N. C. Jain, J- This judgment of ours would dispose of MA (F) No. 3 (SH) of 1998 and MA (F) No. 4 (SH) of 1999 as common question of law arises in both the cases. The important question of law which arises in the two appeals filed by insurance company against the Award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is like this: “Whether the appellant-insurance company can be held legally liable to indemnify the owner to pay compensation amount even if the insurance policy has been issued the same day the accident took place?” 2. The answer to the aforesaid question is dependent upon the proof by the insurance company that the owner paid the amount to the insurance company at 2.00 p.m. on the day the accident took place. In order to determine this fact it is necessary to have a look at the factual matrix of the case which we would pick up from MA (F) No. 3 (SH) of 1998. 3. Two claim petitions, MAC Case No. 12 of 1996 and MAC Case No. 13 of 1996 were filed before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Shillong. It was averred in the claim petitions that the two victims out of whom one was handyman of the offending vehicle and the other an Assistant Sub Inspector of Police traveled in the vehicle on 20th July, 1994. The bus was proceeding from Jowai to Shillong and when it reached a place called Modynder at about 9.15 AM, it met with an accident due to rash and negligent driving of its driver. The victim in MAC Case No. 12 of 1996 died on the spot, whereas the victim in MAC Case No. 13 of 1996 having suffered grievous injuries died later in the hospital at Jowai. In both the cases the Tribunal after recording the finding that the driver was negligent in driving the vehicle awarded different amount of compensation to the legal representatives of the deceased. The counsel for the parties during the course of arguments have not challenged the findings of the Tribunal either on the point of negligence or on the point of compensation amount The arguments of both the counsel centered around the point of law which has been noticed in the beginning of the judgment. 4. The counsel for the parties during the course of arguments have not challenged the findings of the Tribunal either on the point of negligence or on the point of compensation amount The arguments of both the counsel centered around the point of law which has been noticed in the beginning of the judgment. 4. There is absolutely no dispute between the counsel that the accident resulting into the death of the two victims took place on 20th July 1994 and the renewal insurance policy was also issued the same day. The dispute, however, is whether the renewal premium was paid by the owner at 2.00 PM on 20th July 1994 or earlier and in case the insurance company fails to convince the Court that the renewal premium was received by it at 2.00 PM whether the policy would commence from midnight of the day i.e. between 19th July and 20th July. The Tribunal after examining the entire oral and documentary evidence produced before it has found that it was not proved by the insurance company that the payment was made by the insured at 2 PM on 20th July, 1994 and that the policy was alive at 9.15 AM when accident took place and, therefore, the appellant has been held liable to make the payment of the awarded amount. 5. The learned counsel for the insurance company Mr. SS-Sharma has vehemently argued that the Tribunal should have held that the insurance policy was not alive at 9.15 AM on 20th July 1994 when the accident tool place as the renewal premium was paid at 2 PM on that day as is evident from policy renewal notice Ext C wherein the renewal premium is shown to have been received at 2 PM. He has further argued that the Motor renewal endorsement has also been proved by the insurance company as Ext B wherein the date of commencement of the risk was clearly mentioned as 20.7.94 (2 PM) to 19.7.95. The precise argument of Mr. Sharma is that the insurance company not only mentioned the time in the renewal notice and motor renewal endorsement in the year 1994 but the time was mentioned as 12.45 PM in Ext E as well which pertains to previous year and, therefore, there is nothing to disbelieve policy renewal notice (Ext. The precise argument of Mr. Sharma is that the insurance company not only mentioned the time in the renewal notice and motor renewal endorsement in the year 1994 but the time was mentioned as 12.45 PM in Ext E as well which pertains to previous year and, therefore, there is nothing to disbelieve policy renewal notice (Ext. C) and motor renewal endorsement (Ext B) wherein time of 2.00 PM has been mentioned on 20th July, 1994. All official acts according to Mr. Sharma, would be presumed to be duly performed and correctly done by the officials of the insurance company. The learned counsel has with reference to earlier conduct of the insured tried to impress upon us that the policy on earlier occasion was got renewed late. It was submitted that the policy in favour of the insured was originally issued on 22.6.92 and the same was renewed on 30.6.93 at 10.30 AM. Mr. Sharma in support of his argument that the policy would commence from 2 PM only on 20th July 1994 and not from the mid-night between 19th July 1994 and 20th July 1994 has cited two judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court i.e. AIR 1998 SC 257 , Oriental Insurance Company Ltd vs. Sunita Rathi & others and AIR 1997 SC 2147 , National Insurance Company Ltd vs. Smti Jijubhai Nathuji Dabhi & others. Mr. Sharma in MA (F) 4 (SH) of 1998 has lastly argued that Mrs Marak was not entitled, to file an application for compensation for the death of her deceased brother in the presence of the widow and the minor son. 6. The learned counsel for the claimants Mr. V.K Jindal has argued with equal vehemence that neither documentary evidence nor oral evidence of the insurance company proves that payment was made by the owner of the vehicle at 2 PM and therefore, the insurance policy would commence from the mid­night between 19th and 20th July 1994. 