JUDGMENT D. Raju, C.J.—The above writ petition has been filed seeking for the relief of quashing the orders of the Sub-Divisional Officer (C) Sadar, Bilaspur, dated 10.3.1998 filed as Annexure A and that of the Deputy Commissioner, Bilaspur District, dated 25.8.1998 filed as Annexure C and for a consequential declaration that the petitioner was duly elected as a member of Panchayat Samiti, Sadar, Bilaspur from Dharot Ward and the Election Petition filed by the respondent No. 1 may be dismissed. The facts averred by the petitioner in the writ petition are that on 22.12.1995, there was an election to the Panchayat Samiti, Bilaspur and that in the said election, the petitioner was elected as a Member to represent the said ward. Thereafter, the election for the Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti was held and in which three candidates including the petitioner and respondents 1 and 2 contested out of which, the petitioner was said to have been declared elected defeating the other candidates-respondents 1 and 2. Thereupon, the first respondent appears to have filed an election petition invoking the provisions contained in Section 161 of the H.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") in which it is stated that the petitioner and respondent No. 2 were arrayed as respondents. The said election petition was said to have been heard on several dates, but on 10.3.1998, the Sub-Divisional Officer, exercising his powers as Authorised Officer under the Act, made an order merely on the basis of recounting of votes ordered by him, that such a recount disclosed that the petitioner had polled 436 votes as against 433 and 469 said to have been polled by respondents 1 and 2 besides 32 votes which were said to have been rejected as invalid, out of the total 1380 votes said to have been polled in the election. As a consequence of the results flowing from the recounting, the Authorised Officer declared the second respondent to have been duly elected and directed a copy of the order to be marked to the Deputy Commissioner of the district and Block Development Officer, Sadar, Bilaspur, for further action in accordance with law. Aggrieved, the petitioner who was arrayed as the first respondent before the Sub-Divisional Officer/Authorised Officer, filed an appeal under Section 181 of the Act before the Deputy Commissioner, Bilaspur District. Aggrieved, the petitioner who was arrayed as the first respondent before the Sub-Divisional Officer/Authorised Officer, filed an appeal under Section 181 of the Act before the Deputy Commissioner, Bilaspur District. Before the said appellate authority, who is the third respondent before us, the appellant appears to have urged that the order passed by the original authority is illegal, wrong and without jurisdiction for the reason that the procedure adopted for counting of votes by the Sub-Divisional Officer is completely illegal and not warranted under the act. Since he had no jurisdiction to recount the votes and he had jurisdiction only to either set aside the election as mentioned in Section 175 of the Act or dismiss the Election Petition and inasmuch as the recounting is not a ground to set aside the election of a successfully elected candidate, the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer deserves to be set aside. It was also urged in the grounds of appeal before the third respondent that the Sub-Divisional Officer has illegally declared the respondent No. 1 as elected, whereas no such order can be passed and if the election is declared null and void or election is set aside, the only procedure is to order fresh election and, therefore, the order deserves to be set aside. On such grounds, the prayer sought for before the third respondent was to set aside the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer made on 10.3.1998. 2. The third respondent, exercising his powers as statutory Appellate Authority, after perusing the relevant records of the case and hearing the arguments on both sides, dealt with the plea said to have been raised with reference to the two options available to the Sub-Divisional Officer either to dismiss the election petition or to set aside the election and that there was no provision to declare the second respondent elected, ultimately came to the conclusion that, that part of the order under which the Sub-Divisional Officer declared the second respondent duly elected in the place of the petitioner, requires to be and was being set aside and disposed of the appeal finally by maintaining the other part of the order setting aside the election of the petitioner. Though the order passed by the third respondent is a short order, it is seen from the same that the stand taken by the second respondent before the said Appellate Authority that recount was done on the consent of the parties concerned who have also put their signatures on the order-sheet maintained by the Sub-Divisional Officer, has been noticed specifically and that he has come to the conclusion that the stand taken by the Appellate Authority that the Sub-Divisional Officer had limited power either to set aside the election or to dismiss the election petition, is correct. It is not necessary for us, in this case to finally adjudicate on the scope and extent of the powers of the SDO, in such cases. On his further view, that it was not in dispute that there was irregularity in the counting of votes, he has chosen to reject the appeal also, as noticed earlier, by upholding that part of the decision of the Sub-Divisional Officer in which the election of the petitioner has been set aside, Aggrieved, the petitioner has come before this Court with the above writ petition for the reliefs noticed supra. 