JUDGMENT : M.S.Parikh, J. This petition is registered as a winding up petition as a result of opinion of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (for short 'BIFR'), which has been tendered with communication dated 12th May, 1995 addressed to the Registrar of this Court, inter alia, saying that the BIFR has recorded an opinion under section 20(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (for short 'SICA') that it is just and equitable to wind up respondent-company, namely, Unity Steels Ltd., having its registered office at 413-415, Paradise, Opposite College, Sayajiganj, Baroda 390 005. It would appear from the record of this petition that the BIFR opinion came to be subjected to an appeal before the Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, New Delhi (for short 'AIFR'). A copy of the order passed by the AIFR would indicate that the opinion of the BIFR to the effect that the company's operations would not be viable to any scheme of either rehabilitation or of arrangement and that the company needed to be wound up came to be confirmed finding that there was no reason for interfering with the impugned order passed by the BIFR. This order was passed by the AIFR on 31st July, 1996. Accordingly, by order dated 30th November, 1998 notice was directed to the respondents returnable on 18th January, 1999. Since then this petition has remained pending for hearing. It was noticed that in other petitions for winding up moved by the unsecured creditors in one or some of the petitions Mr. S. I. Nanavati's name appeared as an advocate for the respondent-company. Hence, by order dated 26th June, 1999 all the matters were directed to be listed on 15th July, 1999 while also showing the name of Mr. S. I. Nanavati appearing for the respondent-company. 2. Under the aforesaid circumstances, all these matters have been heard, although no one canvassed any submission on behalf of the respondent-company. Short submission on behalf of the petitioning creditors made by Mr. Singhi, learned advocate appearing for one of the petitioning creditors has been that the respondent-company should be wound up without entering into any formality of admitting the petition, that is registered upon the opinion of the BIFR. According to his submission even upon the winding up order being passed, appropriate publications are going to issue. Singhi, learned advocate appearing for one of the petitioning creditors has been that the respondent-company should be wound up without entering into any formality of admitting the petition, that is registered upon the opinion of the BIFR. According to his submission even upon the winding up order being passed, appropriate publications are going to issue. In order to substantiate his submission he made a reference to a decision of the Madras High Court in J. M. Malhotra v. Union Of India, (1997) 89 Comp Cas 600. There, writ petitions were filed by the petitioner seeking for declaration that section 20 of the SICA is ultra vires, and unconstitutional and is violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India. Learned Single Judge negatived the contention and rejected the writ petitions and the matter was carried before the Division Bench of the same High Court. There it was contended that section 20 imposes restriction on the exercise of jurisdiction by a High Court, that unbridled power is given to the Board and the Board can be arbitrary and it can adopt different norms and different procedures in the matters coming up before the Board and as such, it is discriminatory. While answering this question, the Madras High Court observed as under : "Thus, the context in which section 20 of the Act occurs is to enable the Board, after making inquiry under section 16 and after consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances and after hearing all the concerned parties, if it is of the opinion that no scheme can be of any use to the sick industrial company and that the company cannot at all be rehabilitated and it is just and equitable to wind up the company, to report and recommend for winding up of the sick industrial company. So, the report is submitted to the High Court by the Board under section 20 as a last resort in the matter, when the Board comes to the conclusion that nothing else can be done to revive the sick industrial company and as such, it is just and equitable to wind up. The Board, as already pointed out, consists of persons who are experts in the field. It is presided over by a person who has been or is qualified to be a judge of the High Court. The Board, as already pointed out, consists of persons who are experts in the field. It is presided over by a person who has been or is qualified to be a judge of the High Court. It has to record its opinion with reasons after considering all the relevant facts and circumstances and after hearing all the concerned parties. Thus, the Board, while acting under section 20, acts as a judicial body consisting of experts in the field. No doubt, section 433 of the Companies Act specifies the grounds on which the court may order winding up of a company. One of the grounds is that if the court is of the opinion that it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up, it can order winding up of the company. Under the Companies Act, if a winding up proceeding has to be initiated under Chapter II of Part VIII, persons seeking winding up of a company have to satisfy certain conditions as prescribed under section 439 or 440, as the case may be, of the Companies