Brijesh Kumar, C.J.— The brief controversy in this case revolves around the question as to whether a dismissed employee can be a member/office bearer a of the respondent Trade Union, registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), or not ? The learned Single Judge decided the question in the affirmative, that is, the dismissal would not disentitle him to be a member of the Trade Union. Hence, this appeal, against the order of the learned Single Judge, dated 17.11.95, passed in Civil Rule No. 2329 of 1994. 2. We have heard Shri NM Lahiri, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant and Shri LP Sarma, learned counsel for the respondent. 3. The writ petition was filed by Bokajan Cement Corporation Employees' Union, Bokajan, through Shri Pratap Bora, General Secretary of the Trade Union, registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. It appears that the dispute arose relating to elections of the office bearers of the petitioner Trade Union. The Assistant Labour Commissioner prepared a list of members of the petitioner Trade Union for the purposes of Annual General Meeting and the elections scheduled to be held on 24.6.94 and 26.6.94. He deleted the names of 102 contract labourers from the list as well as that of Pratap Bora, who was elected as General Secretary of the petitioner Trade Union in the previous election. Quashing of the list as prepared excluding the aforesaid members was prayed for in the writ petition. It was also prayed that a direction be issued for inclusion of the names of 103 persons in the list of members. The learned Single Judge considering the matter at length, quashed the list prepared by the Assistant Labour Commissioner and further directed him to prepare a fresh membership list. So far Pratap Bora is concerned, it has been held that the order of dismissal of Pratap Bora being under challenge in the proceeding before Labour Court, he cannot be considered to be an outsider. We need not go into the other facts in detail regarding dispute between the rival factions, etc, as that would not be necessary for the purpose of settling down the controversy involved in the appeal. 4. We need not go into the other facts in detail regarding dispute between the rival factions, etc, as that would not be necessary for the purpose of settling down the controversy involved in the appeal. 4. The learned Single Judge made it clear in the order that, save and except the right of Pratap Bora, rights of other members of the Trade Union have not been decided; which are to be decided by the proper authority while preparing the list of members. In this view of the matter, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant is not aggrieved by that part of the order; but the grievance is only in respect of Pratap Bora, who is no more in employment and is a dismissed employee, yet to be considered and treated as a member of the Trade Union. 5. The main thrust of the argument is on the point that since Pratap Bora is no more in employment of the industry, he would not be entitled to be a member of the Trade Union. In this connection, our attention has been drawn to the constitution of the Trade Union and the provisions regarding its membership. Clause 5 deals with membership of the Trade Union. It reads as follows: "5. Membership: Any worker employed by the Cement Corporation of India directly or indirectly throughout shall be eligible for the membership of the Union provided he/she accepts the constitution, bye laws and discipline of the Union and pays the stipulated admission fee of Rs. 100 along with stipulated subscription. Clause 6 relates to the Executive Committee, which reads as under : “6. Executive Committee: The administration of the Union shall be vested in the Executive Committee selected at its Annual General Meeting from amongst the members of the Union which shall consist of 17 to 21 members including the under noted officials." (Emphasis supplied) 6. According to the constitution of the trade union, one who is employed by the Cement Corporation of India directly or indirectly would be eligible for membership of the Union. The emphasis laid on behalf of the appellant is that once an employee is dismissed from service, ceases to be in employment. According to the constitution of the trade union, one who is employed by the Cement Corporation of India directly or indirectly would be eligible for membership of the Union. The emphasis laid on behalf of the appellant is that once an employee is dismissed from service, ceases to be in employment. That being the position, such an employee would not be eligible for membership of the Union, even though his case may be pending before any Labour Court challenging the validity of the order of dismissal from employment. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to section 6 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, more particularly, clause (e), which reads as follows: “6. Provisions to be contained in the rules of a Trade Union - A Trade Union shall not be entitled to registration under this Act, unless the executive thereof is constituted in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and the rules thereof provide for the following matters, namely .... (e) the admission of ordinary members who shall be persons actually engaged or employed in an industry with which the Trade Union is connected, and also the admission of the number of honorary or temporary members as office bearers required under section 22 to form the Executive of the Trade Union;" (emphasis supplied) Section 22 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 provides as under : “22. Proportion of officers to be connected with the industry - No less than one half of the total number of the office bearers of every registered Trade Union shall be persons actually engaged or employed in an industry with which the Trade Union is connected : Provided that the appropriate Government may, by special or general order, declare that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any Trade Union or class of Trade Union specified in the order." Yet another provisions which may be pointed out at this stage relating to membership in clause 7 (ii) (b) of the constitution of the Trade Union, which reads as follows : "(b) Honorary members shall not be entitled to any right, privilege and benefit of the ordinary members except participation in the Committee, conference, conventions, etc of the Union in which they are entitled to participate by virtue of their position as office bearers or members of the Executive Committee of the Union." 