JUDGMENT - PATEL J.N., J.:---Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. The applicants/accused are prosecuted for having committed murder of one Kanahyasing Thakur on 10-10-1998 at about 9.30 p.m. An offence under section 302 read with section 34 of Indian Penal Code came to be registered against the applicants/accused, vide Crime No. 388/1998, by Gadgenagar Police Station, Amravati. The applicant/accused-Biharilal Minatilal Yadao was arrested on 10-10-1998 and was produced before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class on 11-10-1998; whereas the applicant No. 2-Laxmikant Biharilal Yadao; applicant No. 3-Dadu @ Krushnakumar Biharilal Yadao; and applicant No. 4-Nandu Hiralal Yadao, came to be arrested on 13-10-1998 and were remanded to custody. The Police filed Charge-sheet on 8-1-1999 in the Court, on which date, the accused were not produced by the jail authorities and, therefore, the Magistrate issued a Production Warrant and case was adjourned to 22-1-1999. On 22-1-1999, the applicants/accused persons moved an application for bail, which came to be registered as Application No. 3/1999. The applicants/accused sought bail on the ground of default, as contemplated in Proviso (a)(ii) to sub-section (2) of section 167 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Magistrate on the very day rejected their application for bail on the ground that charge-sheet is filed within 90 days and as the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the case by issuing production warrant, the provisions of section 167(2) are not applicable. 3. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Magistrate, rejecting their application, for bail, the applicants/accused preferred Criminal Revision Petition No. 17/1999 before the Court of Sessions at Amravati and sought bail on the ground that the applicants/accused were not produced when the charge-sheet was filed on 8-1-1999 and, therefore, they are entitled to be released on bail and placed reliance on the case of the (Iqbal Zahoor Shaikh and ors. v. State of Maharashtra)1, reported in 1994(4) C.C.R. 2607 and (Khimbhadhur Palshiram Thapa v. State of Maharashtra)2, reported in 1989(2) Crimes 543. The learned Additional Sessions Judge dismissed the Revision Petition on the ground that the Police filed the Charge-sheet on 8-1-1999, which was within limitation of 90 days, as contemplated in section 167(2) Proviso a(i); and as there was no default in filing the charge-sheet, within the prescribed time, the applicants/accused were not entitled for bail. The learned Additional Sessions Judge dismissed the Revision Petition on the ground that the Police filed the Charge-sheet on 8-1-1999, which was within limitation of 90 days, as contemplated in section 167(2) Proviso a(i); and as there was no default in filing the charge-sheet, within the prescribed time, the applicants/accused were not entitled for bail. The learned Additional Sessions Judge also observed that : It is not a case where the accused persons were never produced before the Magistrate during the period of remand. It is only on 8-1-1999 that they were not produced prior to that the applicants/accused were produced before the Court on 4-1-1999 from jail and they were in Magisterial custody and their remand was extended and, therefore, the authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicants are different than the facts of the present case. 4. Aggrieved by the orders of the two courts below, rejecting their application for bail under section 167(2) proviso, the applicants/accused have approached this Court, invoking its inherent jurisdiction and for seeking bail under section 167(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. 5. Mr. Kasat, learned counsel for the applicants/accused submits that the applicants/accused are entitled to be released on bail, on default of the prosecution in filing the charge-sheet, within the prescribed period of 90 days. It is submitted that, this is a statutory right of the accused to be enlarged on bail and the two courts below have erred in law, in denying bail to the applicants/accused. 6. Mr. Kasat, impugned the orders, rejecting the bail to the applicants/accused by relying upon the two cases, cited by him, before the Additional Sessions Judge, as well as an unreported decision of this Court in the case of (Ramu alias Ramkrishna Vithoba alias Vitthal Teltumade v. State of Maharashtra)3, Criminal Application No. 1361 of 1998, decided on 15th October, 1998; and submitted that the applicants be ordered to be enlarged on bail. Mr. Kasat, submitted that on 8-1-1999, which was the date for production of the accused before the JMFC, the accused were not produced before the Magistrate for obtaining remand, which is mandatory as per Proviso (b) to section 167(2) and, therefore, the continuance of the applicants/accused in judicial custody beyond 8-1-1999 was per se illegal, which would entitled the applicants/accused for bail. He further submitted that detention of the applicants/accused, in custody beyond the period of 90 days by the learned Magistrate was in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore, when the applicants moved an application for bail on 22-1-1999, the learned Magistrate ought to have released them on bail. It is submitted that mere filing of the charge-sheet on 8-1-1999 is not enough for the purpose of further detention of the accused beyond the period of 90 days and unless such detention is in conformity with the provisions of section 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which can be only after the Magistrate takes cognizance, any further detention of the applicants/accused under section 167 beyond the period of 90 days was illegal. It is submitted that the applicants/accused be released forthwith on bail. 7. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor strongly objects to the grant of bail in the case and submitted that, non-production of the accused on 8-1-1999 will not vitiate the further detention of the applicants /accused in custody. It is submitted that, for making the order of remand, personal presence of the accused is not always necessary although it is highly desirable. The learned A.P.P. has placed reliance on the case of (Ramesh Ravi @ Ramprasad v. State of Bihar)4, reported in (Kurra Dashrath Ramayah v. State of A.P.)5, 1992 Cri.L.J. 3485 (A.P. Full Bench) and (Prakash s/o Rustam v. State of M.P.)6, 1995 Cr.L.J. 869 (M.P.). 8. It is further submitted that non-production of the accused on 8-1-1999 is well explained before this Court by filing an affidavit of Police Officer from Gadgenagar Police Station and that of the Jailor from Amravati Central Prison. It is further submitted that on 8-1-1999 all the Police force was busy in Bandobast duty as there was a programme of Deputy Chief Minister at Amravati, for which, Police force was also called from outstation as the Police force available in Amravati was not sufficient and, therefore, the Police could not provide escorts to jail authorities for sending the accused to Court, only one constable was sent for getting the extension of remand of the accused on 8-1-1999. It is, submitted that the jail authorities have also in their affidavit stated that the requisition given to the Reserve Police Inspector, Police Head Quarter (City) Amravati, for providing police escorts to produce under trial prisoner in Amravati Court on 7-1-1999, but the Reserve Police Inspector, Police Head Quarter Amravati (City) Amravati has communicated to the jail authorities vide his letter dated 8-1-1999 that Police escorts cannot be made available during the period of 6-1-1999 to 8-1-1999 because they are busy in Bandobast duty for the programme of Deputy Chief Minister and, therefore, non-production of the applicants/accused in the court on 8-1-1999 was beyond the control of the jail authorities and for the reasons that the Police escorts was not made available for the said purpose, of which, the applicants cannot take advantage. 9. It is further submitted by the learned A.P.P. that once report is submitted under section 173(2) and cognizance is taken by the Magistrate the provisions of section 167(2) cannot be invoked as in the present case, charge-sheet was filed on 8-1-1999, which was within the prescribed period of 90 days, as contemplated in proviso a(i) of section 167(2). It is submitted that the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the case by passing an order below Exhibit - 1, i.e. Charge-sheet as under : “Charge-sheet put up on today. Issue production warrant. The order-sheet dated 8-1-1999 discloses that Challan under section 302, Indian Penal Code produced by S. O. Gadgenagar, Amravati. It be registered. Accused are not produced from jail. Case adjourned for production of accused to 22-1-1999. It is submitted by the learned A.P.P. that as the Charge-sheet filed against the applicants/accused discloses that offence under section 302 read with section 34 has been committed by them, it being a Session trial case, the magistrate is required to commit the same to the Court of Sessions under section 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and for the said purpose, it is necessary for the Magistrate to commit the case, after complying with the provisions of section 207, as this was the case instituted on Police report, in which, their production before the Court was necessary. It is submitted that after filing of the charge-sheet on 8-1-1999, further order of remand of the accused/applicants detaining the applicants/accused in custody was under sub-section (2) of section 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code and, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the applicants/accused were detained in custody beyond prescribed period, as contemplated under section 167 and, therefore, the Magistrate as well as the learned Additional Sessions Judge were right in rejecting their application for bail under the said provision. Mr. Kasat, learned counsel for applicants/accused in reply submitted that the order remanding the applicants/accused to further custody on 8-1-1999 cannot be said to have been passed under section 309(2) of Criminal Procedure Code, as claimed by the learned A.P.P. for the very reason that the Magistrate cannot said to be making any enquiry as defined in section 2(g) of the Criminal Procedure Code on the date, he passed the order for production of the accused on 22-1-1999 and placed reliance in the case of (Rajkishor Prasad v. State of Bihar)7, reported in A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1931. The learned A.P.P. submitted that the said authority relied upon by the applicants/accused is in reference to jurisdiction of the Magistrate in exercise of powers under section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vide undertaking commitment proceedings under section 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code. But in the present case, the order of detention beyond 8-1-1999 came to be passed under section 309(2) of Criminal Procedure Code which was after filing the charge-sheet and taking cognizance of the offence, while the accused were in custody of the Court and cited the case of (State through C.B.I. v. Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar and ors.)8, reported in 1997 Bom.C.R.(Cri.) 791. 10. The question, for consideration before this Court is whether w.e.f. 8-1-1999, the detention of the applicants/accused was ordered under section 167(2) or section 309(2) of Criminal Procedure Code. Jurisdiction of the Court to remand the accused to custody firstly can be found in section 167(2), which is applicable during investigation of offence; secondly under section 209(b), which is applicable during pendency of the Sessions trial; and thirdly under section 309(2), which can be invoked during inquiry or trial other than Sessions trial. All the three provisions operate independently of each other. All the three provisions operate independently of each other. After the Magistrate takes cognizance, his power to remand the accused to custody under section 167(2) comes to an end and any power in that behalf has thereafter to be sought from either section 209(b) or section 309 of Criminal Procedure Code as the case may be. The scheme engrafted in these three provisions regarding the detention of the accused in custody, particularly, in relation to the powers of the Magistrate to order detention of the accused in custody, in a case, which is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, has been extensively dealt with by the Supreme Court in the case of (State of U.P. v. Laxmi Brahman)9, reported in A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 439 and reference to paras 12 and 13 of the Judgment makes it amply clear. 12. Section 170 obligates the investigating Officer to submit the Police Report, if in the course of investigation sufficient evidence or reasonable ground is made out for the trial or for commitment of trial of the accused, to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a police report. On this report being submitted the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence disclosed in investigation as envisaged by section 190. It is indisputable that taking cognizance of an offence under section 190 is a purely judicial function subject to judicial review by court of appeal or revision to which the Magistrate is subject. Cognizance of an offence even if exclusively triable by the Court of Session has to be taken by the Magistrate because section 193 precludes it from taking cognizance of any offence when it provides that no Court of Session shall take cognizance of any offence as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the accused has been committed by the Magistrate under the Code. Thus even in case of an offence exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the police report on completion of investigation has to be submitted to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to commit the accused for trial. It is the Magistrate who takes cognizance of the offence and not the Court of Session though the case is one exclusively triable by the latter. Section 170 directs that if the accused in respect of whom police report is being submitted is in police custody, he has to be forwarded along with police report to the magistrate. It is the Magistrate who takes cognizance of the offence and not the Court of Session though the case is one exclusively triable by the latter. Section 170 directs that if the accused in respect of whom police report is being submitted is in police custody, he has to be forwarded along with police report to the magistrate. When the Magistrate receives the report and the accused is produced before him it is necessary for him to pass some order for his further detention subject to provisions contained in Chapter XXXIII as to bails and Bonds. The view taken by the High Court makes it a necessity for the Magistrate to release the accused on bail even if the accused is not otherwise entitled to the discretionary order of bail nor he applies for nor is ready to furnish bail only because the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to keep the accused in custody till an order committing the accused for trial is made. The High Court referred to section 209 which provides that the Magistrate shall commit the accused to Court of Session and subject to the provisions of the Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial. This according to the High Court implies that the Magistrate can exercise power to release on bail or remand to the custody the accused only after making the order of commitment but the Magistrate has no such power anterior to the order of commitment and during the interregnum since the receipt of the charge-sheet. This dichotomy read by the High Court in sections 207 and 209 is certainly not borne out by the provisions of the Code. Section 207 as it then stood made it obligatory for the Magistrate to supply free of costs, copies of the documents set out in the section. The duty cast on the Magistrate by section 207 has to be performed in a judicial manner. To comply with section 