( 1 ) THE petitioner was during the relevant period working as Director of Physical Education in the respondent-University. A disciplinary enquiry into certain charges of misconduct was initiated against him and entrusted to Sri Ko. Channabasappa, retired District and Sessions Judge. The enquiry eventually culminated in a report holding the charges to have been proved. A notice dated 20th of January, 1995 was then issued asking the petitioner to file a representation against the report. In response, the petitioner by a communication dated 27th of January, 1995 addressed to the Disciplinary Authority asked for a month's time to do so. In the meantime, be questioned the fairness of the enquiry as also the findings recorded in the same in W. P. No. 2936 of 1995, which was disposed of by Krishnamoorthy, J. , by his order dated 3rd of February, 1995 with the observation that the petitioner was free to raise all the objections in regard to the enquiry report before the Disciplinary Authority. The following passage from that order is in this connection relevant: "moreover, the Enquiry Officer has only submitted his report and the petitioner will be free to raise all his objections in regard to the matter as to whether the enquiry report has to be accepted or not by the Disciplinary Authority. Before a final decision is taken in the matter, the petitioner will be entitled to raise all contentions, even if there is impropriety in the enquiry proceedings. I do not think that this is a fit case in which this Court should interfere at this stage, especially, in the light of the circumstances and the previous order of this Court in W. P. No. 32577 of 1994. Accordingly, without prejudice to the petitioner raising all his contentions at the appropriate stage and after the final order is passed, I dismiss this writ petition". ( 2 ) THE petitioner's request for grant of time was rejected by the Registrar in terms of his letter dated 27th of January, 1995 without placing the matter before the Disciplinary Authority. A second request was then made by the petitioner for grant of time by his letter dated 30th of january, 1995 addressed to the Syndicate. Before the petitioner could file his objections or even receive an intimation about the fate of his request an order dismissing him from service was passed on 1st of February, 1995. A second request was then made by the petitioner for grant of time by his letter dated 30th of january, 1995 addressed to the Syndicate. Before the petitioner could file his objections or even receive an intimation about the fate of his request an order dismissing him from service was passed on 1st of February, 1995. That order, it is obvious, made the observations of this Court extracted earlier infructuous for even before the petitioner could pursuant to the liberty reserved to him file his objections to the report, the Disciplinary Authority had taken a final decision in the matter. Even the University appears to have noticed the anomaly arising out of its action as it had the matter posted on 7th of February, 1995 for being spoken to only to inform the Court that the Syndicate had at its meeting held on 1st of February, 1995 decided to impose upon the petitioner the punishment of dismissal from service. The Court did not appreciate this hasty action on the part of the Disciplinary Authority although it did not interfere with the order already made and reserved liberty for the petitioner to raise all the objections available to him in an appropriate appeal before the Chancellor. This is evident from the following passage from the order passed by this Court on 7th of February, 1995: "it is to be noted that the University was represented by a Counsel before this Court and the case was heard and judgment was reserved on 1-2-1995. The University could have waited for two or three days, knowing that the issue is now before this Court and the matter is reserved for judgment. At any rate, the University has taken a final decision in the matter. Liberty is granted to the petitioner to raise alt his objections in the appeal to be filed by him to the Chancellor". ( 3 ) AN appeal was accordingly preferred by the petitioner, in which the petitioner among other grounds challenged the order of dismissal on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice, inasmuch as the Disciplinary Authority had without giving a fair and reasonable opportunity to him to file objections ordered his dismissal from service. ( 3 ) AN appeal was accordingly preferred by the petitioner, in which the petitioner among other grounds challenged the order of dismissal on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice, inasmuch as the Disciplinary Authority had without giving a fair and reasonable opportunity to him to file objections ordered his dismissal from service. ( 4 ) IN his order the worthy Chancellor noticed the argument but while holding that an error was committed by the Registrar in not placing the request for time before the Disciplinary Authority declined to interfere on the ground that the petitioner was in the light of the observations made by this Court in its order dated 7th of February, 1995, no longer entitled to advance what was described as "technical plea" of the violation of principles of natural justice. The Chancellor was also of the opinion that since the enquiry had taken a long period to conclude, seven days' time given to the petitioner to file his representation was enough. The Chancellor's reasoning proceeds thus. "the records disclose a technical error in the Register rejecting the application for time without placing it before the Disciplinary Authority. The applications seeking time were formally rejected by the Disciplinary Authority later on. It is necessary to notice that the contention of not being given enough time to make his representation on the enquiry report was brought to the notice of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 2936 of 1995. By its order dated 7-2-1995, the high Court met this technical plea, by directing that the appellant can take all his contentions before the Chancellor. In view of this observation, it is no longer open to the appellant to press the technical plea that enough time was not given to him to file his representations on the enquiry report. Even otherwise having due regard to the fact that the enquiry occupied a long period, the contentions and the developments in the case were well-known to the appellant, and in that context, the time of seven days given to file his representation cannot be deemed to be unreasonable. Anyway, in view of the observation of the High Court, the technical plea is now only of academic significance". Anyway, in view of the observation of the High Court, the technical plea is now only of academic significance". ( 5 ) AGGRIEVED by the dismissal of the appeal, the