Order Heard Mr. Prashant Vedasen, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Kumar Brajendra Nath, learned counsel for the respondents and both sides prayed that this writ application can be disposed of at this stage itself. 2. The petitioner has impugned the order dated 28.10.1997 passed by the respondent no. 4 imposing punishment on the petitioner after completion of the departmental enquiry. Further prayer has been made to direct the concerned respondents not to recover the amount from him and also to pay full salary for the period of suspension. 3. The only point raised by the counsel for the petitioner for assailing the impugned order is that the Disciplinary Authority passed the impugned order without assigning any reason. 4. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. 5. The petitioner was working as Assistant Manager in Manjhaul godown from 25.5.83 to 9.9.83 and thereafter transferred to Patna in 1983 itself. He was suspended on some charges on 12.10.83 and a departmental proceeding was initiated but on 15.5.85 suspension order was revoked after giving him admonition. The petitioner was detained under the Bihar Control of Crimes Act on 29.3.85, which was confirmed by the State Government and he was ordered to be remained in custody till 29.3.86. However, his detention order was quashed by this Court by order dated 10.8.1985 passed in CWJC No. 143 of 1985. While the petitioner was in custody he was again put under suspension by order dated 30.8.85 and thereafter he was asked to show cause on 4.11.85 as to why he should not be removed from service. Reply was filed by him on 20.11.85. Enquiry Officer submitted a report on 18.5.87 and respondent no.3, on the basis of enquiry report, passed the order of petitioner's removal from service on 28.5.87. The petitioner again moved this Court in CWJC No. 2904 of 1987 and the order of removal was set aside with a liberty to the respondents to hold a departmental proceeding in accordance with law after giving specific charge-sheet to the petitioner and affording him opportunity. This Court also directed the respondents to pay 50% of his arrears of salary. It is said that though this writ application was allowed but his counsel was not present at the time of hearing and, as such, the petitioner could not get any information about the order passed in his favour by this Court. This Court also directed the respondents to pay 50% of his arrears of salary. It is said that though this writ application was allowed but his counsel was not present at the time of hearing and, as such, the petitioner could not get any information about the order passed in his favour by this Court. He could obtain the certified copy of the order in March, 1996 and produced the same before the Managing Director of the Corporation on 21.3.96. It is further asserted that as 50% of his salary was not paid he filed a contempt application bearing M.J.C. No. 2509 of 1997, which is pending in this Court for disposal. After joining of the petitioner departmental proceeding was initiated after serving a charge-sheet and the list of witnesses. Altogether five charges were mentioned in the charge-sheet for the period during which the petitioner was posted as Assistant Manager, Manjhaul godown, Begusarai and three charges were related to his posting at Patna. The petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet by, denying all the charges levelled against him. There is no denial of the fact that the Enquiry Officer afforded full opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses. The Enquiry Officer, after considering evidence on record, found one charge out of five charges relating to Begusarai as true and one charge as suspected. The .Enquiry Officer was of the opinion that for destruction of materials in the godown the petitioner was responsible and, as such, recommended for recovery of Rs. 28,274.70 paise with interest from him. However, the petitioner was exonerated from all other charges. The petitioner filed his second show cause on 16.12.96 refusing all the charges. Respondent no. 4 after receiving the enquiry report sent the same to him and directed to submit his show cause in the light of enquiry report. The petitioner filed his reply and again denied the charges. Thereafter by the impugned order the respondent-Managing Director awarded three punishments, which are as follows: "(i) To recover Rs. 28,274.70 from the petitioner with interest. (ii) To stop one yearly increment of the petitioner. (iii) The petitioner would not be paid any salary for the period of suspension except subsistence allowance." A copy of the said order is Annexure-6. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order of Disciplinary Authority is bad in law in as much as respondent no. (ii) To stop one yearly increment of the petitioner. (iii) The petitioner would not be paid any salary for the period of suspension except subsistence allowance." A copy of the said order is Annexure-6. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order of Disciplinary Authority is bad in law in as much as respondent no. 4 has not assigned any reason for awarding those punishments. In support of his contention he has relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad etc. etc. vs. B. Karunakar, etc. etc. ( AIR 1994 S.C. 1074 ) and Vasant D. Bhavsar vs. Bar Council of India and others [ (1999) 1 S.C.C. 45 ]. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioner has not made out any case for interference with the impugned order because he has not alleged any irregularity much less any illegality in conducting the departmental proceeding against him. According to the learned counsel the Enquiry Officer afforded reasonable opportunity to the petitioner and the petitioner availed the same. He was supplied with the enquiry report and was served with the second show cause notice before awarding the punishment. So far giving reasons by the Disciplinary Authority, learned counsel with reference to the cases of Tara Chand Khatri vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others ( AIR 1977 S.C. 567 ) and Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay vs. Union of India and others 1991 Supp (2) S.C.C. 12 contends that where the Disciplinary Authority agree with the enquiry report and passes the order of punishment, there was no necessity for assigning any reason. 8. In the above background the order impugned as contained in Annexure-6 is to be looked into. The impugned order shows that after considering the enquiry report the Disciplinary Authority imposed the punishment on the petitioner as aforesaid. In the case of Tara Chand Khatri (supra) their Lordships under similar circumstances have held as follows : "... 8. In the above background the order impugned as contained in Annexure-6 is to be looked into. The impugned order shows that after considering the enquiry report the Disciplinary Authority imposed the punishment on the petitioner as aforesaid. In the case of Tara Chand Khatri (supra) their Lordships under similar circumstances have held as follows : "... In this connection, we would like to make it clear that while it may be necessary for a disciplinary or administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions to state the reasons in support of its order if it differs from the conclusions arrived at and the recommendations made by the enquiring officer in view of the scheme of a particular enactment or the rules made thereunder, it would be laying down the proposition a little too broadly to say that even an order of concurrence must be supported by reasons. It cannot also, in our opinion, be laid down as a general rule that an order is a non-speaking order simply because it is brief and not elaborate. Every case, we think, has to be judged in the light of its own facts and circumstances. ..." Similar view have been expressed by their Lordships in the case of Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay (supra) by observing that when disciplinary authority in his order merely accepting the findings and punishment proposed along with the supporting reasons of enquiry officer, the order need not furnish detailed reasons. The facts and circumstances in the case of Vasant D. Bhavsar (supra) in my view is quite distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In the aforesaid decision the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India passed the impugned order of suspension debarring from practice for two years holding that the learned advocate mis-conducted himself under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961. There was no documentary proof that fees were paid by the complainant to the advocate and the documents, which were supposed to have been handed over to the advocate for being produced before the authorities there was no receipt. In this view of the matter their Lordships were of the view that it was difficult to see why the documents would have been handed over by the complainant to the advocate for being produced before the authorities when his Vakalatnama was not filed by the complainant before them. In this view of the matter their Lordships were of the view that it was difficult to see why the documents would have been handed over by the complainant to the advocate for being produced before the authorities when his Vakalatnama was not filed by the complainant before them. Under these circumstances, it has been observed that the orders of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council should have been a speaking order. 9. On the other hand, in the instant case after affording full opportunity to the petitioner the Enquiry Officer submitted its detailed report, a copy of which was also served on him. The petitioner filed his reply in response to the second show cause notice. Considering all documents, the Disciplinary Authority passed the impugned order, which is in concurrence with the enquiry report. The ratio of the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad (supra) is quite different, which deals with the question as to whether the delinquent is entitled to get copy of the enquiry report or not. The Supreme Court having noticed several decisions has held that refusal to furnish a copy of the enquiry report to the delinquent amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity and the copy has to be furnished to the delinquent irrespective of whether he asked for it or not. In my view this decision has no bearing on the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 10. If we consider all aspects of the matter, I am of the view that the petitioner has failed to make out any case for interference with the impugned order. No other point has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. I find no merit in this writ application, which is, accordingly, dismissed.