ii) quashing of all proceedings taken under section 8 of the said P.I.T.-N.D.P.S. Act read with sections 82 and 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "1973 Code"). Pending hearing and final disposal of this petition, if admitted, there is a prayer for stay of (i) order of detention issued against Iqbal Memon and (ii) all proceedings under section 8 of the P.I.T.-N.D.P.S. Act read with sections 82 and 83 of the 1973 Code. 3. The petitioner, apart from being the brother of the detenu, claims to be the owner of Hotel Meenas situated at Juhu Tara Road, Santacruz (West). Mumbai which property is the subject matter of attachment under section 83 of the 1973 Code. 4. At the outset, Smt. Tahilramani, the learned P.P. has taken a preliminary objection to the maintainability of this petition at the pre-execution stage. Affidavit-in-reply has been filed by S.S. Sayed. Inspector of Police attached to Anti Narcotics Cell, C.B.C.I.D. Mumbai. In Para 2 of the affidavit, specific contention has been taken in the following words : "At the outset, I say that this petition at the pre-execution stage is wholly misconceived and is untenable and it does not fall under any of the five exceptions as laid down in Alka Gadia's case, reported in Judgment Today 1991(1) S.C. 549 Additional Secretary to the Government of India and others v. Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia and others." 5. In support of the preliminary objection Smt. Tahilramani has invited our attention to the decision of Apex Court in the case of (Additional Secretary to the Government of India and others v. Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia and others)1, recorded in Judgment Today 1991(1) S.C. 549 (for short "Alka Gadia's case"). Our attention is also invited to the subsequent decisions of the Apex Court in (i) (N.K. Bapna v. Union of India and others)2, reported in 1992(3) Supreme Court Cases 512; (ii) (Subhash Muljimal Gandhi v. L. Hmingliana and another)3, reported in 1994 A.I.R. S.C.W. 4975; (iii) (Administration of the National Capital of Delhi, Raj Niwas, Delhi v. Prem Singh)4, reported in 1996 Supreme Court Cases (Cri.) 54; 6. Reliance has also been placed by Smt. Tahilramani on a number of decisions of this Court, where following the law laid down by the Apex Court in Alka Gadia's case and the subsequent decisions mentioned above, this Court has consistently refused to entertain writ petitions at the pre-detention stage. Relying upon the aforesaid judgments it is contended that the petitioner's case does not fall in any of the five exceptions carved out by the Apex Court in Alka Gadia's case namely : (i) the impugned order of detention is not passed under the Act under which it is purported to have been passed: (ii) that the order is sought to be executed against a wrong person: (iii) that it is passed for a wrong purpose: (iv) that it is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds: and (v) that the Authority which passed the order had no authority to do so. 7. We may also refer to the repeated cautions sounded by the Apex Court that the courts have, over the years, evolved certain self restraints for exercising power of judicial review conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution. The jurisdiction vested in this Court under Article 226, though undoubtedly wide, has to be used very sparingly and under circumstances where no other efficacious remedy exists. The jurisdiction vested in this Court under Article 226, though undoubtedly wide, has to be used very sparingly and under circumstances where no other efficacious remedy exists. It is also to be borne in mind that, as far as orders under the laws of preventive detention are concerned, if a detenu is permitted to challenge the order of detention and seek stay of the order even before it is executed, the very purpose of passing the order of detention and the law under which it is passed would be frustrated. The Apex Court has, therefore, observed that even if the case falls in one of the five exceptions mentioned above, the Court is not obliged to interfere at the pre-execution stage and may still insist that the detenu should first submit to the order of detention. This is clear from the observations made by the Apex Court in Para 31 and 32 of the decision in Alka Gadia's case. This approach has been reiterated in subsequent decisions and we need not repeat the same. 8. In reply to this preliminary objection, Shri Shirodkar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner tried to urge that petitioner's case fell under Exception (iii) and (iv) carved out by the Apex Court in Alka Gadia's case. Exception (iii) talks of the order being passed for a wrong purpose. Exception (iv) is that the order is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds. When we go through the petition and the annexures, it is difficult to appreciate how the petitioner's case falls under any of the above exceptions. Though no such specific case is pleaded in the writ petition that the case