6. The learned counsel for the claimants Mr. V.K Jindal has argued with equal vehemence that neither documentary evidence nor oral evidence of the insurance company proves that payment was made by the owner of the vehicle at 2 PM and therefore, the insurance policy would commence from the mid­night between 19th and 20th July 1994. He has further submitted that if this Court is to come to the conclusion that the payment was made by the owner on 20th July 1994 at 2 PM, the law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of Sunita Rathi and Smti Jijubhai (supra) would definitely apply to the facts of the instant case but if this Court comes to the conclusion that oral and documentary evidence produced by the insurance company cannot be relied upon for recording a finding about the payment at 2 PM, the ratio of law as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in New India Assurance Company Ltd vs. Ram Dayal & others reported in 1990 (2) TAC 141 Supp CCT would straightway apply. 7. In order to determine the precise question of law involved in both these appeals it is necessary for us to settle the question of fact first whether the renewal premium was paid by the owner at 2 PM on 20th July 1994 as has been contended by the insurance company or at some other time before the time and date as specified in Ext B and C. 8. The owner of the vehicle after filing of the written statement absented and did not contest the case and, therefore, the Tribunal had to determine the liability of the insurance company on the basis of the evidence led by it. Rather the date and time possibly could not be in the knowledge of the claimants and, therefore, the Tribunal was left with no other option but to record the finding regarding the date and time of deposit of the renewal premium on the basis of the evidence led by the insurance company. Rather the date and time possibly could not be in the knowledge of the claimants and, therefore, the Tribunal was left with no other option but to record the finding regarding the date and time of deposit of the renewal premium on the basis of the evidence led by the insurance company. The Tribunal found that it was not proved by the evidence that the renewal premium amount was received at 2.00 PM on 20th July 1994 and, therefore, the insurance policy would commence from mid-night in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Daya's case (supra) and the mandate of section 64 VB of the Insurance Act. Since the accident admittedly look place at 9.15 AM of 20th July 1994 the insurance company has been held liable to pay the awarded amount. 9. In order to find out whether the finding recorded by the Tribunal is correct or not, we with the help of the counsel for the parties have examined the entire oral and documentary evidence brought on the record of the case by the insurance company. 10. Shri Ajoy Sarma, Branch Manager of the National Insurance Company, Jowai Branch, has appeared into the witness box as opposite party witness No. 1. He has stated that the vehicle in question was originally insured with the appellant company on 22.6.92 for a period of one year. Ext A was the carbon copy of the said policy which came to an end at mid-night of 21.6.93. The said policy was renewed on 30.6.93 at 10.30 PM which expired on 29,6.94 and was again renewed on 20th July 1994 at 2.00 PM for a period of one year. He proved Ext B, the motor renewal endorsement showing that the policy was renewed with effect from 20th July' 94 at 2.00 PM. He also produced Ext C, copy of renewal notice dated 16.5.94 and Ext C (1) a receipt seal put on Ext C showing that the policy was renewed on 20.7.84 and cash was paid at 2.00 PM. He went on to state that since the accident took place at 9.15 AM the insurance policy was not alive and, therefore, the company was not liable to pay any compensation. He went on to state that since the accident took place at 9.15 AM the insurance policy was not alive and, therefore, the company was not liable to pay any compensation. He also produced Ext D, the minor renewal endorsement dated 11.8.93 showing that the vehicle in question had been insured for a period of twelve months ending on 29.6.94. 11. In cross-examination the witness stated that he is conversant with the issuing of policies and that he agreed that the policy is issued on making the proposal for the first time which is taken for a period of twelve months. After the acceptance of the proposal the premium is charged and the money receipt is issued. A premium register is maintained in which the premium is reflected. A certificate of insurance is followed by a policy. He admitted that he has not exhibited any proposal form, the copy of the money receipt and the extract from the premium register relating to the Ext A, insurance policy. He further stated that the insurance contract came to an end on 21.6.93 which could be extended by renewal within a period of 90 days from the date of expiry. There was no renewal on 21.6.93. He further stated that there was no condition in the policy to show that the policy could be renewed within a period of three months after the expiry but no claim bonus is allowed if the policy is renewed within a period of ninety days from the date of expiry. The witness went on to state that after the expiry of the policy, a fresh contract is entered into and no claim is allowed. Ext D was the renewal to policy No.201002/63/000/000. He