M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) IT is necessary to brief the circumstances under which this Court was required to hear this Criminal Appeal on merits. ( 2 ) THE respondent-accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under Section 302. IPC in Sessions Case No. 14/96 and stood his trial before the learned Sessions Judge. Uttara Kannada. Karwar. Briefly stated the charge against him was that on the morning of 24th September. 1995 at about 10. 30 a. m. he had inflicted an injury on the deceased Smt. Umabai Ganapathi Bhat while the lady in question was in the bathroom of the house. The accused is alleged to have inflicted the injury with a sickle as a result of which the spinal cord was cut and the deceased virtually died on the spot. The accused is alleged to have run away with the weapon and it is alleged that in the course of the investigation the weapon was recovered pursuant to certain statements made by him. The learned Sessions Judge held the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302. IPC and convicted him but while imposing the sentence awarded a sentence of 10 years RI. Against this conviction and sentence the State has preferred the present appeal the short point being that once the accused was convicted under Section 302. IPC the Court was required under the law to impose the sentence of R. I for life or the higher sentence and that the awarding of 10 years R. I was not permissible and consequently that the sentence be enhanced. This Court issued notice to the respondent-accused and it is relevant for us to record that the accused had not preferred any appeal against the conviction and sentence. Pursuant to the notice being served on the respondent accused he was not represented before this Court and this Court proceeded on the basis that the respondent-accused had no ground on which to show cause why that the sentence in question be enhanced. This Court had also called for the report from the Trial Judge on the question as to how and under what circumstances the sentence of 10 years R. I. was awarded in a conviction under Section 302, IPC. This Court had also called for the report from the Trial Judge on the question as to how and under what circumstances the sentence of 10 years R. I. was awarded in a conviction under Section 302, IPC. ( 3 ) ON receipt of the report from the learned Sessions Judge, this Court reconsidered the matter and took cognizance of the fact that in a case where enhancement of sentence is sought and notice is issued to the accused, that having regard to the provision of Section 377 (3) of the Cr. P. C. as interpreted by the Supreme Court and other Courts from time to time, that it is a well settled principle of law that the whole issue is open in so far as it is competent for the accused to argue that a lesser sentence be awarded or that the accused be acquitted. At that stage, the Court appointed learned Advocate Sri B. Nagaraj to appear as Amicus Curiae on behalf of the respondent-accused. Notice was also once again issued to the accused-respondent whereupon he engaged the services of a learned Advocate Smt. Anasuya who filed her appearance on his behalf Learned Advocate for the respondent reiterated the position that the whole issue is wide open and that therefore, the appeal would have to be heard on merits and should not be restricted only to the question of sentence and we have upheld this contention in view of the settled position in law and directed that the appeal be heard on merits. Since however by this time the respondent accused had briefed his Counsel and desired that she should represent him, we dictated a separate order and issued certain direction to the office with regard to the payment of professional charges etc. , to the learned Advocate Mr. B. Nagaraj who had been appointed as amicus curiae and we have proceeded to hear the learned State Public Prosecutor and the respondents learned Advocate and we have also briefly heard Mr. B. Nagaraj. ( 4 ) AS indicated by us, the incident in question took place on 24-9-1995. The accused was working as a domestic servant and was employed by the household of the deceased. It is alleged that the incident took place at about 10. B. Nagaraj. ( 4 ) AS indicated by us, the incident in question took place on 24-9-1995. The accused was working as a domestic servant and was employed by the household of the deceased. It is alleged that the incident took place at about 10. 30 a. m. on the morning of that day and it is the prosecution case that this incident was witnessed at close quarters by P. W. 2 Gown who incidentally is distantly connected with the accused, in so far as her daughter is married to the brother of the accused, Gown, was also employed by the family of the deceased and was working in the house on that day. She states that the accused went up to the deceased who was washing clothes in the bath-room and that he had attacked her with a sickle on the neck from the back that she died on the spot and that he ran away from that place with the weapon. The blow was so severe, that the deceased fell down unconscious and died. Gown shouted out and P. W. 1 Ramachandra who is the brother in law and who was working close by in the field came running to that spot. Gown informed him what had happened and with the assistance of other persons they carried the deceased to the front of the house and a private Medical practitioner P. W. 12 Dr. Mahabaleswara was immediately brought. He declared the deceased dead whereupon Ramachandra proceeded to the police station and lodged a complaint at about 1. 00 p. m. on that day. It is a short complaint in which he has clearly implicated the accused as the assistant. ( 5 ) THE evidence in this case rests heavily on the testimony of P. W. 2 Gown. She has very clearly recounted the fact she was present in the house very close to where the incident took place. The incident has taken place in broad day light and Gown identified the accused because he was not a stranger to her. She has stated that the accused attacked the deceased with a sickle and ran away from there and that she raised an immediate alarm. The incident has taken place in broad day light and Gown identified the accused because he was not a stranger to her. She has stated that the accused attacked the deceased with a sickle and ran away from there and that she raised an immediate alarm. Smt. Gown has been Cross-examined and we have carefully scrutinised the evidence, but we do not find any reasons whatsoever to discard this evidence because her version remains unshaken and nothing has been brought on record to either discredit her claim that she was present there nor has anything been elicited on the basis of which it can be said that she has falsely implicated the accused. ( 6 ) THERE is considerable support to the version of P. W. 2 Gown from two other quarters i. e. , the evidence of P. W. 1, Ranlachandra who ran to the spot within minutes on hearing the alarm that Gown had sounded and he states that Gown immediately told him that it was the accused who had attacked the deceased. This is consistent with the fact that P. W. 1 Ramachandra has set out the same version in the complaint that was lodged at 1. 