This revision under section 401/397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is directed against the judgment and order passed on 29.6.98 by the learned Sessions Judge, Hailakandi in Sessions Case No. 5 of 1998, whereby two accused respondents were acquitted for the offence under section 307/324 IPC. Heard the learned counsel for both sides and also perused the record. 2. The prosecution case in brief is that on 25.10.1996 at about 10 PM while PW 2 Amal Kumar Nath was witnessing 'Yatra' performance at Ronpur Kalibari, the accused Pranotosh alias Panna arrived at the place and at first struck on the face with a torch light. Thereafter the accused Amal brought out a knife and stabbed Amal on his abdomen. The accused tried to make further assault but on the interference of the other persons present at the place of occurrence, PW Amal was saved from further assault. The matter was informed to the father of the injured and the injured was removed to Lala Public Health Centre Hospital where the doctor treated him. On FIR being lodged by the present petitioner, who is father of the injured, the police registered a case and after usual investigation submitted charge sheet against the assailant Pranotosh alias Panna and his father Parimal Nath Mazurndar. After the case was committed, the learned Sessions Judge framed charge against both the accused person. During the trial prosecution examined, as many as, nine witnesses, defence did not produce any evidence. On conclusion, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted both the accused persons. Hence the revision by the complainant. This revision is preferred by the complainant against the order of acquittal. The trial was not on the basis of a complaint under section 2 (d) of the Code and State has failed to exercise the right of appeal. So far the power of the High Court in an appeal against the order of acquittal is concerned, it is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court as well as of this Court. In the case of State of Assam vs. M/s Radha Oil Industries & another, (1987) 1 GLR 134 this Court had laid down the ambit of power under section 423 (1) (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the case of State of Assam vs. M/s Radha Oil Industries & another, (1987) 1 GLR 134 this Court had laid down the ambit of power under section 423 (1) (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In a recent case of K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan vs. State of Kerala (1999) 3 SCC 309 the Apex Court reiterated its earlier decision that the plenitude of power available to the Court hearing an appeal against acquittal is the same as that available to a Court hearing an appeal against conviction. In the case of Akalu Ahir vs. Ramdeo Ram, AIR 1973 SC 2145 , the Apex Court observed: “Now adverting to the power of revision conferred on a High Court by section 439 read with section 435 CrPC, it is an extraordinary discretionary power vested in the superior Court to be exercised in aid of justice; in other words, to set right grave injustice. The High Court has been invested with this power to see that justice is done in accordance with the recognised rules of criminal jurisprudence and that the subordinate Courts do not exceed their jurisdiction or abuse the power conferred on them by law. As a general rule, this power, in spite of the wide language of sections 435 and 439 CrPC does not contemplate interference with the conclusions of fact in the absence of serious legal infirmity and failure of justice.” 3. In an earlier case KC Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1962 SC 1788 ) the Apex Court considering its earlier two decisions reported in AIR 1951 SC 196 and AIR 1951 SC 316 observed: “... that the High Court is certainly entitled in revision to set aside the order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal, but it was emphasised that this jurisdiction should be exercised only in exception cases when "there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice". In face of prohibition in section 439 (4) CrPC for the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, it makes all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of the conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial. No doubt, in the opinion of this Court, no criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies for attracting the High Court's power of ordering retrial can be laid down. This Court, however, by way of illustration, indicated the following categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision: (i) Where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the accused; (ii) Where the trial Court has wrongly e shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; (iii) Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial Court to be inadmissible; (iv) Where the material evidence has been overlooked only (either) by the trial Court or by the appellate Court; and (v) Where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law. These categories were, however, merely illustrative and it was clarified that other cases of similar nature can also be properly held to be of exceptional nature where the High Court can justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal.” 4. The law on this point has been summed up by the Madras High Court in the case of Smti Vasantha vs. Smti Sivanthi & others, 1999 (1) Crimes 499 , wherein it was held: “Generally, this Court would be reluctant to disturb the judgment of acquittal in a revision, that too at the instance of a private party, when the State has not preferred any appeal. However, when this Court finds out misreading of evidence, overlooking the important materials or perversity, which had led to the grave miscarriage of justice, the interference is quite imperative. Of course, this Court is quite aware of the limitation, while dealing with the revisional jurisdiction. The limitation is that the acquittal cannot be converted into conviction, but on reversal of acquittal, the further enquiry or trial can alone be directed. Of course, this Court is quite aware of the limitation, while dealing with the revisional jurisdiction. The limitation is that the acquittal cannot be converted into conviction, but on reversal of acquittal, the further enquiry or trial can alone be directed. As indicated earlier, once this Court comes to the conclusion that the findings given by the trial Court are based on surmises and conjectures, overlooking and ignoring the vital piece of evidence and that the cumulative effect of all the infirmities makes the judgment impeachable and that the findings are perverse, the interference by this Court would become imperative.” In the light of the above principles let us examine the record and consider the matter. 