was constrained to admit that in Ext D the date and time of the starting of the renewal of the policy was not mentioned. The proposal, according to him, in the instant case, was taken by Development Officer Shri HW Blah. Ext D was prepared on 11.8.93, but it was signed on 1.9.93. There was no date of issuing and putting of signature by him in Ext D. The renewal, vide Ext D was also taken by the Development Officer Shri Blah and he only accepted the premium. He further stated that he did not see the insured tendering the premium on 20th July 1994 to Shri Blah. There was no date of issuing and putting of signature by him in Ext D. The renewal, vide Ext D was also taken by the Development Officer Shri Blah and he only accepted the premium. He further stated that he did not see the insured tendering the premium on 20th July 1994 to Shri Blah. He further admitted that the money receipt was not issued by him and that the same was issued by the Cashier and that in the money receipt no time is mentioned for receipt of the premium but date is mentioned and further that he did not file the copy of the money receipt along with Ext B which was the renewal policy. He denied the suggestion that he wrongly issued Ext B showing the time for commencement at 2.00 PM without any basis and that the vehicle was having valid coverage on the date when the accident took place. He further denied the suggestion that Ext C and C (1) were prepared subsequently for the purpose of this case. He went on to state that he was aware of the provisions of the Insurance Act, 1958 and also the provisions of section 64 of the Motor Insurance Act. He admitted that in this case he raised the complaint of section 64 VB but he did not remember whether he sent the same to the Controlling Officer or not and that he did not exactly remember when he raised the same. He stated that risk is not to be assumed earlier than the date on which the premium has to be paid by cash or by cheque to the insurance company. He further stated that it was not a fact that according to the provisions of sub-section (20) of section 64 VB of the Insurance Act, the insurance company was liable even if the premium was paid at 12.45 PM. 12. In re-examination the witness stated that since the Cashier receives the premium, the receipt is given on the face of the copy of the renewal notice showing the date, the time, the amount, the receipt number, collection number and this is reflected in the renewal endorsement. However, the time according to him, was not shown on the face of the money receipt issued to the client. However, the time according to him, was not shown on the face of the money receipt issued to the client. Ext C (1) was a the receipt seal showing the date, the lime, amount of premium receipt in the instant case. In further re-cross-examination the witness was constrained to admit that Ext C was prepared by one R. Rymbai, who was an Office Assistant and not the Cashier. He further admitted that there was no signature of the Cashier and the Office Assistant who received the premium and prepared Ext C. 13. OP witness of the insurance company PW 2 is Smti Y. Aier, an Assistant to the Administrative Officer of the insurance company in Shillong office. She stated that she was aware of the two claim cases filed by Smti KP Marak and Smti S. Takai which pertain to an accident which took place at 9.15 AM on 20th July 1994 and that the vehicle involved in the accident was a bus owned by Mr. Ekiansing Siangahai. She stated that the vehicle was originally insured with the insurance company w.e.f. 22nd June 1992 for a period of one year ending on 21.6.93 and Ext A was the insurance policy issued to the owner by the company. In Ext A the time from which the policy was effective had been mentioned as 12.35 PM. The said policy was renewed on 30th June 1993 for another period of twelve months ending o» 20.6.94 and accordingly, the insurance company renewed endorsement which was Ext D. The renewal, according to the witness, was not made immediately but after a lapse of nine days at 10.30 AM. Ext I was a renewal notice showing the cash receipt seal where the date and time and the amount of premium was clearly shown. Subsequently this policy was again renewed on 20th July 1994 at 2.00 PM for a period of another one year upto July 1995 and Ext D was the renewal endorsement showing the date and time. Ext C, according to this witness, was a renewal notice bearing the date and time of e the payment of the premium at the time of renewal. Ext C (1) was the casual cash receipt showing the date and time and the amount of premium. Ext C, according to this witness, was a renewal notice bearing the date and time of e the payment of the premium at the time of renewal. Ext C (1) was the casual cash receipt showing the date and time and the amount of premium. Ext C (2) was the signature of the owner of the vehicle on the renewal notice which was obtained on the date of renewal. She further stated that since there was a gap of 2 days before the policy was renewed on 20th July 1994, the policy was no alive in relation to the vehicle in question. The witness further stated that at the time of renewal on 20th July 1994 at 2.00 PM, the insured suppressed the fact of the accident and the insurance company renewed the policy in good faith. Ext K has also been produced by this witness, which according to her, was a compliance form of section 64 VB of the Insurance Act which was forwarded to all the Divisional Offices by the Branch Office at Jowai. Ext K (1) is the signature of the Branch Manager, Jowai, and Ext L was the proposal form which was filled & up by the insured at the time of original insurance of the vehicle on 22nd June 1992 and Ext L (1) was the signature of the insured. 