Act to maintain the proceedings. When once the report is submitted by the Board, no such requirements of section 439 or 440, as the case may be, of the Companies Act need be looked into. In this case, we are not concerned with Chapters III and IV of Part VIII relating to "voluntary winding up" and "winding up subject to supervision of court". The report of the Board would become the basis for a proceeding to be continued against the sick industrial company for winding up in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act. Sub-section (2) of section 20, which is already reproduced, specifically states that the High Court shall, on the basis of the opinion of the Board, order winding up of a sick industrial company and may proceed or cause to proceed with the winding up of the sick industrial company in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act. Therefore, it is clear that the opinion furnished by the Board will only form a basis for the proceedings to be continued against the sick industrial company for the purpose of winding up and the further proceedings are to be conducted in accordance with the provisions contained in the Companies Act for winding up of the company. Therefore, it is clear that the opinion furnished by the Board will only form a basis for the proceedings to be continued against the sick industrial company for the purpose of winding up and the further proceedings are to be conducted in accordance with the provisions contained in the Companies Act for winding up of the company. Thus, what sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 20 dispense with is only the requirement of section 439 or 440, as the case may be, of the Companies Act for the purpose of initiating a proceeding for winding up of the company under Part VIII, Chapter, II and also the enquiry into the question as to whether it is just and equitable to order winding up of a company. The rest of the proceeding for winding up shall have to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act. Sub-section (2) of section 20 of the Act is not happily worded. Though it opens with the words "High Court shall, on the basis of the opinion of the Board, order winding up of the sick industrial company", but nevertheless, it further says that "and may proceed and cause to proceed with the winding up of the sick industrial company in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956". Therefore, it appears to us that even though the opinion submitted by the Board forms the basis for ordering winding up of the sick industrial company by the High Court, it is nevertheless open to the High Court to go into the correctness of the opinion so submitted by the Board and decide as to whether it should proceed and cause to proceed with the winding up of the sick industrial company, in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act. This is clear by the use of words "and may proceed and cause to proceed" in sub-section (2) of section 20. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that even though the opinion submitted by the Board forms the basis for directing the winding up of the sick industrial company by the High Court, the High Court is precluded from examining the correctness of such opinion. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that even though the opinion submitted by the Board forms the basis for directing the winding up of the sick industrial company by the High Court, the High Court is precluded from examining the correctness of such opinion. Therefore, it cannot be held that it is obligatory on the High Court to order winding up of the sick industrial company once it receives an opinion from the Board in this regard without examining the correctness of such opinion, on hearing the concerned parties. However, normally, such opinion being one tendered by the Board consisting of experts acting judicially will have a greater weight in deciding the question as to proceeding with the winding up of the sick industrial company. Such opinion of the Board cannot be lightly brushed aside. Even otherwise, it is a jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under the Companies Act. Any jurisdiction conferred on High Courts under a statute has to be exercised, subject to the limitations prescribed under the statute, and such jurisdiction can also be taken away or modified by appropriate amendment to the very statute, or by any other law passed by the competent legislative body. In the instant case, even if it were to be held that section 20, to a certain extent, mutilates the jurisdiction of the High Court, it cannot be held to be unconstitutional on that ground. Because both the enactments are passed by Parliament, therefore, it is open to Parliament to modify the powers conferred on the High Courts under the Companies Act. However, one thing is clear on a regarding of sections 20 and 22 that in the case of the sick industrial company to which section 22 is attracted, proceedings for winding up of such sick industrial company cannot be initiated in the High Court, except with the consent of the Board, or, as the case may be, of the Appellate Authority. Therefore, Parliament very advisedly made the provisions contained in section 20 to further the objects of the Act and to effectively implement them as, otherwise, it would have affected the very functioning of the Board and rehabilitation of sick industrial companies and defeated the very objects of the Act, if winding up petitions were to be entertained by the