petitioner has assailed the order made by the disciplinary Authority as also that of the Chancellor in the present writ petition. ( 6 ) MR. Govindaraj, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, raised a short point in support of the petition. He urged that the order made by the Chancellor was legally unsustainable not only because it proceeds on a misunderstanding of the import of the observations made by this Court in its order dated 7th of February, 1995 but also because the admitted facts unequivocally establish the violation of audi alteram partem. He contended that the request made by the petitioner for extension of time was never placed before the Disciplinary Authority and that the decision to dismiss him from service was taken in haste and without the Syndicate having the petitioner's version before it. ( 7 ) MR. Brahmarayappa, Counsel for the University on the other hand, argued that seven days' time granted to the petitioner was enough and that the petitioner's failure to have responded to the show-cause notice clearly established that he was not interested in availing of the opportunity given to him. The requirement of following principles of natural justice was not ritualistic, argued Mr. Brahmarayappa and that the essence of the said requirement was satisfied when the petitioner's'objections against the report were considered by the Appellate Authority. ( 8 ) THE material facts are not in dispute. It is not disputed that the petitioner was required to file a representation against the report of the Enquiry Officer within one week nor is it disputed that the petitioner's request for grant of a month's time was at no stage placed before the Disciplinary authority, the same having been rejected summarily by the Registrar. The question then is whether the grant of seven days' time and a decision imposing the punishment taken without considering the petitioner's version could be said to be fair and reasonable so as to satisfy the minimal requirements of natural justice. The period, within which a party must respond to a notice of show cause before a final decision is taken would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The period, within which a party must respond to a notice of show cause before a final decision is taken would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule or cut and dried formula is available or can be evolved for universal application. The question whether the opportunity granted was fair and reasonable would depend upon the merits of each case keeping in view the attendant facts and circumstances. It is not therefore possible to say that one week's period can in no case be considered sufficient for a delinquent employee or a citizen likely to be affected to respond to the proposed action. The question however is whether the petitioner's request for grant of a month's time could in the instant case be considered to be so unreasonable and unfair that its rejection alone could have met the ends of justice. Apart from the fact that the request ought to have been put up to the authority competent to deal with the same, the prayer for time was not in the peculiar circumstances dilatory or an attempt at procrastinating the matter. As noticed earlier, the petitioner had filed a writ petition challenging the fairness of the enquiry and the findings, which was heard and reserved for orders on the 1st of February, 1995. The University was represented in the case and must be presumed to have known that the petitioner's challenge to the proceedings was under serious consideration by the Court, in which the Court had reserved orders for pronouncement. There was no compelling reason for the University to have taken up the matter simultaneously and even if it was taken up a final decision ought to have waited for the pronouncement of orders by this Court. That was the least, which the University was expected to do out of deference to the proceedings before this Court and with a view to avoid multiplicity of litigation. That such a course was the proper course to follow perhaps can be seen even in the light of the order that was passed by this Court. As noticed earlier, this Court refused interference with the report of the Enquiry Officer because an opportunity was available to the petitioner to question the same before the Disciplinary Authority. That such a course was the proper course to follow perhaps can be seen even in the light of the order that was passed by this Court. As noticed earlier, this Court refused interference with the report of the Enquiry Officer because an opportunity was available to the petitioner to question the same before the Disciplinary Authority. Now, if the Disciplinary authority went ahead with the disposal of the matter, the observation made by this Court and the reason underlying its refusal to interfere would be otiose and superfluous. Similar sentiments were expressed by this Court in its order dated 7th of February, 1995, when it was brought to its notice that as on the date the order was pronounced, the question of considering the representation of the petitioner against the report did not arise as a decision had already been taken by the Syndicate. ( 9 ) THE pendency of the writ petition on an issue so closely related to the correctness of the finding and the fairness of the enquiry apart, the reasonableness of the petitioner's request for grant of further time shall have to be examined from the point of view of ordinary human conduct. Seen thus, the petitioner having come to the Court against the enquiry as also the findings, he was justified in asking for an extension pending disposal of the writ petition especially when the Court had not asked him to respond to the notice pending disposal of the matter before it. It was not unreasonable for the petitioner to expect that the occasion for him to file a reply to the report may arise only if his challenge to the enquiry proceedings failed. Suffice it to say that from the point of view of propriety which demanded that the University waits for the orders of this Court as also from the point of view of legitimate expectation of the petitioner, the request for the grant of further time was in no way vexatious to deserve the kind of treatment which was given to it. Failure on the part of the Syndicate to have considered the said request at the appropriate stage and to communicate its rejection to the petitioner before taking a final decision in the matter thus renders the decision unreasonable causing failure of justice. Failure on the part of the Syndicate to have considered the said request at the appropriate stage and to communicate its rejection to the petitioner before taking a final decision in the matter thus renders the decision unreasonable causing failure of justice. ( 10 ) THE appellate order passed by the Chancellor has