A. PASAYAT, C. J. ( 1 ) QUESTIONING nomination of Rabindranath Sharma (opposite party No. 3), as President of Aska Central Co-operative Bank Limited (in short, the 'bank') in purported exercise of power under Section 28 (g) (ii) of the Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1962 (in short, the 'act') by order dated 6-2-1996 by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Orissa, this writ application had been filed on 6-5-1998. Subsequently the said opposite party No. 3 was elected as President of the Bank, which is also challenged by amending the writ application. ( 2 ) PETITIONER's case is that with effect from 16-8-1995 opposite party No. 3 was functioning as Additional Government Pleader, Aska in the district of Ganjan on the basis of Government letter No. 11234 dated 16-8-1995, and held office of profit making him disqualified to be either nominated or elected as the President. A reference in this context is made to Section 28 (3) (j) of the Act. According to learned counsel for opposite party No. 3, petitioner has no locus standi to question either the nomination or election in a writ application without raising a dispute under Section 67-B of the Act. In any event the petitioner did not hold an office of profit. Additionally it is submitted that a writ application would not lie against the Bank which is a co-operative society. ( 3 ) THE first question is the effect of a person holding an office of profit. The relevant provision is Section 28 (3) (j ). So far as relevant, it reads as follows :"28. Additionally it is submitted that a writ application would not lie against the Bank which is a co-operative society. ( 3 ) THE first question is the effect of a person holding an office of profit. The relevant provision is Section 28 (3) (j ). So far as relevant, it reads as follows :"28. Society to have a Committee- (1) and (2) xxx xxx xxx (3) No individual shall, whether by himself or as a representative of the Society be eligible for being chosen or for continuing as a member or President or as the Vice-President of any of the Committee of a Society, if he (a) to (i) xxx xxx xxx (j) is holding any office of profit under the State or Central Government, any Public Sector Undertaking, Local Authority, Educational Institution or a Co-operative Society :provided that nothing in this clause shall debar- (i) any such person from becoming a member of the President of the Committee of a Society composed exclusively of such persons; and (ii) a person nominated under sub-section (1) of Section 31, or appointed under this Act to manage the affairs of a Society from becoming a member but not the President of the Committee of a Society. "a bare reading of Section 28 (3) makes it clear that no individual, whether by himself or as a representative of the Society, shall be eligible for being chosen or for continuing as a member or President or as the Vice-President of any of the Committee of a Society, if he holds an office of profit, under the specified categories enumerated therein. ( 4 ) A Division Bench of this Court while dealing with the question vis-a-vis the Orissa Panchayat Samiti Act, 1959 (in short, the 'panchayat Act') hold that an Assistant Public Prosecutor holds an office of profit. The said view upheld by the Apex Court in Rabindra Kumar Nayak v. Collector, Mayurbhanj, 1999 (2) Supreme 203 . The relevant provision, i. e. , Section 45 (1) (i) read as follows :"45. Disqualification for becoming a member and continuing as a member :- (1) A person shall not be eligible to stand for election under sub-section (1) of Section 16, if he-- (i) holds any office of profit under the State or Central Government or any Local Authority; or. Disqualification for becoming a member and continuing as a member :- (1) A person shall not be eligible to stand for election under sub-section (1) of Section 16, if he-- (i) holds any office of profit under the State or Central Government or any Local Authority; or. " ( 5 ) THE power of the Government to appoint a person to an office of profit or to continue him in that office or revoke his appointment of their discretion and payment from out of Government revenue are important factors in determining whether that person is holding an office of profit under the Government. An office has to be held under some one for it is impossible to conceive of an office held under no one. For holding an office of profit under the Government a person need not be in the service of the Government and there need not be any relationship of master and servant between them. The office in question must be held under a Government and to that some salary, emoluments or other allowances are attached. For finding out whether an office in question is an office under a Government and whether it is an office of profit, the relevant tests would be (1) whether the Government makes the appointment? (2) Whether the Government has the right to remove or dismiss the holder? (3) Whether the Government pays the remuneration? (4) What are the functions of the holder? Does he perform them for the Government?, and (5) Does the Government exercise any control over the performance of those functions? This test was indicated by the Apex Court in Shivamurthy Swami v. Agadi Sanganna Andanappa, (1971) 3 SCC 870 . The word 'profit' connotes the idea of pecuniary gain. If there is really a gain, its quantum or amount would not be material; but the amount of money receivable by a person in connection with the office he holds may be material in deciding whether the office really carried any profit. This position was also highlighted by this Court in Nitayananda Behera v. State of Orissa, AIR 1997 Orissa 1. In Mahadeo v. Shantibhai, (1970) 2 SCJ 407, the dispute revolved round the question whether the person was holding an office of profit in the Railway Administration. This position was also highlighted by this Court in Nitayananda Behera v. State of Orissa, AIR 1997 Orissa 1. In Mahadeo v. Shantibhai, (1970) 2 SCJ 407, the dispute revolved round the question whether the person was holding an office of profit in the Railway Administration. It was observed as follows :"it is true that he would get a sum of money only if he appeared but the possibility that the railway might not engage him is a matter of no moment. An office of profit really means an office in respect of which a profit may accrue. It is not necessary that it should be possible to predicate of a holder of an office or