High Court in the case of sick industrial companies to which sections 20 and 22 are attracted. The contention is accordingly rejected.' (p.606) 3. Referring to the aforesaid observations Mr. Singhi has submitted before this court that by virtue of the provisions contained in section 20(1) and (2) of the SICA the requirements of sections 439 and 440 of the Companies Act for the purpose of initiating the proceedings for winding up of the company under Part VII, Chapter II and also inquiry into the question as to whether it is just and equitable to order winding up of the company, are dispensed with. The rest of the proceedings for winding up are to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act. While so observing the Madras High Court has expressed that it would be open to the High Court to go into the correctness of the opinion submitted by the Board and decide as to whether it should proceed with the winding up of the sick industrial company in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act. Mr. Singhi has, therefore, submitted that since even after the notice in the present petition as also after the intervening proceedings in the other petitions, there has been no opposition or no application in the nature of rehabilitation scheme or scheme of arrangement, it would be futile to resort to the procedure of admission of the present petition and then proceeding further with ordering winding up of the respondent-company. According to his submission, even after the order of winding up public notice in accordance with the rules is going to issue. For that purpose Mr. Singhi has referred to the relevant stages of the publication of the notice. He has first made a reference to rule 96 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959. That rule reads as under : "Upon the filing of the petition, it shall be posted before the Judge in Chambers for admission of the petition and fixing a date for the hearing thereof and for directions as to the advertisements to be published and the persons, if any, upon whom copies of the petition are to be served. That rule reads as under : "Upon the filing of the petition, it shall be posted before the Judge in Chambers for admission of the petition and fixing a date for the hearing thereof and for directions as to the advertisements to be published and the persons, if any, upon whom copies of the petition are to be served. The Judge may, if he thinks fit, direct notice to be given to the company before giving directions as to the advertisement of the petition." It has been submitted that rule 96 would be applicable where a regular petition for winding up has been filed and in case if the petitions so filed by the unsecured creditors were required to be proceeded with, the procedure as contemplated by rule 96 as quoted above, would need to be followed. In the present case that stage, namely, the stage as contemplated by rule 96 is not required to be followed by virtue of the provisions contained in section 20 of the SICA as considered by the Madras High Court from the observations excerpted hereinabove. According to his submission, in the present case no writ petition has also been filed by any party either affected, or interested in the matter. Rule 96 finds its place by virtue of the provisions contained in Chapter II, Part VII of the Companies Act. Hence, in the facts of the present case, submits Mr. Singhi, there is no necessity of passing formal order of admission of this petition, more particularly in the background of the proceedings which have been undertaken in other petitions. According to his submission, the public has sufficiently been informed by the BIFR while undertaking proceedings prior to forming of opinion under section 20. Besides, according to his submission, public notice is required to be issued or will issue as a result of passing of winding up order. For this purpose he has referred to rule 113. According to his submission, the public has sufficiently been informed by the BIFR while undertaking proceedings prior to forming of opinion under section 20. Besides, according to his submission, public notice is required to be issued or will issue as a result of passing of winding up order. For this purpose he has referred to rule 113. The said rule reads as under : "Save as otherwise ordered by the court, every order for the winding up of a company by the court, shall within 14 days of the date of making the order, be advertised by the petitioner in one issue each of newspaper in the English language and a newspaper in the regional language circulating in the State or the Union Territory concerned and shall be served by the petitioner upon such person, if any, and in such manner as the Judge may direct. The advertisement shall be in Form No. 53." 4. It might be noted that the aforesaid decision of the Madras High Court was carried before the hon'ble Supreme Court and the hon'ble Supreme Court in V. R. Ramaraju v. Union of India, (1997) 89 Comp Cas 609, observed as under : "We do not find any ground to interfere with the High Court's view which has rejected the challenge to the constitutional validity of sub-section (2) of section 20 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. It is obvious that sub-section (2) of section 20 has to be construed to mean that the High Court in deciding the question of winding up of the company has to take into account the opinion of the Board forwarded to it under sub-section (1) and is not to abdicate its own function of determining the question of winding up. So read, sub-section (2) does not suffer from any infirmity. This in substance is the view taken by the High Court in the impugned order."