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1999 DIGILAW 312 (MAD)

Pappillon Exports Limited and Another v. M. M. T. C. Limited

1999-03-22

A.RAMAMURTHI

body1999
Judgment :- A. RAMAMURTHI, J. These petitions are filed by the petitioners under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to quash the proceedings pending against them in C.C. Nos. 458, 380, 405, 457 and 456 of 1996, on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No. I, Tiruppur. The case in brief for disposal of all the petitions is as follows : The respondent filed these complaints under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as. "N.I. Act") against these petitioners. The petitioners are accused in these cases. The trial court ought not to have taken cognizance of the case because there was no board resolution authorising a particular person to file the complaint. There is also no power of attorney duly executed by the respondent under its company seal to represent the company in any court proceedings. The said Thiyagarajan has no locus standi to represent the company or give any sworn statement. He is also not a payee of the cheques, as contemplated under section 142(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The letter to the said Thiyagarajan cannot take the place of a resolution of the board of directors or power of attorney. Thiyagarajan, deputy general manager, cannot act on behalf of the company even under delegation of powers except under the authority of the board through a resolution. Furthermore, the complainant having taken recourse in a civil court by filing a suit in O.S. No. 640 of 1997, on the file of Sub-court, Tiruppur, in respect of the subject-matter of the complaint, the criminal case cannot be proceeded with further. There is a genuine dispute with regard to the amounts due under the export transaction and only a civil court of competent jurisdiction can deal with the matter and under the circumstances, the proceedings are liable to be quashed.The respondent/complainant opposed the application and contended that Thiyagarajan is the deputy general manager of the company and he has been duly authorised by the chief general manager. Learned counsel further pointed out that the company itself has filed the complaints and, therefore, any officer working in the company is competent to file the complaint. The delegation of power also has been provided in the rules of the company. Furthermore, the pendency of a suit will not be a bar to take criminal action in respect of the offence. The delegation of power also has been provided in the rules of the company. Furthermore, the pendency of a suit will not be a bar to take criminal action in respect of the offence. The question is a mixed question of fact and law and as it requires oral evidence, the proceedings cannot be quashed by this court. The respondent/complainant as well as the petitioner/accused are one and the same in all the cases. All the cases relate to complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The dispute involved and the points to be considered are similar in all the cases and, as such, a common order is pronounced. Heard learned counsel for both the sides. The company viz., M.M.T.C. Ltd., Chennai House, represented by its general manager, Mr. Thiyagarajan, filed the aforesaid complaints under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, against these petitioners. These cases are pending on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No. I, Tiruppur. Learned counsel for the petitioners raised the following grounds and contended that the complaints ought not to have been taken cognizance of by the trial court. The first ground raised by the petitioners is that there is no resolution passed by the board or any power of attorney, authorising the deputy general manager either to file a complaint or to give the sworn statement. The said Thiyagarajan is not the payee of the cheques as contemplated under section 142(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The authorisation said to have been given by the chief general manager to the said Thiyagarajan cannot take the place of the resolution of the board of directors or power of attorney. Lastly, for the very same subject-matter the respondent had already filed a suit in O.S. No. 640 of 1997, on the file of the Sub-Court, Tiruppur, and under the circumstance, no criminal action can be taken.A perusal of complaints clearly indicated that the said Thiyagarajan has been given letter of authorisation to file complaint by the chief general manager apart from the delegation of powers. Even in the list of documents, the letter of authority given to him is clearly mentioned. Furthermore, learned counsel for the respondent also brought to the notice of this court relating to the delegation of power amended up to March 31, 1990 relating to the respondent-company. Even in the list of documents, the letter of authority given to him is clearly mentioned. Furthermore, learned counsel for the respondent also brought to the notice of this court relating to the delegation of power amended up to March 31, 1990 relating to the respondent-company. Only, on the basis of which, the chief general manager, had authorised the deputy general manager to file these complaints. The question whether the delegation of power is valid under law or not is a matter of evidence. Hence I am of the view that this ground cannot be now made use of to quash the proceedings. Regarding the other objections about the pendency of O.S. No. 640 of 1997 on the file of the Sub-Court, Tiruppur, there will not be any bar for taking criminal action on the very same subject-matter. I am unable to agree with the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that only a civil court of competent jurisdiction can deal with the matter and the complaint cannot be proceeded with. It is open to the parties to move either for criminal action or to file a civil suit for getting necessary relief. Interest can be claimed only in the suit filed by the power of attorney of the firm and under the circumstance, when there is no bar preventing the parties that they should have recourse only one way and in the absence of any such bar, I am of the view that the pendency of the civil suit will not affect the taking cognizance of a criminal case by the competent court. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon Swastik Coaters Pvt. Ltd. v. Deepak Brothers, wherein it is observed that one of the directors can present a complaint if there is a proper authorisation in favour of such a director. Such power or authorisation to file a complaint could also be conferred by the memorandum of association or articles of association. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon Swastik Coaters Pvt. Ltd. v. Deepak Brothers, wherein it is observed that one of the directors can present a complaint if there is a proper authorisation in favour of such a director. Such power or authorisation to file a complaint could also be conferred by the memorandum of association or articles of association. Where no such authorisation is proved, a complaint instituted by a director under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act would not be maintainable."They also relied upon another decision in C.B.S. Gramaphone Records and Tapes (India) Ltd. v. P. A. Noorudeen wherein it is observed that where the payee of a dishonoured cheque was the petitioner-company, and a complaint under section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, was filed by its representative, authorised in this regard by a resolution of the board of directors of the company, it was held, that the magistrate was wrong in setting aside the complaint on the ground that the complainant was neither the payee nor the holder in due course. There is no dispute about this proposition but the applicability of the same depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Learned counsel for the respondent also relied upon a decision of this court in Sivaram (P.) v. D. Baskaran, wherein it is observed that when the cheque has been issued in favour of a company, a complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can be filed by its manager, partner, director or any other person authorised by the company. A similar view has also been reiterated in another decision of this court in Sagayadurai v. J.D. Electronics 1997 1 LW (Crl.) 297. Reliance was also placed upon another decision of this court in Shakthi Concrete Industries Ltd. v. Valuable Steels India P. Ltd. 1998 1 LW (Crl.) 354 (Mad), wherein it is observed that the cause title as well as the averments made in the complaints and the sworn statement would disclose that the complaints had been filed by the company represented by the director and, as such, the company alone approaches the court as payee as provided under section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In the instant case, as per the cause title and the averments the complainant company has approached the court through some human agency, namely, director of the company, in preferring the complaints, as the company has no soul, mind, body and limbs. If the company approaches the court through some other person, who is not connected with the affairs of the company, then necessarily to authorise that person to file the complaint on its behalf. Therefore, in this case, the company being the complainant through its director is competent to file the complaints even without any authorisation. The complaints are valid and the same are in accordance with law. This decision is also applicable to the case on hand in all fours.Reliance was also placed upon another decision of the apex court in United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar, wherein it is observed that allowing public interest to be defeated on mere technicality - not rectified - suit by bank for recovery of loan - dismissal on ground of plaint being not signed and verified to competent person - not proper. The analogy in this decision also can be made applicable to the facts on hand. From section 141, Explanation (a), it is clear that the court is empowered to take cognizance if the complaint is preferred by the firm, a company under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, through the manager of the company. The definition of the company under the Negotiable Instruments Act indicates any body corporate including a firm indicating that the company has to be represented by some human agency in preferring a complaint. The dictates of common sense, practical wisdom, precedence and expedience impel the court in such a situation to allow the company to present a complaint before the court represented by some person connected with the affairs of the company. If that be so, now the present complaints also have been filed only by the respondent represented by the deputy general manager. Moreover, there is also an authorisation by the chief general manager. Since the dispute raised by the petitioners is mixed with the question of fact and law, this court cannot take parallel trial and whatever objection available to the petitioners can be agitated before the trial court. There is prima facie material to proceed further against the petitioners and there are no materials to quash the proceedings. Since the dispute raised by the petitioners is mixed with the question of fact and law, this court cannot take parallel trial and whatever objection available to the petitioners can be agitated before the trial court. There is prima facie material to proceed further against the petitioners and there are no materials to quash the proceedings. For the reasons stated above, all the petitions are dismissed. It is further open to the petitioners to raise the same objections before the trial court and the trial court is also directed to consider the same ignoring all the observations made by this court. The trial court is directed to expedite the trial of all the cases in a period of three months. Consequently, Crl. M.P. Nos. 7401 to 7405 of 1998 and 1144 to 1148 of 1999 are also dismissed.