ORDER S.P. Srivastava, J. 1. Feeling aggrieved by the order disposing of the writ petition No. 41 of 1992, dated 22.1.1996, filed by the respondent issuing a direction requiring the appellant to regularize the services of the respondent/petitioner on the post of Assistant Engineer from January, 1993 and pay to him the difference of wages to which he was entitled as Assistant Engineer, the employer/appellant has now come up in the Letters Patent Appeal seeking redress praying for the reversal of the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge. 2. We have heard the learned counsel for the employer/appellant as well as the learned counsel representing the petitioner/respondent, and have carefully perused the record. 3. The facts in brief shorn of details, and necessary for the disposal of this appeal lie in a narrow compass. The petitioner had passed the examination for the award of a Diploma in Electrical Engineering having completed a three year cause prescribed therefor from the Government Polytechnic, Ashoknagar in November, 1988. 4. The appellant/employer had appointed the petitioner as an Apprentice (Electrical) vide the order dated 5.2.1990. The contract of apprenticeship was however not got registered by the employer as contemplated under the provisions of the Apprentices Act, 1961. The services of the petitioner were terminated vide the order dated 5.2.1991. In the order dated 5.2.1991, it had been indicated that the petitioner had been appointed as Apprentice (Electricals) for a period of one year and since the period of apprenticeship had been completed, his services shall stand terminated from the afternoon of 5.2.1991. 5. However, vide the order dated 10.4.1991, the petitioner was granted an engagement temporarily for a period of 89 days on daily wage basis at the rate of Rs. 20/- per day. It was indicated in this order that the petitioner will work in the Electrical room under the Chief Engineer. 6. The aforesaid period was however extended for a further period of 89 days with effect from 27.7.1991. It Was again extended for a period of 89 days with the enhanced wages at the rate of Rs. 21/- per day. 7. On 22.10.1991, an advertisement was published by the employer inviting applications for appointment on various posts which included the post of an Assistant Engineer (Mechanical). It Was again extended for a period of 89 days with the enhanced wages at the rate of Rs. 21/- per day. 7. On 22.10.1991, an advertisement was published by the employer inviting applications for appointment on various posts which included the post of an Assistant Engineer (Mechanical). The minimum eligibility criteria for being considered for appointment on that post were that the applicant should have to his credit a B.E. (Mechanical) Degree with 5/6 years experience or Diploma in Mechanical Engineering with 7/8 years experience. 8. On 10.12.1991, the employer/appellant issued an order of appointment in favour of Rajat Kumar Patra, Ram Niwas Sharma and Neeraj Bansal, where under indicating that they had been selected by a duly constituted selection committee on 2.11.1991, they were being appointed as Apprentice Engineer on a consolidated salary of Rs. 1,800/- per month. 9. In the aforesaid order of appointment, it was clearly provided that the period of service as Apprentice Engineer will be only one year and the service will be purely temporary. In case however the work and conduct was found satisfactory in that event these appointees could be considered for appointment on the post of Assistant Engineer. 10. The petitioner alleged that Ram Niwas Sharma was a diploma holder in Electrical trade and had been appointed by the employer along with two other candidates as Trainee Engineer although no advertisement was issued for the post of Trainee Engineer or Assistant Engineer in Electrical trade. Had it been so issued, the petitioner could have also applied. It was claimed by the petitioner that the employer had directly appointed the respondent no. 2, Ram Niwas Sharma on a consolidated salary of Rs. 1,800/- per month whereas the petitioner had worked for the same job initially at the rate of Rs. 500/- per month and thereafter on daily wages at the rate of Rs. 20/- per day and thereafter at the rate of Rs. 21/- per day. This action was claimed to be clearly discriminatory and vitiated in law. 11. The petitioner prayed for a direction declaring that he had acquired the status of a permanent employee in the establishment of the employer. A further direction was sought for quashing the order of appointment of the respondent no. 2 on the ground of its being illegal and void. 11. The petitioner prayed for a direction declaring that he had acquired the status of a permanent employee in the establishment of the employer. A further direction was sought for quashing the order of appointment of the respondent no. 2 on the ground of its being illegal and void. In the alternative, the petitioner prayed that he be declared as senior to the respondent no. 2 on the post of Assistant Engineer (Mechanical). 12. The petitioner further prayed for a direction requiring the employer for payment of the wages at the same rate as had been sanctioned to the respondent no. 2 and for giving the difference of wages from the initial period of appointment as trainee. It was, further prayed that the employer be directed to regularise the services of the petitioner on the post of Assistant Engineer and also give him the pay scale admissible to an Assistant Engineer. 