(p.610) 5. Bearing in mind the aforesaid observations of the Apex Court affirming the decision of the Madras High Court Mr. Mihir Joshi, learned advocate who was present in the court, requested to permit his to make his submissions on principle. He was so permitted. This in substance is the view taken by the High Court in the impugned order."(p.610) 5. Bearing in mind the aforesaid observations of the Apex Court affirming the decision of the Madras High Court Mr. Mihir Joshi, learned advocate who was present in the court, requested to permit his to make his submissions on principle. He was so permitted. He, therefore, submitted that the provision of rule 96 of the Companies (Court) Rules [quoted hereinabove is mandatory insofar as the admission of the petition, fixing the date of final hearing and accordingly issuing directions as to the advertisement to be published are concerned. For making good this submission he also made reference to rules 99 and 24 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959. They read as under : "99. Advertisement of petition. - Subject to any directions of the court, the petition shall be advertised within the time and in the manner provided by rule 24 of these rules. The advertisement shall be in Form No. 48. Advertisement of petition. - (1) Where any petition is required to be advertised, it shall, unless the Judge otherwise orders, or these rules otherwise provide, be advertised not less than fourteen days before the date fixed for hearing, in one issue of the Official Gazette of the Stale or the Union territory concerned, and in one issue each of a daily newspaper in the English language and a daily newspaper in the regional language circulating in the State or the Union territory concerned, as may be fixed by the Judge. (2) Except in the case of a petition to wind up a company the Judge may, if he thinks fit, dispense with any advertisement required by these rules." Conjoint reading of rules 96, 99 and 24 would make it clear that admission of the petition for winding up and issuance of public advertisements while fixing date of final hearing would be mandatory inasmuch as it is only when a public notice is issued as provided under the aforesaid rules any one interested either in supporting the prayer for winding up or opposing such prayer might be in a position to appear before the company court and canvass his cause. Mr. Mr. Joshi submitted that winding up proceedings can be initiated against a company, either in the manner and as contemplated under sections 439 and 440 of the Companies Act or for that matter as per Chapter II of Part VII of the Companies Act, or on a report submitted by the Board under section 20 of the SICA. The said provisions operate in wholly different fact situations, and, obviously the requirements of section 439 or 440 and for that matter all other provisions of the said Chapter cannot be imported and applied to the proceedings initiated for winding up of a company on a Board report. He submitted that rule 96 read with rules 99 and 24 as quoted hereinabove, prescribe the mode of admission and advertisement of the petition including petitions for winding up of companies. In proceedings initiated on a Board report, ordinarily, admission of the petition, would follow as a matter of course. However, since the High Court has a discretion whether or not to wind up the company, notwithstanding the Board report that in its opinion, it should be so wound up as observed in V. R. Ramaraju's case (supra), the petition would have to be advertised for hearing as contemplated under the aforesaid rules. This is so since the proceedings initiated under section 439 and 440 or under any of the provisions appearing in the aforesaid Chapter and Part of the Companies Act and proceedings under section 20, chart a common course after admission of the petitions, guided by the provisions of the Companies Act. This can be seen from section 20(2). Mr. Joshi, therefore, submitted that both the courses need be considered till upto the stage of admission of the petition in accordance with the respective provisions of the two Acts. Hence, according to his submission even if the matter has come up before the court under section 20, procedure for admission of petition registered under that provision will have to be followed as per the aforesaid rules, namely, rules 96, 99 and 24. It is only then that a person interested even in challenging the Board opinion might have had a notice to do so, since it is possible that all persons interested might not be parties before the BIFR or might not be aware of the proceedings before the BIFR. 6. As against the aforesaid submission of Mr. Mihir Joshi, Mr. It is only then that a person interested even in challenging the Board opinion might have had a notice to do so, since it is possible that all persons interested might not be parties before the BIFR or might not be aware of the proceedings before the BIFR. 6. As against the aforesaid submission of Mr. Mihir Joshi, Mr. Singhi submitted that rule 96 of the Companies (Court) Rules would apply where winding up petition is preferred under section 433 of the Companies Act and for that matter in proceedings under Chapter 11 Part VII of the Companies Act. According to his submission the provisions of the aforesaid rules will not apply to a case where opinion is formed by the Board