14. In cross-examination the witness stated that she was working as an officer of the company since 1990 in Shillong office and that he was conversant with different documents used in connection with the insurance policies and that insurance policy consists of four pages including the conditions of the policy. She was constrained to admit in cross-examination that the money receipt is also in printed form and that there was a separate form for renewal notice. The renewal notice, the insurance policy and the money receipt are signed by authorised insurance officer. The renewal notice, according to her, specifies the date and advice to the insured to renew insurance policy of the vehicle by a specified date. The renewal notice is sent by ordinary post. All the documents exhibited as A to L were issued from Jowai office and that the knowledge of the said documents was through the records and not in accordance with her personal knowledge. The renewal notice is sent by ordinary post. All the documents exhibited as A to L were issued from Jowai office and that the knowledge of the said documents was through the records and not in accordance with her personal knowledge. The renewal notice and money receipt were separate documents and that the owner of the vehicle had neither visited Shillong Divisional Office nor he ever put signature in her presence. She further stated that when the insurance policy was renewed, no fresh policy was issued but only renewal endorsement and a certificate of insurance was issued. The certificate of insurance was also issued relating to the two renewals of Ext A. She admitted that the certificate of insurance pertaining to the said two renewals have not been exhibited by her. The certificate of insurance is issued first and renewal endorsement is also issued later on. Ext L according to her, is for 12 months and if the insured wishes to renew the same, the. policy is revalidated at the time of renewal. The option to renew the policy had to be exercised before the expiry of the insurance policy. In the present case, the option to renew the policy was exercised by the insured, but no fresh proposal was taken. Ext A (Ext E) photo copy of Ext A, the witness stated, did not carry the terms and conditions. She further admitted that Ext A was not a complete policy. She went on to state that there was no signature on Ext C and photo copy of Ext C marked as Ext G of any officer of the insurance company. The said exhibit, according to her, did not show any advice to the insured to renew the vehicle by a particular date, but the date of expiry was mentioned. So was also the case in Ext I. Ext C and I were not in printed form, she states. She went on to state that signature as Ext C (2) was not put in her presence. She further stated that she tallied the signature appearing as Ext C (2) and on policy form and came to the conclusion that the signature was of the insured although she was not handwriting expert. Ext 12 (I) was neither taken in her presence nor in her office. She further stated that she tallied the signature appearing as Ext C (2) and on policy form and came to the conclusion that the signature was of the insured although she was not handwriting expert. Ext 12 (I) was neither taken in her presence nor in her office. She denied the suggestion that Ext C and I were not the renewal notice and that the same were fabricated for the purpose of this case. She admitted that she did not file any copy of the money receipt and in Ext F, the photo copy of Ext D, which was the renewal endorsement, the time was not specified for the commencement of the policy. Ext K according to her, specified the date for the commencement of the policy. She admitted that the money receipt mentioned in Ext. did not specify the time when the money was charged. She denied the suggestion that the premium in the instant case was taken prior to 20th July'94 and the insurance company issued the policy late. She admitted that in column A of Ext K there was no requirement for mentioning the time for commencement. She denied the suggestion that the time of 2.00 PM in Ext A was not mentioned by OPW 1. She went on to state that when the notice was received from the Court, the suppression of fact by the owner regarding the accident was known to them. She admitted that in case of suppression of fact and fraud committed by the insured at the time of taking the policy, the insurance company had a right to cancel insurance policy, but she was not aware if the policy in question was cancelled by the insurance company. She admitted that she was aware that an order of no fault liability was a passed against the insurance company in the instant case and that a revision petition was filed in the High Court taking the ground that the vehicle was not insured at the time of accident, but the High Court rejected the revision application and the payment was made. 15. It is in the light of the aforementioned evidence that we have to determine whether the renewal premium was paid by the owner at 2.00 PM on 20th July, 1994 or that same was received by Mr. Blah earlier. 15. It is in the light of the aforementioned evidence that we have to determine whether the renewal premium was paid by the owner at 2.00 PM on 20th July, 1994 or that same was received by Mr. Blah earlier. Before recording the finding on this aspect of the matter, it is appropriate to take into consideration the case laws cited by the counsel for the parties to which reference has been made in the earlier part of the judgment. 