B. BHATTACHARYA, J. ( 1 ) -THIS appeal is at the instance of a husband in a suit for divorce and is directed against the judgment and decree dated January 13, 1992 passed by the learned Additioinal District Judge, 11th Court, Alipore, District-24 Parganas in Matrimonial Suit No. 18 of 1989 thereby dismissing the said suit. ( 2 ) THE appellant herein filed the aforesaid suit for divorce under the provision of sections 27 (a) and 27 (d) of the Special Marriage Act and the case made out by appellant was as follows :-A. THE parties were married on August 15, 1977 under Special Marriage Act, 1954 and thereafter they b. started living in the husband's house at 10b, Gopal Banerjee Lane, Calcutta-26. c. After coming into her matrimonial home the respondent expressed her dissatisfaction and displeasure towards her in-laws and ill treated the parents, brother and sister of the husband. She refused to participate in the house-hold duties and and to help the mother of the petitioner and used to go to her parents and stayed there till late in the evening on the plea that she being the only daughter of her parents should attend to the needs of her parents as a matter of routine. d. She insisted on appellant's staying at the respondent's father's place, as according to her, she would be at home and it would be convenient for her to look after her parents. Although the husband did not like the idea of staying in his in-laws' house leaving his aged parents, in order to purchase peace he shifted to his in-laws' house on January 26, 1981. e. In the family of the in-laws, the husband was treated like a servant. There was no child in the wedlock of the parties and after treatment by well-known gynaecologist ultimately it transpired that there was little chance of her being a mother. f. From the month of March 1986, the wife started visiting her "guru Ma" and after taking 'diksha' she avoided conjugal relation with the petitioner on one pretext or the other. She used to sleep in a separate bed and brought the co-habitation to an end. The respondent gave out that she had been living a spiritual life and she felt the company of the appellant's as loathsome. She used to sleep in a separate bed and brought the co-habitation to an end. The respondent gave out that she had been living a spiritual life and she felt the company of the appellant's as loathsome. g. From May 1987, the wife started staying with her "guru Ma" at 172, Rashbehari Avenue, leaving behind the petitioner in a helpless condition. She even did not hesitate to leave behind her ailing parents and in the circumstances the husband had to nurse them and had to face difficulties. h. The wife used to visit her parents' house ones or twice a week to feed the band of her pet cats. Ultimately, the husband/appellant came back to his parent's house on May 31, 1988. i. Therefore, the wife/respondent was guilty of deserting the petitioner and also had perpetrated extreme cruelty by her acts particularly by withdrawing herself from the society of the husband and by bringing the co-habitation and conjugal relation to an end. ( 3 ) IT will not be out of place to mention here that the husband filed an applicatioin for amendment of his petition thereby adding some new allegatioins of cruelty and such application was allowed. By way of such amendment, the husband alleged that while staying in the house of his wife, the husband faced difficulties for the peculiar habit of his father-in-law, who used to show his regards to the every picture of God displayed in the walls of different rooms of the house till he went to bed at about 11. 30 to 12 o' clock at night including the room occupied by the parties. For this peculiar habit, the husband could not sleep till midnight every day and whenever objected for such inconvenience, the respondent and the member of the family became annoyed and abused the petitioner. It was further alleged that in 1983 when the petitioner along with the respondent/wife went to Bombay, he found inside the respondent's diary, two letter written by one Shyamal Saha, who was a friend of the respondent. He was shocked to read the contents of those two letters. It was further alleged by way of amendment that the wife was in the habit of suspicious nature and conduct and she used to pick up the names of different unknown as well as known girls, who are her friends and used to pass ugly remarks and comments. He was shocked to read the contents of those two letters. It was further alleged by way of amendment that the wife was in the habit of suspicious nature and conduct and she used to pick up the names of different unknown as well as known girls, who are her friends and used to pass ugly remarks and comments. Ultimately, the husband further alleged that from 1984, the respondent started collecting good number of cats which caused not only nuisance in the house but also affected the relationship between the parties. ( 4 ) THE aforesaid suit was contested by the wife/respondent by filing written statement thereby denying all the materials allegation made in the application for divorce and the defence was that the husband himself could not adjust with his mother, sister etc. and as such at his instigation she came with him to her parents house which is almost in the same locality. ( 5 ) THE further case of the respondent was that there was normal co-habitation between the parties till May 1988 and they shared the same bed. The inmates of the husband's house was not sympathetic to the husband and in order to avoid unpleasant situation the husband himself decided to live at his in-laws' house. There was thus no act of desertion or cruelty on the part of the wife. ( 6 ) AT the time of hearing of the aforesaid suit the husband himself, one of his friends, and the mother of the husband gave evidence in support of the application while the wife herself alone gave evidence in opposing such prayer. ( 7 ) THE learned trial Judge on consideration of the materials on record held that the parties having lived together as husband and wife till May 1987 as admitted by the husband himself, the husband was not entitled to get a decree for divorce on the ground of desertion in this proceeding which was instituted on November 24, 