Punit Vidyalaya Primary School Vali Mandal v. State of Gujarat
1999-02-05
B.C.PATEL
body1999
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : B.C. Patel, J. These two petitions are filed by the Punit Vidyalay Primary School Vali Mandal (association of parents) and Punit Education Trust running Punit Vidyalaya, against common order passed by Deputy Secretary, Education Department on 17-5-1997. 2. In view of the various irregularities being found by the Administrative Officer, decision was taken to de-recognise the school from June 1985 which was communicated to Punit Vidyalaya by a letter dated 29-11-1984 at annexure-B with a direction to submit the record of the school to the Principal of School No.49, after closing the school. Considering the interest of the pupils, after considering the reply in response to the show cause notice, decision was taken, which was communicated in November, 1984, to close the school after completion of the term, i.e. from June 1985. It appears that against the said order Regular Civil Suit No.818 of 1985 was filed in the court of Civil Judge (S.D.), Rajkot, and against the order at annexure-B prayer was made to restrain the authorities not to compel the Trust to close down the school. Such an order came to be passed by way of ad interim relief. It appears that after hearing the concerned parties the trial court vacated the order on 23-3-1987. The School management thereafter preferred an appeal being Civil Misc. Appeal No. 210 of 1987 in the District Court at Rajkot, which came to be dismissed on 24-4-1991. The said order was challenged in this court by preferring Civil Revision Application No. 577 of 1991. The order passed in the said revision application is produced at annexure-C to the petition. The original plaintiff Trust requested the court to grant permission to withdraw the revision application contending that trust wanted to move the concerned authorities for continuance of recognition of the school or for revocation of the order de-recognising the school. The learned Judge, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case granted permission as sought for. It was kept open for the revisionist to move appropriate authority by way of representation. The concerned authority was directed to decide the said representation on merits as and when it was made. The status quo order granted by the court on 11-6-1991 was extended till 30-4-1995.
It was kept open for the revisionist to move appropriate authority by way of representation. The concerned authority was directed to decide the said representation on merits as and when it was made. The status quo order granted by the court on 11-6-1991 was extended till 30-4-1995. Thereafter there is neither an order of status quo, nor any order staying the operation of the order annexure-B passed by the Administrative Officer, Nagar Palika, Rajkot. After the revision application was withdrawn, representation was made, which was decided on 17-5-1997. It is this order which is challenged before this court. 3. The important question raised in this petition is that once having withdrawn the revision application, whether the petition would be maintainable if a decision is rendered on the representation made by the party which had earlier failed before the High Court in obtaining favourable order. 4. This question is required to be considered because in several matters, after realising the trend of the court, request is made for withdrawal of the petition, and after the petition is withdrawn, representation is made and against the decision of the authority deciding the representation petition is again filed. This approach is erroneous. Once by withdrawing the petition filed before this court, the party has accepted the decision of the lower court, thereafter if the party has submitted to the wisdom of the concerned authority by making a representation, then it would not be permissible to file a writ petition against the order passed on the representation, more particularly when the Court has not reserved any liberty to challenge the order. 5. Similar situation arose before the Division Bench of this Court, in Special Civil Application No. 7256 of 1996, which was decided on 27.9.1995. In that case, the award made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer under the Land Acquisition Act was the subject matter. This order was challenged earlier by preferring Special Civil Application No.4364 of 1990. Before the Court, the learned Advocate appearing for the applicant made a statement as under:- "Under instructions from the petitioners, Miss.
