D. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner alleges the he was originally employed in the Directorate of Industries, handicrafts Division, Kanpur. Subsequently his services were placed at the disposal of the respondent No. 1, U. P. Export Corporation Limited, Kanpur. Initially his service with the respondent No. 4, Director of Industries, Handicrafts Division was terminated, which, however, was alleged to be withdrawn. Ultimately the said order of termination was withdrawn and then the petitioner was confirmed as a Store Keeper. Despite such order dated 18th November, 1988, the petitioner rendered the service with the Corporation and he was even promoted to the post of senior Clerk in the Corporation. Subsequently, he was further promoted in the year 1978 as assistant Executive in the Corporation. He was, thereafter, again promoted to the post of Deputy executive of the said Corporation. The petitioner claims that he had been on deputation during all the period with the Corporation. Therefore, according to him, the rules of the Corporation would not be applicable to him with regard to disciplinary proceedings. By an order dated 4th november, 1992, it is alleged that a sum of Rs. 25,000/- was sought to be recovered against the petitioner, against which a writ petition No. 479 (SS) of 1993 was moved before the Lucknow bench, wherein by an order dated 14th January, 1993, the recovery was stayed. Thereafter, the petitioner was suspended on 15th February, 1994 on the ground that he was absenting from service as well as on the charge of causing a loss of Rs. 25,000/- to the Corporation. This order dated 15th February, 1994 has since been challenged in this writ petition No. 17357 of 1996 before this Court at Allahabad. ( 2 ) MR. M. D. Misra, learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioner has retired on 30th June, 1988. No interim order, however, was passed in this writ petition. ( 3 ) THE fact remains that in the writ petition, there is no pleading to distinguish that the present writ petition is not on same facts as prohibited in Rule 7, Chapter XXII of the Allahabad High court Rules. However, Mr. Misra points out from the order dated 14th January, 1993 passed by the Lucknow Bench in the other writ petition that the said writ petition was concerned with the order dated 4th November, 1992. However, Mr. Misra points out from the order dated 14th January, 1993 passed by the Lucknow Bench in the other writ petition that the said writ petition was concerned with the order dated 4th November, 1992. But there is no pleading as to the contents of the order dated 4th November, 1992. Mr. Misra, however, submits from the Bar that the said order was confined only to the recovery of Rs. 25,000/- only and it was neither an order of suspension nor a proposal to hold enquiry. ( 4 ) BE that as it may, in absence of the record of other writ petition, it is not possible to ascertain the situation. However, in his usual fairness, Mr. Misra had admitted that the said writ petition is still pending. He further contends that though charge sheet was issued pursuant to the order dated 15th February, 1994 and the petitioner had submitted his reply, yet no enquiry has been held as against him. He contends that since the Rules do not apply to the services of the petitioner, it is not open to the respondents to hold enquiry against him and proceed against him pursuant to the order dated 15th February, 1994. In that view of the matter, according to him, the writ petition should be allowed and the order dated 15th February, 1994 should be quashed. ( 5 ) I have heard Mr. M. D. Misra, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. K. R. Singh learned standing Counsel at length. ( 6 ) ADMITTEDLY, the petitioner had been working since 1971. The petitioners service was dispensed with from the Industries Directorate and was placed at the disposal of the Corporation by the order dated 25th February, 1972. Though subsequently the order of termination was withdrawn and the petitioner was confirmed in the Directorate of Industries, but the fact remains that the petitioners service was placed with the Corporation in 1972 and he had obtained regular promotions to the post of Assistant Executive in 1978 even before the order dated 18th november, 1988 was passed. Thereafter, the petitioner accepted further promotion in the post of deputy Executive. Thus it appears that though the petitioner had been attempting to claim a lien in the Industries Directorate but he having accepted promotion in the Corporation, he ceased to have any right to claim lien in the Industries Directorate. Thereafter, the petitioner accepted further promotion in the post of deputy Executive. Thus it appears that though the petitioner had been attempting to claim a lien in the Industries Directorate but he having accepted promotion in the Corporation, he ceased to have any right to claim lien in the Industries Directorate. It was open to him to seek his repatriation to his parent department. But he had never sought for. On the other hand, he had accepted the service in the transferred department, where he had accepted