fell under Exception (iii) and (iv), Shri Shirodkar contended that what is alleged against the detenu is commission of offences under the N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 for which he is sought to be detained under order dated 2nd September, 1994 passed under the P.I.T. N.D.P.S. Act, 1988. Though no such specific case is pleaded in the writ petition that the case fell under Exception (iii) and (iv), Shri Shirodkar contended that what is alleged against the detenu is commission of offences under the N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 for which he is sought to be detained under order dated 2nd September, 1994 passed under the P.I.T. N.D.P.S. Act, 1988. Relying upon the affidavit filed by Police Inspector Ashok Khodkar in earlier Criminal Writ Petition No. 170 of 1994 in this Court, Shri Shirodkar contended that there are two cases pending against the detenu (i) N.D.P.S. Case No. 170 of 1993 arising out of Crime No. 38 of 1993 of the Narcotic Cell, in respect of incident of 2nd September, 1993 and (ii) N.D.P.S. Case No. 150/94 arising out of C.R. No. 7/94 of the Narcotic Cell in respect of the incident of 26th Feb. 1994. We are not concerned with the sufficiency of material for passing the order of detention particularly in a petition like this which is at the pre-execution stage and which must be confined to the narrow compass indicated by the Apex Court in Alka Gadia's case. However, we may briefly indicate that in respect of the N.D.P.S. Case No. 170 of 1993, the detenu himself had filed Criminal Writ Petition No. 170 of 1994 in this Court praying for a writ of certiorari for quashing the chargesheet dated 30th November, 1993. A Division Bench of this Court on 4th March, 1994 rejected writ petition in the following words : "Heard parties. Perused investigation papers. Rejected." 9. Undeterred by the dismissal of Criminal Writ Petition No. 170 of 1994, the detenu had preferred Writ Petition No. 904 of 1994 making prayers, almost similar to those made in Writ Petition No. 170 of 1994. After calling for necessary papers and perusing the same, this Court had passed orders refusing to grant relief of quashing the proceedings. However, the detenu was granted exemption from personal appearance in the N.D.P.S. Case No. 170/93 pending in the Sessions Court. This order dated 17th October, 1994 passed in Writ Petition No. 904 of 1994 was challenged by the State before the Apex Court in Special Leave Petition No. 4008 of 1994. However, the detenu was granted exemption from personal appearance in the N.D.P.S. Case No. 170/93 pending in the Sessions Court. This order dated 17th October, 1994 passed in Writ Petition No. 904 of 1994 was challenged by the State before the Apex Court in Special Leave Petition No. 4008 of 1994. On 13th January 1995 the Apex Court disposed of the Special Leave Petition expressing its disapproval of the manner in which this Court had granted exemption to the detenu from appearing in the N.D.P.S. Case pending before the Sessions Court. However, since the application for discharge was rejected in the meanwhile by the Special Judge himself by his order dated 7th November, 1994, the Apex Court did not think it necessary to deal with the matter any further and closed the matter on the ground that in had become infructuous. 10. However, being aggrieved by the order dated 7th November, 1994, passed by the Special Judge, rejecting the prayer for discharge, Criminal Revision Application No. 54 of 1995 was filed in this Court which was disposed of on 29th January 1996. The revision application was filed by the detenu himself praying for his discharge in N.D.P.S. Case No. 170 of 1993. This Court referred to the earlier orders passed in the two writ petitions and the order of the Apex Court dated 13-1-1995 and observed that since the accused did not even want to surrender to the Magesty of law, it was not proper to entertain his revision application on merits. In the circumstances, the revision application was rejected on 29-1-1996. 11. It thus appears that two N.D.P.S. cases are pending against the detenu Iqbal Mohammed Memon being (i) N.D.P.S. Case No. 170 of 1993 arising out of C.R. No. 38 of 1993 and (ii) N.D.P.S. Case No. 150 of 1994 arising out of C.R. No. 7/94. We need not go into the merits of any of the two cases since that is not the subject matter of this petition. We referred to them only because Shri Shirodkar's first contention is that the order of detention is passed for a wrong purpose and in support of this ground, he sought to contend that there is no substance in any of the two cases mentioned above. We reject the contention of the petitioner. 12. We referred to them only because Shri Shirodkar's first contention is that the order of detention is passed for a wrong purpose and in support of this ground, he sought to contend that there is no substance in any of the two cases mentioned above. We reject the contention of the petitioner. 