N. K. MITRA, C. J, S. R. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) THIS Special Appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the learned single Judge dismissing the appellants writ petition seeking quashing of the order dated 13. 7. 1998 passed by the first respondent whereby the order of District Inspector of Schools attesting the signature of petitioner No. 2 was set aside post-fixed with a direction to attest the signature of 3rd respondent surjeet Singh as Manager of the Institution. ( 2 ) THE facts, shorn of unnecessary details, may be stated thus : The 3rd respondent Surjeet Singh was elected Manager of the Committee of Management on 8. 5. 1996 of Sri Guru Govind Singh inter College. Govind Nagar (Model Town), Bareilly which is an institution recognised under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the affairs of which are managed by a committee of Management constituted under the approved scheme of administration and his signature was attested by the District Inspector of Schools on 24. 6. 1996. Subsequently, a representation was made to the District Inspector of Schools that the 3rd respondent resigned from the office of the Manager on 15. 8. 1997 and his resignation had been accepted by the committee of Management in its meeting held on 10. 12. 1997 in which the 2nd petitioner-appellant, Kamal Jeet Singh was elected/appointed as Manager of the Institution, the district Inspector of Schools attested the signature of the second petitioner-appellant on 17. 1. 1998. Subsequently, on a representation being made by Surjeet Singh, the District Inspector of Schools acting upon a resolution dated 7. 5. 1998 allegedly passed by Committee of management attested the signature of the 3rd respondent on 18. 6. 1998 without giving any notice to the 2nd petitioner appellant. The District Inspector of Schools, however, cancelled the order dated 18. 6. 1998 and again attested the signature of the second petitioner-appellant vide order dated 25. 6. 1998 on a representation of the President. The 3rd respondent then represented his case before the Joint Director, who by order dated 13. 7. 1998 set aside the order passed by the district Inspector of Schools on 18. 6. 1998 and directed, vide order dated 13. 7. 1998, the District inspector of Schools to re-attest the signature of the 3rd respondent. Consequently, his signatures were attested on 16. 7. 1998. 7. 1998 set aside the order passed by the district Inspector of Schools on 18. 6. 1998 and directed, vide order dated 13. 7. 1998, the District inspector of Schools to re-attest the signature of the 3rd respondent. Consequently, his signatures were attested on 16. 7. 1998. The petitioner-appellant then preferred the writ petition for quashing the orders dated 13. 7. 1998 and 16. 7. 1998. The writ petition came to be dismissed by the learned single Judge by the order dated 10th August, 1998. ( 3 ) WE have heard Sri R. N. Singh, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners-appellants and Sri s. K. Verma, learned counsel representing the third respondent. The thrust of the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants is that the Joint Director of Education was not justified in taking an ex parte decision affecting the rights of the petitioners-appellants without any notice to them. The learned counsel submitted that the contentious issues of fact involved in the matter and raised by the third respondent ought not to have been decided without notice to the petitioner-appellants. Sri S. K. Verma repudiated the submissions of Sri R. N. Singh and submitted that in the fact-situation of the present case, it was not necessary to issue notice to the petitioners-appellants and the learned single Judge has rightly held so. ( 4 ) WE have given our anxious considerations to the submissions made across the bar. On a perusal of the record, we find that the Joint Director passed the order sans any notice being given to the petitioners-appellants. The learned single Judge held that : "no opportunity of hearing was required to be given to Kamal Jeet Singh has the limited period for which he was appointed as manager in a temporary vacancy during the absence of Sardar Surjeet Singh had come to an end". The learned single Judge further held that : "as a matter of fact and reality, Sardar Surjeet singh has manifested his intention to tender his resignation from the post of Manager, but a formal letter of resignation was not submitted by him. " ( 5 ) INDISPUTABLY, the Joint Director of Education decided the matter without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioners-appellants. " ( 5 ) INDISPUTABLY, the Joint Director of Education decided the matter without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioners-appellants. The question whether Kamal Jeet Singh was appointed manager for a limited period in a temporary vacancy and the question whether Sardar Surjeet singh had only manifested his intention to resign and given a formal letter of resignation being highly contentious issues of fact, ought to be decided after notice to the concerned parties. In the case of Basudeo Tiwari v. Sido Kanhu University and others, JT 1908 (6) SC 464, the appointment of the appellant therein was cancelled