Judgment :- K. Narayana Kurup, J. These Writ Appeals are directed against the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in O.P. No. 4739 of 1990. The parties in these appeals will be referred to as the petitioner and the Life Insurance Corporation (for short'the Corporation'). 2. The brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of these appeals are as follows: Petitioner is the widow of one PJ. Augustine. In the Writ Petition she had prayed for the issuance of a direction to the Corporation to pay her "the entire insured amount of late PJ. Augustine as per the proposal No. 615781 dated 27.8.88 for Rs. 10 lakhs". Other incidental and consequential reliefs were also prayed for the O.P. The aforesaid Augustine, during his life time, had proposed his life for insurance for a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs. The proposal was submitted on 16.8.1988 before the Branch Office of the Corporation, as per proposal No. 615781 of Ernakulam Branch. An amount of Rs. 7925/- was also received from deceased Augustine, as evidenced by Ext. P1 receipt. Subsequently an amount of Rs. 15,974/- was received from deceased Augustine on 27.8.1988, as evidenced by Ext. P2 receipt. An additional sum of Rs. 426 was also remitted by him on 5.9.1988, as evidenced by Ext. P3 receipt. The amounts received under Exts. P1 to P3 were kept in suspense account by the Corporation pending finalisation of the Policy since the Branch Office of the Corporation was not competent to accept the proposal of deceased Augustine as it was for Rs. 10 lakhs, in which case a decision has to be taken by the Zonal Office of the Corporation. Before the proposal of deceased Augustine was finalised, he was required to undergo a comprehensive medical check-up including a Treadmill Test (TMT), as evidenced by Ext. P4. However, deceased Augustine, as per Ext. R2(b) telegram, informed the Corporation that he did not want to maintain the Policy and that the Corporation be pleased to pay him back the amount covered by Exts. P1 to P3. Deceased Augustine also informed the Corporation that he wanted to discontinue the proposal for life insurance in the name of his wife also and sought refund of the amount already paid, vide Ext. P5 letter. On receipt of Ext. P1 to P3. Deceased Augustine also informed the Corporation that he wanted to discontinue the proposal for life insurance in the name of his wife also and sought refund of the amount already paid, vide Ext. P5 letter. On receipt of Ext. P5 letter by the Corporation on 22.10.1988, a decision was taken to cancel the proposal submitted by deceased Augustine and under cover of letter dated 10th November, 1988 a cheque for an amount of Rs. 24,225/-favouring deceased Augustine, being refund of the premia paid less Rs. 100/- towards expenses incurred by the Corporation for his medical examination, was forwarded to him. The letter enclosing the cheque was returned to the Corporation by the postal authorities with the endorsement "addressee Sri. Augustine expired". 3. The factum of death of Augustine was communicated to the Corporation by the petitioner by letter dated 17.11.1988 in which is stated that he died due to a car accident. Accordingly, the petitioner requested the Corporation to settle in her favour the amounts due under the proposal at the earliest, being the nominee of the deceased. As per Exts. P7 and P8 letters, the Corporation requested the petitioner to return to the Branch Office the receipts Exts. P1 to P3 for the amounts held in suspense deposit, so as to enable the Branch office to refund to her the initial deposits made by deceased Augustine towards the proposal for life insurance. However, the petitioner took the stand that as per the contract between the Corporation and the deceased, the Corporation is bound to pay to the petitioner the entire insured amount and that the Corporation is not entitled to contend that they are liable to refund only the premium paid. Since the demand of the petitioner was not acceded to by the Corporation, she moved this Court with the present Writ Petition out of which these appeals arise, for the various reliefs as already noticed. 4. In the above O.P., the Corporation filed a counter-affidavit contending inter alia that the Writ Petition is not maintainable to enforce a money claim and since the proposal of deceased Augustine was never accepted, as the deceased had withdrawn the proposal before acceptance, there was no concluded contract of insurance between the deceased and the Corporation and in that view they are not bound to pay the policy amount as claimed. 5. 5. A learned Single Judge of this Court, as per the judgment impugned in these appeals, partly allowed the O.P. holding that there is no concluded contract of insurance between the deceased and the Corporation disentitling the petitioner to claim the insurance amount and at the same time directing the Corporation to pay the amount covered by Exts. P1 to P3 to the petitioner with interest at 18% from the date written the letter addressed to the deceased was returned as he was no more till the date of payment. Aggrieved by that part of the judgment rejecting the claim of the petitioner for the insurance amount, she has filed W.A. No. 1035 of 1997, and against the latter part of the judgment awarding interest, the Corporation has preferred W.A.No.1031 of 1997. 6. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties in both these appeals at length, we are not satisfied that any ground has been made out for interference with the judgment appealed against. 7. The first and foremost question to be considered in these appeals is whether there is a concluded contract between the Corporation and the deceased, entitling the petitioner to claim the full insurance amount of Rs. 10 lakhs. It is no doubt true that a proposal was submitted by the deceased during his lifetime, on 16.8.1988, before the Branch Office of the Corporation at Ernakulam and the said proposal was numbered as 615781 of Ernakulam Branch and further amounts covered by Exts. P1 to P3 were also paid by him which is admitted by the Corporation. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, who figures as appellant in W.A.1035 of 1997, is that by virtue of receipt of the premium by the Corporation there is a concluded contract which fastens liability on the Corporation to pay the entire insurance amount on the death of the assured. We are unable to accede to this contention, having regard to the fact that a perusal of Exts. P1 to P3 will reveal that the deceased was informed by the Corporation that payments as shown in Exts. P1 to P3 have been received and held in suspense and that if the payments are found in order, then only the amounts will be adjusted and official receipt of the Corporation will be issued. In fact, Ext. P1 to P3 will reveal that the deceased was informed by the Corporation that payments as shown in Exts. P1 to P3 have been received and held in suspense and that if the payments are found in order, then only the amounts will be adjusted and official receipt of the Corporation will be issued. In fact, Ext. P1 amount was kept in suspense as initial amount towards the proposal, Ext. P2 amount was kept in suspense towards balance of the first premium due and Ext. P3 amount was kept in suspense towards the balance of premia. It is the admitted case of the parties that no Insurance Policy had been issued by the Corporation in favour of the deceased signifying the acceptance of the proposal. All that the Corporation did was to accept the amount covered by Exts. P1 to P3 and to keep it under "Suspense Memorandum". 8. The effect of deposit of money in suspense account was the subject-matter of decision by a Division Bench of this Court in L.I.C. of India v. Prasanna Devaraj (1994 (2) KLT 541) wherein this Court ruled that in such a situation, there is no acceptance of the proposal creating a concluded contract. There is no material before us to show that there was acceptance of the proposal creating a concluded contract between the parties. 9. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question as to when an acceptance will be complete in a contract of insurance in the decision reported in L.I.C. of India v. R. Vasireddy (AIR 1984 SC 1014) where the Court ruled that acceptance is complete only when it is communicated to the offerer, and silence or receipt and retention of premium cannot be construed as acceptance. It was observed in paragraph 13 of the aforesaid judgment as follows: "A contract of insurance will be concluded only when the party to whom an offer has been made accepts it unconditionally and communicates his acceptance to the person making the offer. Though in certain human relationship silence to a proposal might convey acceptance but in the case of insurance proposal, silence does not denote consent and no binding contract arises until the person to whom an offer is made says or does something to signify his acceptance. Though in certain human relationship silence to a proposal might convey acceptance but in the case of insurance proposal, silence does not denote consent and no binding contract arises until the person to whom an offer is made says or does something to signify his acceptance. Mere delay in giving an answer cannot be construed as an acceptance, as, prima facie, acceptance must be communicated to the offerer. Similarly the mere receipt and retention of premium until after the death of the applicant or the mere preparation of the policy document is not acceptance." 