ORDER M.R. Hariharan Nair, J. 1. Does one need court permission to file a transfer O.P. under S.24 of C.P.C. against a Receiver? That is the basic question that falls for consideration in this revision. 2. The petitioner who is the defendant in O.S.427 of 1996 of the Principal Munsiff's Court, Ernakulam and the petitioner in T.O.P.No.199 of 1997 of the District Court, Ernakulam is aggrieved by the dismissal of her petition which sought transfer of the said suit to the Sub Court, Ernakulam. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the dismissal was only on the ground that permission of the Court had not been obtained to file a petition against the respondent in so far as he is the Official Receiver. The learned counsel further submits that there is no suit sought to be filed against the Official Receiver and as such the question of permission does not arise. 4. The respondent did not appear at the time of arguments and hence I am disposing of the case after hearing the petitioner alone. 5. As regards the contention of the petitioner that common questions arise in O.S. 427 of 1996 aforementioned as also in I.P. No. 3 of 1955 of the Sub Court, I do not propose to enter any finding for the present. That is a matter to be decided after going through the relevant records including copies of the plaint and other evidence if any. I therefore, proceed to consider the question of requirement of court permission to sue the Receiver. There is no statutory provision which compels a party to take the leave of the Court to sue a Receiver. The rule has come down as a rule of equity. Rationale behind it is the public policy which requires that when a Court has assumed possession of a property in the interest of the litigants before it, the authority of the Court is not to be obstructed by suits designed to disturb the possession of the Court. The institution of such suits tantamount to a contempt of the authority of the Court and therefore, the party contemplating such a suit is required to take the leave of the Court so as to absolve himself of that accusation. The institution of such suits tantamount to a contempt of the authority of the Court and therefore, the party contemplating such a suit is required to take the leave of the Court so as to absolve himself of that accusation. The grant of the leave is not made in exercise of any power conferred by a statute, but in the exercise of the inherent power which every Court possess to prevent acts which constitute or is akin to an abuse of the authority. 6. It is well settled by decisions that such permission need not always be obtained before institution of the suit; it is sufficient if the plaintiff obtains and produces it before the question of maintainability on that ground is decided by the Court. 7. The scope of the requirement regarding Court permission came up for consideration in Everest Coal Co. v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1977 SC 2304 ). The Court summed up the position as follows: "When a Court puts a Receiver in possession of property, the property comes under Court custody, the Receiver being merely an officer of agent of the Court. Any obstruction or interference with the Court's possession sounds in contempt of that Court. Any legal action in respect of that property is in a sense such an interference and invites the contempt penalty of likely invalidation of the suit or other proceedings. But, if either before starting the action or during its continuance, the party takes the leave of the Court, the sin is absolved and the proceeding may continue to a conclusion on the merits. In the ordinary course, no Court is so prestige-conscious that it will stand in the way of a legitimate legal proceeding for redressal or relief against its receiver unless the action is totally meritless, frivolous or veratious or otherwise vitiated by any sinister factor. Grant of leave is the rule; refusal, the exemption. After all, the Court is not, in the usual run of cases, affected by a litigation which settles the rights of parties and the Receiver represents neither party, being an officer of the Court. For this reason, ordinarily the Court accords possession to sue, or to continue. The jurisdiction to grant leave is undoubted and inherent; but not based on black-letter law in the sense of enacted law. For this reason, ordinarily the Court accords possession to sue, or to continue. The jurisdiction to grant leave is undoubted and inherent; but not based on black-letter law in the sense of enacted law. Any litigative disturbance of the Court's possession without its permission amounts to contempt of its authority; and the wages of contempt of Court in this jurisdiction may well be viodability of the whole proceeding. Equally clearly, prior permission of the Court appointing the Receiver is not a condition precedent to the enforcement of the cause of action. Nor is it so grave a vice that later leave sought and got before the decree has been passed will not purge it". 8. As far as the present case is concerned, no suit is proposed to be instituted against the Receiver. No right over the property possessed by the Receiver is involved here. What is involved is only a transfer of a case in which the Receiver is already a party. There is no question of the Court's authority being challenged merely because a change of the forum in which the case is pending is sought. The Court below has not quoted any authority for concluding that even for filing an O.P. of the present nature, permission of the Court is required. I am of the view that the principles which justify the condition that Court permission is required to sue a Receiver is not at all applicable in a petition of the present nature where the request is only for transfer of a pending proceeding from one Court to another. It is obvious that such a petition does not at all require permission of the Court which appointed the Receiver whether it be prior permission or ex post facto permission obtained during the pendency of the proceeding. In the above view of the matter, I do not think that the dismissal of the petition merely on the ground that the Court permission to sue the Receiver has not been obtained is justified. There is no need to get sanction for filing the petition against the Official Receiver. The impugned Order is unsustainable and accordingly it is set aside. The O.P. is restored to the file of the District Court, Ernakulam. The Court below is directed to proceed with the O.P. in accordance with law and pass fresh orders on it on the merits.