In that case, the award made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer under the Land Acquisition Act was the subject matter. This order was challenged earlier by preferring Special Civil Application No.4364 of 1990. Before the Court, the learned Advocate appearing for the applicant made a statement as under:- "Under instructions from the petitioners, Miss. V.P. Shah stated that the petitioners will submit a proposal to the Corporation to the effect that if they are given land bearing Nondh No. 2229 together with constructions for the school made thereon, they will hand over the entire Nondh No. 2161 and with all constructions for the school building of the same area, as is put up in Nondh No. 2229, at their costs, in exchange." In the aforesaid case, the Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation rejected the application. Before the Court submission was made that mere withdrawal should not come in the way of the petitioners. The Division Bench observed as under in paragraph 6 of the judgment: "The principle embodied in Order XXIII, Rule 1 has been extended to writ petition. This is not a case where a promise was given by the other side and on giving such promise the petitioners withdrew the petition. But the petitioners withdrew of their own. Where a party unconditionally withdraws his suit or Special Civil Application in view of the matter in dispute being referred to a party, then he cannot subsequently sue again in respect of such matter although the reference may have become infructuous. In the instant case, the petitioners left the matter to the discretion of the Municipal Commissioner and it was for him to decide the matter and that would not give him a fresh cause of action to file a writ petition, because what was challenged earlier was an award and today also, the petitioners have challenged the same award on the same available grounds.
When the petitioners themselves did not want to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or having invoked the same did not want to press writ petition and if the petition is withdrawn, the same is not required to be entertained, unless the Court, while permitting withdrawal of a petition, has granted liberty to file a fresh petition on the same subject matter as contemplated under Rule 1, Order XXIII." In that case, the Division Bench also considered a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwalior reported in AIR 1987 wherein the Honourable Supreme Court held as under:- "The law confers upon a man no rights or benefits which he does not desire. Whoever waives, abandons or disclaims a right will lose it. In order to prevent a litigant from abusing the process of the Court by instituting suits again and again on the same cause of action without any good reason the Code insists that he should obtain the permission of the Court to file a fresh suit after establishing either of the two grounds mentioned in sub-rule (3) of R.1 of O. XXIII. The principle underlying the above rule is founded on public policy, but it is not the same as the rule of res judicata contained in Section 11 of the Code which provides that no Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly or substantially in issue has been directly or substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. The rule of res judicata applies to a case where the suit or an issue has already been heard and finally decided by a Court.
The rule of res judicata applies to a case where the suit or an issue has already been heard and finally decided by a Court. In the case of abandonment or withdrawal of a suit without the permission of the Court to file a fresh suit, there is no prior adjudication of a suit or an issue is involved, yet the Code provides, as stated earlier, that a second suit will not lie in sub-rule (4) of R.1 of O. XXIII of the Code when the first suit is withdrawn without the permission referred to in sub-rule (3) in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court." "The question for our consideration is whether it would or would not advance the cause of justice if the principle underlying R.1 of O. XXIII of the Code is adopted in respect of writ petitions filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution also. It is a common knowledge that very often after a writ petition is heard for some time when the petitioner or his counsel finds that the Court is not likely to pass an order admitting the petition, request is made by the petitioner or his counsel, to permit the petitioner to withdraw from the writ petition without seeking permission to institute a fresh petition. A Court which is unwilling to admit the petition would not ordinarily grant liberty to file a fresh petition while it may just agree to permit the withdrawal of the petition. It is plain that when once a writ petition filed in a High Court is withdrawn by the petitioner himself he is precluded from filing an appeal against the order passed in the writ petition because he cannot be considered as a party aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court." The Apex Court further held as under :- "But we are of the view that the principle underlying R.1 of O. XXIII of the Code should be extended in the interests of administration of justice to cases of withdrawal of writ petition also, not on the ground of res judicata but on the ground of public policy as explained above. It would also discourage the litigant from indulging in bench-hunting tactics.
