JUDGMENT : R.K. Dash, J. - The accused, Appellant herein, stood charged u/s 302, Indian Penal Code for having committed murder of Durua Madhi (hereinafter referred to as 'the deceased'). The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jeypore, on 'consideration of evidence led during the trial, held the accused guilty for the said offence arid sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. The aforesaid order of conviction and sentence recorded by the learned trial Judge has been assailed in this appeal. 2. The prosecution case culled out during the trial may briefly be stated thus: On 22.4.1991 at about 3.00 p.m., the deceased trespassed into the house of the accused, damaged the thatch of his house and threw away his house?hold belongings to outside. The accused being enraged, chased the deceased with knife and stabbed on his abdomen, chest, back and right side ear; as a result, he succumbed to the injuries. On a report being lodged by Deba Madhi (P.W. 1) at Mundaguda Out Post under Mathili Police Station, a case u/s 302, Indian Penal Code was registered and after due investigation charge-sheet was placed against him u/s 302, Indian Penal Code to stand his trial. 3. At the trial, the accused abjured the guilt and pleaded innocence. 4. The prosecution, in order to bring home the charge against the accused, examined as many as nine witnesses and the learned trial Judge upon assessment of the evidence, held the accused guilty and sentenced him as hereinbefore stated. 5. The autopsy doctor P.W. 4 on examination of the dead body found three incised injuries over left lower thorax, right upper abdomen, left temporal region and one stab injury over left lower back of the deceased. On dissection, he noticed injuries on large and small intestines, right side liver, left pleura and also on the brain. According to him, all the injuries were ante mortem in nature and the cause of death was due to injuries to the aforesaid vital organs of the body. The fact that the deceased died a homical death has not been assailed before us. In view of the above, the question remains to be considered in whether the accused was responsible for the death of the deceased. 6. The fact that the deceased died a homical death has not been assailed before us. In view of the above, the question remains to be considered in whether the accused was responsible for the death of the deceased. 6. The prosecution in order to prove its case relied upon the ocular testimony of the sole eye-witness P.W. 3, besides other circumstantial evidence, such as, seizure of weapon of offence, namely, knife stained with human blood of group 'B' which was the blood group of the deceased, and the find of human blood of the same group on the napkin (towel) of the accused. 7. Learned Counsel appearing for the accused strenuously urges that P.W. 3 was a 'chance witness' and his statement having not been sufficiently corroborated by any other evidence, it would be hazardous to rely upon the same and act upon it. Moreover, there was delay on the part of the investigating agency to examine him and to record his statement and such delay having not been explained, his evidence should be viewed with suspicion. 8. Controvelling the aforesaid submission, learned Counsel appearing for the State, contends that presence of P.W. 3 at the scene of occurrence was quite natural and probable and the learned trial Judge who had the occasion to mark his demeanour at the time of his examination, was of the opinion that he was a witness of truth and accordingly, accepted his evidence. As to the delayed examination of P.W. 3 by the Investigating Officer, counsel submits, that the first Investigating Officer, P.W. 7 went to the village on the night of occurrence, i.e. 22.4.1991 and since it was night, he stated investigation on the next day and on 24.4. I 991 the second Investigating Officer, P.W. 8 took further investigation in course of which he examined P.W. 3 and therefore it can not be said that there was any delay on his part to record the statement of P.W. 3. 9. In view of the aforesaid submissions of the counsel appearing for the parties, at the outset we would proceed to scrutinise the evidence of the sole eye-witness P.W. 3 to find whether his evidence inspires confidence. 9. In view of the aforesaid submissions of the counsel appearing for the parties, at the outset we would proceed to scrutinise the evidence of the sole eye-witness P.W. 3 to find whether his evidence inspires confidence. As deposed to by him, on the date and time of occurrence he while returning home saw the accused stabbing the deceased on his chest, abdomen, back and forehead with a knife and there?after made good his escape. The defence during cross-examination could not elicit anything to impeach his credibility. He is a co-villager of both deceased and the accused and his presence at the scene of occurrence was quite probable and therefore, he cannot be termed as a 'chance witness'. The expression' chance witness' is borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle and every one must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is a most unsuitable expression in a country whose people are less formal and more causal. In a murder trial by describing the independent witnesses as 'chance witness' it cannot be implied thereby that their evidence is suspicious and their presence at the scene doubtful. Murders are not committed with previous notice to witnesses; soliciting their presence. If murder is committed in a dwelling house, the inmates of the house are natural witnesses. If murder is committed in a brothel, prostitutes and paramours are natural witnesses. If murder is committed in a street, only passersby will be witnesses. Their evidence, cannot be brushed aside or viewed with suspicion on the ground that they are mere 'chance witnesses'. (see Rana Partap and Others Vs. State of Haryana, ). 10. P.W. 3 in the present case, whose evidence we have discussed earlier, was a natural witness and his version about the accused having inflicted injuries to the deceased cannot be brushed aside by terming him as a chance witness. Besides, we find that his ocular account stands sufficiently corroborated by other circumstantial evidence. It would appear from the evidence available on record that the accused while in custody of the Investigating Officer, made a disclosure statement and gave recovery of the knife M.O.I and the doctor P.w. 4 on examining the said knife opined that the injuries noticed on the person of the deceased could be caused by it. It would appear from the evidence available on record that the accused while in custody of the Investigating Officer, made a disclosure statement and gave recovery of the knife M.O.I and the doctor P.w. 4 on examining the said knife opined that the injuries noticed on the person of the deceased could be caused by it. It is also borne out from the evidence of P.W. 8 that he seized the napkin (towel) of the accused and sent the same along with the knife M.O.I. and other materials for chemical examination." As borne out from the chemical examination report, Ext. 14, human blood of group 'B', which was the blood group of the deceased, was noticed on the Lungi of the deceased, knife M.O.I. as well as the napkin of the accused. There was no explanation by the accused as to how human blood of group 'B', which was the blood group of the deceased, could be found on his napkin. All these materials coupled with the eye-witness account of P.W. 3 persuade us to hold that it was the accused who stabbed the deceased with knife M.O.I. and caused his death. 11. In view of our above conclusion, the next question that crops up for consideration is whether the accused would be liable for punishment u/s 302 or 304, Indian Penal Code. To repeat with, it is the admitted case of the prosecution that since the deceased traipsed into the house of the accused, damaged his thatch and threw away his household articles, the accused being enraged chased and stabbed him to death. Explanation-1 to Section 300, Indian Penal Code envisages that culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, caused the death of the person who gave the provocation. In the present case, the accused who belongs to tribal community and hails from interior part of a tribal district, in a sudden heat of passion and on grave provocation by the deceased, lost his self-control, inflicted blows with a knife and caused his death. We are, therefore, of the view that the act of the accused ill causing death of the deceased is culpable homicide not amounting to murder and therefore he is liable for punishment for the offence u/s 304. Part-I and not u/s 302, Indian Penal Code. 12. We are, therefore, of the view that the act of the accused ill causing death of the deceased is culpable homicide not amounting to murder and therefore he is liable for punishment for the offence u/s 304. Part-I and not u/s 302, Indian Penal Code. 12. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part. While setting aside the judgment and order of conviction recorded against the Appellant u/s 302, Indian Penal Code, we alter his conviction to Section 304, Part-I, Indian Penal Code and sentence him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period often years. P.K. Mohanty. J. 13. I agree. Final Result : Allowed