3. Heard Mr. Inder Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Advocate-General for the third respondent, who caused the production of the records relating to the Sub-Divisional Officer, in view of the serious dispute raised with respect to the factual issue in respect of the consent alleged to have been given by the petitioner for the recounting. The other respondents, namely, 1 and 2, have not appeared before the Court in spite of notices having been served, through any counsel or in person to defend the proceedings. The other respondents, namely, 1 and 2, have not appeared before the Court in spite of notices having been served, through any counsel or in person to defend the proceedings. The third respondent has filed a reply, in which it is contended that the election under dispute was for Panchayat Samiti and not for Block Development Committee as wrongly found noticed in the writ petition, that recounting was ordered by the Sub-Divisional Officer (C), Sadar, Bilaspur with the consent of both the parties and in proof thereof, they have appended their signatures on the order-sheet, that the first respondent had filed a petition before the Sub-Divisional Officer mainly on the ground that more than 50 votes of the respondent No.1 were wrongly counted towards the votes of the petitioner and the Returning Officer did not allow recounting despite the request of the first respondent before the Returning Officer for the purpose and the first respondent the petitioner before this said Authority, had also filed an affidavit along with the petition stating that more than 50 votes of him had been put in the bundle of the writ-petitioner and, therefore, the election of the petitioner has been materially affected and if the recounting is done, then the 1st respondent herein would get more votes and deserved to be elected as Member and consequently, the order for recounting made by the Sub-Divisional Officer was a right decision taken and, therefore, cannot be said to be totally without jurisdiction. It is also urged that the Sub-Divisional Officer had jurisdiction to order recounting of votes under Section 175(d)(ii) and (iii) of the Act and, therefore, that part of the order of the Authorised Officer setting aside the election of the elected person, on such an irregularity, is valid. It is also reiterated that the first respondent can be believed in his claim that his request for recounting was not ordered by the Returning Officer before declaring the results based on his affidavit filed before the Sub-Divisional Officer and inasmuch as the parties have appended their signatures to the order-sheet maintained by the Sub-Divisional Officer, no exception could be taken to the order passed by way of recounting by the Sub-Divisional Officer. The third respondent also reiterated that since the election of the petitioner has been set aside after satisfying that the requirements of Section 175(d) (ii) and (iii) of the Act were not complied with by dealing with the claim for recounting made before final declaration of results, no exception could be taken to that part of the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer setting aside the election of the -petitioner. 4. Mr. Inder Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner, contended that there is no power with the Sub-Divisional Officer to order recount and as a consequence thereof, the recounting and the consequential order passed on 10.3.1998 is liable to be set aside. The further plea on behalf of the petitioner is that even if there had been consent for recounting, such an order for re-counting in the absence of any specific power is without jurisdiction and a nullity and honest in the eye of law and, therefore, the petitioner shall be deemed to have been duly elected. Argued the learned Counsel for the petitioner further that the Deputy Commissioner committed an error in not deciding the points raised before him as to whether the recount was with the consent of the parties and without recording any decision on the said point, the respondent No. 3 could not have rejected the appeal and, therefore, the petitioner cannot be denied the rights flowing from his election duly declared by the Returning Officer. 5. The learned Advocate-General, while reiterating the stand taken in the reply filed by the respondent as noticed supra, contended that no interference is called for with the order of the Deputy Commissioner which has restored and retained only the legal part of the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer and which has done justice according to law, and the same does not call for any interference in these proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 6. We have considered the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing on either side. 6. We have considered the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing on either side. Before adverting to the various submissions made on either said, we would like to advert to and place on record our impressions of the facts disclosed from the file of the Sub-Divisional Officer/Authorised Officer under the Act, pertaining to the disposal of the election petition filed by the first respondent, with particular reference to the procedure adopted by him by re-counting the votes and whether it was with the consent, if any, of the petitioner. We could see from the note sheet of the day-to-day hearing of the election petition filed before the Sub-Divisional Officer that for the first time on 9.12.1997 after arguments were heard from both parties, and it is found noticed that Rs, 200/- were ordered to be deposited a charges for re-counting within five days and the record was ordered to be called for from the Block Development Officer, Sadar Bilaspur and the recounting was ordered to be done on 7.1.1998. Thereupon for the said purpose, it was being adjourned on more than one occasions and at last on 10.3.1998, we find the proceedings recorded in manuscript pertaining to re-counting as also the results of re-counting. It is a fact that when the orders were announced as a result of recounting by the Sub-Divisional Officer, he appears to have obtained signatures from the counsel as also the parties and the officials