profit that he was bound to get a certain amount of profit irrespective of duties discharged by him. So long as the engagement was not put an end to, he was holding an office of profit in the Railway Administration, and as such was disqualified for being elected to the legislative assembly. " ( 6 ) ONE of the meanings of the word 'office' as given in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary is as follows :"an office is a right to exercise of public or private employment and take the (sic) emoluments thereunto belonging. "in Chambers' Twentieth Century Dictionary it is described as follows :"a function or duty; settled duty or employment, a position imposing certain dates or giving right to exercise as employment; possession of a post in the Government business; act of worship. "the words 'office of profit' do not relate to the office, but to the holder of the office and whether the emoluments of the office come from bounty of the creator of, or appointer to the office or not, they are profits of the office from the point of view of the holder of the office who is entitled to consider that the profits are paid to him as remuneration for performance of the office and not the bounty of any one. The phrase is not a term of art. (See Dale v. I. R. C. , (1953) 2 All ER 671 ). The function by virtue whereof a person has some employment in the affairs of another, whether judicial, ministerial, legislative municipal, ecclesiastical etc. is termed as 'office'. The phrase is not a term of art. (See Dale v. I. R. C. , (1953) 2 All ER 671 ). The function by virtue whereof a person has some employment in the affairs of another, whether judicial, ministerial, legislative municipal, ecclesiastical etc. is termed as 'office'. 'office of profit' does not connote that its incumbent actually makes a profit from it; (sic) he might reasonably be expected that a man would make a profit of it, it must be considered an office of profit. ( 7 ) THE phrase 'holds any office of profit' employed in this clause is the bone of contention. The expression 'office of profit' only means an office which yields income or profit; the word 'office' had been subject-matter of judicial consideration as long back as in 1922. In Great Western Railway Co. v. Bater (1920 (3) KB 266), Rowlatt, J. defined the term 'office' and 'employment' or one subsisting, permanent, substantive position which had an existence independent from the person who filled it, which went on and was filled in succession by excessive holders. This was approved by the House of Lords in Mcmillan v. Guest, (1942) AC 561. ( 8 ) THE Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand Surana, AIR 1970 SC 694 quoted with approval the aforementioned exposition of 'office' by Rowlatt, J. In that case the question was whether an advocate appointed as Special Government Pleader to assist the Government Pleader in a particular case, held 'office of profit' under the Government and hence incurred disqualification under Article 191 of the Constitution of India. Relying on the said exposition, the minority view was expressed by Hidayatullah, C. J. (speaking) for himself and Mitter, J.) thus :"what matters is that there was an office created apart from Mr. Kathuria. It is in evidence that it was first held by Mr. Manaklal Mathur another advocate. It is likely that if Mrs. Kathuria had declined some one else would have been found. Therefore, there was an office which could be successively held; it was independent of Mrs. Kathuria who filled it, it was a substantive position and as permanent as supernumerary offices are. Every one of the tests laid down by Rowlatt, J. are found here. We would, therefore, hold that the High Court was right in its conclusion that Mrs. Kathuria held an office. Kathuria who filled it, it was a substantive position and as permanent as supernumerary offices are. Every one of the tests laid down by Rowlatt, J. are found here. We would, therefore, hold that the High Court was right in its conclusion that Mrs. Kathuria held an office. Since there is no dispute that it was for profit and under the State, the election of Mrs. Kathuria must be held to be void as she was disqualified to stand for the election. "in coming to that conclusion, the learned Judge followed their own judgment in Mahadeo v. Shantibai, (1969) 2 SCR 422 wherein it was held that the appellant therein who was on the panel of lawyers prepared by the Western Railway Administrations, held office of profit under the Government. ( 9 ) BUT Sikri, J. speaking for the majority, after referring to the same exposition of the term 'office' as well as the observations of Lord Atkin and Lord Wright in Mc Millan's case (1942 AC 561) (supra) observed :"there was no doubt that if her engagement as Special Government Pleader amounted to appointment to an office, it would be an office of profit under the State Government of Rajasthan. . . . . . . . . Therefore, no particular significance can be attached to the notification made under Rule 88 appointing the appellant as Special Government Pleader. We cannot visualise an office coming into existence, every time a pleader is asked by the Government to appear in a case on its behalf. The notification of his name under Rule 88 does not amount to the creation at an 'office'. We cannot visualise an office coming into existence, every time a pleader is asked by the Government to appear in a case on its behalf. The notification of his name under Rule 88 does not amount to the creation at an 'office'. "the difference of opinion between the majority and the minority is on the question whether by the notification the Government created office of Special Government Pleader, but not in regard to meaning of the expression 'office of profit' and the application of the tests enunciated by Rowlatt, J. ( 10 ) IN a subsequent judgment of the Apex Court in Madhukar G. E. Pankakar v. Jaswant Chobbildas Rajani, AIR 1976 SC 2283 , the enunciation of Rowlatt, J. and observations of the House of Lords in Mc Millan's case, referred to above, were relied upon to hold that a Medical Practitioner working as a panel doctor appointed under the Employees' State Insurance Scheme did not hold 'office of profit' under the State Government so as to attract disqualification under Section 16 (1) (g) of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965, Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the Bench concluded :"the critical test of independent