S. P. KHARE, J. ( 1 ) APPELLANT Vinod Kumar Shukla has been convicted under S. 25 (1) (a) of the Arms Act, 1959 for unlawful possession of a firearm and a cartridge and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years and to a fine of Rs. 10,000/ -. ( 2 ) THE prosecution case relevant for the decision of this appeal is that on 14-6-1993 at 2-40 p. m. Virendra Pratap Singh (P. W. 8), Sub-Inspector of Police recovered a country made pistol (Katta) and a cartridge from appellant Vinod Kumar Shukla on his personal search near the bridge of the Karkeli railway station. This firearm and the cartridge were seized from him as per seizure memo Ex. P-4 in the presence of two witnesses Santosh Kumar and Ramswaroop (P. W. 5 ). The sanction for prosecution of the appellant was granted by the District Magistrate, Shahdol by order dated 14-9-1993 Ex. P-8 as required by S. 39 of the Arms Act. ( 3 ) THE accused pleaded not guilty. He has denied the recovery of the Katta and a cartridge from his possession. ( 4 ) THE trial Court held on the basis of the evidence of Virendra Pratap Singh (P. W. 8) Sub-Inspector of Police and the seizure memo Ex. P-4 that the Katta and the cartridge were in unlawful possession of the appellant. ( 5 ) IN this appeal it is argued that the recovery of the firearm and the cartridge from the possession of the appellant is not established beyond reasonable doubt and sanction for the prosecution given by the District Magistrate is not in accordance with law. ( 6 ) THE evidence on record has been carefully scrutinised by this Court. Virendra Pratap Singh (P. W. 8) Sub-Inspector of Police has deposed that on 14-6-1993 at 2-30 p. m. he took in custody accused Vinod Kumar Shukla and interrogated him. He took his search and a country made pistol of 315 bore and a cartridge were found. According to him recovery was made in the presence of the witnesses. He prepared the seizure memo Ex P-4. The sanction granted by the District Magistrate is Ex. P-8. The Katta is article 'a' and the cartridge is article 'b'. In cross-examination he has stated that he had taken accused Vinod Kumar Shukla in custody near the bridge of Karkeli railway station. He prepared the seizure memo Ex P-4. The sanction granted by the District Magistrate is Ex. P-8. The Katta is article 'a' and the cartridge is article 'b'. In cross-examination he has stated that he had taken accused Vinod Kumar Shukla in custody near the bridge of Karkeli railway station. ( 7 ) RAMSWAROOP (P. W. 5) has not corroborated the testimony of Virendra Pratap Singh (P. W. 8), Sub-Inspector. According to him the Katta and the cartridge were not recovered from the appellant in his presence. He has admitted his signature on the seizure memo Ex. P.-4. The other witness to the seizure memo Santosh Kumar has not been examined by the prosecution. ( 8 ) IT is argued on behalf of the appellant that the independent witness to the seizure memo has not supported the evidence of the Sub-Inspector and therefore the sole testimony of the police officer cannot be relied upon for conviction of the appellant under S. 25 (1) (a) of the Arms Act. Reliance is placed on the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Sons Pal Singh v. State of Delhi AIR 1999 SC 49 . In that case the police party did not ask any public person to stand as a witness at the time of search of the accused even though a number of persons were passing through at the time when the recovery of country made pistol is said to have been made. It was held that it would be unsafe to maintain conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under S. 25 of the Arms Act. To the same effect is the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Narsi v. State of Haryana, AIR 1999 SC 234 . It was held that in absence of any independent witness, seizure of a pistol and a cartridge from the possession of the appellant becomes doubtful. It was found highly improbable that the appellant had gone to the police station with the firearm. ( 9 ) IT is not the law that the conviction cannot be based on the sole testimony of the investigating officer in such a case. It was found highly improbable that the appellant had gone to the police station with the firearm. ( 9 ) IT is not the law that the conviction cannot be based on the sole testimony of the investigating officer in such a case. It was held in Modan v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1978 SC 1511 : (1978 Cri LJ 1531) that if the evidence of the investigating officer who recovered the material objects is convincing, the evidence as to recovery need not be rejected on the ground that the seizure witnesses do not support the prosecution case. ( 10 ) IN Tahir v. State of Delhi, AIR 1996 SC 3079 , it has been laid down that no infirmity attaches to the testimony of the police officials, merely because they belong to police force and there is no rule of law or evidence which lays down that conviction cannot be recorded on the evidence of the police officials if found reliable unless corroborated by some independent evidence. The rule of prudence, however, only requires a more careful scrutiny of their evidence since they can be said to be interested in the result of the case projected by them. Where the evidence of police officials, after careful scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form basis of conviction and the absence of some independent witness of the locality to lend corroboration to their evidence, does not in any way affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution case. Similarly in Anil v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1996 SC 2943 : (1996 Cri LJ 1698), it has been held that there is no rule of