JUDGMENT : - Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. : This revisional application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is at the instance of one of the respondents in an appeal preferred by the opposite party No. 1 and is directed against order dated May 12, 1999 passed by the learned District Judge, Alipore in Title Appeal No. 85 of 1999 thereby staying all further proceedings of a proceeding under section 29(b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act ("Act") till the disposal of the application for stay filed by the opposite party No. 1. 2. The present petitioner filed a proceeding under section 29(B) of the Act for eviction of the opposite party No. 1 on the ground of reasonable requirement thereby giving rise to A.R.C. Case No.8 of 1995 and the case made out by the petitioner herein was that by virtue of a compromise decree passed in Title Suit No. 113 of 1994 of the 4th Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Alipore, he became the absolute owner of the suit property and that he reasonably required the premises in possession of the opposite party No. 1 as tenant for his own use and occupation. 3. There is no dispute that the opposite party No. 1 was a tenant under all the co-sharers including the present petitioner. The present opposite party No. 1 filed a suit in the 4th Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Alipore being Title Suit No. 83 of 1996 thereby praying for a declaration that the compromise decree obtained by the present petitioner was a nullity and not binding upon the opposite party No. 1 as the said decree was obtained collusively in order "to evict the opposite party No. 1 from the suit property. 4. Immediately after filing of the said suit, the opposite party No. 1 filed an application for stay of all further proceedings of the said rent control proceeding under section 29(B) of the Act but the same having been refused both by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, the matter came up before this court in revision and Panigrahi, .J. by order dated June 11, 1997 directed the learned trial Judge to hear out the suit within four months. His Lordship was further pleased to stay all further proceedings of the proceeding before Rent Controller till the disposal of the suit. 5. His Lordship was further pleased to stay all further proceedings of the proceeding before Rent Controller till the disposal of the suit. 5. It appears that although direction was' given for disposal of the suit by four months, it took nearly two years to dispose of the said suit and ultimately, the suit has been dismissed. 6. Being dissatisfied, the opposite party No. 1 has preferred the aforesaid Title Appeal No. 85 of 1999 and immediately thereafter has come up with a fresh application for stay of the proceeding before Rent Controller on the ground that in view of the dismissal of the suit, previous stay granted by this Court had come to an end. 7. Since a caveat was lodged by the present petitioner, the learned first appellate court below fixed July 6, 1999 for nearing of the stay application and granted interim stay till that date. While passing such order, the learned first appellate court below observed that refusal of stay will encourage multiplicity of the proceeding and hearing of the appeal should be expedited. Being dissatisfied, the petitioner has come up in revision. 8. Mr. S. S. Mukherjee, the learned advocate appearing in support of the application has contended that the suit filed by the tenant challenging the decree for partition among landlords was not at all maintainable and the sole object of the opposite party No. 1 was to delay the disposal of the eviction proceeding. Mr. Mukherjee contends that the suit having been dismissed on merit, the learned first appellate court below should not have stayed all further proceedings of the eviction proceeding pending before Rent Controller. 9. Mr. Subhrokamal Mukherjee, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite party No. 1 has on the other hand supported the order passed by the learned District Judge, and has contended that in the past, Panigrahi, J having stayed the further proceeding of eviction before Rent Controller till the disposal of the suit, no illegality has been committed by the learned first appellate court below by extending such stay. According to Mr. Subhrokamal Mukherjee, appeal is the continuation of the suit and as such the stay should continue till the disposal of the appeal. In support of such contention Mr. Subhrokamal Mukherjee has relied upon a decision pf this court in the case of Damodar Mukherjee & Ors. According to Mr. Subhrokamal Mukherjee, appeal is the continuation of the suit and as such the stay should continue till the disposal of the appeal. In support of such contention Mr. Subhrokamal Mukherjee has relied upon a decision pf this court in the case of Damodar Mukherjee & Ors. vs. Bonwarilal Agarwalla., reported in AIR 1960 Cal page 469. 10. Mr. Mukherjee has further relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sk. Sattar vs. Gundappa Amabadas, reported in 1996 (6) SCC page 373, in support of his contention that a tenant is entitled to challenge a decree for partition amongst landlords if he can show that the said decree was a mala fide one with the sole object of evicting the tenant. 11. After hearing the learned advocates for the parties and after going through the materials on record, I find that the proceeding for eviction was initiated in the year 1995 and more than four years have passed in the meantime. In the proceeding before Rent Controller for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement the present petitioner could very well agitate that the compromise decree was a mala fide one in order to create ground for eviction. Instead of doing' so, the opposite party No. 1 decided to file a separate suit challenging the decree for partition. 