under section 20(1) of the SICA and the court has a discretion under section 20(2) whether to follow the procedure prescribed under the aforesaid rules. He submitted that this would apply with greater force in the present case where there is no challenge to the opinion formed by the Board. To strengthen his submission, he submitted that during the course of the proceedings before the BIFR all the required public notices were issued and in the present case there is no writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India filed against the opinion of the BIFR. He placed reliance upon a decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Lakshmi Porcelain Ltd. v. BIFR reported in [1996] 1 Comp LJ 522, He placed reliance upon the following observations appearing at para 10 of the citation : "10. A company is creation of the Companies Act, a statute, which statute also provides for winding up of the company by the court under certain circumstances mentioned in section 433 of that Act. The Companies Act also provides for voluntary winding up of a company. SICA adds another ground of winding up of only a sick industrial company to which the Act applies in its winding up under section 20 of the Act. A sick industrial company is a class by itself and when there is a failure to revive it by adopting various method, it is only then that the expert body like the Board forms its opinion that it is just and equitable that the sick industrial company be wound up. A sick industrial company is a class by itself and when there is a failure to revive it by adopting various method, it is only then that the expert body like the Board forms its opinion that it is just and equitable that the sick industrial company be wound up. The execution is left to the High Court concerned, and we do not find that SICA to be invalid on any ground as alleged by the petitioners. Keeping in view the objects of the Act and further that it applies only to companies having industrial undertakings going sick having a great deal of ramifications, all out efforts are sought to be made for revival of the sick industrial company by various methods even by providing financial assistance, which even include granting of concessions and sacrifices by various bodies including the Central and State Governments. As seen above, the Board is constituted of qualified persons. An appeal against the order of the Board lies to the Appellate Authority which again is headed by a Chairman who is or has been a Judge of the Supreme Court or has been a Judge of the High Court for not less than five years. Against the order of the Appellate Authority, a High Court exercises jurisdiction of judicial review under article 226 of the Constitution. It is only that after this whole process is gone into that the High Court comes into picture under section 20 of the SICA to proceed with the winding up of the company. It cannot be said that the High Court is in any way devalued as it was sought to be projected." According to his submission the execution part spoken to by the Delhi High Court is one that follows the stage of order of winding up being passed by the Company Court by virtue of section 20. 7. Mr. Singhi read the provision of section 2 of the SICA coupled with article 31C of the Constitution of India, which also came to be dealt with by the Delhi High Court in the aforesaid decision. The same appears in paras 11 and 12 of the citation, which might be reproduced : "11 All this having been said, it will appear that the real question has escaped our attention which is the effect of declaration made under section 2 of the SICA. The same appears in paras 11 and 12 of the citation, which might be reproduced : "11 All this having been said, it will appear that the real question has escaped our attention which is the effect of declaration made under section 2 of the SICA. Under article 31C of the Constitution, law giving effect to certain Directive Principles have been saved. This article is as under : "31C. Saving of laws giving effect to certain Directive Principles. - Notwithstanding anything contained in article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing all or any of the principles laid down in Part IV shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred, article 14 or article 19, and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy : Provided that where such law is made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent. 12. Now, as noted above, under section 2 of the SICA, a declaration has been made that the Act was for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clauses (b) and (c) of article 39 of the Constitution. 12. Now, as noted above, under section 2 of the SICA, a declaration has been made that the Act was for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clauses (b) and (c) of article 39 of the Constitution. In Navnit R. Kamani v. R. R. Kamani, AIR 1989 SC 9 , the court noticed the order of Board in that case and observed as under : "We may also mention that the BIFR was wholly right that the provisions of the Act were immune from challenge by virtue of the declaration contained in section 2 of the Act attracting application of article 31C of the Constitution." The court put a stamp of approval on the scheme sanctioned by the BIFR in that case and said as under : "Since the scheme is being framed under the statutory authority and directive in order to revive the same in the larger public interest and inasmuch as there is a necessary declaration contained in section 2 of the Act which attracts the applicability of article 31C of the Constitution, the decision rendered by the BIFR is unassailable and unimpeachable." 