JUDGMENT 1. - The instant petition has been filed for quashing the impugned order dated 15.11.1996 (Annexure-7), by which the services of the petitioner had been terminated for the reason that he did not possess the requisite qualification on the date of appointment. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that petitioner possessed the Diploma in Medical Laboratory Technology in 1988 from an Institution at Ghaziabad, which was duly recognised by Para-Medical Society of India. Petitioner was appointed on 22.5.1989 (vide Annexure-3) on the post of Laboratory Technician temporarily for a period of six months. It appears that the said appointment was extended from time to time. Petitioner was issued a notice dated 24.10.1996 (Annexure-5) to show cause why his services should not be terminated as he did not possess the requisite qualification. Petitioner filed his reply on 5.11.1996 (Annexure-6), wherein he contended that he had never made any misrepresentation or played any fraud in seeking employment. Moreover, during this period, he had also completed the training in Malaria Microscopic for a period of thirty-four days from R.C.O., Jaipur. Thus, he requested that even if he did not possess the requisite qualification, as he was in service for a long time, he may be allowed to continue and his appointment may be regularised. After considering his explanation, impugned order dated 15.11.1996 (Annexure-7) was passed terminating his service. Hence this petition. 3. Heard Mr. A.K. Rajwanshi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. G.L. Khatri, for the respondents. 4. It has been submitted by Mr. Rajwanshi that even if petitioner did not possess the qualification duly recognised by the respondents, as he was working for a long time, there was no occasion for the respondents to terminate his services. However, respondents have stated in the reply that petitioner had been given appointment temporarily for a period of six months initially and the same had been extended from time to time but it took a long time to verify the documents filed by him and as soon as they could verify that the Diploma obtained by the petitioner was not duly recognised by the State Government and he had wrongly been recommended by the employment exchange for the post of Laboratory Technician, his services had been terminated after giving him opportunity of hearing and, thus, no fault can be found with the impugned order. 5. 5. The issue of eligibility has been considered by the Supreme Court in Smt. Ravinder Sharma v. State of Punjab, 1995(1) SCC 138 : 1995(1) SCT 48 (SC); Smt. Harpal Kaur Chahal v. Director, Punjab Industries, 1996 Suppl.(4) SCC 706; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shyama Pardhi, 1996(7) SCC 118 : 1996(2) SCT 170 (SC); Dr. S.K. Kacker v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences, 1996(8) JT (SC) 513 : 1996(4) SCT 600 (SC); and State of Rajasthan v. Hitendra Kumar Bhatt, 1997(7) JT (SC) 287 : 1997(4) SCT 32 (SC) , wherein it has been categorically held that appointments made in contravention of the Recruitment Rules are illegal and persons so appointed have been found ineligible even after continuing for years in service. In Harpal Kaur Chahal's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that she had already worked for sixteen years under the interim orders passed by the Court from time to time and should be allowed to continue on the post she was holding. 6. The rules providing the mode of recruitment/promotion have to be followed and cannot be ignored. In Sirsi Municipality v. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis, AIR 1973 SC 855 the Supreme Court observed that "the ratio is that the rules or the regulations are binding on the authorities." 7. Similarly, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Sukhdeo Singh v. Bhagat Ram Sardar Singh Rajvanshi, AIR 1975 SC 1331 , has observed as under:- "The statutory authorities cannot deviate from the conditions of services. Any deviation will be enforced by legal sanction of declaration by Courts to invalidate actions. The existence of rules and regulations under statute is to ensure regular conduct with a distinctive attitude to that conduct as a standard. The statutory regulations in the cases under consideration give the employee a statutory status and impose restriction on the employer and the employee with no option to vary the conditions. An ordinary individual in a case of master and servant contractual relationship enforces breach of contractual terms. The remedy in such contractual relationship of master and servant is damages because personal service is not capable of enforcement. In cases of statutory bodies, there is no personal element whatsoever because of the impersonal character of statutory bodies. An ordinary individual in a case of master and servant contractual relationship enforces breach of contractual terms. The remedy in such contractual relationship of master and servant is damages because personal service is not capable of enforcement. In cases of statutory bodies, there is no personal element whatsoever because of the impersonal character of statutory bodies. In the case of statutory bodies, it has been held that the element of public employment or service and the support of statute require observance of rules and regulations." 8. It has been canvassed on behalf of the petitioner that in a case like the instant, the court should have some sympathetic view towards the petitioner. In Hitendra Kumar Bhatt's case (supra), the Apex Court has observed that in a case where a person, not eligible to hold a post, is holding a post under some peculiar circumstances, he cannot be given any sympathetic treatment, as it is settled law that relaxing the prescribed requirements in a case of one individual, may cause grave injustice to others. Similarly, in the case of Gurdeep Singh v. State of J&K, 1995 Suppl.(1) SCC 188, the Supreme Court observed as under:- "We are afraid, unduly lenient view of the courts on the basis of human consideration in regard to such excesses on the part of the authorities, has served to create an impression that even where an advantage is secured by stratagem and trickery, it could be rationalised in courts of law. Courts do and should take human and sympathetic view of matters. That is they very essence of the justice. But considerations of judicial policy also dictate that the tendency of this kind, where advantage gained by illegal means, is permitted to be retained will jeopardise the purity of selection process itself, endanger, cynical disrespect towards the judicial process and in the last analysis embolden errant authorities and candidates into a sense of complacency and impunity that gains achieved by such wrongs could be retained by an appeal to the sympathy of the court. Such instances reduce the jurisdiction and discretion of Courts into private benevolence. This tendency should be stopped." 