D.N. CHOWDHURY, J- This is an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 115 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure questioning the legality and validity of a proceeding initiated at the instance of the Opposite Party No. I/ Plaintiff, M/s. Flotech Consultants & Services Pvt. Ltd., before the Civil Judge (Jr. Division) No. 1, Sibsagar, wherein the learned Civil Judge passed an order of injunction dated 1.10.99 (in Misc. (J) Case No. 64/99) in the form of an order for maintenance of status quo and an order dated 12.10.99 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division) No. 1 in Misc. (J) Case No. 66/99, directing the Police to do the needful for implementing enforcing the order dated 1.10.99 passed in Misc. (J) Case No. 64 of 1999. The defendant/ ONGC Ltd being aggrieved by the aforesaid two orders, moved this Court by way of this revision petition challenging the legality and validity of the proceedings, the correctness and justification of the orders indicated, as being illegal and without jurisdiction. 2. The necessary facts leading to the institution of this proceeding are summed up hereinafter. A suit for permanent injunction was instituted by the opposite party No. 1 before the Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Sibsagar, impleading the present petitioners as defendants on the 1st of October, 1999. The said suit was registered and numbered as Title Suit No. 57/99. In the suit, the plaintiff pleaded that after processing the tender papers, the defendants allotted work for operation and maintenance of 2 (two) numbers of ONGC Ltd owned work over rigs for a period of two years. The period of work was extended from time to time and the plaintiff has been doing the said job till institution of the suit. The relevant part of the pleadings as mentioned in paragraphs 4 and 8 along with the prayer are called down below: "4. That the defendants floated a tender vide Tender No. NZR/MM/OBC/O&M/WOR/ 05/98-99 dated 26.8.98 for operation and maintenance of the ONGC owned (upto 6 nos.) work over rigs fixing the closing date and time as 14.00 hours (1ST) on 25.9.98. 8. That in view of the High Court's order for suspension of further action in the matter of newly floated tender, the defendants have extended the contract of three other contracts viz. 8. That in view of the High Court's order for suspension of further action in the matter of newly floated tender, the defendants have extended the contract of three other contracts viz. North Eastern Drilling & Work Over Pvt. Ltd. Dibrugarh, Jay Bee Energy Services Pvt. Ltd. and Assam Baryties & Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. But, the plaintiff has not been given extension. Instead they have sent a fax message intimating the plaintiff that their services would no longer be required. In fact, the defendants have many incomplete job for work over services for which the floated new tender as aforesaid the further action of which has been suspended by the Hon'ble High Court. It may be noted that the plaintiff has been executing the job at the same rate at which the aforesaid three contractors have been executing. Thus, the action of the defendants, are arbitrary, illegal, and discriminatory. The plaintiff is entitled to get the equal treatment with that of other three contractors. So, the plaintiff is compelled to file this suit for declaration that it is entitled to get equal treatment with that of the three contractors and thus entitled to an extension of the contract and for further declaration that the decision of the defendants in not extending the job to the plaintiff is arbitrary, illegal and discriminatory. The plaintiff has also prayed for permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from debiting/demobilising the plaintiff from the work over rig under reference. The plaintiff therefore prays that - i) Suit be decreed that the plaintiff is entitled to equal treatment from the defendants as that of the other contractors viz. North Eastern Drilling & Workover (Pvt) Ltd., Assam Baryties & Chemicals (P) Ltd., and Jay Be Energy Services (P) Ltd. ii) Suit be decreed declaring that the action of the defendants to dehire/demobilise the services of the plaintiff in respect of the contract No. ER/NZR/OBG/SOON/ WOR/17/94-95/PC-07 dtd. 31.01.1997 for the work operation & Maintenance of 2 (two) Nos. of work over rigs is arbitrary, illegal, discriminatory, unreasonable and void; iii) Permanent injunction be decreed restraining the defendants from dehiring/demobilishing the services of the plaintiff for the aforesaid work. 31.01.1997 for the work operation & Maintenance of 2 (two) Nos. of work over rigs is arbitrary, illegal, discriminatory, unreasonable and void; iii) Permanent injunction be decreed restraining the defendants from dehiring/demobilishing the services of the plaintiff for the aforesaid work. iv) All costs of the suit be decreed; v) Any other relief or reliefs which the plaintiff may be found entitled to under law and equity may also be decreed." Along with the said application, an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC was also made before the Civil Judge (Jr. Division) praying for an injunction. The learned civil Judge (Jr. Division), Sibsagar, registered a suit, issue summons to the opposite party and also registered a Misc. case on the application for injunction. On hearing the counsel for the plaintiffs alone, the learned trial Court issued notice to the opposite party to show cause as directed the parties to maintain status quo till the next date fixing 10.11.99 for show cause reply. The said order of injunction was passed ex-parte. It appears from the Paper Book that an application was made under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC before the Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Sibsagar, stating therein that inspite of service of the order dated 1.10.99, on defendant No. 1 on 2.10.99 by the office, the defendants initially carried out the same, but subsequently violated the same on 6.10.99 and further, in violation of the order of the Court, issue letter to other contractor assigning the job of the plaintiff/petitioner to the said Contractor. The learned Court by its order dated 12.10.99, entertained the application, issued notice on the opposite parties to show-cause and at the instance of the petitioner, further made the following ex-parte order: ".... The petitioner also prayed for an order directing the police concerned to enforce the order of this Court passed on 1.10.99. As the order was directing both sides to maintains 'status quo' and as it is reported that the O.P. has not complied with the Court order, the O/C, Sibsagar and Simaluguri PS is directed to do the needful for enforcing the order...." The legality of the above order(s) is/are thus challenged in this application. 