13. The aforesaid writ petition was contested by the employer on various grounds. It was asserted that the employer-respondent no. 1 did not fall within the ambit of "State" as envisaged under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, as it was neither discharging any statutory function nor could be taken to be an instrumentality of the "State". It was claimed that it was simply manufacturing sugar and as a manufacturing unit it was not doing any governmental function. The fact that the petitioner had been appointed as an apprentice under the Apprentice Act, was admitted. It was further stated that the petitioner never got a status of management trainee. It was however claimed that the petitioner was not entitled to any employment on regular basis, in paragraph 10 of the return/counter-affidavit, it was stated that it was not necessary to advertise the post of Assistant Engineer (Electrical) and if the petitioner did not apply, he had to thank himself. It was claimed that in the case of a direct recruitment, the performance of a candidate in the department is irrelevant and the petitioner should have appeared at the interview. In paragraph 11, it was stated that the case of the respondent no. 2 was distinguishable as the respondent no. 2 had been appointed by way of direct recruitment whereas the petitioner had not even applied for that. It was indicated that the petitioner and the respondent no. 2 were doing different duties. The respondent no. In paragraph 11, it was stated that the case of the respondent no. 2 was distinguishable as the respondent no. 2 had been appointed by way of direct recruitment whereas the petitioner had not even applied for that. It was indicated that the petitioner and the respondent no. 2 were doing different duties. The respondent no. 2 was doing the supervision of the maintenance work and the petitioner was performing the duties of a worker. The duties being different equality could not be claimed. 14. The learned single Judge in the impugned order drawing support from the observations made by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ramswarup Ramcharan Gupta v. Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Marketing Federation Limited and others, reported in 1976 M.P.L.J. 376, to the effect that a co-operative society registered under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act does not fall within the definition of the term "other authorities" as stated in Article 12 of the Constitution and is not a statutory body. Therefore, it will suffice to observe that normally such societies will not be amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court except In cases where according to the provisions of the Statute or rules or regulations framed under the Act by which the Society is governed, there is a statutory or public duty imposed on it, and the enforcement of which is being sought.", held that even if a Co-operative Society cannot be characterized as a "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution, a writ may still be issued against it to enforce the 'statutory duty' or a 'public duty' imposed on it. 15. The learned single Judge while considering the case of the petitioner held that although he was qualified for the post of Assistant Engineer (Electrical), he did not apply in response to the advertisement dated 22.10.1991 as the post sought to be filled up as indicated therein was a post of Assistant Engineer (Mechanical) but the respondent-employer on the appointed date and time, interviewed the respondent no. 2 along with some other candidates, namely; Ratan Kumar Patra and Neeraj Bansal, who were also diploma holders like the petitioner and took them as trainee engineers. It was also observed that the respondent-employer later appointed them as Assistant Engineer (Electrical). 2 along with some other candidates, namely; Ratan Kumar Patra and Neeraj Bansal, who were also diploma holders like the petitioner and took them as trainee engineers. It was also observed that the respondent-employer later appointed them as Assistant Engineer (Electrical). In the circumstances, it was found that pursuant to the advertisement, annexure P/10, the recruitment could only be made of the candidates holding diploma in Mechanical trade who could only be recruited and the action of the respondent-employer in not advertising the post of Assistant Engineer (Electrical) could not be justified and the petitioner was surely denied the opportunity of his applying to the said post. It was further observed that where the advertisement was for a post and contained certain criteria as to the qualifications, persons without such qualifications could not have applied nor could be appointed. As in that situation, the other candidates with similar qualifications could neither propose their candidature nor could be considered for appointment. 16. In the aforesaid circumstances, the learned single Judge came to the conclusion that the action of the respondent no. 1 in selecting the respondent no. 2 with Rajat Kumar Patra and Shri Niraj Bansal against the post of Assistant Engineer (Electrical) which was not advertised at all though not justifiable yet the respondent no. 1 in para 13 of the return/counter-affidavit had without any reasoning stated that the post was not required to be advertised. The act of the respondent-employer was held to be discriminatory and arbitrary. 17. The learned single Judge proceeding to hold as indicated above, came to the conclusion that the petitioner had succeeded in making out a case of discrimination against him and noticing that a post of Assistant Engineer had been declared vacant by the respondent no. 1 in January, 1993, and had not been filled up, found that the petitioner being fully qualified and experienced deserved to be absorbed on the said post. Accordingly, the learned single Judge directed for the regularization of the services of the petitioner from January, 1993, on the post of Assistant Engineer with a direction that he be paid upto date wages as Assistant Engineer. 18. The learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that on the facts proved and established on the record, there could be no justification for the issuance of the impugned directions by the learned single Judge. 18. The learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that on the facts proved and established on the record, there could be no justification for the issuance of the impugned directions by the learned single Judge. It has been pointed out that Raj Kumar Patra, Ram Niwas Sharma and Niraj Bansal had not been granted any appointment on the post of Assistant Engineer vide the order dated 10.12.1991 and in fact they had been granted appointment on a purely temporary basis as apprentice engineer for a period of one year only. It was also indicated in the aforesaid appointment order that in case their work and conduct was found satisfactory in that event, their cases could be considered for appointment on the post of Assistant Engineer. 