8. On the basis of the provisions indicated above, it is submitted on behalf of the appellant that Pratap Bora, after he ceased to be in employment on his dismissal from service, he is nonqualified to be an ordinary member of the Trade Union. Mere pendency of any proceeding before the Labour Court or before any other forum will not have the effect of continuance of the membership of the Trade Union. To strengthen this submission, arned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reported in (1996) 11 LLJ 288 in the case of State Bank of India Staff Association & another vs. State Bank of India & others. In this case, a retired employee of the Bank was elected as eneral ecretary of the Bank's Staff Association. The management refused to negotiate with him as he was no more employee of the Bank, being erely a retired employee: It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that he cannot claim a right to negotiate with the management as representative of the Union. 9. On behalf of the respondent, namely, Pratap Bora, it has been submitted that he continues to be a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, even after he is not in employment. In that connection, learned counsel for the respondent has taken pains in citing several decisions to indicate that an employee after cessation of his employment continues to be a workman. Reliance in this connection has been placed on certain decisions, reported in AIR 1957 SC 104 , Central Provinces Transport Services, Ltd vs. Raghunath; AIR 1957 SC 264 , Dharangadhar Chemical Works Ltd vs. State of Saurashtra; AIR 1971 SC 832, State of Kerala & another vs. RE D'Sovzha; AIR 1964 SC 355 , M/s Basti Sugar Mills Ltd vs. Ram Ujagar & others; AIR 1970 SC 426 , Bennett Coleman and Co Pvt Ltd vs. Punya Priya Das Gupta. 10. We find that the learned Single Judge has also heavily relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1970 SC 426 (supra). This was a case relating to a working journalist who had resigned from service. There were some dues on account of gratuity in connection whereof he had moved under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, claiming payment of dues on account of gratuity. This was a case relating to a working journalist who had resigned from service. There were some dues on account of gratuity in connection whereof he had moved under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, claiming payment of dues on account of gratuity. The plea raised in defence that he ceased to be workman after resignation; hence proceedings could not be initiated nor could he claim the amount in those proceedings, was negatived. Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the scheme of all Acts dealing with industrial questions is to permit an ex-employee to avail of the benefits of the provisions of such enactments in respect of claims accrued whilst the claimant was in the employment of the person against whom it is made. From the above observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court the reasoning is quite clear. By cessation of employment the dues or benefits which accrued during the period of employment, they are not wiped off, eg, if wages for certain period is due and not paid, it cannot be said that on retirement, discharge, dismissal or termination, he cannot claim that benefit accrued during the period he was in employment invoking the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as workman. For such personal benefits he is to be considered as workman so as to pursue the claim and the remedy as available under the Industrial Disputes Act. 11. The other cases which have been relied upon on behalf of the respondent are also related to similar facts and circumstances. These cases could not be relevant for the purposes of consideration of the question before us. It is not a dispute relating to personal benefit accrued to the claimant as workman. It pertains to a right to continue as a member of the Trade Union for which one would be entitled only if actually engaged in the industry or falls in the category of honorary or temporary member so as to be one of the office bearers of the Executive Committee. The facts of the present case are a bit nearer to the facts as in the case of State Bank of India Staff Association (supra). It would, however, be necessary to examine the facts of the present case. 12. The facts of the present case are a bit nearer to the facts as in the case of State Bank of India Staff Association (supra). It would, however, be necessary to examine the facts of the present case. 12. It has been seen earlier that the Trade Union is required to frame its rules in accordance with the provisions contained under section 6 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 so as to be entitled for being registered as a Trade Union. Accordingly, the Rules have been framed and clause 5 of the constitution, in consonance with section 6 (e) of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, as noted earlier, provides that any worker employed by the Cement Corporation of India shall be eligible for membership of the Union. The claim of the petitioner/respondent as member of the Trade Union and its General Secretary is based on being a member as provided under clause 5 of the constitution of the Bokajan Cement Corporation Employees' Union. Once dismissed from service, he may not be entitled to claim to be in employment or having the status of "any worker employed by the Cement Corporation of India", for the purposes of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 or the Rules framed thereunder. Since an employee or worker once dismissed the relationship of master and servant ceases,- he no more remains in employment; hence, he would not be a worker employed. 13. The objects of the Trade Union are different. These are : to foster a spirit of solidarity in service, brotherhood and co-operation amongst all workers; to secure effective and complete organisation of the workers; to obtain and maintain adequate scale of wages and responsible hours of work; to raise the status and improve the conditions of life of the workers; to secure redressal of the grievances of the members and to regulate and secure as far as possible settlement of disputes by mutual consultation and on its failure, by reference to arbitration or adjudication; to make necessary arrangements for efficient conduct and satisfactory conclusions of all disputes including authorised strike or satyagraha, etc. The above are the objects of the Trade Union in question as indicated in the constitution itself. The activities of the Union are for the collective purposes, namely, collective bargaining or for general welfare of the members of the Union, their conditions of service and emoluments, etc. The above are the objects of the Trade Union in question as indicated in the constitution itself. The activities of the Union are for the collective purposes, namely, collective bargaining or for general welfare of the members of the Union, their conditions of service and emoluments, etc. It may negotiate or settle the disputes, or resort to authorised strike or satyagraha, etc