3. As the order was directing both sides to maintains 'status quo' and as it is reported that the O.P. has not complied with the Court order, the O/C, Sibsagar and Simaluguri PS is directed to do the needful for enforcing the order...." The legality of the above order(s) is/are thus challenged in this application. 3. Mr P.C. Deka, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners/ defendants, stated and contended that initiation of the proceeding, more particularly granting of the ex-parte injunction, in the facts and circumstances of the case, amounted to arbitrary exercise of powers which amounted to abuse of process of the Court. The learned counsel for the petitioners, referring to the pleadings in the plaint, submitted that the learned Court below without due application of mind not only entertained the plaint but also granted injunction causing serious repercussion on a public sector undertaking apart from causing economic loss to the nation as a whole in its trial. The learned senior counsel submitted that granting of injunction in such matters is of serious consequence and for this reason, it is incumbent on the trial Court to scrutinise the matter and pass orders thereafter on due application of law and mind. The learned counsel for the petitioners conceded that this is a matter where the parties could have gone and preferred an appeal though the Civil Courts were closed from 16.10.99; but the real object for moving this Court is to bring to the notice of the Court about the manner in which the Civil Court was dealing with the matter which has serious ramifications on the institutional functioning vis-a-vis discharge of public duty. Mr Deka, the learned counsel, summed up his argument by stating that the superintending jurisdiction of the High Court is not to be readily exercised in all the situations, more so where an adequate alternative legal remedy is available; but then the said rule is not rigid and inflexible. It is indeed the duty of the higher Court to exercise the superintending jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice. The learned counsel in support of his contentions as to the maintainability of an application under Article 227 of the Constitution, referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat Etc.-Vs-Vakhatsinghji Vajesinghji Vaghel and others, reported in AIR 1968 SC 1481 , and two other decisions of this Court viz. The learned counsel in support of his contentions as to the maintainability of an application under Article 227 of the Constitution, referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat Etc.-Vs-Vakhatsinghji Vajesinghji Vaghel and others, reported in AIR 1968 SC 1481 , and two other decisions of this Court viz. Isha Haque-Vs-Azadur Rahman Hazarika and others, reported in (1993)1 GLR 92, and Ms/. Contemporary Target Pvt. Ltd. and others-Vs-M/s. Enterprises & Others. The learned counsel for the petitioners, further referred to the following decisions of the Supreme Court cautioning the Courts in the matter of granting of injunction: (1) 1995)5 SCC 545, Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. and others-Vs-Coca Cola Co. & others. (2) Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee, Gondal and others-Vs- Giridharbhai Ramjibhai Chhaniyara and others, (1997)5 SCC 468 . (3) Raunaq International Ltd.-Vs-IVR Construction Ltd. and others, AIR 1999 SC 393 . 4. Mr H.N. Sarma, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite parties, first questioned the maintainability of the petition. Mr Sarma submitted that, admittedly, the order challenged was appealable and since this Court provided a remedy, therefore, exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution could come in. The civil Court is authorised to exercise the powers under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 as well as under Section 151 of the CPC and, therefore, when in exercise of the jurisdiction, the learned trial Court fell into error, it can be taken care of in appeal and not under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as it is an extra­ordinary power conferred under the Constitution. The power is intended to be exercised sparingly and not as a substitute for ordinary revisional jurisdiction, submitted the learned senior counsel. Every error of law in a decision making process of the subordinate Courts, it was contended by the learned counsel, is not subject to Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court should not in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution entertain an application when alternative remedy was available, pointed Mr Sarma, the learned counsel for the opposite parties. Mr H.N. Sarma, the learned counsel, in support of his contentions referred to the following decisions of this Court, viz. The High Court should not in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution entertain an application when alternative remedy was available, pointed Mr Sarma, the learned counsel for the opposite parties. Mr H.N. Sarma, the learned counsel, in support of his contentions referred to the following decisions of this Court, viz. Binoy Nandar T Choudhury- Vs-L.R. Choudhuri and others, reported