1988. The learned trial Judge further held that from the materials on record including the documentary evidence it was clear that the allegation made by the husband in the application for divorce as regards cruelty was not proved and as such he was not entitled to get any relief. ( 8 ) BEING dissatisfied, the husband has preferred the instant appeal. ( 9 ) MR. ( 8 ) BEING dissatisfied, the husband has preferred the instant appeal. ( 9 ) MR. Banerjee, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the husband has firstly submitted that the learned trial Judge erred in law in dismissing the suit on the ground of desertion by totally misreading the evidence of the husband wherein he stated that he co-habitated lastly with the wife till May 1987. According to Mr. Banerjee, by the word "co-habit" his client wanted to mean living together in the house of wife but he never meant conjugal relationship between parties. It appears that specific suggestion was given to the husband in cross-examination that till May 1988 the wife had normal co-habitation with the husband and the husband denied such suggestion and in answer to the very next question he specifically stated that he last co-habitated with her in May 1987 probably and that since then the wife had deserted him. ( 10 ) IN view of such un-equivocal statement of the husband, there is no trace of doubt that he specifically asserted that their conjugal life continued till May 1987. The suit having been filed on November 24, 1988, the learned trial Judge rightly held that the two years continuous period of desertion as required under section 27 of the Special Marriage Act was not proved and as such no relief could be granted on that ground. Moreover, it appears from the judgment that before the learned trial Judge, such issue was not pressed by the learned advocate for the husband in view of such evidence on record. ( 11 ) UNDER the aforesaid circumstances, we do not find any substance in the aforesaid contention of Mr. Banerjee and we are of the opinion that in view of such statement, the husband is not entitled to get the relief of divorce on the ground of desertion. ( 12 ) AS regards the ground of cruelty, Mr. Banerjee has contended that the learned trial Judge had only considered some of the diaries written by the husband while arriving at the conclusion that there was no act of cruelty. According to Mr. Banerjee the other materials on record would indicate that the wife was guilty of committing mental cruelty upon the husband. We have gone through the entire material on record including all the exhibited documents. According to Mr. Banerjee the other materials on record would indicate that the wife was guilty of committing mental cruelty upon the husband. We have gone through the entire material on record including all the exhibited documents. We are at one with the learned trial Judge that the writings of the husband in the diaries of different years do not show that the behaviour of the wife towards husband amounted to cruelty; on the other hand, that the husband was not at all happy with the behaviour of his mother was reflected from the writings of the husband. ( 13 ) REGARDING presence of about 7 or 8 cats is the house of the wife, in our opinion, such habit of the wife cannot amount to cruelty and on that flimsy ground the husband is not entitled to get any decree for divorce. ( 14 ) THE other allegation of the husband that after taking 'diksha' from "guru Ma" the wife put an end to the conjugal relationship with him has also not been proved. The husband wanted to prove by evidence that he was forced to take 'diksha' from the said "guru Ma" but as rightly pointed out by the learned trial Juge, the letter written by husband to the "guru Ma" itself shows that he had respect towards "guru Ma". Over and above, other photographs exhibited in this suit clearly shows that nobody had any grievance against such "guru Ma" and all of them treated "guru Ma" with respect. The appellant, in our opinion, could not prove that the conjugal relationship between parties came to an end as alleged by husband. It has come out from evidence that the said "guru Ma" is a married lady and no evidence except the evidence of one of the friend's of husband was produced before court to show that the said "guru Ma" had any such direction upon her to severe conjugal relationship. As regards the evidence of P. W.-2, a friend of the husband, the wife has categorically denied that she had ever had any talk with the said P. W.-2. Moreover, the said friend has merely stated that after talking with wife he had an impression in his mind that the wife was leading a spiritual life. In our opinion, from the materials on record the learned trial Judge rightly disbelieved such case. Moreover, the said friend has merely stated that after talking with wife he had an impression in his mind that the wife was leading a spiritual life. In our opinion, from the materials on record the learned trial Judge rightly disbelieved such case. Moreover, even from the admission of the husband, it appears that they had conjugal relation upto May 1987 i. e. even after taking 'diksha' although it is the case of the wife that such relation continued till September 1988 when husband returned to his father's house. ( 15 ) AS regards the allegation of intimacy with one Shyamal Saha, the husband could not prove the two letters alleged to have been written by Shyamal Saha and xerox copies of those letters could not be marked as exhibit. Therefore, we are not in a position to go into the contents of the said letter. Even if we accept such allegation that wife had some intimacy with one Shyamal Saha prior to her marriage, discovery of such fact after marriage cannot be a ground of divorce. In the petition, what was the nature of intimacy has not been disclosed and there is no evidence adduced by the husband on that point. Therefore, even if the wife had some intimacy with a person before her marriage, that cannot be a ground for divorce in this application. There is no dispute that the parties to this proceeding had a "love marriage" in 1977. Therefore, even if two letters are written by a person who had earlier acquaintance with the wife that cannot be a case