12. The next ground urged by the petitioner is that the case falls under the fourth exception carved out by the Apex Court in Alka Gadia's case. As indicated above, the fourth exception is that the order of detention is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds. It is difficult to appreciate how, without even the grounds of detention being served on the detenu, the detenu's brother can file a writ petition contending that the grounds of detention are either vague, extraneous or irrelevant. Obviously, it was not possible for the petitioner to demonstrate how the order is passed on any vague, extraneous or irrelevant grounds. No grounds of detention are made available to us though the order of detention is annexed to the petition. We therefore, hold that there is no substance in the contention that the order of detention falls under exception (iii) and (iv) carved out by the Apex Court. 13. It was then contended by Shri Shirodkar that the petitioner's property being Hotel Meenas has wrongly been subjected to proceedings under section 8 of the P.I.T. N.D.P.S. Act read with section 83 of the 1973 Code. Section 8 of the P.I.T. N.D.P.S. Act deals with the powers to deal with absconding persons. Sections 82, 83, 84, 85 and 86 falling under Chapter VI of the 1973 Code deal with proclamation and attachment of property in respect of persons absconding. Since the detenu has been declared to be a person who is absconding, action has been taken under section 8 of the P.I.T. N.D.P.S. Act read with the said provisions of the 1973 Code. It appears that the petitioner's property Hotel Meenas is one of the properties attached under section 83 of the Code by virtue of order dated 28-1-1999 passed by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Esplanade, Mumbai in applications dated 11-12-1998 and 2-2-1996 filed by the State Government at the instance of the Anti Narcotic Cell, (C.B.), C.I.D. Mumbai. 14. It appears that the petitioner's property Hotel Meenas is one of the properties attached under section 83 of the Code by virtue of order dated 28-1-1999 passed by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Esplanade, Mumbai in applications dated 11-12-1998 and 2-2-1996 filed by the State Government at the instance of the Anti Narcotic Cell, (C.B.), C.I.D. Mumbai. 14. However, the learned P.P. Smt. Tahilramani invited our attention to the orders dated 12th April, 1999 passed by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 8th Court, Esplanade, Mumbai in Notices No. 6 and 7/N/1999. By virtue of these two orders passed on the applications of (i) the petitioner Aslam Merchant and (ii) Heena, wife of the detenu, the learned Magistrate has stayed the execution of the order of attachment dated 28th January, 1999. It is brought to our notice that the said orders dated 12th April, 1999 have been passed in proceedings under section 84 of the 1973 Code. While we need not express any opinion on the merits of the proceedings taken by the concerned parties, suffice it to say that the petitioner has already adopted alternate remedy for the release of his property Hotel Meenas and this is yet another reason why this writ petition at the pre-detention stage should not be entertained in so far as the petitioner's prayer in respect of the quashing of the proceedings for attachment of his property Hotel Meenas is concerned. Not only has the petitioner and the wife of the detenu adopted proceedings under section 84 of the 1973 Code, they have obtained stay orders on 12th April, 1999. 15. In view of the above, we uphold the preliminary objection raised by Smt. Tahilramani on behalf of the State. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Alka Gadia's case, and the subsequent decisions referred to above, we hold that this petition at the pre-execution stage is not at all maintainable. 16. We may incidentally mention that similar view was taken by this Court in a number of petitions namely (i) (Sayed Toher Bawamiya v. The Joint Secretary to Government of India and others)5, in Writ Petition No. 1459 of 1990 decided on 17th July, 1991, (ii) (Gauri Shankar Jakhalia v. The Jt. 16. We may incidentally mention that similar view was taken by this Court in a number of petitions namely (i) (Sayed Toher Bawamiya v. The Joint Secretary to Government of India and others)5, in Writ Petition No. 1459 of 1990 decided on 17th July, 1991, (ii) (Gauri Shankar Jakhalia v. The Jt. Secretary and others)6, in Writ Petition No. 648 of 1996 decided on 2-7-1996, 1996(I) L.J. 620 (iii) (Ghanshyam Raj Narayan Dubey v. State of Maharashtra and others)7, in Writ Petition No. 781 of 1997 decided on 29-9-1997, reported in 1998(5) Bom.C.R. 652 (iv) (Mohan Keshav Tandel v. The Union Territory of Daman Diu and others)8, in Writ Petition No. 1719 of 1998 decided on 14th January, 1999 and lastly (v) (Suresh Keshav Tandel v. The Union Territory of Daman Diu and others)9, in Writ Petition No. 1720 of 1998 decided on 14th January, 1999. 17. In view of the above, writ petition is dismissed. 18. Issuance of certified copy expedited. Petition dismissed. -----