JUDGMENT : P.C. Naik, J. - The challenge in this writ petition is to the order under Annexure5 so far as it relates to the promotion of Harekrushna Barik, opposite party No. 3 herein, from: the post of Assistant Traffic Foreman to that of Traffic Foreman against a post reserved for a Scheduled Caste candidate. 2. The case of the Petitioner is that on 9-2-1976 the Petitioner' admittedly a person belonging to Scheduled Castes community was appointed as an Outdoor Clerk in the Paradeep Port Trust against a post reserved for Scheduled Caste candidate and on 26-4-1980, he was promoted to the post of Assistant Traffic Foreman also as a Scheduled Caste candidate which post he is now holding; On the other hand, opposite party No. 3, a person not belonging' to Scheduled Caste, was appointed as on Outdoor Clerk in the Traffic Department on 5-9-1972 as a candidate belonging to the general category. He was also promoted to the post of Assistant Traffic Foreman on 21-4-1980 as a person in the' general category. It is the case of the Petitioner that in the year 1973, a seniority list of Assistant Traffic Foreman was' drawn, up wherein the name of opposite party No. 3 was at serial No. 8 as a candidate belonging to the general category and that of the Petitioner was at serial No. 18 who was shown as a Scheduled Caste candidate. According to the Petitioner, notwithstanding that he is the"seniormost candidate holding the post of Assistant Traffic Foreman, opposite parties 1 and 2 have by the impugned order wrongly and illegally promoted opposite party No. 3, a, general candidate against a vacancy reserved for Scheduled Caste candidate, contending that the Petitioner is a general candidate and cannot get promotion against a vacancy reserved for a Scheduled Cast candidate. Hence the Petitioner has approached this Court for quashing the impugned order and for a direction to opposite party No. 2 to promote him to, the post of Traffic Foreman against the vacancy in the Scheduled Caste quota. 3. Opposite parties 1 and 2. In fact, did not dispute the factual position that opposite party No. 2 was appointed as a general candidate and was promoted as such. 3. Opposite parties 1 and 2. In fact, did not dispute the factual position that opposite party No. 2 was appointed as a general candidate and was promoted as such. It is also not, disputed that in the seniority list of Assistant Traffic Foreman as on 1-1-1993, whereas opposite party No. 3 was shown at serial No. 8 as a general candidate, the Petitioner was shown at serial No. 10 as a Scheduled Caste candidate. It is also not disputed that whereas the Petitioner was promoted to the post of Assistant Traffic Foreman against a vacancy in the Scheduled Caste quota, opposite party No. 3 was promoted against a vacancy in the general category. It is, however, submitted that on 13-4-1992, opposite party No. 3 had submitted a caste certificate to the port authorities certifying that he belongs to 'Dewar' caste which has been declared to he a Scheduled Caste as per the judgment dated 19-9-1991 rendered by this Court in O.J.C. No. 837 of 1990 Krushna Chandra Barik v. State of Orissa and Ors. and desired his service record to be corrected. In view of the circular of the Government relating to issuance of caste certificate, the Port authorities however made a reference to the Tahasildar, Jajpur regarding correctness of the certificate produced by opposite party No. 3 and the Tahasildar vide his fetter No. 5292 dated 22-4-1994 confirmed the issuance of the caste certificate in favor of opposite party No. 3, which was in order. Accordingly, the Port authorities corrected the service record of opposite party no. ' 3 showing as' one belonging to Scheduled Caste. Thereafter, when a vacancy in the post of a Traffic Foreman occurred in the Scheduled Caste category, opposite party No. 3, whose name was at serial No. 8, i.e. above the Petitioner, was duly considered and he was promoted initially on ad hoc basis. But subsequently, his promotion was regularized as per order dated 27-6-1996. The Port authorities accordingly submitted that the Petitioner could not, under the facts and circumstances of the case, have any grievance as admittedly opposite party No. 3 was senior to him. 4. Opposite party No. 3 does not deny the fact of his initial appointment as also his earlier promotion as a general candidate. The Port authorities accordingly submitted that the Petitioner could not, under the facts and circumstances of the case, have any grievance as admittedly opposite party No. 3 was senior to him. 4. Opposite party No. 3 does not deny the fact of his initial appointment as also his earlier promotion as a general candidate. It is his case that in view of the judgment of this Court, referred to above, he had applied to the competent authority, i.e. Tahasildar, Jajpur, for Issuance of a caste certificate which after due enquiry by the Tahasildar, was granted to him. On receiving the said certificate, he applied to the Port authorities for making necessary corrections/entries in his Service Book by showing him as a Scheduled Caste candidate instead of a general candidate. Thereafter, after due verification by the Port authorities, his Service Book was corrected and he was shown as one belonging to the Scheduled Castes community. Accordingly, when a post of Traffic Foreman fall vacant, he was duly considered and on being found fit, having been treated as a Schedule Caste candidate, was promoted to the said post as a Scheduled Cast candidate. His case is that as admittedly he was at serial No. 8 and was shown as a Scheduled Caste candidate, while the Petitioner also a Scheduled Caste 'candidate was at serial No. 10, he was rightly promoted. The petition is also opposed, inter alia, on the ground that as the Petitioner did not challenge the seniority list published in the year 1993, he was stopped from challenging it after a delay of about three years and further, as the Port authorities had on the objection of the Petitioner made' an enquiry and found the caste certificate submitted by him (0. p. No. 3) to be in order, no case for interference in the.order of promotion is made out. 5. Before proceeding further, we may refer to the constitutional.provisions regarding Scheduled Castes and Scheduled' Tribes and to some authoritative pronouncements of the.Apex Court on this score. 