16. In Sunita Rathi's case (supra) the facts were that the accident occurred on 10th December, 1991 at 2.20 PM and it was only thereafter the same day that the insurance policy and the cover note were obtained by the insured at 2.55 PM. There was express mention in the cover note that the effective date and time of commencement of the insurance was 10th of December, 1991 at 2.55 PM. On the said facts it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in view of the clear mention of time in the policy, insurance company was not liable. The Apex Court relied upon Jijubhas case (supra) which was decided in the year 1997. It deserves to be noticed at this stage that the entire judgment makes it more than clear that there was no dispute of fact regarding the time of the accident and the timing of the issuance of insurance policy and the cover note and in view thereof the decision in Ram Dayal's case (supra) was held to be not applicable by the Apex Court as is clear from the observations below : “2. The motor accident occurred on 10th December, 1991 at 2.20 PM. It was only thereafter the same day at 2.55 PM that the insurance policy and the cover note were obtained by the insured, owner of the motor vehicle involved in the accident. There is express mention in the cover note that the effective date and time of commencement of the insurance for the purpose of the Act was 10th December, 1991 at 2.55 PM. The applicability of the decision in Ram Dayal's case 1990 (2) SCR 570 , (supra) has to be considered on these facts. In our opinion the decision in Ram Dayal's case (supra) is distinguishable and has no application to the facts of this case. The applicability of the decision in Ram Dayal's case 1990 (2) SCR 570 , (supra) has to be considered on these facts. In our opinion the decision in Ram Dayal's case (supra) is distinguishable and has no application to the facts of this case. The facts of that decision show that the time of issuance of the policy was not mentioned therein and the question, therefore, was of presumption when the date alone was mentioned and not the time at which the insurance was to become effective on that date. In such a situation, it was held in Ram Dayal's case (supra) that in the absence of any specific time being mentioned, the logical inference to draw was that the insurance became effective from the previous mid-night and, therefore, for an accident which took place on the date of the policy, the insurer became liable. There is no such difficulty in the present case in view of the clear finding based on undisputed facts that the accident occurred at 2.20 PM and the cover note was obtained only thereafter at 2.55 PM in which it was expressly mentioned that the effective date and time of commencement of the insurance for the purpose of the Act was 10.12.1991 at 2.55 P.M. The reliance on Ram Dayal's case (supra) by the Tribunal and the High Court was, therefore, misplaced, we find that in a similar situation, the same view which we have taken, was also the view in M/s National Insurance Co Ltd vs. Smti Jijubhai Nathuji Dabbi, 1996(8) SCALE 695 , wherein Ram Dayal's case (supra) was distinguished on the same basis.” 17. In Jijiibhai's case (supra) the Apex Court while distinguishing the earlier judgment held as under: “3. This Court in New India Assurance Co. vs. Ram Dayal, (1990) 2 SCR 570 , had held that in the absence of any specific time mentioned in that behalf, the contract would be operative from the mid-night of the day by operation of provisions of the General Clauses Act. But in view of the special contract mentioned in the insurance policy, namely, it would be operative from 4.00 PM on October 25,1983 and the accident had occurred earlier thereto, the insurance coverage would not enable the claimant to seek recovery of the amount from the appellant-company.” 18. But in view of the special contract mentioned in the insurance policy, namely, it would be operative from 4.00 PM on October 25,1983 and the accident had occurred earlier thereto, the insurance coverage would not enable the claimant to seek recovery of the amount from the appellant-company.” 18. The aforementioned observations were made by the Apex Court in view of the findings recorded by the Tribunal on a point of fact that the contract of renewal came into force on October 25,1983 at 4.00 PM whereas the accident took place on the same date at 11.14 AM i.e. before the renewal of the contract. 19. This brings us straightway to the decision of the Apex Court in Ram Dayal's case (supra). In that case the Apex Court ruled that the insurer will be liable in case the policy has been obtained on the date, the accident occurred, as it would be operative from previous mid-night. It has further been held in Ram Dayal's case (supra) that effectiveness of the policy would be from the commencement of the date of the insurance i.e. from the previous mid-night and since the accident took place on the date of the policy, the insurer was liable. The Apex Court while making the insurance company liable has relied upon certain judgments of the Madras High Court, the Punjab and Haryana High Court and the Allahabad High Court. 20. In view of the discussion of all the 3 (three) decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the following propositions of law emerge. (i) If time is mentioned in the insurance policy or cover note, the effectiveness of the policy would start from that time and date and not from an earlier point of time; (ii) If the accident takes place on that very date before the time which is mentioned in the insurance policy, the insurer will not be liable to indemnify the insured; (iii) If the time is not mentioned in the insurance policy, it would commence from that date which means-mid-night and in case the accident occurred on the date of taking the policy, the insurer will be liable to meet the liability of the insured under the award. 