207 which is cast in a mandatory language, when the accused is produced before the Magistrate, he has to enquire from the accused by recording his statement whether the copies of the various documents set out in section 207 have been supplied to him or not. To comply with section 207 which is cast in a mandatory language, when the accused is produced before the Magistrate, he has to enquire from the accused by recording his statement whether the copies of the various documents set out in section 207 have been supplied to him or not. No order committing the accused to the Court of Session can be made under section 209 unless the Magistrate fully complies with the provisions of section 207. And if it is shown that the copies of relevant documents or some of them are not supplied, the matter will have to be adjourned to get the copies prepared and supplied to the accused. This is implicit in section 207 and section 209 provides that on being satisfied that the requisite copies have been supplied to the accused, the Magistrate may proceed to commit the accused to the Court of Session to stand his trial. The statutory obligation imposed by section 207 read with section 209 on the Magistrate to furnish free of costs copies of documents is a judicial obligation. It is not an administrative function. It is a judicial function which is to be discharged in a judicial manner. It is distinctly possible that the copies may not be ready. That makes it necessary to adjourn the matter for some time which may be spent in preparing the copies and supplying the same to the accused. The Magistrate can proceed to commit the accused for trial to the Court of Session only after he judicially discharges the function imposed upon him by section 207. This conclusion is fortified by the provisions contained in Chapter XVIII which prescribed the procedure for trial of a case by Court of Session. Section 226 provides for opening the case for the prosecution. Section 227 confers power on the Court of Session to discharge the accused if upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. No duty is cast on the Court of Session to enquire before proceeding to hear the case of the prosecution under section 226 to ascertain whether the copies of the documents have been furnished to the accused because section 207 casts the obligation upon the Magistrate to perform the judicial function. 13. No duty is cast on the Court of Session to enquire before proceeding to hear the case of the prosecution under section 226 to ascertain whether the copies of the documents have been furnished to the accused because section 207 casts the obligation upon the Magistrate to perform the judicial function. 13. Now, if under section 207, the Magistrate is performing a judicial function of ascertaining whether copies have been supplied or not, it would undoubtedly be an inquiry for the purpose of satisfying himself that section 207 has been complied with in letter and spirit. That satisfaction has to be judicial satisfaction. It is not a trial but something other than a trial and being judicial function it would necessarily be an inquiry. The making of an order committing the accused to the Court of Session will equally be a stage in the inquiry and the inquiry culminates in making the order of commitment. Thus, from the time the accused appears or is produced before the Magistrate with the Police report under section 170 and the Magistrate proceeds to enquire whether section 207 has been complied with and then proceeds to commit the accused to the Court of Session, the proceeding before the Magistrate would be an inquiry as contemplated by section 2(g) of the Code. We find it difficult to agree with the High Court that the function discharged by the Magistrate under section 207 is something other than a judicial function and while discharging the function the Magistrate is not holding an inquiry as contemplated by the Code. If the Magistrate is holding the inquiry obviously section 309 would enable the Magistrate to remand the accused to the custody till the inquiry to be made is complete. Sub-section (2) of section 309 provides that if the Court, after taking cognizance of an offence or commencement of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement or adjourn any inquiry or trial it may, from time to time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody. There are three provisos to sub-section (2) which are not material. There are three provisos to sub-section (2) which are not material. If, therefore, the proceedings before the Magistrate since the submission of the police report under section 170 and till the order of commitment is made under section 209, would be an inquiry and if it is an inquiry, during the period the inquiry is completed, section 309(2) would enable the Magistrate to remand the accused to the custody. Therefore, with respect, the High Court committed an error in holding that “the order remanding the respondents to custody, made after cognizance of offence was taken cannot be justified under sections 167(2), 209 and 309 of the Code and no other provision under which the respondents can be remanded to custody at this stage, having been indicated by the learned Government Advocate, we feel that it would be proper to accede to the request made by the respondents and to direct that they would be released on bail after furnishing adequate security to the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate Banda.” 