5. Now coming to the facts of the case, in the impugned judgment the learned trial Judge did not come to any finding that no occurrence of assault as alleged took place. The prosecution had examined the injured and eye witnesses, doctor and the Investigating Officer to establish the incident of assault. The victim has stated that the accused Pranotosh alias Panna first assaulted him with a torch light and thereafter, stabbed in the abdomen. The injured was first taken to Lala Public Health Centre and thereafter he was removed to Silchar Medical College Hospital. PW 9, the Doctor at Silchar Medical Hospital found following two injuries “(1) Swelling with bruises over right side of the face about 2 Cm x 2 Cm size. Type of weapon was blunt and nature of injury was fresh and simple. (2) Sharp pointed injury about 2 Cm x 1.5 Cm x 6 Cm with localised haematoma to the parities of left Eli lumber area. Injury was fresh and simple.” 6. In the impugned judgment, the learned Sessions Judge has quoted the evidence of the victim Amal Nath, PW 2 but there is no discussion or analysis of the statement given on oath by the injured. Not to speak of a finding, there is not a single word in the entire judgment as to whether the injured is a reliable witness or not and what will be the effect of his evidence. PW 1 is a victim of an assault and the injuries sustained by him has been established by the oral and medial evidence on record. PW 1 is a victim of an assault and the injuries sustained by him has been established by the oral and medial evidence on record. The question, therefore, arises is to why this witness will falsely implicate the accused and allow the real assailant to go scot free. 7. On examination of impugned judgment I find that the approach of the learned Sessions Judge in recording an order of acquittal was slipshod and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge is unsustainable. Undue emphasis has been laid for the alleged delay of 20 hours in lodging the FIR whereas the evidence on record shows that the PW 2 was immediately taken to Lala Public Health Centre, where the Doctor asked the escorts/persons accompanying the injured to immediately removed the injured to Silchar Medical College Hospital in view of the grave injuries. The incident took place at about 10-00 PM and Silchar is far away from Lala. The concerned persons immediately rushed to Silchar along with the patient. In such a situation, the saving the life of the injured was more important than lodging of the FIR. May be PW 2 is alive today, only because of timely medical treatment. It is also well settled that the FIR is not a substantial piece of evidence. The injured and eye witnesses have consistently stated that it was accused who gave the stabbing blow on PW 2 on a vital part by means of knife while PW 2 was enjoying 'Yatra'. The basic prosecution case as unfolded by the testimony of the aforesaid witnesses stands fully corroborated by the medical evidence on record and the learned trial Judge was not justified in discarding this part of the prosecution case in acquitting Pranotosh alias Panna. There is no evaluation even of the evidence of the injured and the evaluation of the other evidence was manifestly erroneous. 8. In the case of Ayodhya Dube & others vs. Ram Sumer Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1415 , the Apex Court held: “When the Sessions Judge acquitted the accused by ignoring the probative value of FIR and reliable testimony of eye witnesses and without considering material evidence on record and his judgment was full of inconsistencies and consisted of faulty reasoning, the order of the High Court in revision directing retrial by setting aside acquittal would be justified.” 9. In the instant case I find that the trial Court has completely overlooked the material evidence of the injured eye witness. There was no finding that no incident of assault, as alleged, took place or that PW 2 did not sustain any injury or that the appellants were not involved or did not participate in the incident or that the prosecution evidence is soky or unreliable for which benefit of doubt is required to be given. As per the prosecution the motive of assault was that in a football match the accused participated as a player and the injured was a Referee and for commission of a foul the injured Amal showed a red card to the accused Panna and the incidence is the result of the said decision of the injured. The trial Judge found no cogent material regarding such dispute in the football match and thereafter discarded the entire prosecution case. It is well settled that motive is irrelevant when there is a direct testimony as to the incident that has happened. I find that the material evidence on record has been totally overlooked by the appellate Court and the prosecution case falls under the category of Illustration 4, as stated above Akalu Ahir (supra). 10. In view of the foregoing discussion, I find that so far acquittal of accused Pranotosh alias Panna is concerned, it needs to be set aside, which I hereby do. So far the other accused Parimal Nath Mazurndar is concerned, there is no evidence alleging any overt or covert act on the part of this accused who is the father of co-accused Pranotosh alias Panna. The only material appearing against him is that just prior to the incident he had asked his wife and daughter to leave the place of occurrence. The prosecution, therefore, wants to show that he had a knowledge about the impending incident and he is an accomplice to the assailant. In a criminal trial a person cannot be convicted on such inferences, surmises only. Hence the acquittal of Parimal Nath Mazurndar needs no interference. 11. In the result, the revision is partly allowed. So far the acquittal of Parimal Nath Mazurndar is concerned, the order passed by the trial Court stands. In a criminal trial a person cannot be convicted on such inferences, surmises only. Hence the acquittal of Parimal Nath Mazurndar needs no interference. 11. In the result, the revision is partly allowed. So far the acquittal of Parimal Nath Mazurndar is concerned, the order passed by the trial Court stands. The impugned order of acquittal so far it relates to accused Pranotosh alias Panna is concerned it is set aside and the matter is send back to the trial Judge for fresh disposal in accordance With law. The trial Court shall reconsider the evidence already recorded by it and hearing both sides, pass necessary judgment as per law. It is further observed that the trial Court will do so uninfluenced by any of the observations made herein before. Send down the records.