existence of the position irrespective of the occupant is just not satisfied. . . . . . we are unable to hold that there is an 'office of profit' held by him and that he is 'under Government'. "opposite party No. 3 was, therefore, not eligible for being chosen or nominated as President of the Bank. The position that he was nominated as President does not make any difference. The criteria is eligibility. Once a person is ineligible, it does not matter whether he is appointed as President on being nominated or elected in an election. ( 11 ) PLEA was taken that the petitioner should have raised dispute under Section 67-B of the Act and should not have filed the writ application. Strong reliance is placed on a decision of this Court in Rabindra Kumar Das v. State of Orissa, (1999) 87 Cut LT 123. On a reading of the fact situation, it is clear that the decision was rendered on a different factual set up. Strong reliance is placed on a decision of this Court in Rabindra Kumar Das v. State of Orissa, (1999) 87 Cut LT 123. On a reading of the fact situation, it is clear that the decision was rendered on a different factual set up. In this regard, we may refer to the conclusions arrived at paragraph 15 of the said judgment to the following effect :"we do not find that once having filed objection before the Election Officer within the scope of sub-rule (5) of Rule 6, the petitioners can come before this Court after Election Officer to say that they are remedyless and the writ Court will quash Annexure 2 for any academic purpose. If Annexure 2 has vitiated the election and the election has been over, the remedy available is under Section 67-B and objection, if any, may be filed which can be dealt with by the proper forum. "in the case resort was made to the statutory authorities and thereafter a plea was taken that there is no available forum. The facts situation are undisputedly different in the present case. ( 12 ) ON the question of locus standi it is (submitted) that the petitioner is a member of the Society, and said position is not in dispute. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner has no locus standi. ( 13 ) ADDITIONALLY it is stated that the writ application would not lie against a Co-operative Society. The plea has no substance at all. Alleging infraction of statutory provison, i. e. , Section 23 (3) (j) the writ application has been filed. Therefore, the usual plea that a writ application would not lie against a Co-operative Society does not subsist. In any event, as has been observed by the Apex Court in U. P. State Co-operative Land, Development Bank Ltd. v. Chandra Bhan Dubey, 1998 (9) Supreme 535 : ( AIR 1999 SC 753 ) bank is an extended arm of the State and thus an instrumentality of the State or authority as mentioned under Article 12 of the Constitution. In any event, as has been observed by the Apex Court in U. P. State Co-operative Land, Development Bank Ltd. v. Chandra Bhan Dubey, 1998 (9) Supreme 535 : ( AIR 1999 SC 753 ) bank is an extended arm of the State and thus an instrumentality of the State or authority as mentioned under Article 12 of the Constitution. The language of Article 226 does not admit of any limitation on the powers of High Court for exercise of jurisdiction thereunder though by various decisions of the Apex Court with varying and divergent views it has been held that jurisdiction under Article 226 can be exercised only when body or authority, decision of which is complained was exercising its power in the discharge of public duty and that writ is a public law remedy. ( 14 ) IT does appear to us that Article 226 while empowering the High Court for issue of orders or directions to any authority or person does not make any such difference between public functions and private functions. It is not necessary for us in this case to go into this question as to what is the nature, scope and amplitude of the writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. They are certainly founded on the English system of jurisprudence. Article 226 of the Constitution also speaks of directions and orders which can be issued to any person or authority including, in appropriate cases, any Government. Under clause (1) of Article 367 unless the context otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall subject to any adaptations and modifications that may be made therein under Article 372 apply for the interpretation of the Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India. 'person' under Section 2 (42) of the General Clauses Act shall include any company, or association or body individuals, whether incorporated or not. Constitution is not a statute. It is a fountainhead of all the statutes. When the language of Article 226 is clear, we cannot put shackles on the High Courts to limit their jurisdiction by putting an interpretation on the words which would limit their jurisdiction. Constitution is not a statute. It is a fountainhead of all the statutes. When the language of Article 226 is clear, we cannot put shackles on the High Courts to limit their jurisdiction by putting an interpretation on the words which would limit their jurisdiction. When any citizen or person is wronged, the High Court will step into protect him, be that wrong be done by the State, an instrumentality of the State, a company or a co-operative society or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not, or even an individual. Right that is infringed may be under Part III of the Constitution or any other right which the law validly made might confer upon him. But then the power conferred upon the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution is so vast, the Apex Court has laid down certain guidelines and self-imposed limitations have been put there subject to which High Courts would exercise jurisdiction, but those guidelines cannot be (sic) in all circumstances. High Court does not interfere when an equally efficacious alternative remedy is available or when there is established procedure to remedy a wrong or enforce a right. A party may not be allowed to by-pass the normal channel of civil and criminal litigation. High Court does not act like a proverbial 'bull in china shop' in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226. The writ application is allowed with the conclusion that opposite party No. 3 was not eligible to be either nominated or elected as President of the Bank. No costs. ( 15 ) DAS, J. , I agree. Petition allowed.