11. The contention of the learned Counsel for the applicants/accused that in view of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in (Raj Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar)8, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1931 in which, the Supreme Court has distinguished the case of State of U.P. v. Laxmi Brahman, which will show that, any steps taken by the Magistrate prior to making an order of commitment under section 209, Criminal Procedure Code cannot be considered as an inquiry and, therefore, the provisions of section 309(2) of Criminal Procedure Code would not be attracted, cannot be accepted for the simple reason that in case of Raj Kishore Prasad, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing the question viz. - “Can a Magistrate undertaking commitment under section 209, Criminal Procedure Code of case triable by a Court of Session, associate another person as accused, in exercise of power under section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or under any other provision, is the significant question which crops up for consideration in this appeal. The Supreme Court did not dwell on the question as to whether after filing of the charge-sheet in a case, exclusively triable by the Court of Session, at what stage, it can be said that the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence. The Supreme Court did not dwell on the question as to whether after filing of the charge-sheet in a case, exclusively triable by the Court of Session, at what stage, it can be said that the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence. Whereas in the case of State of U.P. v. Laxmi Brahman, the Apex Court has explained that, cognizance of any offence even if exclusively triable by the Court of Session has to be taken by the Magistrate because section 193 precludes it from taking cognizance of any offence as a court of original jurisdiction unless the accused has been committed by the Magistrate under the Code. Thus even in case of an offence exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the Police report on completion of investigation has to be submitted to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to commit the accused for trial. It is the Magistrate who takes cognizance of the offence and not the Court of Session though the case is one exclusively triable by the latter. Now the question is as to what will be the state of affairs in respect of detention of the accused, after charge-sheet is filed. Obviously section 167(2) would cease to operate and so the Court is left with section 209(b) of Criminal Procedure Code. Section 209 provides procedure while committing the accused to the Court of Session. It is mandatory provision. It not only empowers the Magistrate to remand during and until conclusion of the trial, but commands him to do so and such order will continue to be valid until conclusion of the trial subject to provisions of the Code relating to bail, remand section 209(b) would come into operation after the Magistrate commits the case to the Court of Session and, therefore, it is only section 309(2) which can be said to be in operation, vesting the jurisdiction in the Magistrate to take the accused in judicial custody, after the charge-sheet is filed. The only requirement in order to invoke the powers vested in section 309(2) is : “If the Court, after taking cognizance of an offence, or commencement of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of, or adjourn, any inquiry or trial, it may, from time to time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody”. In the case of (Sanjay v. Union of India)10, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 514 it has been held that : The view that adjournments can be granted at the committal stage is not questioned by the Supreme Court : it has only been observed that, long adjournments should not be granted to allow the accused to inspect voluminous documents which may not be relevant or to cross-examine prosecution witnesses relating to them, because the committing Magistrate has no power to take or examine evidence at that stage, except that of an approver under the specific provisions in section 306. The power vested in the Court to remand the accused in custody is restricted for a term not exceeding 15 days at a time. There is another aspect that section 309 provides power to postpone or adjourn proceedings in the Court, but insofar as such exercise of power is made by a Magistrate, it is restricted to period of 15 days at a time. On the other hand, a remand of the accused, in custody, other than powers vested in the Court to remand the accused in custody under section 209 of Criminal Procedure Code being a special provision, order of remand made by the committing Magistrate, continue during and until conclusion of the trial. 