21. 21. In addition to the three prepositions of law as have been deduced from the three authoritative judicial pronouncements of the Apex Court, it can also be held on first principle that in the absence of an owner, it is the insurance company upon whom heavy onus lies to prove necessary facts. In such like matters, namely, as to when the insurance policy would commence, either the owner would have necessary knowledge or the insurance company would be in possession of factual data. The claimant being ignorant as to when the policy commences, if the insurance company does not discharge the onus about the time when the renewal premium was received by it, a presumption in law would arise that the policy commenced from mid-night of the date when the payment was made as has been held in Ram Dayal's case (supra). 22. For the determination of the liability of the insurer in the present case and in order to find out as to which proposition would apply to the case in hand, it has to be found by this Court as to from which time and date the policy would become effective. 23. Adverting to the determination of the factual question whether the owner paid the insurance renewal premium at 2.00 PM on 20th July, 1994, we are of the firm view that the insurance company has not been able to prove that the payment was received from the owner at that time. This Court in earlier part of the judgment has minutely noticed the entire evidence. The renewal notice Ext C cannot legally prove the payment of premium on 20th July, 1994. The document clearly shows that the same is not in printed form. It evidences certain calculations. Putting up of seal on this document showing the payment at 2.00 PM would not improve the case of the insurance company as it has been admitted by OP Witness 2 that the renewal notice is in a printed form. The alleged signature of the owner even if it can be presumed to be correct cannot help the insurance company as the receipt issued by the Cashier who has received the payment has not been produced by the appellant. If an entry had beer made in the money receipt regarding the time of receipt of the payment, it might have helped the Court. If an entry had beer made in the money receipt regarding the time of receipt of the payment, it might have helped the Court. It is not known as to how the time of payment has been given on Ext C which is not so mentioned in the cash money receipt. Money receipt was the best document to prove at the earliest from time point of view where an entry could have been made by the Cashier to the effect that the payment was received at 2.00 PM. Ext C cannot be relied for one more reason as it is dated 16.5.1994. There is no date below the alleged signature of the owner. The document has got absolutely no evidentiary value and the same in our considered opinion cannot be described even the renewal notice. Ext C does not carry the signature of any officer of the insurance company. The document according to OP witness 1 was prepared by Mr. Rymbai but he has not been produced in the witness box. Ext C is not signed by Mr. Rymbai either. 24. Ext B is a Motor Renewal Endorsement showing the date and time as 20th July, 1994 at 2.00 PM. This document does not mention at all the receipt number for renewal of the policy. It has remained unexplained on record as to from where and on what basis the time of 2.00 PM is mentioned in Ext B. This document cannot be read in isolation and has to be read along with Ext C the so-called renewal notice which has been disbelieved by us above. It appears to us that the time in Ext B has been noted from Ext C and once Ext C is disbelieved, the entry in Ext B would automatically fail. Had Ext B mentioned money receipt number and had money receipt been issued by the Cashier on 20th July, showing the payment of the amount at 2.00 PM, something could be said in favour of the insurance company. In view thereof, Ext B also does not prove the receipt of the renewal premium at 2.00 PM. Ext A, carbon copy of the policy is irrelevant to prove the payment on 20th July 1994 as it was initially issued on 22nd June, 1992. Ext B and C cannot be relied upon for one more reason. In view thereof, Ext B also does not prove the receipt of the renewal premium at 2.00 PM. Ext A, carbon copy of the policy is irrelevant to prove the payment on 20th July 1994 as it was initially issued on 22nd June, 1992. Ext B and C cannot be relied upon for one more reason. Ext D pertaining to he renewal in the year 1993 does not show any time when the payment was received from the insured. If this had been the practice of the insurance company to give time of receipt of renewal premium, it would have been noted i.e. Ext D which pertained to the previous year. The absence of time in Ext D is a clear pointer to the fact that time in the renewal notice has been given for the first time at 2.00 PM on 20th July, 1994. Since the insurance company has not produced the best evidence by producing the money receipt and since it has been admitted by Mr. Ajoy Sharma, the Branch Manager, that no time is mentioned in the money receipt, the document Ext B and C cannot and do not prove the payment at 2.00 PM on 20th July 1994. 