S. N. Kapoor, J. ( 1 ) THE purpose of prior sanction is to discourage frivolous and vexatious prosecution of public servants. It is a safeguard for the innocent but not a shield for the guilty. One of the guiding principles for sanctioning authority would be the public interest and therefore, the protection available to the public servant cannot be said to be absolute. The sanctioning authority or the Government have an absolute discretion to grant or withhold their sanctions. Despite the fact that the evidence discloses a primafacie case, they can refuse sanction on any ground which commends itself to them, including administration expediency. However, the sanctioning authority cannot adequately discharge this obligation without knowledge of the facts of the case and without applying its mind to those factors. ( 2 ) IN UP Financial Corpn. v. Gem Cap (India) (P) Ltd. , AIR 1993 SC 1435 , the Supreme Court made the following observations: "11. The obligation to act fairly on the part of the administrative authorities was evolved to ensure the rule of law and to prevent failure of justice. This doctrine is complementary to the principles of natural justice which the quasi-judicial authorities are bound to observe. . It is true that the distinction between a quasi-judicial and the administrative action has become thin, as pointed out by this Court as far back as 1970 in A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 . Even so the extent of judicial scrutiny/judicial review in the case of administrative action cannot be larger than in the case of quasi-judicial action. If the High Court cannot sit as an appellate authority over the decisions and orders of quasi-judicial authorities it follows equally that it cannot do so in the case of administrative authorities. In the matter of administrative action, it is well known, more than one choice is available to the administrative authorities; they have a certain amount of discretion available to them. They have a right to choose between more than one possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable people to hold differing opinions as to which is to be preferred. (Lord Diplock in Secy. of State for Education and Science v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council, 1977 AC 1014 (p. 1064 ). The Court cannot substitute its judgment for the judgment of administrative authorities in such cases. (Lord Diplock in Secy. of State for Education and Science v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council, 1977 AC 1014 (p. 1064 ). The Court cannot substitute its judgment for the judgment of administrative authorities in such cases. Only when the action of the administrative authority is. so unfair or unreasonable that no reasonable person would have taken that action, can the Court intervene. " ( 3 ) IN the instant case, the only thing which has been alleged is bias of the sanctioning authority. It is alleged that at one stage, the third respondent Dr. R. K. D. Shah had himself recommended the purchase of the equipment in question and recorded on note dt. 25/28th August 1989 for the circulation to the Directors of BHEL. The relevant part of the note reads as under: "there are very few presses of this capacity and range in the world and getting offers for second hand presses of this type is not so frequent. CFFP is therefore, trying to encash the opportunity available on account of this offer. " ( 4 ) EVEN earlier, the third respondent had requested the Directors and the CMD for according sanction of the Forge Lathe through his note dated August 23, 1989. It is not the case that he was member of the technical team which had visited West Germany in July 1989 for the purpose of ascertaining the suitability of the second and Forge press. It is claimed by the petitioner that the third respondent had accorded sanction without applying his mind firstly for the sanction does not bear the date on which it was accorded; secondly, it is alleged that the third respondent accorded sanction under compulsion as he wanted to buy immunity for himself from being prosecuted nine days before his retirement on 22nd May 1988. As such), he acted as a Judge in his own cause by granting sanction. Consequently, the sanction so accorded stands vitiated being afflicted by objectionable bias towards the petitioner. Thirdly, the third respondent was disqualified for giving sanction as he was instrumental in clinching the deal with M/s Smachtin Machine Tools for purchase of equipment. ( 5 ) ON the other hand, the learned senior counsel for the first and the third respondent Mr. Arun Jaitley and Mr. Thirdly, the third respondent was disqualified for giving sanction as he was instrumental in clinching the deal with M/s Smachtin Machine Tools for purchase of equipment. ( 5 ) ON the other hand, the learned senior counsel for the first and the third respondent Mr. Arun Jaitley and Mr. Jayant Bhushan for the second respondent have submitted that sanction was proper and valid sanction granted by the third respondent u/s 19 (1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 after applying his mind to the material on record. The third respondent was neither under pressure from any quarter nor his decision was affected by any extraneous considerations. It was not undated inasmuch as sanction was accorded on 22nd May 1998 as is evident from his letter to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, CBI. In so far as the note of the third respondent dated 25th/28th August 1989 is concerned, it is submilted that it was based upon the report of the committee which had visited West Germany and had inspected the machine from 18th July 1989 to 23rd July 1989. It was the report of the said committee which misled the third respondent into recording the note dated 25th/28th Angus 1989. 