10. Applying the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court to the facts of the present case, we have no hesitation in holding that there is no concluded contract between the Corporation and deceased Augustine. At the risk of repetition we would state that a contract of insurance will be concluded only when the Corporation, to whom an offer has been made, accepts it unconditionally and communicates to the proposer its acceptance of the proposal. No binding contract will be created until the Corporation, to whom it is made, says or does something to signify its acceptance. Mere delay in giving an answer cannot be construed as an acceptance for acceptance, must be communicated to the proposer. Likewise, the mere receipt and retention of the amount towards initial deposit or a simple proposal of insurance or the mere preparation of the policy document cannot be construed as acceptance of the proposal. That apart, on facts of this particular case, it has come out that it is the Zonal Office of the Corporation which i s competent to accept the proposal sinee the amount is Rs. 10 lakhs and the Zonal Office has not yet accepted the proposal. The Corporation has not communicated to the deceased its acceptance of the proposal dated 27.8.1988. There is no whisper anywhere in the O.P. that the Corporation did accept the proposal of the deceased and he was communicated by the Corporation of its acceptance of the proposal. That apart, we are told that before a decision could be taken by the Zonal Office of the Corporation, the deceased sent Ext. R2(b) telegram dated 19.10.1988 followed by Ext. P5 letter dated 21.10.1988, informing the Corporation that he did not want to maintain the policy and that the Corporation be pleased to pay him back the amounts covered by Exts. R2(b) telegram dated 19.10.1988 followed by Ext. P5 letter dated 21.10.1988, informing the Corporation that he did not want to maintain the policy and that the Corporation be pleased to pay him back the amounts covered by Exts. P1 to P3. The deceased also informed the Corporation that he wanted to discontinue the proposal for insurance in the name of his wife also and sought refund of the amount already paid. Ext. P5 letter was received by the Corporation's Office on 22.10.1988 and thereafter a decision was taken to cancel the proposal submitted by the deceased. 11. Under the facts and circumstances thus brought to our notice, we have no hesitation in holding that there is no concluded contract of insurance between the deceased and the Corporation. Therefore, what is payable to the petitioner, as the legal heir of the deceased, is only the amount paid by the deceased and covered by Exts. P1 to P3 receipts, less the fee paid by the Corporation for the special reports of the medical check-up which is not seen undergone by the deceased. The learned Single Judge, in our view, rightly rejected the claim of the petitioner for payment of the entire insurance amount and limited it only to the premium already paid with interest, which, in our opinion, is not liable to be disturbed. The decision of the Supreme Court in General Assur. Society v. ChandmullJain (AIR 1966 SC 1644), strenuously contended for the proposition that the very payment of premium itself will constitute a concluded contract fastening liability on the Corporation to pay the entire policy amount. According to learned counsel, the Corporation having received the premium up to the date of death of the deceased has no authority to say that they are liable to refund only the premium paid and not the insured amount, and that the inaction of the Corporation to pay the insured amount is illegal, unjust and unwarranted. Having bestowed our anxious consideration to the aforesaid contention and having perused the judgment cited, we are afraid that we are unable to find anything there in support of the aforesaid proposition canvassed. All that the decision says is that a contract is formed when implied if the insurer accepts the premium and retains it. Having bestowed our anxious consideration to the aforesaid contention and having perused the judgment cited, we are afraid that we are unable to find anything there in support of the aforesaid proposition canvassed. All that the decision says is that a contract is formed when implied if the insurer accepts the premium and retains it. The decision further says that in the case of the assured, a positive act on his part by which he recognises or seeks to enforce the policy amounts to an affirmation of it. 13. As already noticed, on the facts of the present case, we are not persuaded to hold that there is acceptance of the proposal by the Corporation much less unqualified acceptance. Added to that we find that the deceased himself had gone back upon his policy by withdrawing from the same, as per Ext. R2(b) read with Ext. P5. The conduct of the assured himself militates against the creation of a concluded contract between the parties. Thus, on the whole, we are satisfied that the learned Single Judge, on a correct appreciation of the factual and legal position, dismissed the claim of the petitioner for the entire amount proposed, limiting it to the amount already paid by way of premia, as evidenced by Exts. P1 to P3, with 18% interest. We do not propose to interfere with the judgment under appeal. Accordingly we confirm the judgment of the learned Single Judge and dismiss both the appeals.