8. Mr. Singhi then read the commentary appearing under section 20 in the book styled "Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 - Law Practice & Procedure by P. S. Kaicker, 1996 edn. He also read statement of objects and reasons appearing at page 4 of the book. For the purpose of appreciating his submissions the objects and reasons of the SICA might be reproduced from the said book : "The ill-effect of sickness in companies, such as, loss of production, loss of employment, loss of revenue to the Central and State Governments and locking up of investable funds of banks and financial institutions are of serious concern to the Government and the society at large. The concern of the Government is accentuated by the alarming increase in the incidence of sickness in industrial companies. It has been recognised that in order to fully utilise the productive industrial assets afford maximum protection of employment and optimise the use of the funds of the banks and financial institutions, it would be imperative to revive and rehabilitate the potentially viable sick industrial companies as quickly as possible. It has been recognised that in order to fully utilise the productive industrial assets afford maximum protection of employment and optimise the use of the funds of the banks and financial institutions, it would be imperative to revive and rehabilitate the potentially viable sick industrial companies as quickly as possible. It would also be equally imperative to salvage the productive assets and realise the amounts due to the banks and financial institutions, to the extent possible from the non-viable sick industrial companies through liquidation of those companies.” 9. Dealing with the decision in V. R. Ramarajus case (supra) the learned author has observed that the vires of section 20(2) of the SICA came to be upheld by the Madras High Court by reading down the word "shall" appearing in section 20(2) of the SICA as 'may' and that process of interpretation of section 20(2) has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the said matter. According to the learned author section 20(2) is not required to be read down, in view of the settled proposition that very purpose of the enactment might be defeated and might lead to absurd result and serious consequences might flow from not following the mandatory sense appearing in section 20. The learned author has made reference to earlier decisions of the Apex Court in Administrator, Municipal Committee v. Ramjilal Bagla reported in, JT 1995 (5) SC 486 and Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 1967 SC 1074 . 10. Having heard the learned advocates at length, I am of the opinion that when section 20 of the SICA provides for tendering of Board opinion for winding up of a sick industrial company, it would necessarily mean that the High Court to whom such an opinion is tendered will be required to follow the procedure with regard to admission of a petition registered as a result of such an opinion tendered under section 20 of the SICA. Otherwise, role of the High Court would be that of rubber stamp upon the receipt of Board opinion as noted in the aforesaid Madras High Court decision as approved by the Supreme Court. The submission of Mr. Otherwise, role of the High Court would be that of rubber stamp upon the receipt of Board opinion as noted in the aforesaid Madras High Court decision as approved by the Supreme Court. The submission of Mr. Singhi might sound attractive, but obviously run counter to the latest decision of the Supreme Court in V. R. Ramaraju's case (supra), where the Supreme Court has said that section 20(2) has to be construed to mean that the High Court in deciding the question of winding up of the company has 1s to take into account the opinion of the Board forwarded under sub-section (1) and is not to abdicate its own function of determining the question of winding up. If that is so the mandate of the statute as appearing in the aforesaid rule 96 read with rule 99 read with rule 24 of the Companies (Court) Rules will stand violated and the very purpose behind the same will also stand defeated, in case winding up order is passed upon receipt of the Board opinion. In that view of the matter, following order is required to be passed : "Admit. To be advertised in Indian Express, English edition and Jansatta, Gujarati edition. The operating agency, namely, IPCI, will see to the advertisements being published. Such advertisements shall be published on or before 12th August, 1999 stating therein the date of final hearing to be 9th September, 1999. Notice shall also be published in Government Gazette. The matter is fixed for final hearing accordingly on 9th September, 1999. It will be open to any of the petitioning creditors in other petitions to issue public advertisements in case the operating agency fails to issue public advertisements after obtaining necessary orders in that respect and in such eventuality the date of final hearing might have to be changed. Office to issue notice to the operating agency, namely, IFCI having its office at IFCI Bhavan, Near Lal Bungalow, C. G. Road, Ahmedabad for complying with the aforesaid order of issuing public notice, immediately. It is made clear that further orders regarding incidence of the cost of publication will be passed at the appropriate stage." Order allowed.