12. Even if we assume for the sake of argument that the decree for partition was a fraudulent one, the petitioner is entitled to proceed with the application under section 29(B) of the Act in view of the fact a co-owner can also maintain such an application. 13. Mr. Subhrokamal Mukherjee, the learned advocate appearing for the opposite party No. 1 has seriously contended that in the proceeding before Rent Controller under section 29(B) of the Act, his client will be bound by the certificate issued by the Area Commander within whose jurisdiction the premises is situated and as such if any certificate is given by such Commander, his client will not be able to dispute its correctness. Mr. Mukherjee contends that in the proceeding before Rent Controller he will not be permitted to challenge the decree for partition among landlords as mala fide because he will be bound by such certificate which is conclusive evidence of the fact stated therein. 14. Mr. Mukherjee contends that in the proceeding before Rent Controller he will not be permitted to challenge the decree for partition among landlords as mala fide because he will be bound by such certificate which is conclusive evidence of the fact stated therein. 14. In my opinion, if the law gives such a privilege to an ex-military person, by filing a separate suit challenging the decree for partition, the opposite party No. 1 cannot deprive the petitioner of such a right. The object of section 29m) of the Act is to give speedy remedy to the military personnel and other persons mentioned therein. Unlike other decree for eviction, no right of appeal has been conferred upon a tenant against order passed under section 29(b) of the Act but instead, such a tenant is entitled to file a revisional application against order of eviction before this court under section 29(B) of the Act. Therefore, by filing a suit for declaration that the partition decree was a fraudulent one, in my opinion, the proceeding before Rent Controller cannot be stayed for indefinite point of time. No fruitful purpose will be served by staying the proceeding till the disposal of the appeal because even if the decree for partition is declared to be fraudulent the petitioner will remain a' co-sharer of the property and as such as a co-sharer he is entitled to maintain an application under section 29(b) of the Act. 15. In the case of Sk. Sattar vs. Gundappa Amabadas (supra) relied upon by Mr. Subhrokamal Mukherjee, the Apex Court while disposing of an appeal arising out of a proceeding for eviction of a tenant maintained the well settled principle that whether the premises, which is in occupation of the tenant, shall be retained jointly by all the lessors or they would partition it among themselves, is the exclusive right of the lessors to which no objection can be taken by a tenant and that even if the tenant was being dealt with by only one of them on behalf of the whole body of lessors, he cannot object to the transfer of any portion of the property to a third person or to the partition of the property. While making the aforesaid observation, the Apex Court recognised the defence of a tenant in an eviction proceeding to show that the partition was not a bona fide one and was a sham transaction to overcome the rigorous of Rent Control Laws. 16. Therefore, the aforesaid defence is available to the tenant before the Rent Controller dealing with an application under section 29(b) of the Act. Once it is held that the proceeding under section 29(B) of the Act is maintainable, a Civil Court, as it appears from the first sentence of the section, lacks inherent jurisdiction to entertain any dispute which can be raised by a tenant by way of defence in the proceeding under section 29(b) of the Act, particularly when such proceeding is pending before the Rent Controller. 17. Therefore, the learned District Judge, acting as a first appellate court against the dismissal of the suit for declaration and injunction, could not pass a direction of stay of all further proceedings for eviction before Rent Controller. 18. Moreover, the learned District Judge, neither being the appellate authority against an order passed by a Rent Controller in a proceeding under section 29(B) of the Act nor having any power of superintendence over the Rent Controller dealing with such proceeding, could not pass a direction for stay of such proceeding. 19. Under the aforesaid circumstances, the learned District Judge acted without jurisdiction in passing such a direction upon the Rent Controller. 20. This Court is quite conscious that a Civil Court although cannot pass a direction upon a Tribunal in 'the absence of an appellate jurisdiction or power of superintendence over the latter, in an appropriate case restrain a party before it by an order of injunction from pursuing with his remedy before such Tribunal. However, in the instant case, in view of my finding that the point raised by the opposite party No.1 in the Civil Suit is very much available to him by way of defence in the proceeding before Rent Controller and that section 29(B) of the Act has ousted the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide such question; I do not find any reason to pass such order of injunction against the petitioner. The balance of convenience and inconvenience is also in favour of refusing such prayer. 21. The order impugned is thus set aside. The balance of convenience and inconvenience is also in favour of refusing such prayer. 21. The order impugned is thus set aside. The Rent Controller is directed to proceed with the application under section 29(B) of the Act in accordance with law. 22. The revisional application is thus allowed. 23. No order as to costs. Application is allowed.