JUDGMENT : - Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J.: This appeal is at the instance of some of heirs of the deceased defendant no. 2 in a proceeding for grant of probate and is directed against the judgment and decree dated November 30. 1984 passed by the learned Additional District Judge. 10th Court. Alipore in Original Suit No. 3 of 1983 thereby granting probate in favour of the respondent no.1. 2. The respondent no. 1 claiming to be the executor of the last will and testament .of one Smt. Nalinibala Debi filed an application for grant of probate of such will. In the application, the respondent no. 1 made one Smt. Maya Roy as defendant no. 1, Surendranath Mukherjee the brother of husband of the testatrix as defendant no. 2 and Smt. Kamala Chatterjee, the sister of the husband of the testatrix as defendant no. 3. 3. Defendant no. 2, the brother of the husband of the testatrix alone contested the said proceeding by filing written statement thereby denying the allegation made in the application for grant of probate. In the said written statement the defendant no.2 denied that the writing annexed to the application was the last will and testament of Smt. Nalinibala Debi. According to the said defendant no. 2, he had bona fide reason to believe that the will alleged to have been executed by the deceased was a forged or manufactured one and not an outcome of a free will and intention. According to the defendant no. 2, in the application Smt. Maya Roy has been wrongly described as an heir of the deceased inasmuch as the deceased was a childless widow and according to Hindu Succession Act, only the defendant no. 2 and defendant no. 3 viz. the brother and sister respectively of the husband of the deceased were the legal heirs. The further defence of the said defendant no. 2 was that Nalinibala Debi executed a will as far back as on January 26, 1978 and the said defendant believed that the plaintiff in collusion with defendant no.1 and some interested parties had manufactured the will for fulfillment of a wrong design. The further defence of defendant no. 2 was that the alleged will was not only unnatural but also contained misstatement and as such it was clear that she had no independent legal advice before execution of such will, it at all executed. 4. The further defence of defendant no. 2 was that the alleged will was not only unnatural but also contained misstatement and as such it was clear that she had no independent legal advice before execution of such will, it at all executed. 4. According to the said defendant it was not improbable that she had to lend her hands or put her signature under duress, coercion and/or misrepresentation. 5. During the pendency of the said proceeding, the original defendant no. 2 having died all his heirs and legal representatives were substituted and some of them viz. the appellants, after entering appearance adopted the written statement filed by their predecessor. 6. At the time of hearing of the aforesaid suit, all the four attesting witnesses of the will and the alleged scribe gave evidence for the purpose of proving execution and attestation of the same. The defendant no. 1 examined herself and the maternal uncle of her husband in support of the grant, while the appellant no. 4 viz. the widow of the deceased defendant no. 2 alone deposed in opposing the grant of probate. 7. The learned trial Judge by the judgment and decree impugned herein allowed the application for grant of probate thereby holding that the propounder had proved execution and attestation of the will which was the last will and testament of the deceased. It was further held that there was no suspicious circumstance surrounding the execution of the said will and that there was no undue influence or coercion or misstatement in the matter of execution as alleged. 8. Being dissatisfied, some of the heirs of the deceased defendant no. 2 have preferred the instant appeal. 9. Mr. Sengupta, the learned senior advocate appearing in support of the instant appeal has at the very outset submitted that the very texture of the will is suspicious and the executor did not remove the suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the said will. According to Mr. Sengupta, the alleged will was an unnatural one and the reason for depriving the natural heirs was 'not explained. Mr. Sengupta submits that the propounder, a cousin brother of the testatrix, was colluding with the husband of defendant no. 1 for deprieving the natural heirs. According to Mr. Sengupta, no reason has been assigned why the testatrix appointed a cousin brother as the executor when her own brother was alive. Mr. Sengupta submits that the propounder, a cousin brother of the testatrix, was colluding with the husband of defendant no. 1 for deprieving the natural heirs. According to Mr. Sengupta, no reason has been assigned why the testatrix appointed a cousin brother as the executor when her own brother was alive. According to him, there was no earthy reason why all the four attesting witnesses were outsiders. Mr. Sengupta further contends that the will was made in the month of April 1981, just four months prior to the death of the testatrix and the proceeding was started on March 17, 1982 just a few months after the death of testatrix which should arouse suspicion in the mind of court. Mr. Sengupta further expressed doubt in the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff that the testatrix handed over the will to P.W. 3, a total stranger, not related to the testatrix. Mr. Sengupta further contends that P.W. 1, the alleged scribe although submitted that he had written the will from a draft but the said draft was not produced. 10. Relying upon the aforesaid circumstances, Mr. Sengupta submitted that the learned trial Judge did not follow the well settled principles which were required to be followed by a court granting probate. In support of such contention Mr. Sengupta relied upon the following decisions :- (1) H. Benkatchala vs. B.N. Thimmojam; AIR 1959 SC 442; (2) Smt. Indu Bala vs. Manindra; AIR 1982 SC 133 ; (3) Anath Vs. Bijoly: AIR 1982 Cal 236 . 