25. In view of the finding recorded herein above, regarding documentary evidence produced by the insurance company, it remains to be seen whether the insurance company has been able to prove from oral evidence that the payment was made by the owner at 2.00 PM on 20th July 1994. At the very outset, it deserves to be mentioned that neither the Cashier who had received the payment nor Mr. Blah, the Development Officer, who took the renewal of the insurance policy, have been produced into the witness box. In absence of these said two persons, the evidence of Mr. Ajoy Sarma and Smti Y. Aier would pale into insignificance. Mr. Ajoy Sarma is the Branch Manager of the company of Jawai Branch, who after deposing about the procedure as to how the policy is renewed^ had to admit in his cross-examination that he has not exhibited any proposal form, the copy of the money receipt and the extract from the Premium Register. He further admitted that his Ext D, the renewal endorsement, no date and time is given. He further admitted that his Ext D, the renewal endorsement, no date and time is given. He further admitted that Ext C was prepared on 11.8.93 but is was signed on 1.9.93, and that the renewal vide Ext D was also taken by the Development Officer, Mr. Blah. He further stated in his cross-examination that he did not see the owner tendering the premium on 20.7.94 to Mr. Blah and that the money receipt was signed by the Cashier, but it did not contain any time for receipt of the premium. This witness although stated in re-examination that the Cashier received the premium and the receipt was shown on the renewal notice showing the date, time, the amount, the receipt number and collection number but he admitted that the time had not been shown on the face of the money receipt. In further re-cross-examination, the witness was constrained to admit that Ext C, me so called renewal notice dated 16.5.94 was prepared by one R. Rymbai, an Office Assistant, and not the Cashier, and that there is no signature of the Cashier and the Office Assistant who had received the premium and prepared Ext C. 26. The statement of the Branch Manager, in our considered view, does not prove the receipt of payment by the insurance company at 2.00 PM. He had neither seen Mr. Blah nor owner tendering premium renewal amount to the Cashier. The Cashier had not stepped into the witness box .to state that the payment was received by him from the owner at 2.00 PM. Even if the cashier had appeared into the witness box, he having not given any time on the money receipt, the Court would have been left guessing as to how the insurance company can prove the payment at 2.00 PM on 20th July, 1994. 27. The statement of Smti Y. Aier, OP Witness No. 2, an Assistant Administrative Officer, is equally irrelevant to prove the payment at 2.00 PM. Although this witness has stated that Ext 1 was a renewal notice giving the time at 10.30 AM on 30.6.93, yet the same was not signed by the owner, whereas Ext C, the renewal of the year 1994 was signed by the owner. Although this witness has stated that Ext 1 was a renewal notice giving the time at 10.30 AM on 30.6.93, yet the same was not signed by the owner, whereas Ext C, the renewal of the year 1994 was signed by the owner. These two documents as has been observed above cannot be held to be renewal notice as even this , witness Smti Aier admitted that the same were not in the printed form. This witness had further to admit that the renewal notice is signed by the officer of the company, but these two renewal notices have not been signed by any officer. The alleged signature of the insured on Ext C according to Smti Aier, were not put in her presence. Smti Aier further admitted that in Ext D the renewal prior to Ext B the time for commencement of the policy was not mentioned and, therefore, both these documents, even according to her statement, cannot be reconciled by a Court of law. Either Mr. Blah or the Cashier could throw some light as to when the payment was received from the owner, but none has been produced. In fact, as has been observed above, the first document, the money receipt having not specified the time of receipt of the renewal premium, no other document in our considered view, could prove the payment at 2.00 PM. It appears to is that Mr. Blah received the payment prior to the date and time mentioned in Ext C and the same was deposited late with the Cashier as admittedly the owner was not seen by any one making the payment in the office on 20th July, 1994. 28. The onus was heavy upon the insurance company to prove that the payment was received by it on 20.7.94 at 2.00 PM. The claimant was in a disadvantageous position to prove the negative i.e. the non-payment on the relevant date he being not a party to it. The owner having absented himself after filing of the written statement, it was only the insurance company who could give conclusive proof regarding payment. Since the insurance company has not been able to discharge the onus, it is held that the payment was received by the insurance company at some time before 2 PM either on 20.7.94 or on some other date. 29. Since the insurance company has not been able to discharge the onus, it is held that the payment was received by the insurance company at some time before 2 PM either on 20.7.94 or on some other date. 29. Once the conclusion is arrived at that the payment was not received at 2.00 PM by the insurance company, the effectiveness of the insurance policy would commence from previous mid-night as has been held in Ram Dayal's case (supra) and, therefore, the policy was alive at the time of accident. The two judgments of the Apex Court cited by the counsel for the insurance company are inapplicable as the time and date as mentioned in the insurance policy in 8 these cases were either not disputed or the Tribunal recorded a finding on that aspect of the matter in favour of the insurance company which was not disputed before the Apex Court. 30. In view of the aforementioned discussion we do not find any force in any of the arguments of Mr. Sharma noticed in the beginning of the judgment. The official acts can neither be presumed to be duly performed nor correctly done by the officials, of the insurance company in view of the finding recorded by us above. The conduct of the insured to have the.renewal late every time cannot give rise to any presumption that the insured paid the premium on 20th July, 1994 only and not before. 