It would also discourage the litigant from indulging in bench-hunting tactics. In any event, there is no justifiable reason in such a case to permit a petitioner to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution once again. While the withdrawal of a writ petition filed in High Court without permission to file a fresh writ petition may not bar other remedies like suit or a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution since such withdrawal does not amount to res judicata, the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution should be deemed to have been abandoned by the petitioner in respect of the cause of action relied on in the writ petition when he withdraws it without such permission." 6. In the instant case, Revision Application was preferred by the petitioner against the order passed by the trial Court refusing to grant interim relief. However, the applicant enjoyed the benefit of ad-interim orders passed by the trial Court, lower appellate Court and the High Court. However, wisdom prevailed over the management, as a result of which the application was withdrawn. Merely because it was kept open for the party to make a representation before the appropriate authority, would not give him a cause of action to file a writ petition. The Apex Court has pointed out that on the ground of public policy also, such litigation should not be permitted. Revision Application was maintainable and it was open for the applicants to get a decision on merit from the Court. It is under this circumstances the petition is required to be rejected as not maintainable. 7. That apart, the representation has been considered by the authority in detail and it is pointed out by the authority, after perusing the report of the competent authority, officers, and the report forwarded by the authority on personal verification that there is no improvement, irregularities are continued, and it appears that the Department could not take any action because of the orders passed by the Court. In 1984, fourteen defects were pointed out including that of nonpayment of salary to the teachers as per the grade fixed and non-maintenance of any records.
In 1984, fourteen defects were pointed out including that of nonpayment of salary to the teachers as per the grade fixed and non-maintenance of any records. Even in 1996, it is found that the school changed its premises and the classes were conducted in different and separate premises without any permission; appointments were made in contravention of the rules; before taking interviews, the competent officer was not even informed. It was also found that two teachers who were not qualified were appointed. There was no audit till for the year 1995. On personal visit on 13.9.1996, teachers admitted that no appointment orders were issued, which fact was also admitted by the Principal in his statement dated 18.9.1996. A sum of Rs. 42/- was being collected from each pupil without prior permission and the amount was not credited in the school account. No answer was given whether payment to the staff was made by cheque or not. Students were housed in classes which were too small. Names of Teachers were not mentioned in the Muster Roll and it did not bear signature of any teacher. The ratio of the teachers as per the subject was not being maintained. The explanation given was that lady teachers after getting married were leaving the school. Even show cause notice was given on 31.1.1997 pointing out 7 irregularities. Considering all these, by giving a detailed, reasoned order, the representation has been rejected. It is against the rejection of this representation that this petition is preferred. 8. As pointed out by me earlier, there was no merit or substance in the case. It is also required to be noted that in the instant case, Revision Petition has been disposed of by the learned Single Judge. However, the learned Single Judge has not permitted at the time of withdrawal to file further proceedings, and therefore, the moment the Revision Application was withdrawn, the order passed by the authorities would become operative. In the instant case, it was made operative from 30-4-1995 as the order passed by Administrative Officer, at annexure-B was ordered to be suspended till that date only and not thereafter. Thereafter, there being no interim relief, the petitioners were duty bound to act according to the order passed by the competent authorities. 9.
In the instant case, it was made operative from 30-4-1995 as the order passed by Administrative Officer, at annexure-B was ordered to be suspended till that date only and not thereafter. Thereafter, there being no interim relief, the petitioners were duty bound to act according to the order passed by the competent authorities. 9. When there are two modes of invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court and one of this modes has been chosen and exhausted, it would not be proper and sound exercise of discretion to grant relief in the other set of proceedings in respect of the same order of the subordinate Court. This view has been taken by the Apex Court in the case of Shankar v. Krishna Reported in AIR 1970 SC. 1 . In the instant case, as said earlier, the application was already withdrawn and the petitioner school was permitted to make a representation. That would not give a fresh cause of action because the party approached the authorities again and the authorities declined to entertain the petitioner's representation. The petitioner had withdrawn the Revision Application. Therefore, the order passed by Administrative Officer, which has not been set aside, cannot be challenged in subsequent proceedings and that would amount to abuse of process of law and finality which has been reached cannot be reopened by a parallel proceedings. 10. In this matter, at the initial stage, the Court, in the absence of other side, granted ad-interim relief but after hearing the parties, vacated the ad-interim relief. Despite the continuance of benefit of ad-interim relief, the school has not made any improvement, but on the contrary, looking to the report, it cannot be said that permission to run such school can be said to be in the interest of students. Therefore, these petitions are required to be rejected, and are hereby rejected with costs. Petitions rejected.