12. In the present case what will have to be examined is whether after filing of the charge-sheet, the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the case or not? The order passed by the Magistrate below Exhibit-1, i.e. Charge-sheet reads : Charge-sheet put up today. Issue production warrant. itself shows that the order of the Magistrate as to issue of production warrant for production of the accused persons and adjourning the case to 22-1-1999 can be only said to be a step after taking cognizance of the offence. The order passed by the Magistrate below Exhibit-1, i.e. Charge-sheet reads : Charge-sheet put up today. Issue production warrant. itself shows that the order of the Magistrate as to issue of production warrant for production of the accused persons and adjourning the case to 22-1-1999 can be only said to be a step after taking cognizance of the offence. As the process against the accused under section 204(1) can be issued by the Magistrate, who takes cognizance of the offence, under section 190, Criminal Procedure Code and which is the first step to be taken by a Magistrate in commencement of proceedings before Magistrates and in a case, which is instituted on police report and is exclusively triable by the Court of Session section 207 casts a duty on the Magistrate taking cognizance of Police report to supply the relevant prosecution documents to the accused and then only the Magistrate can commit the case to the Court of Session under section 209 of Criminal Procedure Code and remand the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial by virtue of clause (b) of section 209. Therefore, there is no difficulty in arriving at a conclusion that on charge-sheet being filed on 8-1-1999, the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence by issuing warrant of production to the accused before the court and it cannot be said that the order of remanding the accused on 8-1-1999 came to be passed under section 167(2) of Criminal Procedure Code. It is not much disputed that production of accused before the Court is not necessary while passing the order under section 309(2) of Criminal Procedure Code. Now let me examine the case of Iqbal Zahoor Shaikh and others v. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) and that of Khimbhadhur Palshiram Thapa vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra), relied upon by the counsel for the applicants and also that of Ramu alias Ramkrishna s/o Vithoba alias Vitthal Teltumade v. State of Maharashtra. Now let me examine the case of Iqbal Zahoor Shaikh and others v. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) and that of Khimbhadhur Palshiram Thapa vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra), relied upon by the counsel for the applicants and also that of Ramu alias Ramkrishna s/o Vithoba alias Vitthal Teltumade v. State of Maharashtra. The learned Additional Sessions Judge was justified in observing that on facts, the two cases i.e. one of Iqbal Zahoor Shaikh and Khimbhadhur Thapa (cited supra) are not applicable as in the case of Iqbal Zahoor Shaikh and others as at no time the petitioners were produced before the Magistrate and the Court found nothing on record to show that the Magistrate applied his mind so as to indicate that he has taken cognizance before remanding the accused under the provisions of section 167(2) of Criminal Procedure Code. On the other hand, in Khimbhadhur Palshiram Thapa's case, the Court has clearly observed that : if a charge-sheet is filed it is open to the learned Magistrate to remand him to further custody, if it could be said that the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence under section 309 sub-section (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Court found that the Magistrate has not taken cognizance, but mechanically adjourned the case after charge-sheet was filed and, therefore, the detention of the accused beyond the prescribed period was found to be unjustified. Even in the case of Ramu alias Ramkrishna s/o Vithoba alias Vitthal Teltumade (cited supra) the Court has observed that the learned A.P.P. was not in a position to satisfy me that the order passed by the learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge are justified, particularly, in reference to the facts as to whether further detention of the accused, after filing of the charge-sheet was after taking cognizance or not? 13. As regards the contention of the applicants/accused that in absence of the accused, the Magistrate would not have passed the order of remand under proviso (b) to section 167. 13. As regards the contention of the applicants/accused that in absence of the accused, the Magistrate would not have passed the order of remand under proviso (b) to section 167. It is the consistent view of the Courts in the matter that the personal presence before the Magistrate is not necessary, for extension of remand by Magistrate (Rajnarayan v. Central Jail, New Delhi)11, reported in 1971 Cri.L.J. 244, (Gaurishankar Zaa v. State of Bihar)12, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 711, (Sandip Kumar Dey v. Officer In-charge, Jamshedpur)13, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 871, Rameshkumar v. State of Bihar and others, 1987 Cri.L.J. 1489, Patna High Court, Full Bench. All these authorities clearly go to show that order of remand can be passed in absence of the accused, if his presence could not be secured. In the present case, the respondent/State has sufficiently explained by giving valid reasons for non production of the applicants/accused on 8-1-1999, i.e. for want of escorts as the Police force was busy in Bandobast duty, on the eve of visit of Dy. Chief Minister at Amravati, which fact is not disputed by the applicants/accused. 14. In the result, the application stands rejected. 15. Rule is discharged. Application dismissed. -----