31. Equally untenable is the argument of Mr. Sharma that Mrs. Marak was not entitled to file claim petition. Smti Marak is sister of the deceased and she had stated in her evidence when she appeared in the witness box that the deceased brother was married and was survived by wife and minor son. The deceased used to live with her and she brought him up. She further stated that she was taking care of the wife and minor child and further that the claim petition was filed with the consent of the wife. The claimant Smti Marak filed her affidavit before us slating therein that the widow of his brother was paid the entire compensation received during the pendency of claim petition before this Court. A receipt has also been filed before this Court evidencing the said payments. The claimant Smti Marak filed her affidavit before us slating therein that the widow of his brother was paid the entire compensation received during the pendency of claim petition before this Court. A receipt has also been filed before this Court evidencing the said payments. We while holding applicant liable for making the payment of the compensation amount herein observe that the balance of the amount would be paid by Smti Marak to the widow of the deceased and she would file receipt in the registry of the High Court. The widow and the minor child would be entitled to share the compensation amount in equal shares. The amount falling to the share of the minor child would be deposited in fixed deposit by the Tribunal which would be paid only after the minor son attains majority. However, the widow would be entitled to withdraw interest on the deposited amount for bringing up the child. She be paid her share by way of account payee cheque. As regards MA (F) 3 (SH) of 1998 the sole respondent would have the entire compensation amount The balance of the amount which has remained unpaid would be got deposited by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in a fixed deposit for a period of thirty seven (37) months. 32. Before parting with the judgment it is necessary to mention that during the pendency of the appeal before this Court, the appellant filed an application for additional evidence to produce Mr. Blah who was working as Development Officer at the relevant time. It was stated in the application that it was necessary to examine the said witness for proving Ext C and the seal affixed on Ext C as Ext C (1). Some photostat copies of documents were attached with the application. The said application was dismissed by us by making the following observations: further necessary for us to observe that it has been mentioned that Mr. Blah would produce some such like evidence when he appears into the witness box. As to what that evidence would be, the same is left to the guess work of the Court or the claimants. In our considered view, such an application cannot be allowed at the appellate stage particularly when as has been observed by us above, it would amount to filling up the lacuna. As to what that evidence would be, the same is left to the guess work of the Court or the claimants. In our considered view, such an application cannot be allowed at the appellate stage particularly when as has been observed by us above, it would amount to filling up the lacuna. Admittedly, the owner of the vehicle has remained absent after the filing of the written statement before the Claims Tribunal. If we allow Mr. Blah to be produced in evidence at the appellate stage, it would virtually amount to permitting the insurance company to say anything it likes in evidence which would go un-controverted because the claimants do not have any knowledge regarding the time of payment. The permi­ssion to grant opportunity, therefore, would cause manifest injustice to the claimants. Above all, the applicant does not satisfy the conditions of Order 41 Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code. The said provision clearly lays down that the parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence whether oral or documentary in the appellate Court until and unless the Court from whose decree the appeal has-been preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted. It is not the case of the applicant that the Claims Tribunal in the instant case had ever refused to admit such evidence which is sought to be produced before us. The provision further lays down that the party can produce evidence if it is established that such evidence could not be produced despite the exercise of due diligence and that the same was not within the knowledge of the party or the party could not, after the exercise of due diligence produce such evidence at the time of passing the decree by the trial Court. No such averment on this point has been made in the application. We could also allow the production of evidence if we require the same to enable us to pronounce the judgment. We are of the view that we are able to pronounce the judgment on the basis of the evidence existing on the record and, therefore, none of the conditions as specified in Order 41 Rule 27 has been satisfied in the instant case.” 33. For the reasons recorded above the finding of the Tribunal is affirmed and both the appeals filed by the insurance company are ordered to be dismissed. For the reasons recorded above the finding of the Tribunal is affirmed and both the appeals filed by the insurance company are ordered to be dismissed. However in view of the important question of law arising in the appeal, the parties are left to bear their own costs throughout.