5. 1. In so far as the question of not putting the date on the sanction is concerned, it was signed along with the letter to the Director CBI dated 22nd May 1989 and, therefore, it cannot be inferred on the basis of lack of date on the sanction order itself that the sanctioning authority did not apply its mind. 5. 2. Those who allege bias have to establish a very tangible bias first. It is also required that such a bias should affect, the decision to the prejudice of the person against whom the sanction has been granted. Here, excepting the bare words and the writing of the said note there is nothing to indicate that the sanctioning authority could be biased. 5. 3. As regards the note written by respondent No. 3, it is not in dispute that he had not gone along with the technical team; he had not seen the machine; he had just seen the report of the technical team. On the basis of the report, he felt satisfied and put the note accordingly. 5. 3. As regards the note written by respondent No. 3, it is not in dispute that he had not gone along with the technical team; he had not seen the machine; he had just seen the report of the technical team. On the basis of the report, he felt satisfied and put the note accordingly. This would neither be sufficient to equate respondent No. 3 with nor to put him in the category of those who had visited West Germany, seen the machine and submitted the report. After all, no institution could be run by suspecting all the persons and all the time. If he acted upon the report of the technical committee which submitted the report, it could not be a ground to say that he was himself in hand and glove with the members of the committee and therefore, he wanted to buy immunity from his own prosecution. There is no allegation against him in the report submitted by the CBI that he was also involved, connived and conspired along with the members of the technical committee to mislead the company. ( 6 ) SUPPOSING for the sake of argument that he suffered from such a bias as is being imagined, even then it is required to be seen whether it is in the public interest to accept such a sanction or not. Only when the action of the administrative authority is so unfair or unreasonable that no reasonable person would have taken that action, can the court intervene as has been observed in U. P. Financial Corporation (Supra ). ( 7 ) NOW, let us see whether any reasonable person can reach any other decision on the material placed before the Sanctioning Authority. In this case, the most serious allegations made against the petitioner was that in the record of the BHEL the capacity of the Forge Press was mentioned as 9000 MT, while its actual capacity is 7500mt. It is only the intensifier which has the capacity of 9000 MT. The Technical committee, it appears, also succeeded in the representation to obtain import licence for 9000 MT Forge Press with accessories for DM 8657500 though the cost of the said Forge Press (7500) with inlensifier (9000 MT) with all accessories including Manipulator was DM 0. 37 million. It is only the intensifier which has the capacity of 9000 MT. The Technical committee, it appears, also succeeded in the representation to obtain import licence for 9000 MT Forge Press with accessories for DM 8657500 though the cost of the said Forge Press (7500) with inlensifier (9000 MT) with all accessories including Manipulator was DM 0. 37 million. This extra amount obviously meant for causing wrongful loss to the BHEL and obviously for wrongful gain to the accused. Another serious allegation against the petitioner is that the foreign trader had no technical capability to underlake erection/commissioning of the said equipment but the accused officers managed to obtain the approval of the competent authority of 9000 MT Forged Press along with accessories including the Manipulator and for erection and commissioning of the equipment at BHEL, Hardwar. The accused officer of the BHEL without any authority and to cause favour to the foreign trader waived penalty Clauses from the purchase order in an illegal manner. The foreign trader allowed to withdraw almost the entire payment through SBI, Frankfurt without supplying any equipment and even after receiving payment it had refused erection and commissioning of the equipment. The accused officer of the BHEL also by illegal and dubious means adjusted the bills of the supplier for only DM 6. 21 lakhs for non-supply of Manipulator on the basis of weight. The petitioner took extraordinary initiative to purchase Crane Girder (DM 1. 80 lakhs) and Quality Improvement Equipment valuing DM J 3. 50 lakhs without any feasibility report and without approval of the Board of Directors of BHEL and accordingly order was placed on 5th February 1993 by Mr. J. L: Jain. ( 8 ) SEEING the abovesaid allegations, it would not be possible to say that no reasonable person would have granted the sanction. So long it does not appear that the order granting sanction is so unfair and unreasonable that no reasonable person would have taken that action, the court must not intervene. J. L: Jain. ( 8 ) SEEING the abovesaid allegations, it would not be possible to say that no reasonable person would have granted the sanction. So long it does not appear that the order granting sanction is so unfair and unreasonable that no reasonable person would have taken that action, the court must not intervene. ( 9 ) IT may further be mentioned that leaving aside alleged bias, mala fides in launching prosecution against the respondent with a view to punishing him could not he a sufficient