as indicated.In the context of the above, it will not be appropriate to draw analogy of the meaning of the word 'workman', as used under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or other Acts regulating the conditions of service of the ployees of an organisation. For the purpose of initiating and pursuing the eedings regarding claims of benefits accrued during the course of employment of a particular employee would entirely be a different matter. If some wages or benefits, etc are liable to be paid, they are not wiped off on cessation of employment. Hence, for that purpose, a workman may be treated t6 be continuing in employment within the meaning of the term under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or other similar provisions. To claim a right that one would be entitled to remain a member of a Trade Union, even though one ceases to be in employment, would be entirely a different thing as compared to pursuing proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or other similar provisions for recovery of claim of the benefits accrued during the course of employment. Membership of the Trade Union is not such a benefit which accrues to the employee so as to claim its continuance even after he ceases to be in employment. His right to be an ordinary member of the Trade Union continues so long he remains employed by the industry. By cessation of employment he ceased to be employed by the industry; so, losing the right to be a member of the Trade Union. It is not an accrued right which he earns during the course of his employment. It is not such an accrued benefit which may be claimed to be continued even after termination of the employment. Therefore, it would be fallacious to take a clue of the meaning of the word 'workman' so mployed in the other enactment for the purposes other than as envisaged under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. It is not such an accrued benefit which may be claimed to be continued even after termination of the employment. Therefore, it would be fallacious to take a clue of the meaning of the word 'workman' so mployed in the other enactment for the purposes other than as envisaged under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. The same word used in two different enactments in different back ground may have different meanings. herefore, while an workman may be treated to be continuing as workman for the purposes of pursuing his remedies under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to claim accrued benefit during the course of employment; but the same meaning would not be attached for the purposes of continuance as a ^member of a Trade Union, even though he is a dismissed employee. This right continues so long he was actually employed; but there is nothing which has accrued during the period of employment that can be claimed after cessation of the employment. 14. In context with the discussion held above, the case of State Bank of India Staff Association (supra) may be perused and it is to be noted that it has been held that the management was not supposed to negotiate with a retired employee as General Secretary of the Banks Staff Association, since he ceased to be an employee of the Bank after retirement. 15. It is submitted on behalf of the respondent that section 6 (e) of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, requires that Rules shall be framed for admission of ordinary members and also admission of number of honorary or temporary members as office bearers, as required under section 22 to form the executive of the Trade Union. Therefore, it is not necessary that the respondent, Pratap Bora, must be actually employed so as to be a member. He can be a honorary or temporary member in respect of whom it is nowhere indicated that he must be f actually in employment. 16. First of all, it may be observed that it is not the case of the respondent Pratap Bora, that he was a temporary or honorary member of the Trade Union. He was a member of the Union as an ordinary member and was elected as General Secretary as such. Hence, this question does not arise. 16. First of all, it may be observed that it is not the case of the respondent Pratap Bora, that he was a temporary or honorary member of the Trade Union. He was a member of the Union as an ordinary member and was elected as General Secretary as such. Hence, this question does not arise. Secondly, we find that under the rules as framed by the Union, clause 7 (ii) (b) provides that honorary members 8 shall not be entitled to any right, privilege and benefit of the ordinary members. An honorary member can only participate in the committee, conference, conventions, etc, by virtue of his position as office bearer or member of the Executive Committee of the Union. It is, thus, seen that the rights of an honorary member have been restricted as indicated above. They do not seem to be entitled to right of vote. 17. As observed earlier, firstly, it is riot a case that the respondent, Pratap Bora, was an honorary member and, even if that be so, rights of an honorary member are limited and restricted, and they are indicated in clause 7 (ii) (b), of the constitution of the Union. They cannot equate themselves with the ordinary members. An ordinary member would be one as provided under clause 5, namely, one who is in actual employment of the industry. An outsider may become an honorary or temporary member subject to the conditions as may be provided under the Rules. Under the Rules as indicated above, they have only the right to participate in the committee, conventions and conferences, etc, by virtue of their being office bearers or members of the Executive Committee. In this view of the matter also, he could not claim a right to be included in the list of members entitled to vote. 18. The respondent, Pratap Bora, would not be entitled for the reliefs prayed for, since he was enjoying the status in the Trade Union only as its ordinary member, which benefit was not available to him after he was dismissed from service. It does not seem to be ever the case that he was there in the Executive Committee or as an office bearer in the capacity of the honorary member. It does not seem to be ever the case that he was there in the Executive Committee or as an office bearer in the capacity of the honorary member. Simply by reason that proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are pending impugning the order of dismissal, would not by itself amount to suspension of order of dismissal for the purposes of being member of General Secretary of the Trade Union. 19. In view of the discussions held above, the appeal is allowed, the order of the learned Single Judge is set aside only in so far it relates to Pratap Bora being treated as member of the Trade Union and the writ petition is dismissed to that extent. There will, however, be no order as to costs.