promotions successively. By reason thereof, he is estopped from claiming any lien in the Industries directorate. Therefore, he cannot allege that the Rules of the Corporation would not be applicable to the petitioner. ( 7 ) THE apart, when a person is employed on deputation on a particular Directorate of department and he is responsible for infringement of any condition of service in the said department or directorate on deputation, he is susceptible to the disciplinary proceedings in the Directorate itself. He cannot claim that he would be immuned from the Rules of the place of deputation so as to claim immunization from the rules of service, where he is serving. Once he is accepting the promotion in the same department as and when it becomes due and comes on his way without claiming any promotion in the parent department and thereby enjoying the benefit of his service in the department on deputation, he cannot claim that he is immune from the rules when the question of disciplinary proceedings comes in his way to his disadvantage. He cannot seek advantage in one department for one purpose and seek advantage of other department when the rules of the department is to his disadvantage. ( 8 ) FOR all these reasons, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Misra to the extent that the petitioner is immune from the disciplinary proceedings of the department, where he is serving by reason of peculiar facts and circumstances of the case as observed earlier. ( 9 ) FROM the pleadings, it is difficult to ascertain as to the scope and ambit of the earlier writ petition pending before the Lucknow Bench. But, however, the facts remains that the said petition was moved on 14th January, 1993 whereas the impugned order was passed on 15th february, 1994. ( 9 ) FROM the pleadings, it is difficult to ascertain as to the scope and ambit of the earlier writ petition pending before the Lucknow Bench. But, however, the facts remains that the said petition was moved on 14th January, 1993 whereas the impugned order was passed on 15th february, 1994. Therefore, there is no scope in including this order of suspension passed on 15th february, 1994 in the said petition. There might be some substance in the submission of Mr. Misra that fresh cause of action could not have been incorporated in the said writ petition. If the order dated 4th November, 1992 was not an order of suspension on account of the alleged charges mentioned in the order dated 15th February, 1994, in that event the contention of Mr. Misra has a force, which is to be accepted. In case the order dated 4th November, 1992 was also an order of suspension on the same charges, in that event, this writ petition would be hit by Rule 7 of Chapter XXII since the present cause of action would be a part of the cause of action, which was subject matter in the writ petition before the Lucknow Bench. In absence of any materials, it is not possible to arrive at a conclusive finding. ( 10 ) THEN again, in view of the order that is being passed in the present petition, this question is also not necessary to be gone into at this stage and this point may remain open for being decided in the pending writ petition before the Lucknow Bench if occasion arise and it appear to be so necessary. ( 11 ) THE petitioner was suspended by the order dated 15th February, 1994. But by reason of the petitioners retirement with effect from 30th June, 1998, the purpose of this writ petition has become infructuous since the order of suspension has come to an end with the expiry of the date of superannuation that is 30th June, 1998. Since I have already held that he is susceptible and subject to the Rules of the Corporation, therefore, it is open to the respondents to conclude the enquiry, if not already conclude, within a period of six months from the date a copy of this order is presented before the appropriate authority by the petitioner. Since I have already held that he is susceptible and subject to the Rules of the Corporation, therefore, it is open to the respondents to conclude the enquiry, if not already conclude, within a period of six months from the date a copy of this order is presented before the appropriate authority by the petitioner. The order of suspension shall be subject to the result of the enquiry if it is held and concluded. Since the question of recovery is subject matter in the earlier writ petition, I do not see any reason to pass order with regard to the recovery or otherwise. It will be open to the respondents to hold the enquiry in accordance with law without being influenced by any observations made in this order, within the stipulated time. It will also be open to them to pass appropriate orders, if not already passed in respect of enquiry against the petitioner. Any adjournment or time taken by the petitioner shall be excluded while calentating six months as stipulated above. ( 12 ) IN that view of the matter , this writ petition is disposed of with the observations as above. There will, however, no orders as to costs. ( 13 ) A copy of this order may be supplied to the learned Counsel on payment of usual charges at the earliest. .