11. There is no dispute that the testatrix was a childless widow and according to the Hindu Succession Act defendant nos. 2 and 3 were her natural heirs and legal representatives, the property having been inherited from her husband. The subject matter of the will is the unpartitioned dwelling house having half share in Krishnanagar and a small house wherein the testatrix had absolute ownership, also situated in Krishnanagar, apart from a sum of Rs. 4,112.03 paise lying in three different accounts along with defendant no. 1. By the said will the testatrix had given the ancestral two storied building in favour of the wife of defendant no. 2 and the one storied building was given absolutely to defendant no. 1 who happens to be the eldest daughter of defendant no. 2. The moveable property as mentioned above has also been given to defendant no. 1. 1. By the said will the testatrix had given the ancestral two storied building in favour of the wife of defendant no. 2 and the one storied building was given absolutely to defendant no. 1 who happens to be the eldest daughter of defendant no. 2. The moveable property as mentioned above has also been given to defendant no. 1. It appears from the depositions of the parties that as the testatrix was childless, she and her husband brought up defendant no. 1, the eldest daughter of defendant no. 2 as her own child and her marriage was also given by the husband of the testatrix. It further appears from record that during her life time, the testatrix had also given other properties by way of gift in favour of defendant no. 1 and ultimately breathed her last in the house of defendant no. 1 at Calcutta. Although, we find substance in the contention of Mr. Sengupta that in the application for grant of probate, defendant no. 1 was wrongly described as adopted daughter of testatrix as there was no adoption in the eye of law but the fact remains that Maya the defendant no. 1 was treated as the own daughter of the testatrix. 12. The propounder of the will has examined all the four attesting witnesses and the scribe of the said will. Mr. Sengupta took strong exception in the evidence of P.W. 1, the alleged scribe on the ground that in the body of the will, the name of the said scribe was not mentioned. According to Mr. Sengupta, P.W. 1 did not at all write the said will. Although, we find that in the body of the will no name of the scribe was mentioned but the P.W. 1 has categorically asserted in his evidence that it was he who wrote the will as per direction of the testatrix contained in a draft and after writing the will, he handed over the draft as well as the original will to the testatrix. In cross-examination the learned lawyer appearing on behalf of the contesting defendants asked the said witness to put his handwriting on a piece of paper and after the same was done, no further question was put to him disputing the handwriting of the P.W. 1 to be the handwriting appearing in the disputed will. In cross-examination the learned lawyer appearing on behalf of the contesting defendants asked the said witness to put his handwriting on a piece of paper and after the same was done, no further question was put to him disputing the handwriting of the P.W. 1 to be the handwriting appearing in the disputed will. Under the aforesaid circumstances, we cannot accept the contention of Mr. Sengupta that the will was not written by P.W. 1. It was the duty of the appellants to apply for examination of the handwriting of P.W. 1, for the purpose of comparing the same with that appearing in the will, but not having done so, such point is not available to the appellant before this court. 13. All the four attesting witnesses have proved the attestation of the said will. Two of the attesting witnesses were not present at the time of execution, but subsequently, the testatrix asked them to become attesting witnesses after acknowledging her signature on the will. Those two witnesses accordingly put their respective signature in the presence of the testatrix. The other two witnesses however proved execution of the will by the testatrix in their presence and they also said that they attested the signature of the testatrix at the time of execution. In cross-examination no discrepancy came out in their depositions, Therefore, we are at one with the learned trial Judge that execution and attestation of the will were proved by the four attesting witnesses. At this stage it will be profitable to refer to the sole testimony of D.W. 3 who opposed the grant of probate. In her deposition, the appellant no. 4 merely tried to dispute that Maya was the foster daughter of the testatrix and she tried to impress upon the court that the testatrix used to live in Krishnanagar house and she nursed her. However, the letter written by the said witness shows that there was some misunderstanding between the testatrix and her husband's brother's family as a result of which testatrix left Krishnanagar house. She however did not dispute that Maya's marriage was given by the husband of the testatrix and Maya used to stay at least for sometime with the testatrix before marriage. She merely stated that she did not know about the will in question. She however did not dispute that Maya's marriage was given by the husband of the testatrix and Maya used to stay at least for sometime with the testatrix before marriage. She merely stated that she did not know about the will in question. But no assertion was made by this witness that any undue influence or coercion was practiced upon the testatrix by Maya. Even the signature of the testatrix in the will was not disputed. The said witnesses made no allegation that a blank paper with the signature of the testatrix was converted into a will as alleged by Mr. Sengupta. Therefore, in our opinion, the learned trial Judge rightly held that the signature appearing in the will was that of the testatrix and that it was duly executed and attested. 