who caused the production of the record and who participated in the re-counting. In Sr. No. 4, we find the signatures of the petitioner too. Though it may be possibly contended for the respondents that the participation in the counting without any demur by the petitioner and affixing his signatures to the results of recounting or without in any manner protesting against the decision taken on 9.12.1997 after hearing both the counsel on either side to recount the votes, would constitute sufficient acquiescence with the procedure adopted by the Sub-Divisional Officer and, therefore, he should be held precluded from making a grievance of the same before this Court, we would even prefer to proceed on the basis that the petitioner has not been a consenting party to the recounting and thereby consider the consequences flowing from the orders of the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Deputy Commissioner in this case which are being challenged before us. It is a well settled proposition of law that where a statutory authority had no powers to do a particular thing, such power cannot be claimed or usurped on the basis of mere consent or alleged consent of parties before it, since it is axiomatic that consent alone cannot confer jurisdiction where there is none. It is equally well settled by now that though an order passed without jurisdiction may be a nullity and can be collaterally also challenged, any order so passed by a statutory authority in the purported exercise of some powers claimed to be possessed by such authority, has got to be set aside either in the manner known to law or got annulled in any collateral proceedings at least before any rights in derogation of such order can be claimed and it is not given to a party to just ignore the order and assert before a Court of law any rights to the detriment of a result created by such order. So far as the case on hand is concerned, in order to appreciate the stand taken for the third respondent, it is useful to refer to some of the provisions in the Act and the Rules made thereunder. Chapter II of the Rules provide for de-limitation of constituencies and Chapter III of the Rules provide for electoral rolls. While Chapter IV deeds with the reservation of seats, Chapter V deals with conduct of elections, commencing from the appointment of Returning Officers, the declaration of the election programme, the actual conduct of elections, the various powers of the Returning and other officers to effectuate the purpose of elections culminating in the declaration of the results of the said elections. While Chapter IV deeds with the reservation of seats, Chapter V deals with conduct of elections, commencing from the appointment of Returning Officers, the declaration of the election programme, the actual conduct of elections, the various powers of the Returning and other officers to effectuate the purpose of elections culminating in the declaration of the results of the said elections. Rule 79 specifically provides for recounting of votes by stipulating that sifter the completion of counting, the Returning Officer or any other officer authorised by him, shall prepare the result sheet and declare the result in the manner set out in Section 75 and after the result has been declared, a candidate or in his absence, his election agent or his counting agent may apply in writing to the Returning Officer or any other officer authorised in this behalf for a recount of all or any of the ballot papers already counted stating the grounds on which he demands such recount and that on such application for recount being made to the Returning Officer or any other officer authorised by him in this behalf shall decide the matters and may allow the application in whole or in part or may reject if it appears to him to be frivolous or unreasonable. The said rule while envisaging an order of rejection with reasons also, further enables the Returning Officer or any other officer authorised by him in this behalf to allow an application either in whole or in part and thereby count the ballot papers again in accordance with the decision, and thereafter amend the result-sheet to the extent necessary after such recount and announce the amendment, so made by him. Sub-rule (6) is interesting to be noticed when it stipulates that after the total number of votes polled by each candidate has been announced under sub-rule(1) or sub-rule (5) the Returning Officer or such other officer authorised by him, shall complete and sign the result-sheet and no application for a recount shall be entertained thereafter provided that no step under this sub-rule shall be taken on the completion of the counting "until the candidates and election agents present at the completion thereof, have been given a reasonable opportunity to exercise the right conferred by sub-rule(2)" which enables the said persons to seek for a recounting of the votes already counted. Section 174 of the Act provides of the filing of an election petition before the Authorised Officer and Section 175 enumerates the grounds for setting aside the election. Clause (d) of sub-section (1) on which strong reliance has been placed by the third respondent reads as follows:— "(d) that the result of the election, insofar as it concerns the elected person, has been materially affected— (i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination, or (ii) by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void, or (iii) by any non-compliance with the provisions of this Act or of any rule made under this Act, the authorised officer shall set aside the election of the elected person.” A person aggrieved by the order passed on the election petition is enabled to file an appeal under Section 181 of the Act before the Deputy Commissioner, who, it is stipulated therein, shall hear and dispose of the appeal within 90 days. It is axiomatic, in the absence of any specific limitation imposed upon the powers of the appellate authority, particularly