9. The mandate issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court from time to time does not permit this Court to adopt any lenient view in this matter. 10. Such instances reduce the jurisdiction and discretion of Courts into private benevolence. This tendency should be stopped." 9. The mandate issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court from time to time does not permit this Court to adopt any lenient view in this matter. 10. While deciding an identical and similar issue in Deenbandhu Parmar v. Rajasthan State Mineral Corporation Ltd., D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 776/1997 : 1998(3) SCT 488 (Rajasthan)(db) , the Division Bench of this Court did not accept the similar averments made on behalf of the appellant therein. Therefore, I find no force in the submission made by Mr. Rajwanshi that the petitioner had continuously worked for seven years and got training also. Thus, the question of requisite qualification becomes irrelevant today. As the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi Mineral Development Corporation Ltd., AIR 1990 SC 371 , does not hold any water today in view of the judgments referred its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, being a Court of equity, is obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith he as the equity is known "to prevent the law from crafty evasions and sub-lets inviting to evade law." Similar contention has been rejected by a Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Aqueela v. State of Rajasthan, 1998 Raj. LW 497. 11. Mr. Rajwanshi has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Santosh Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1991(2) SCT 377 : AIR 1996 SC 3328 : 1996(3) SCT 615 (SC) , contending that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has quashed the order of termination in identical facts and circumstances. However, Mr. Khatri has vehemently opposed it. The facts and circumstances involved in Santosh Yadav were entirely different. Undoubtedly, she possessed the Diploma Certificate from the Board not duly recognised at the time of her appointment in 1980 but the condition of eligibility had been changed in 1981 and her services had been terminated after a decade in 1990 and this was the main consideration for passing such an order. In the instant case, there is no change of eligibility nor the certificate possessed by the petitioner is being duly recognised till today. Therefore, petitioner cannot take any advantage of the said judgment. 12. In the instant case, there is no change of eligibility nor the certificate possessed by the petitioner is being duly recognised till today. Therefore, petitioner cannot take any advantage of the said judgment. 12. Moreover, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Gujarat State Deputy Executive Engineers' Association v. State of Gujarat, 1994 Suppl.(2) SC 591 : 1994(3) SCT 325 (SC) , has held that appointments made even under the interim order and where persons have been allowed to continue in service for long time, the argument that their termination at such a stage would be unjust and harsh, cannot be entertained. In R.C. Sahi v. Union of India, 1999(1) SCT 86 (SC) : 1999(1) SCC 482 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has protected such appointments in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution by creating supernumerary post as it was found necessary by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to do so "for doing complete justice in cause or matter." But this Court has not been enclothed with such powers. 13. In State of Punjab v. Surinder Kumar, AIR 1992 SC 1593 : 1992(1) SCT 538 (SC) , the Supreme Court observed as under:- "The Constitution has, by Article 142 empowered the Supreme Court to make such order as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it, which authority the High Court does not enjoy. The jurisdiction of the High Court, while dealing with a writ petition, is circumscribed by the limitation discussed and declared by the judicial decisions and it cannot transgress the limits on the basis of whims or subjective sense of justice varying from Judge to Judge." 14. Similar view has been taken by the Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Naresh Kumar Bali, 1994(4) SCC 448 : 1994(3) SCT 590 (SC). 15. In J&K Public Service Commission v. Dr. Narinder Mohan, AIR 1994 SC 1808 , the Apex Court has observed as under : "Therefore, the High Court is not right in placing reliance on the judgment as a ratio to give the direction to the Public Service Commission to consider the case of the respondents. Article 142 power is confined only on this Court. The ratio in....... is also not an authority under Article 141." 16. Article 142 power is confined only on this Court. The ratio in....... is also not an authority under Article 141." 16. B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, 1995(6) SCC 749 : 1996(1) SCT 617 (SC) , in a separate judgment, one Hon'ble Judge of the Apex Court has observed that the High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution has ample power to do complete justice, meaning thereby that the power which the Supreme Court can exercise under Article 142 of the Constitution can also be exercised by the High Court but the other two Hon'ble Judges did not express an opinion on this issue. 17. In Sanchalakshri v. Vijay Kumar R. Mehta, 1998(8) SCC 245 : 1999(1) SCT 88 (SC) , the Apex Court has categorically held that in absence of enabling provision analogous to Article 142 of the Constitution, the High Court cannot "pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice' like the Supreme Court. The Court further observed as under : "It would not be correct to say that this court in B.C. Chaturvedi case (supra) has accepted the view that the High Court Tribunals possess the same powers which this Court has under Article 142 of the Constitution for doing complete justice even in the absence of such a provision." 18. In view of the above, it is clear that this Court has no power to issue such directions. 19. Thus, in view of the above, the petitioner is held not entitled for any relief. The petition is accordingly dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******