reason for preventing the court of competent jurisdiction from examing the evidence swhich may be allowed before it for coming to the conclusion whether offence has been committed or not (See State of Maharashtra v. Ishwar Piraji Katpalri, (1996) I SCC542 para 22 ). hnwdnotbe said. that malafides is many shades worse than bias . ( 10 ) IT may also be added that the while it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that valid sanction has been granted by the sanctioning authority after it was satisfied that the sanction has been made out constituting the offence, this may be done in two ways either (i) by producing the original sanction which itself contains the facts constituting the offence and the grounds of satisfaction; and (ii) by adducing evidence aliunde to show the facts before the sanctioning authority and the satisfaction arrived at by it. (Sec Mohd. lqhal Ahmed v. Stale of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 677 pura 3 ). ( 11 ) IN so far as the question of introducing principles of natural justice is concerned,in the matter like grant of sanction for prosecution, the observations made by the Supreme Court in a matters of civil nature and disciplinary proceedings and not relating to the grant of sanction may not be applicable. 11. 1. It is apparent from the judgment State of Maharashtra v. Ishwar Piraji Kalpatri (supra) that "for the formation of a prima facie opinion that an officer may be guilty of criminal misconduct leading to the filing of the First Information Report, there is no provision in law or otherwise which makes it obligatory that an opportunity of being heard be given to a person against whom the report is to be lodged. That such satisfactory account had to be rendered before a court is also borne out from the judgment of this Court in Veeraswami case" (para 15 ). 11. 2. Thus, the opportunity which is to be afforded to the delinquent officer of explaining his conduct etc. is before the court when trial commences and not at any earlier stage. ( 12 ) THERE is distinction in legislative approach with reference to sanction under Section 197 Cr. P. C. and sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. This distinction is well pronounced in following observations of the Supreme Court in Kulicharan Mahapatra v. State of Orissa, 1998 (6)SCC 411 in para 13 as under: "13. It must be remembered that in spite of bringing such a significant change to Section 197 of the Code in 1973, the Parliament was circumspect enough not to change the wording in Section 197 of the Act which deals with sanclion. The reason is obvious. The sanction contlemplated in Section 197 of the Code concerns a public servant who "is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty", whereas the offences contemplated in the P. C. Act are those which can not be treated as acts either directly or even purportedly done in the discharge of his official duties. Parliament must have desired to maintain the distinction and hence the wording in the corresponding provision in the former P. C. Act was materially imported in the new P. C. Act, 1988 without any change in spite of the change made in section 197 of the Code. " (Emphasis supplied) 12. 1. The distinction between the employees of the State instrumental or agent of State was also recognised in Mohd. Hadi Raja v. State of Bihar and Anr. , 1998 (2)JCC (SC)18: 1998 (5) SCC 91 , for one is covered by the provisions of Section 197 Cr. PC, the other is not. There is distinction in approach in the protection given u/s 197 Cr. PC which is larger than the protection provided u/s 19 (1) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In this connection sub-section (3) and (4) of Section 19 may also be seen. These read as under: 19. PC, the other is not. There is distinction in approach in the protection given u/s 197 Cr. PC which is larger than the protection provided u/s 19 (1) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In this connection sub-section (3) and (4) of Section 19 may also be seen. These read as under: 19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.-- (1) xxx (2) xxx (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973," (A) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has infact been occasioned thereby; (B) no Court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice; (C) no Court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no Court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings. (4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings. " (Emphasis supplied) 12. 2. If according to clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, "no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the. ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that Court; a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. ", obviously the prime importance has been given not to the irregularity or error in the sanction on the ground of the alleged and assumed bias but to failure of justice. ", obviously the prime importance has been given not to the irregularity or error in the sanction on the ground of the alleged and assumed bias but to failure of justice. Here in this case, the alleged bias is not likely to lead to failure of justice in view of the serious allegations made against the petitioner and so long as there is no failure of justice, this court is not supposed to intervene on the basis of assumed and imaginary bias or error or irregularity. It may be mentioned that for the purpose of Section 19 of Prevention of Corruption Act, error includes competence of the authority to grant sanction. In this case, the competence of respondent No. 3 has been challenged on the ground of bias.