the first appellate authority that the extent of powers of such authority would be co-extensive with that of the original authority and, therefore, it would be permissible for the appellate authority to have regard to all the grounds which are enumerated and available for being considered by the original authority dealing with the election petition under Section 174 in disposing of the appeal also. Viewed thus, we are of the view that the third respondent-appellate authority could have considered the grievance contained in the election petition filed by the first respondent as to whether the result of the election insofar as it concerns the elected person has been materially affected by an improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote which is void or by any non-compliance with the provisions of this Act or any of the rules made under the Act. If that be the position and powers available with the third respondent as an Appellate Authority, we fail to see any infirmity in the order of the Appellate Authority in taking cognizance and notice of the grievance made by the first respondent before the Sub-Divisional Officer about the refusal to recount inspite of a 3pecific request having been made therefor, which has been mainly projected as the sole ground to challenge the declaration of the result made in this case in favour of the petitioner and which the Sub-Divisional Officer has chosen to proceed to deal with on the basis of the alleged concession given by both the parties to have the recount before and by him. While dealing with the tenability or otherwise of the plea about the existence or absence of any consent from the petitioner, leave alone the powers or otherwise of the Sub-Divisional Officer to himself recount it cannot be legitimately contended before us that the Deputy Commissioner committed any error or the Sub-Divisional Officer committed any error in declaring the election of the petitioner to be illegal, though the Sub-Divisional Officer has chosen to declare the election of the petitioner illegal on a ground which was stated to be not permissible for him to take note of. It was well justified for the Appellate Authority to sustain that part of the order for other reasons not given by the original authority, which were obvious, otherwise from the record, in that the Appellate Authority coming to such a conclusion on noticing the fact that a request for recount made before the Returning Officer was not considered or complied with by the Returning Officer before finally declaring results of the elections arid to that extent there had been violation of the provisions contained in Section 175(d)(ii) and (iii). Even assuming that the Deputy Commissioner also committed an error in not specifically recording the decision on the question as to whether the petitioner had given consent for recounting or not, it cannot be possibly contended for the petitioner that what was open to the Appellate Authority was to record a decision on this factual issue raised before him by the petitioner and that if there was no consent found to have been given by the petitioner, the election of the petitioner should have been allowed to stand and rendered immune from any interference despite the flagrant violation of a statutory provision which has been legitimately found to have been complained of by the first respondent, before the Sub-Divisional Officer which has not been decided equally specifically by the Sub-Divisional Officer in passing the order. It was obligatory, in our view, for the Appellate Authority to decide not only the grievance of the petitioner who was an appellant before him, but also the grievance of the respondent before the Appellate Authority which was projected by him even at the initial stage before the Sub-Divisional Officer, before either setting aside or confirming the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer on appeal and, therefore, we fail to see any illegality committed by the third respondent-Appellate Authority in partly confirming the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer to the extent of setting aside the election of the petitioner on an obvious ground of illegality committed by the Returning Officer, though not specifically noticed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, apparently as account of his straight away concerning for recount particularly, when the grievance of the first respondent before the Sub-Divisional Officer was only on that ground and which very much weighed ultimately with the Appellate Authority in sustaining a part of the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. 7. Be that as it may, since the petitioner is now before us, it cannot be contended legitimately for the petitioner, that we cannot also go into the question, on going through the records, to find out the tenability of the grievance or otherwise of the parties before us. 7. Be that as it may, since the petitioner is now before us, it cannot be contended legitimately for the petitioner, that we cannot also go into the question, on going through the records, to find out the tenability of the grievance or otherwise of the parties before us. As pointed out earlier, on our scanning through the records summoned on the request of the petitioner himself, we find that though an irregularity has been committed by the Sub-Divisional Officer in ordering the recount without deciding the issue objectively and declaring the results of election himself, that part of the irregularity committed by the Sub-Divisional Officer has been rectified appropriately by the Appellate Authority by setting aside a portion of the order and no exception could be taken to the ultimate order passed by the Appellate Authority which, in our view, is quite in accordance with law and does not call for any intereierence in our hands in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition, therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed. -