00 p. m. in the police station. Ramachandras evidence is virtually unshaken and nothing has been brought on record nor has it even been suggested that he has wrongly and falsely implicated accused. ( 7 ) THERE are two very strong connect heads of corroboration to this evidence, which we find in the evidence of P. W. 9 Smt. Sujatha and P. W. 10 Suryanarayan both of the whom are persons residing in the area. P. W. 9 Sujatha is in fact the sister in law of the deceased and she states that she saw the accused running away from the scene of offence with the weapon M. O. 13 in his hand. There is an identical version from P. W. 10 who is a resident of the locality who is an independent witness not being related to the parties and who also states that he saw the accused running away from the scene of offence with the weapon in his hand. We have 110 reason once again to either doubt or disbelieve the evidence of these two witnesses. The last supportive factor is the medical evidence, which is totally consistent with the version of these witnesses. We have 110 reason once again to either doubt or disbelieve the evidence of these two witnesses. The last supportive factor is the medical evidence, which is totally consistent with the version of these witnesses. The Post Mortem Report and the evidence of the doctor indicate that there was a 16 cm. long injury on the back of the neck of the deceased and the spinal cord had been cut. This evidence is absolutely, consistent with the version of the other witness. Also, there is the opinion of the doctor on record to the effect that the injury on the deceased would have been caused by the weapon such as M. O. 13. The medical evidence therefore totally and completely fits in with the ocular evidence in this case. ( 8 ) THE last head of evidence and which again has been established by the prosecution is to the effect that after he had been apprehended the accused made a statement in the presence of the panchas, pursuant to which, he led the police and the panchastoa certain place from where he is alleged to have produced the weapon M. O. 13 The recovery evidence has been established through, P. W. 18 Mahabaleshwar who again has completely supported the prosecution. We have record of the voluntary statement and the record also of the recovery and this is the very weapon that was shown to the doctor on the basis of which he has given his opinion that the injury could have been caused by a weapon of this nature. On a total analysis of the material before us we find that the evidence fully and completely establishes that the accused was the person who inflicted the fatal injury on the deceased as a result of which she died. The respondents learned Advocate did point out to us that even though the doctor has been examined and even though he has given the cause of death as shock due to severance of spinal cord and cardiac pulmonary arrest, he has not in so many words stated that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The submission was that in the absence of such formal evidence the charge under Section 302, IPC is not sustainable. The submission was that in the absence of such formal evidence the charge under Section 302, IPC is not sustainable. ( 9 ) LEARNED State Public Prosecutor vehemently refuted this contention and he has submitted that in a case where there may be some ambiguity with regard to the seriousness of the injury, and the question arises as to whether the injury was sufficiently grave and was life threatening, that it is essential for the Medical Officer to specifically indicate to the Court as to whether the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Relying on the well served position in law, the learned State Public Prosecutor submitted that it is equally permissible in cases where the injury is so very serious and where it is self apparent that it is sufficient to cause death for the Court to take cognizance of this fact. In this regard we need to record that the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Brij Bhushan and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, has laid down precisely this principle. It is true that the respondents Advocate cited before us the decision reported in Nachittar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, in support of her contention that if the injury inflicted by the accused is not established to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death that the offence must be brought down to run under Section 304, Part - 1 IPC. Similarly, the learned Advocate drew our attention to the decision reported in Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana where the Supreme Court held that in such circumstances the offence would be covered by Clause (3) of Section 300. The reason why the Supreme Court took this view in that case was because it was demonstrated that the deceased had been hit with the blunt side of the gandasa and furthermore that the assault was in the heat of the moment and without premeditation. Reliance was also placed by the learned Advocate on the decision reported in Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, where again the Supreme Court brought the conviction down to one under Section 304 Part - II because this was an incident that took place in the course of a sudden quarrel on the spur of the moment arising out of a trivial reason on a chance meeting of the parties. Lastly, reliance was placed on one of the latest decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Ramachandra Ohdar v. State of Bihar, where again even though the injury was on the neck, the Supreme Court on a consideration of the nature of the injury which was minor and the weapon as also the part of the body on which blow was given, held that the conviction could only be under Section 326, IPC. ( 10 ) WE have been guided by the principles enunciated by the. Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions as also by the well settled principles of law that emerge from several other cases of the Supreme Court and the High Court. It is true that in a large number of instances where the incident is in the course of the sudden quarrel or on the spur of the moment, where it is demonstrated that even though it was serious enough in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but that it could not have been With the intention to cause death that the conviction must necessarily be brought down to one under Section 304 Part - for Part - II. At the same time the learned State Public Prosecutor has specifically brought to our notice that even though such a plea is put forward in almost every murder case, that the Court would have to carefully take note of some of the basic principle, the first of them being that the facts have got to be carefully assessed in each case and secondly that no watering down is permissible in those of the cases where the offence squarely comes under Section 302, IPC. In this regard we are guided by the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Kashmira Singh v. state of Madhya Pradesh, wherein it is pointed out that each case rests on Us own special features however similar the facts of two cases may be, they can never be identical since more or less similar facts cannot necessarily lead to identical consequences. ( 11 ) THE present case has certain distinguishing features. We helve conceded, as pointed out by the respondent's learned Advocate, that the prosecution has neither attributed nor established any motive for the commission of the offence. ( 11 ) THE present case has certain distinguishing features. We helve conceded, as pointed out by the respondent's learned Advocate, that the prosecution has neither attributed nor established any motive for the commission of the offence. Whereas the respondents Advocate submitted that this casts a serious doubt on the entire, prosecution case, we are not prepared to go to that extent or to accept the submission because the intention, after our careful scrutiny, is based on the test of probability. Also, though motive may be one of the crucial ingredients of a criminal offence it is equally true that there are situations in which the establishment of motive is not essential if the case can rest on the evidence. de hors this factor. There is a clear suggestion that the deceased used to be careless about her privacy particularly while bathing and that the accused who was a young male servant had been reprimanded by her for his curiosity. Obviously the lady overlooked elementary and basic cautions and paid for it with her life. This is all nothing more than a suggestion, but the basic principle which lays down that conviction is sustainable even in cases where motive is uncertain has been enunciated since a long time in the decisions reported in A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 474 and A. I. R. 1955 S. C. 807. ( 12 ) ON the other hand, what we have taken special note of the fact that the learned 5tate Public Prosecutor has been very emphatic in pointing out that the intention of the accused has to be inferred from some of the attendant factors namely the type of weapon used, type of injury inflicted and the effect of that injury. We find in this case that the weapon was a sharp sickle and that when it comes to the nature of the injury that the accused had chosen the rear of the neck of the deceased which is one of the most vital and vulnerable parts of the human body. It was a severe blow that was inflicted on the back of the neck which has virtually cut the spinal cord and from the type of injury inflicted it is abundantly clear that the intention could be nothing else than to instantly kill. It is equally important for us to record that the deceased was busy in washing clothes. It was a severe blow that was inflicted on the back of the neck which has virtually cut the spinal cord and from the type of injury inflicted it is abundantly clear that the intention could be nothing else than to instantly kill. It is equally important for us to record that the deceased was busy in washing clothes. She had neither talked to the accused nor was there any quarrel or altercation or provocation and under these circumstances, this case is distinguishable from the long list of decisions wherein the charge was reduced to one under Section 304, IPC on the ground that the incident was sudden, sporadic or unintentional. It is on the basis of these factors and on the basis of a careful and correct application of the I. P. C. as interpreted by the Courts that we have no hesitation in holding that the finding of the learned trial Judge that the accused is liable to be convicted for an offence under Section 302, IPC requires to be confirmed. It is true that a plea was made before us that the conviction should be brought down to one under Section 304, IPC. In support of this one more decision was cited viz. , Mavila Thamban Nambiar v. State of Kerala, but that case is again distinguishable inasmuch as the weapon used was a pair of scissors and the type of injuries inflicted could not necessarily have been delivered aimed at killing. The gravity of the present case is far more serious and is clearly distinguishable from what had happened in the decision referred to supra where the accused suddenly picked up a pair of scissors from the table and stabbed the deceased. In this case, it was without any provocation or any cause given by the deceased. The prosecution has clearly established that it was virtually a one way assault with, the accused approaching the deceased who was in a vulnerable position, and inflicting the vital blow on her. It is for this reason that we are of the considered view that the conviction under Section 302, IPC is correct and that Section 304 or any other lesser section cannot apply. ( 13 ) IN view of the aforesaid position, we confirm the conviction and sentence awarded to the respondent by the learned trial Judge for the offence punishable under Section 302. IPC. ( 13 ) IN view of the aforesaid position, we confirm the conviction and sentence awarded to the respondent by the learned trial Judge for the offence punishable under Section 302. IPC. We set aside the operative part of the order of the trial Court whereby the respondent has been awarded a sentence of 10 years R. I and in substitution thereof we direct that the respondent shall undergo R. I for life. ( 14 ) THE appeal accordingly succeeds and stands disposed of. We have issued separate directions to the office with regard to the professional charges payable to the learned Advocate for respondent who was earlier appointed as Amicus curiae. ( 15 ) THIS case has involved certain intricate and interesting points of law and we record our appreciation to the learned State Public Prosecutor Mr. B. R Nanjundaiah as also to Smt. G. S. Anasuya and learned Advocate Mr. Nagaraj for the assistance to the Court. Appeal allowed.