in (1983)2 GHC 2; Leena Das-Vs-Presiding Officer, State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Assam & Others, reported in (1987) 2 GLR 135 and Shri Otin Panging & another- Vs-Nambor Kaman and others, reported in (1990)2 GLR 314. Mr Sarma also referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Miss Maneck Custodiji Surjarji- Vs-Sarafaj AH Nawab AH Mirza, reported in AIR 1976 SC 2446 , in aid of his contention that the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is an extra-ordinary jurisdiction and it is not to be exercised as it was an appellate jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the opposite parties, further referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. and others-Vs-Coca Cola Co. & others, reported in AIR 1999 SC 2372, and Trembak Gangadhar-Vs-Ramachandra Ganesh, reported in AIR 1977 SC 1222 , argued that the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not unfettered and unrestricted and it has to be exercised sparingly in appropriate cases. Mr Sarma, the learned counsel for the opposite parties, sought to distinguish between a cause of action for trial and a cause of action for a decree. 5. Referring to the pleadings, Mr Sarma submitted that this is not a case where the plaint can be rejected for want of a cause of action. Finally, during the course of trial, the plaintiffs failed to establish its case. The learned counsel for the opposite parties submitted that at the stage of Order VII CPC, the Court is to ascertain from the plaint as to whether in fact and in law, a cause of action does arise or not for trial. Mr Sarma, the learned counsel for the plaintiff/opposite parties submitted that granting of injunction is an equitable remedy. Granting of such injunction is no doubt discretionary and the Courts are to exercise the discretion to avoid injustice and injury to the party(ies). 6. Mr Sarma, the learned counsel for the plaintiff/opposite parties submitted that granting of injunction is an equitable remedy. Granting of such injunction is no doubt discretionary and the Courts are to exercise the discretion to avoid injustice and injury to the party(ies). 6. It is no doubt true that the order was appealable and, therefore, question of exercise of the power under Section 115 C.P.C. will not arise in view of the clear bar under Section 115(2) C.P.C. Thus, the only question for determination is as to whether an application under Article 227 of the Constitution is maintainable in the facts and circumstances of the case. Article 227 of the Constitution conferred on the High Court a superintending jurisdiction which is not akin to the certiorari jurisdiction. It is purely a supervisory jurisdiction reposed on the High Court to scrutinise the records and proceedings of the lower Courts to ensure that the courts functioned in accordance with law. Mr Sarma, the learned senior counsel for the opposite parties, is right that the said power under Article 227 of the Constitution should be used in far and rare cases and sparingly. But in an appropriate case, a duty is cast on the High Court for exercise of the supervisory power to keep the subordinate Courts within their boundaries. An application under Article 227 of the Constitution is not applicable for correcting mere errors, but it can undoubtedly be exercised to see that the Courts followed the mandate of the legislations and to see that the Courts and Tribunals function within its authority. In the matter of institution of a suit, the Civil Procedure Code delineated the procedures. A Judge before whom a plaint is filed, is to read the plaint meaningfully and is not to read the pleadings mechanically and formally. If any misunderstanding or any illusion is created on the courts by clever drafting, it is the duty of the Courts to examine the parties and to ascertain the facts pleaded. Order VII of the CPC indicates about the particulars to be contained in the plaint and the procedure of admitting a plaint. If any misunderstanding or any illusion is created on the courts by clever drafting, it is the duty of the Courts to examine the parties and to ascertain the facts pleaded. Order VII of the CPC indicates about the particulars to be contained in the plaint and the procedure of admitting a plaint. Order VII Rule 11 CPC empowers the Courts to reject a plaint in cases where it does not reveal a cause of action, where the relief claimed is undervalued and the plaintiff on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time fails to do so within the time fixed, where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written on paper insufficiently stamped and the plaintiff on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamps within a time fails to do so within the time fixed, and where the suit appears from the statement of the plain to be barred by any law. The statute has provided sufficient indication for scrutinising the plaint before issuing summons. A duty is reposed on the Court to examine the plaint and to satisfy itself as to whether any cause of action has been pleaded, whether any relief has been claimed against the defendants and whether the plaint should be rejected or returned for amendment. In T. Arivandandam-Vs-T.V. Satyapal and another reported in AIR 1977 SC 2421 , the Supreme Court emphasised upon the Courts to make a meaningful exercise in the matter of accepting a plaint. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in the aforesaid case in his usual candour cautioned the Court with the following words: "The learned Munsiff must remember that if on a meaningful - not formal-reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under O. VII R.II, C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clear drafting has caused the illusion... An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial Courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men, (Ch. And, if clear drafting has caused the illusion... An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial Courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men, (Ch. XI) and must be triggered against them." The learned Judge finally cautioned with the following words: "Another moral of this unrighteous chain of litigation is the gullible grant of ex-parte orders tempts gamblers in litigation into easy Courts. A judge who succumb to ex-parte pressure in unmerited cases helps devalue the judicial process....." The aforesaid case is further relied upon and followed in ITC Ltd.Vs-Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, reported in (1998) 2 SCC 70 . Herein in the case, the material part of the plaint is already indicated. The plaintiff in the suit, sought for a decree in the form of extension of his contract in the light of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Specific Relief Act, 1963 specifically mentions about the contracts which cannot be specifically enforced in Section 14 of Chapter II. Under Section 41 of the Act, 1963 the legislature has specified as to when an injunction is to be refused. An injunction cannot be granted, amongst others, to prevent a breach of the contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. Even in the matter of granting ex-parte injunction, the Courts cannot be blind to the requirements of the well defined policy as laid down by the higher Courts. Granting of injunction is a serious matter having ramifications. The following principles are laid down in India by the higher Courts for consideration before granting injunction. 1. As to whether there is a prima facie case. 2. As to whether the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff. 3. As to whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable loss if the prayer for injunction is disallowed. The whole object of providing injunction is to provide equitable relief to mitigate the injustice caused to the plaintiff before the uncertainty is resolved. The end purpose is to protect and preserve the rights of the plaintiff from the invasion of his rights and status where one cannot be compensated in terms of money. The whole object of providing injunction is to provide equitable relief to mitigate the injustice caused to the plaintiff before the uncertainty is resolved. The end purpose is to protect and preserve the rights of the plaintiff from the invasion of his rights and status where one cannot be compensated in terms of money. While weighing a need for protection, the Court undoubtedly is required to consider the corresponding rights and needs of the defendants. He is or they are also equally required to be protected against likely injury from being prevented from exercising his/their legal rights. The principles of granting injunction are already well defined and well settled. A civil Court in such a situation is to work with extreme caution and care. 7. The superintending jurisdiction of the High Court over all the Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises its jurisdiction has its own meaning. The supervisory jurisdiction is meant for keeping the subordinate Courts, Tribunals within the limits of their authority and seeing that they assiduously adhere to the law of the land. The power can be exercised even in those cases in which no appeal or revision lies to the High Court. The power of superintendence, however, it limited for the purpose of keeping the Courts and Tribunals within its bounds. In exercising superintending powers, the High Court does not act as an appellate Court, it will also not review or reweigh the evidence on which the determination of the Tribunals rests of for correcting mere errors of law committed by the Court. An erroneous decision will not allow the High Court to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution. The power of superintendence is to be exercised with care and prudence and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate Courts within the bounds of its authority. In interpreting the power of superintendence of a High Court under Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 193 5 Sir George Rankin, Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court, in Manmatha Nath Biswas-Vs-Emperor, reported in 37 CWN 201 (AIR 1933 Cal 132), observed that the power under Section 107 (which is roughly akin to Article 227 of the Constitution) does not vest the High Court with unlimited power to correct errors of the subordinate Courts. The power of superintendence's that it confers is a power of a known and recognised character and should be exercised upon those judicial principles which give it its character. Broadly speaking, the superintending power of a High Court is a power to keep the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. In Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. -Vs-Sukumar Mukherjee, reported in AIR 1951 Cal 193 , the said principle of law was recalled and approved by the same High Court while in a proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Chief Justice Harris rehearsing the observation of Rinkin, J., observed that mere error of law not resulting in injustice is not subject to correction in a proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution. The aforesaid principle of law is restated by the Supreme Court in Wary am Singh-Vs-Amar Nath, reported in 1954 SC 215. The law is now shaped in numerous decisions in the Supreme Court of India. The power conferred on the High Court under Article 227 is plenary in nature and it is not limited by any other pro vision of the Constitution. The purpose is to uphold the rule of law. The Courts in India, however, on its own, adopted a rule of procedure imposing on itself the restriction of refusal to exercise such power where effective and efficacious remedy is available. Same is the principle adhered to by the Courts here in respect of a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but the existence of alternative remedy is not a total bar in all situations. A Court in India is consistent in the policy that the alternative remedy shall not operate as a bar in