of cruelty by the wife. The husband could not prove that the wife had written any letter or maintained any relation with the said Shyamal Saha by giving any independent evidence. Therefore, we agree with the learned trial Judge that no ground of cruelty has been proved in this instant case. ( 16 ) MR. Banerjee lastly contends that even if his client had failed to prove cruelty, we should pass a decree for divorce on the sole ground that the marriage between the parties is dead and it has broken down irretrievably. In support of such contention Mr. Banerjee has relied upon the following decisions of the apex court :-1) Chandrakala Trivedi v. Dr. Banerjee lastly contends that even if his client had failed to prove cruelty, we should pass a decree for divorce on the sole ground that the marriage between the parties is dead and it has broken down irretrievably. In support of such contention Mr. Banerjee has relied upon the following decisions of the apex court :-1) Chandrakala Trivedi v. Dr. S. P. Trivedi; 1993 (4) SCC page 232, 2) Romesh Chandra v. Smt. Savitri ; AIR 1995 SC page 851, 3) Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri ; 1997 (4) SCC page 226. ( 17 ) WE have gone through the aforesaid three decisions of the apex court. After carefully going through the decisions we are of the firm opinion that in any of the aforesaid decisions the apex court has not laid down any law that even if no ground as required in the statute for obtaining a decree for divorce is proved, a court can grant decree simply on the ground that the marriage has broken down irretrievably. ( 18 ) IN the case of Chandrakala Trivedi (supra), a divorce on the ground of cruelty was granted by the High Court. The wife preferred the special leave application before the apex court and submitted that the High Court committed and error in observing that matrimonial proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and therefore it was for the wife to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the husband was leading an adulterous life. The apex court found substance in such contention of wife but did not send the appeal back to the Division Bench to decide the question afresh as according to the apex court, the marriage between the parties was dead and thus instead of sending the matter back, they directed the husband either to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- or a one room flat in Thane and Rs. 2,00,000/- for the future maintenance of the wife thus maintaining the order of divorce. In our opinion, the apex court for doing complete justice between the parties, exercised its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India in the fact of the said case. But the course adopted by the apex court of India cannot be followed by this court in the absence of any such power. In our opinion, the apex court for doing complete justice between the parties, exercised its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India in the fact of the said case. But the course adopted by the apex court of India cannot be followed by this court in the absence of any such power. The said decision cannot be used as an authority to show that even if the ground of divorce is not proved, a court can pass a decree for divorce on the ground of irretrievable break down of marriage. ( 19 ) IN Romesh Chander v. Smt. Sabitri (supra), the apex court in paragraph 4 of the said judgment specifically mentioned that in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India the apex court dissolved the said marriage, subject to the apellant's transferring the house in the name of wife. Therefore, the said decision is also not an authority for the aforesaid proposition. ( 20 ) IN the case of Ashok Hurra (supra), the husband preferred a speical leave application against the order of the Gujarat High Court dismissing an application of the appellant for granting a decree of divorce. In paragraph 22 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court observed that there was long lapse of years since the filing of the petition and existence of such a state of affairs warranted the exercise of the jurisdiction of the said court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and to grant a decree for divorce by mutual consent under section 13 (B) of the Hindu Marriage Act in order to meet the ends of justice. There after the court gave direction directing a decree for divorce by mutual consent under section 13 (B) of the said Act as it appears from paragraph 26 of the said judgment. ( 21 ) THEREFORE, the said decision cannot be treated to be an authority in support of the proposition that even in the absence of grounds mentioned in the statute, a court can pass a decree for divorce simply on the ground of irretrievable break down of marriage. The very mention of Article 142 of the Constitution of India in two of the aforesaid three cases indicates that the apex court was conscious that the Matrimonial laws do not sanction divorce unless grounds prescribed therein are proved. The very mention of Article 142 of the Constitution of India in two of the aforesaid three cases indicates that the apex court was conscious that the Matrimonial laws do not sanction divorce unless grounds prescribed therein are proved. ( 22 ) WE agree with the submission of Mr. Roy, the learned advocate for the respondent that unless any of the grounds as mentioned in section 27 of the Special Marriage Act is proved, we are incompetent to pass a decree for divorce even if we find that the marriage between the parties has broken down irretrievably. ( 23 ) MOREOVER, in this case although the litigation is continuing for the last 11 years, the wife has even before this court expressed her desire to live with the husband. Therefore, simply because parties are living separately for the last 11 years, we cannot conclude that the marriage has broken down irretrievably. Therefore, we do not find any substance in the aforesaid contention of Mr. Banerjee. All the points taken by Mr. Banerjee having failed, we find no substance in this appeal and the same is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances we however make no order as to costs. A. Talukdar, J.-I agree. Appeal dismissed.