14. We also do not subscribe to the submission of Mr. Sengupta that the will was unnatural one. By the will the testatrix gave the ancestral house at Krishnanagar in favour of wife of defendant no. 2 by depriving defendant no. 2 and the married sister of defendant no. 2. She was cautious that the ancestral house of her husband does not go to any outsider. The one storied house at Krishnanagar was however given to Maya whom she treated as her daughter. She was staying and ultimately died in the house of Maya. Therefore, by the said will, really the sister-in-law of the deceased viz. husband's married sister was deprieved. The said sister did not come forward to oppose the grant of probate. It is worth mentioning that the other heirs of defendant no. 2 although contested the proceeding did not give any evidence showing that testatrix loved them equally with Maya nor did they produce any evidence disputing allegation of Maya that she was brought up by the testatrix. It further appears from the evidence that during her life time the testatrix authorised Maya to realise rent from the tenants. Therefore, under the aforesaid circumstances, if she deprieved the husband's sister and brother and instead gave everything to the eldest daughter of the said brother of husband and his wife, the will cannot be said to be unnatural one and we do not find any suspicious circumstances surrounding execution of the said will. 15. As regards the other contention of Mr. 15. As regards the other contention of Mr. Sengupta that no explanation has been given why instead of her own brother, the testatrix appointed her cousin brother as executor, it appears from deposition of Maya that the said brother was lying invalid and no suggestion was given contradicting the aforesaid circumstances. Therefore, from the aforesaid uncontroverted material, it can be ascertained that most probably for the aforesaid reason, the testatrix appointed her cousin brother as executor. Moreover by the will, no benefit has been given to the said cousin brother and as such no doubt should be cast in the matter of appointment of the cousin brother as executor, excluding her own brother. 16. As regards the decisions cited by Mr. Sengupta, we find that those decisions are of no avail to Mr. Sengupta's client. As regards the mode of proving a will and the onus of proving the same, the law is now well settled. In the case of Smt. Indu Bala vs. Manindra Chandra Bose & Anr., reported in AIR 1982 SC 133 , relied upon by Mr. Sengupta, the Apex Court laid down the said law in the following terms :- "This court has held that the mode of proving a will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except to the special requirement of attestation prescribed in the case of a will by section 63 of the Succession Act. The onus of proving the will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, proof of testamentary capacity and the signature of the testator as required by law in sufficient to discharge the onus. Where however there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the court before the Court accept the will as genuine. Even where circumstances give rise to doubts, it is for the propounder to satisfy the conscience of the court. The suspicious circumstances may be as to the genuineness of the signatures of the testator, the condition of the testator's mind, the disposition made in the will being unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances, or there might be other indications in the will to show that the testator's mind was not free. The suspicious circumstances may be as to the genuineness of the signatures of the testator, the condition of the testator's mind, the disposition made in the will being unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances, or there might be other indications in the will to show that the testator's mind was not free. In such a case the court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicion would be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. If the propounder himself takes a prominent part in the execution of the will which confers a substantial benefit on him, that is also a circumstance to be taken into account, and the propounder is required to remove the doubts by clear and satisfactory evidence. If the propounder succeeds in removing the suspicious circumstances the court would grant probate, even if the will might be unnatural and might cut off wholly or in part near relations. Needless to say that any and every circumstance is not a 'suspicious' circumstance. A circumstance would be 'suspicions' when it is not normal or is not normally expected in a normal situation it is not expected of a normal person." (Emphasis supplied) 17. We are also not unmindful of the observation of the Privy Council in Motibai Hormusjee's case reported in AIR 1924 PC 33, where the Privy Council stated that "a man may act foolishly and even heartlessly; if he acts with full comprehension of what he is doing the court will not interfere with the exercise of his volition." 18. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles laid down by the Apex Court as well as Privy Council, we find that in this case no suspicious circumstance has been brought to our notice. As pointed out by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision every circumstance is not suspicious circumstance, circumstance would be suspicious when it is not normal or is not normally expected in a normal situation or is not expected of a normal person. In the instant case from fact appearing from the materials on record, the will cannot be said to be unnatural where property of the testator has been divided between one of the daughter of the husband's brother whom the testatrix loved as her own daughter and the wife of the said husband's brother by deprieving the husband's brother and husband's married sister. 19. Under the aforesaid circumstances, we find no merit in the instant appeal and the same is dismissed. 20. In the facts and circumstances there will be however no order as to costs. Amit Talukdar, J.: I agree. Appeal dismissed.