law that the evidence of police officials has to be discarded or that it suffers from some inherent infirmity. Prudence, however, requires that the evidence of the police officials who are interested in the outcome of the result of the case needs to be carefully scrutinised and independently appreciated. The police officials do not suffer from any disability to give the evidence and the mere fact that they are police officials does not by itself give rise to any doubt about their creditworthiness. ( 11 ) IN this connection the caveat of the Supreme Court in Som Prakash v. State of Delhi, AIR 1974 SC 989 : (1974 Cri LJ 784) is also very relevant. ( 11 ) IN this connection the caveat of the Supreme Court in Som Prakash v. State of Delhi, AIR 1974 SC 989 : (1974 Cri LJ 784) is also very relevant. It has been observed that the demanding degree of proof traditionally required in a criminal case and the devaluation suffered by a witness who is naturally involved in the fruits of his investigation efforts, suggest the legitimate search for corroboration from an independent or unfaltering source-human or circumstantial to make judicial certitude doubly sure. Not that this approach casts any per jorative reflection on the Police Officer's integrity, but that the hazard of holding a man guilty on interested, even if honest, evidence may impair confidence in the system of justice. ( 12 ) THE principle which is deducible from the decisions of the Supreme Court on the point in issue is that legally conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the police officer who conducted the search and seizure. That cannot be disbelieved on the ground that no independent witness was examined to prove the search or that witness turns hostile in the Court. In other words if the evidence of the police officer is reliable, inspires confidence and is of sterling character, the same can form the basis for conviction. In case the evidence is not fully reliable or is of doubtful character, it would be difficult to base conviction on his evidence. Much depends upon the intrinsic worth of the evidence of the police officer. Here also the salutary principle that evidence is to be weighed and not counted and the quality of the evidence is more important than the quantity assumes significance. Therefore, if the testimony of the police officer is of unimpeachable character and he is honest and truthful that can be accepted without any corroboration by the independent witness. This will essentially be a question of fact in each case whether the evidence of such an officer passes through this test or not. It is well known that "there is no such thing as a judicial precedent on facts". ( 13 ) THE evidence of Virendra Pratap Singh (P. W. 8), Sub-Inspector of Police tested in light of the principles laid down above, does not appear to be of such a character on which implicit reliance can be placed. It is cryptic and imprecise. It is not cogent and convincing. ( 13 ) THE evidence of Virendra Pratap Singh (P. W. 8), Sub-Inspector of Police tested in light of the principles laid down above, does not appear to be of such a character on which implicit reliance can be placed. It is cryptic and imprecise. It is not cogent and convincing. In examination-in-chief he does not say where he found appellant Vinod Kumar Shukla and where he took him in custody. He does not tell whether the two witnesses who had signed on the seizure memo were actually present when the country made pistol and the cartridge are said to have been recovered from the possession of the appellant. In cross-examination he has stated that the appellant was found near the bridge of Karkeli railway station. In this connection it is to be seen that the appellant was also charged in this case for the offence punishable under S. 395, IPC for committing dacoity with other persons but he has been acquitted of that charge. Therefore, it is difficult to uphold the conviction based on the solitary testimony of Virendra Pratap Singh (P. W. 8 ). The recovery of the Katta and the cartridge from the possession of the appellant is not free from doubt. ( 14 ) SO far as the question of sanction for prosecution under S. 39 of the Arms Act is concerned, the order dated 14-9-1993 Ex. P-8 of District Magistrate, Shahdol fulfils the requirement of law. That is a speaking order. That has been passed after perusal of the case diaryand the material available therein. The learned counsel for the appellant has cited the decision of this court in Raju Dubey v. State of M. P. (1998) 1 Jab LJ 236 but that is distinguishable on facts. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that the sanction must be accorded by the authority concerned by application of mind on the basis of material collected during the investigation. In State of Orissa v. Mrutunjay Panda, AIR 1998 SC 715 : (1998 Cri LJ 782) it has been held by the Supreme Court that the condition precedent for reversal of conviction in appeal on the ground of want of proper sanction is that whether it has "occasioned a failure of justice". Section 465 cures an error or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution unless that has occasioned failure of justice. Section 465 cures an error or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution unless that has occasioned failure of justice. ( 15 ) IN view of the above discussion, the recovery of country made pistol and the cartridge from the possession of the appellant is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. This appeal is, therefore, allowed. The conviction and sentence of the appellant are set aside and he is acquitted of the charge under S. 25 (1) (a) of the Arms Act, 1959. Appeal allowed. .