given a twofold reason for the rejection of a similar plea raised before him. Firstly, it states that the observations made by this Court in its order dated 7th of February, 1995 precluded the petitioner from raising the plea that an adequate opportunity was not given to him to file his objections. Secondly, it is stated that since the enquiry had taken a long time to conclude, seven days' time to file a representation against the report was not insufficient. Both these reasons have failed to impress me. In the first place, the order of this Court dated 7th of February, 1995 nowhere denied to the petitioner the right to make a grievance as regards refusal to extend time for filing objections. All that the order said was that the petitioner could make his grievance in the appeal to be filed by him. This meant that the petitioner was entitled to question the correctness of the Disciplinary Authority's order among others on the ground that it had not given him sufficient time to file his objections. Far from precluding the petitioner from raising the plea it specifically entitled him to do so. Equally untenable is the second ground on which the Chancellor repelled the submission. The enquiry may have taken a sufficiently long period to conclude but the same was no ground for denying to the petitioner a fair and reasonable opportunity to file objections to the Enquiry Officer's report. The necessity to grant such an opportunity did not depend upon whether the enquiry had been concluded quickly or after long delay. The requirement of providing an opportunity arose out of the primordial need to give a fair deal to the delinquent before a final decision was taken. The grant of only seven days' time to file a representation was, as observed earlier, not enough nor was the petitioner's request for extension, in the facts and circumstances of the case, dealt with properly and by the person competent to do so. ( 11 ) THAT brings me to the only other submission made by Mr. The grant of only seven days' time to file a representation was, as observed earlier, not enough nor was the petitioner's request for extension, in the facts and circumstances of the case, dealt with properly and by the person competent to do so. ( 11 ) THAT brings me to the only other submission made by Mr. Brahmarayappa on behalf of the respondents. It was contended that an opportunity to file objections and to challenge thefindings recorded by the Enquiry Officer before the Chancellor in the appeal was a sufficient compliance with the requirements of natural justice. The Chancellor had, according to the learned Counsel, examined the criticism of the petitioner against the report and found no merit in the same. This was, according to the learned Counsel, a sufficient compliance with the audi alteram partem. rule, The argument although attractive is not equally sound. What was required was an opportunity before the Disciplinary Authority took a final decision in the matter. If that requirement failed because of denial of any such opportunity, the order passed by the disciplinary Authority would be liable to be quashed. That such a hearing or opportunity was given at the appellate stage would not tantamount to a hearing at the stage at which it was deserved and cannot cure the defect. That apart a hearing before the Appellate Authority as a substitute denies to the delinquent employee the opportunity to canvass his defence before the disciplinary Authority. A delinquent is entitled to expect that given such an opportunity and considered fairly, the objections filed by him may have prevailed. Denial of an opportunity before the Disciplinary Authority if taken as remedied by such an opportunity given at the appellate stage may even amount to converting the Appellate Authority into a Disciplinary authority and thereby making the appellate remedy illusory. I have therefore no difficulty in rejecting this contention also. ( 12 ) THE only other aspect that needs to be considered is whether the quashing of the order made by the Disciplinary Authority and that passed in appeal by the Chancellor should entitle the petitioner to be treated in service for the purpose of reinstatement or monetary benefits. The petitioner has already attained the age of superannuation. The question of his reinstatement in service consequent upon the setting aside of the two orders does not therefore arise. Insofar as monetary benefits were concerned, Mr. The petitioner has already attained the age of superannuation. The question of his reinstatement in service consequent upon the setting aside of the two orders does not therefore arise. Insofar as monetary benefits were concerned, Mr. Brahmarayappa contended that since the orders are being set aside for want of an opportunity to the petitioner to file his representation against the report, the petitioner's entitlement to claim any benefit should depend upon the fresh order, which the disciplinary Authority may pass in the matter. ( 13 ) MR. Govindaraj, Counsel for the petitioner, fairly concedes the above proposition and in fact relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, E. C.. L. , Hyderabad V B. Karunakar, submitted that this Court could follow the procedure devised in the said decision and leave the question of back wages and other benefits etc. to be determined by the Disciplinary authority upon fresh consideration. In Karunakaran's case, supra, the Supreme Court has made the following observations. " the theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an "unnatural expansion of natural justice" which in itself is antithetical to justice". ( 14 ) IN the circumstances and keeping in view the submissions made at the Bar, the setting aside of the impugned orders would not ipso facto entitle the petitioner to any monetary or other benefit. Any such benefit would follow only if the Disciplinary Authority directs so upon reconsideration of the matter keeping in view the objections/representations which the petitioner may file to the report of the Enquiry Officer. Any such benefit would follow only if the Disciplinary Authority directs so upon reconsideration of the matter keeping in view the objections/representations which the petitioner may file to the report of the Enquiry Officer. ( 15 ) IN the result, this writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Chancellor in appeal against the same are hereby quashed. The petitioner shall file his representation against the report of the Enquiry Officer within six weeks from today, in which event the Disciplinary Authority shall consider the said representation and pass a fresh order in the matter expeditiously and in accordance with law. The petitioner shall be entitled to monetary benefits, if any, only in the manner and to the extent the disciplinary Authority may direct upon reconsideration. No costs.