removing injustice. The Supreme Court of India firmly held that an alternative remedy will not bar the entertainment of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution where such petition is presented for enforcement of the fundamental rights, or where there have been infringement of the principles of natural justice; or where the orders of proceedings are wholly outside the jurisdiction or contrary to the law. In a similar situation, the constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in A. V Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay-Vs-Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani and another, reported in AIR 1961 SC 1506 , referring to the numerous judgments of the Court, restated the law in the following manner: "..... The passage in the judgments of this Court we have extracted would indicate (1) that the two exceptions which the learned Solicitor General formulated to the normal rule as to the effect of the existence of an adequate alternative remedy were by no means exhaustive, and (2) that even beyond them a discretion vested in the High Court to have entertained the petition and granted the petitioner relief notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy. We need only add that the broad lines of the general principles on which the Court should act having been clearly laid down their application to the facts of each particular case must necessarily be dependent on a variety of individual facts which must govern the proper exercise of the discretion of the Court, and that in a matter which is thus pre-eminently one of discretion, it is not possible or even if it were, it would not be desirable to lay down inflexible rules which should be applied with rigidity in every case which comes up before the Court." The decisions referred to at the Bar by both the sides also indicated about the nature of the proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 8. I have already set out in detail the nature of the case and the manner in which the learned trial Court made indiscriminate use of the power of injunction. The plaint do not indicate that any interim order was passed by the High Court in favour of the plaintiff. That apart, it was for the High Court to take care of the situation on the matter if there was any wilful violation of the order of the Court. Mere extension of the contracts in favour of other contractors ipso facto may not be a ground for extension of the contract in favour of the plaintiff also. The plaint did not indicate about any such entitlement by the plaintiff of any legal character or to any right as to any property. Mere extension of the contracts in favour of other contractors ipso facto may not be a ground for extension of the contract in favour of the plaintiff also. The plaint did not indicate about any such entitlement by the plaintiff of any legal character or to any right as to any property. The Court while entertaining the suit, passed an interim order but failed to take note of the relevant aspects of the matter and the legislative intent of the statute contained in Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The learned trial Court further acted in a most unauthorised manner in ordering the police to enforce the earlier order of the Court in violation of the principles of natural justice. Order XXI Rule 32 CPC speaks of enforcement of a decree for injunction. Admittedly, it was only an ad-interim injunction which was yet to be made absolute. For the ends of justice, the Court was authorised to enforce an interim injunction. The rule of law demanded a notice to the defendants for compliance of the order instead of authorising the Police to do the needful for enforcing the order. In passing the injunction order, the Court ought to have acted with a caution and circumspection and satisfied itself as to the existence of all the factors viz., a prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable loss, requisite for granting an injunction and above all, its effect on public interest. After all the defendant/petitioner was/is involved with investigation, exploration, drilling and production of scarce resources. 9. The law as regards granting of injunction is well settled. The duty of the Courts are to apply the law. No arbitrary or unfettered discretion is conferred on the Courts, as stated earlier. The discretion of granting injunction is to be exercised in accordance with the settled legal principles. Granting of injunction means restraining a person from doing a particular thing which is an act dependent on the discretion of the Court and in exercising that discretion, the Courts will indubitably consider, amongst other things, whether the doing of a thing sought to be restrained causes injury to the party seeking the injunction, whether the injury can be remedied or atoned for by award of damages, one of the basic principle of granting injunction is that prima facie one cannot obtain injunction to restrain actionable wrongs, for which damages are the proper remedy. Here in the case, the Court was to act within the parameters of law and ought not have yielded in the fashion it did for enforcing its own order. 10. Under no circumstances are the Courts meant for disobeying the rule of law. The power of superintendence is conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution and the High Courts are to see that the Courts and Tribunals abide by the law and do not contravene the same. Under the circumstances set out above, I am of the opinion that this is a fit case for exercise of the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and set aside the impugned orders. Accordingly, the order dated 1.10.99 passed in Misc. (J) Case No. 64/99 and 12.10.99 passed in Misc. (J) Case No. 66/99, arising out of Title Suit No. 57 of 1999, by the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Sibsagar, are set aside. The civil revision petition is allowed with costs on the opposite party No. 1, M/s. Flotech Consultants & Services Private Limited.