( 1 ) LEAVE granted. ( 2 ) THIS appeal is directed against the order of the Delhi High Court in dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellant against the order of the competent authority under sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 granting permission to the respondents to institute a suit for eviction of a tenant under the Delhi Rent control Act. The competent authority on consideration of the materials placed before him has recorded a finding that the present appellant had been functioning at 9-B, Connaught Circus with effect from 26-6-1982 and it was shifted to the premises in question on 30-11-1984 by informing the Registrar of the Company, as required under the Companies Act. According to the competent authority the fact that the appellant had been able to acquire an alternative premises at K-9, Connaught Circus which the Company could own or hire as an alternative premises disentitles him to protection of Section 19 (1) (a) of the Act and accordingly granted permission to the respondents for institution of a proceeding for eviction under the Delhi Rent Control Act. The appellant assailed the aforesaid order of the competent authority by filing a writ petition but the High Court did not find any error apparent on the face of the order of the competent authority so as to be interfered with by the High court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the constitution. Mr Gupta, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant seriously contended that there has been no finding of the competent authority with regard to the means of the appellant who is a tenant to the effect that an alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant would be available to him if he were evicted and in the absence of such finding the order granting permission under Section 19 (4) is vitiated and the High Court committed error in not considering the same and considered some other factors which would not be germane to the issue of grant or refusal of permission under sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Act. We, however, on consideration of the impugned order of the competent authority do not find much force in the aforesaid submissions. Sub-section (4) enables the competent authority in granting or refusing to grant permission under subsection (3 ). We, however, on consideration of the impugned order of the competent authority do not find much force in the aforesaid submissions. Sub-section (4) enables the competent authority in granting or refusing to grant permission under subsection (3 ). On consideration of the factors mentioned in clauses (a) and (b), clause (a) stipulates that the competent authority must consider whether an alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant would be available to him if he were evicted. If we read the order of the competent authority granting permission we find that the fact that the tenant had shifted his registered office from 1982 to the premises at 9-B, Connaught Circus had weighed with the competent authority to come to the conclusion that he had sufficient means and he would have sufficient means to have alternative accommodation even if he is evicted. It is true that in terms no such findings have been arrived at but from the finding arrived at it must be held that the preconditions engrafted in clause (a) of sub-section (4) of Section 19 have been satisfied and therefore the order of the competent authority granting permission could not have been interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction. We, therefore, see no justification for interfering with the impugned order of the High Court under Article 136. This appeal is accordingly dismissed.