19. It may be noticed at this stage that there was nothing on the record which could indicate that the aforesaid persons had in fact been granted regular appointment as against the substantive vacancy in the post of Assistant Engineer. In the advertisement inviting applications for appointment as against the post of Assistant Engineer (Mechanical) it had been clearly indicated that the candidates should have to their credit a Degree of B.E., (Mechanical) 5/6 years experience or a Diploma in the Mechanical Engineering with 7/8 years experience. Neither the petitioner nor the persons who had been appointed on 10.12.1991 satisfied the aforesaid minimum eligibility criteria on the date of the advertisement. 20. It is, therefore, obvious in the aforesaid circumstances that the appointment which had been offered to the respondent no. 2 and to the other two persons was not on the post of Assistant Engineer but only as an apprentice engineer temporarily for a period of one year. The fact that it had been indicated in the appointment order that they could i.e considered for appointment on the post of Assistant Engineer could not lead to an inference that the minimum eligibility criteria as specified in the advertisement was to be treated as having been dispensed with for these candidates. 21. It has further been urged that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the plea of discrimination set up by the petitioner was not liable to be entertained at all as even according to the petitioner himself, the appointment of the respondent no. 2 and the other two persons was manifestly illegal. 21. It has further been urged that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the plea of discrimination set up by the petitioner was not liable to be entertained at all as even according to the petitioner himself, the appointment of the respondent no. 2 and the other two persons was manifestly illegal. It was also asserted that no direction for the regularization of the services of the petitioner or his absorption on permanent posts as against the post of an Assistant Engineer deserved to have been granted. 22. The learned counsel for the petitioner/respondent, however, tried to support the impugned order on the basis of the reasonings contained therein. 23. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. 24. The Apex Court in its decision in the case of Chandigarh Administration and another v. Jagjit Singh and another, reported in AIR 1995 SC 705 , while dealing with "discrimination" had observed as under- .....Generally speaking, the mere fact that,the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing, a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other persons might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extra-ordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent-authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The extra-ordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent-authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to law indeed, wherever it is possible, the court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality, the court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public Interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioner's case is similar to the other person's case. But then why examine another person's case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the court and seeking the relief. It is not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into the correctness of the order made or action taken in another person's case, which other person is not before the Court nor is his case. In our considered opinion, such a course-barring exceptional situations would neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. The orders and actions of the authorities cannot be equated to the judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts nor can they be elevated to the level of the precedents, as understood in the judicial world. 25. The controversy raised in the writ petition giving rise to the present appeal had to be decided taking into consideration the position in law as clarified by the Apex Court referred to hereinabove. 26. It may further be noticed that as held by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Coromandel Fertilizers Limited v. Union of India and others, reported in (1985) 1 SCR 523 at page 532, a wrong decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim the benefit on the basis of the wrong decision. 27. In the present case on the facts found even by the learned single Judge, it is apparent that the appointment granted to the respondent no. 2 was only as apprentice engineer and that too for a period of one year. On the date of the advertisement, neither the petitioner nor the respondent no. 2 and the other two persons had to their credit the requisite minimum qualification indicated in the advertisement so as to make them eligible for appointment on the post of an Assistant Engineer whether on the Electrical side or on the Mechanical side. In such a circumstance, we are of the considered opinion that there could be no occasion or justification for directing the absorption of the petitioner on a permanent basis on a substantive post of an Assistant Engineer purporting to regularize his services which were being continued on daily wage basis and further to direct for the payment of difference of wages as has been done vide the impugned order. 28. Considering the totality of the circumstances as brought on record, we are of the clear opinion that the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge is not sustainable in law. 28. Considering the totality of the circumstances as brought on record, we are of the clear opinion that the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge is not sustainable in law. We are of the further opinion that the appellant-employer had to act in a fair and just manner in the matter relating to the filling up of the vacancies in the post of Assistant Engineer (Electrical) or (Mechanical) keeping in view that the merit and suitability ought to be the sole criteria for filling up a post through the process of selection by way of direct recruitment. 29. In the result, this appeal succeeds and the impugned order is set aside with a direction to the appellant/employer to fill up the posts of Assistant Engineer (Electrical) in accordance with law within a period of three months, making it clear that not only the petitioner/respondent but also the respondent no. 2 as well as the other two persons shall be entitled for being considered for appointment. 30. There shall, however, be no order as to cost. Appeal allowed