on the ground that the appointment was not made in accordance with the provisions contained in Bihar Universities Act, 1970 and statutes made thereunder. Reliance was placed on Section 35 (3) of the Bihar Universities Act, 1970 in which it was provided that any appointment or promotion made contrary to the provisions of the act, Statutes. Rules or Regulations or in any irregular or unauthorised manner shall be terminated at any time without notice. The order was unsuccessfully challenged in the High court, but came to be set aside by the Supreme Court holding as under : "the said provision provides that an appointment could be terminated at any time without notice if the same had been contrary to the provisions of the Act, statutes rules or regulations or in any irregular or unauthorised manner. The condition precedent for exercise of this power is that an appointment had been made contrary to Act, Rules, Statutes and Regulations or otherwise. In order to arrive at a conclusion that an appointment is contrary to the provisions of the Act, statutes rules or regulations etc. , a finding has to be recorded and unless such a finding is recorded, the termination cannot be made but to arrive at such a conclusion necessarily an enquiry will have to be made as to whether such appointment was contrary to the provisions of the Act etc. If in a given case such exercise is absent, the condition precedent stands unfulfilled. To arrive at such a finding necessarily enquiry will have to be held and in holding such an enquiry the person whose appointment is under enquiry will have to be issued to him. If in a given case such exercise is absent, the condition precedent stands unfulfilled. To arrive at such a finding necessarily enquiry will have to be held and in holding such an enquiry the person whose appointment is under enquiry will have to be issued to him. If notice is not given to him then it is like playing Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark that is, if the employee concerned whose rights are affected, is not given notice of such a proceeding and a conclusion is drawn in his absence, such a conclusion would not be just, fair or reasonable as noticed by this Court in D. T. C. Mazdoor Sabhas case. In such an event, we have to hold that in the provision there is an implied requirement of hearing for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion that an appointment had been made contrary to the Act, statutes, rules or regulations etc. and it is only such a conclusion being drawn the services of the person could be terminated without further notice. Admittedly in this case notice has not been given to the appellant before holding that his appointment is irregular or unauthorised and ordering termination of his service. Hence the impugned order terminating the services of the appellant cannot be sustained. " ( 6 ) IN our considered view the principle laid down in the case of Basudeo Tiwari, (supra) will apply to the facts of the present case. The Joint Director of Education committed a grave error in the course of decision-making process and his order dated 13. 7. 1998 was liable to be quashed. The learned single Judge was not justified in holding that opportunity of hearing was not required to be given in the fact-situation of the case. The learned single Judge having held that the order impugned in the writ petition was passed sans any notice to the appellants, ought to have demolished the order and directed the authority concerned to decide the controversy afresh after notice to the parties for : "judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made. . . . . " State of U. P. v. Dharmendra Prasad Singh, AIR 1989 SC 997 para 28 at p. 1010. . . . . " State of U. P. v. Dharmendra Prasad Singh, AIR 1989 SC 997 para 28 at p. 1010. ( 7 ) IN State of M. P. and others v. M/s. M. V. Vyausaya and Co. , AIR 1997 SC 993 (para 16), the scope of the power of superintendence under Article 226 has been expatiated upon as thus : "in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, (1982) 3 AER 141, the House of Lords has observed that "the purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorised or enjoined by law to decide for itself a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court". This principle has been referred to with approval in innumerable decisions of this Court. This decision clearly sets out the limits of the supervisory power under Article 226 of the Constitution and emphasises that the, jurisdiction under the said Article is neither unlimited nor unrestrained, much less unguided. " ( 8 ) IN view of the above discussion, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside. The orders dated 13. 7. 1998 and 16. 7. 1998 impugned in the writ petition are quashed and the matter is remitted to the Joint Director of Education for taking fresh decision in accordance with law within a period of one month from the date of production of a certified copy of this judgment. ( 9 ) BEFORE parting with this case, we need hardly say that it would be open for the Joint Director of Education to make such interim arrangement in respect of the management of the affairs of the institution as may be commensurate to the best interest of the institution. .