6. Clause (24) of Article 366 in Part XIX of the Constitution of India defines "Scheduled Castes" to mean such castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within such' castes, races or tribes as are deemed under article 341 to the Scheduled Castes for the purposes of this Constitution. 6. Clause (24) of Article 366 in Part XIX of the Constitution of India defines "Scheduled Castes" to mean such castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within such' castes, races or tribes as are deemed under article 341 to the Scheduled Castes for the purposes of this Constitution. Likewise, Clause (25) thereof lays down that "Scheduled Tribe" means such tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within such tribal communities as are deemed under Article 342 to be Scheduled Tribes for the purposes of this Constitution, 7. Part XVI of the Constitution of India contains special provisions relating to certain classes. Articles 341 and 342 which find place in this part relate to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled. Tribes. The object of the said articles is,to provide additional protection to the members of Scheduled Castes having regard to the economic and educational backwardness from which they suffer, Accordingly, power is conferred on the President to specify the castes., races or tribes or parts of or groups within the castes, races or tribes which shall, for the purposes of the Constitution, be deemed to be Scheduled Castes in relation to parts of the State or Union Territory, as the case may be, in respect of which public notification is issued. 8. Likewise, with respect to Scheduled Tribes, the President is authorized to specify the tribes or tribal communities or parts of or grounds within tribes or tribal communities which shall for the purposes of the Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Tribes in relation to that State or', Union Territory, as the case may be. If any variation -in the List appended to the President's Order is needed, the same, in terms of Clause (2) of Article 341 and also Article 342, can only be possible by law of Parliament. 9. The List of Scheduled Castes which finds place in the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 and that, of Scheduled Tribes which finds places in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950, were amended by the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Order (Amendment) Act from time to time. 9. The List of Scheduled Castes which finds place in the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 and that, of Scheduled Tribes which finds places in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950, were amended by the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Order (Amendment) Act from time to time. Thus the Scheme clearly is that the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes or parts of or groups within them will be only those which are specified in the respective orders issued by the President subject, however to any' law made' by Parliament to include or' exclude any caste, race or tribe or part off grade there from. 10. From the above, it follows that in order to find out whether a particular caste is a Scheduled Caste within the meaning of Article 341 or a Scheduled Tribe within the meaning of Article 342; one is required to make a reference to the respective order which. With respect to each State or Union Territory contains a list of castes, sub-castes, groups or tribes which in that particular State or a part of that State are to be treated as Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, as the case may be. As the said Articles stand, the Court obviously' would not have any power to go behind the Order and enter upon an inquiry as to whether or not any particular group falls within the Order. 11. At this stage, a reference may be made to the decision of a Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in B. Basavalingappa Vs. D. Munichinnappa wherein, while considering the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, in paragraph 6 of the judgment the following observations were made; It may be accepted that it is not open to make any modification in the Order by producing evidence to show (for example) that though caste A alone in mentioned in the Order, caste 5 is also a part of caste A.and, therefore, must be deemed to be included in caste A. It may also be accepted that wherever one caste has another name it has been mentioned in brackets after it in the Order: (See Aray (Mala), Dakkal (Dokkalwar) etc.). Therefore, generally speaking it would not be open to any person to lead evidence to establish that caste B (in the example quoted above) in part of caste A notified in the Order. Therefore, generally speaking it would not be open to any person to lead evidence to establish that caste B (in the example quoted above) in part of caste A notified in the Order. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not have been open in the present case to give evidence that the Fodder caste was the same as the Bhovi caste specified in the Order for Vodder caste is not mentioned in brackets after the Bhovi caste in the Order. Again, in Bhaiyalal Vs. Harikishan Singh and Others, another Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court observed: 8 It is thus clear, that in order to determine whether or not a particular caste is a scheduled caste within the meaning of Article 341, one has to look at the public notification issued by the President in that behalf. In the present case, the notification refers to Chamar, Jatav or Machi, and so in dealing with the question in dispute' between the parties the enquiry which the Election Tribunal can hold is whether or not the Appellant is a Cbamar, Jatav or Machi. The plea that though the Appellant is not Chamar as such, he can claim the same status by reason of the fact that he belongs to the Dabar, cast which is a sub-caste of the Chamar caste, cannot be accepted.' It appears to us that on enquiry of this kind would not be permissible having regard to the provisions contained in Article 341 We may now refer to a decision of a Bench of three learned Judges of the Apex Court in Srish Kumar Choudhury v. State of Tripura and Ors. 1995 (Supp.) SCC 220. Therein, while considering the entries in the Presidential Order, it was observed: 16.... the entries in the Presidential Order have to be taken as final and the scope of enquiry and admissibility of evidence is confined within the limitations indicated. It is, however not open to the court to make any addition or subtraction from the Presidential Order, xx xx xx 20. The two Constitution Bench judgments indicate that enquiry is contemplated before the Presidential Order is made but any amendment to the Presidential Order can only be by legislation.... 12. In Palghat Jilla Thandan Samudhaya Samrakshna Samithi and Another Vs. The two Constitution Bench judgments indicate that enquiry is contemplated before the Presidential Order is made but any amendment to the Presidential Order can only be by legislation.... 12. In Palghat Jilla Thandan Samudhaya Samrakshna Samithi and Another Vs. State of Kerala and Another the question raised' for consideration before a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges of the Apex Court related to the validity of the decision of the State of Kerala not to treat the members of the Thandan community belonging to the erstwhile Malabar district including Palghat district of Kerala State as members of the Scheduled Castes. The Bench making reference to the three Hon'ble Judges Bench decision in Srish Kumar's case (supra) and the Constitutional Bench decision in Basavalirigappa's case supra) observed thus: 18. These judgments leave no doubt that the Scheduled Castes Order has to be applied as it stands and no enquiry can be held or evidence led in to determine whether or not some particular community falls within it or outside it. No action to modify the plain effect of the Scheduled Castes Order, except as contemplated by Article 341, is valid. 13. Reference may also be made to another three Judges Bench decision of the Apex Court in Nityanand Sharma and another Vs. State of Bihar and others wherein the question raised was, whether Lohara (in the State of Bihar) could be considered as synonyms of Loharas or Lohras.. After making a reference to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Bhaiya Lal's case (supra) and Basavalingappa's case (supra) and Dina v. Narayan Singh (1968) 38 E.L.R. 212 the Court observed: 16. In Dina v. Narayan Singh (1968) 38 E.L.R 212 ), Dina declared in his nomination papers, as being a member of Gond (Mana) caste, a. Scheduled Tribe in GodohiroIi Toluca of Chand District in Maharashtra State. Evidence was led to show that he was Maratha Mana. Therefore, he was not Gond. The Court found that the customs, manners, forms of worship and dress of the members of Mana community are different from customs, manners, for as of worship and dress of Gonds. It was held that Manas are not Gonds and that, therefore, he was not a Schedule Tribe under the Presidential Order entitled to get elected as a member of the Scheduled Tribes. In Srish Kumar Choudhury v. State of Tripura and Ors. It was held that Manas are not Gonds and that, therefore, he was not a Schedule Tribe under the Presidential Order entitled to get elected as a member of the Scheduled Tribes. In Srish Kumar Choudhury v. State of Tripura and Ors. a Bench of 3 learned Judges was called upon to consider whether Laskar community in State of Tripura is a Scheduled Tribe. In a representative petition under Article 226, they sought declaration that earlier to the Act and the Order, they were recognized as Scheduled Tribes by rulers of Tripura State and those they were Tripura/Tripuri/Trippera Laskar and that; therefore, they were entitled to the status as Scheduled Tribes. The High Count dismissed the writ petition. 'On appeal, this Court held that though evidence may be admissible to verify the entries in the Presidential Order to find a caste/tribe included in a particular tribe or caste, tribal communities, the admissibility of the evidence is confined within the limitations enacted in the Order. It is not; however, open to the Court to make any addition or subtraction from the Presidential Order. Laskars, therefore, as a community cannot be included as Scheduled Tribes. In Kumnari Madhuri Patel and Ors v. Addl. Commissioner Tribal Development and Ors. (1994) 6 S.C.C 241 , a Bench of two Judges, to' which one of us (K. Ramaswary, J.) was a: member, had to consider whether Kolis, a Backward Class in Maharashtra would be declared as Mahadev Koli, a Scheduled Tribe in Maharashtra. Despite the cultural advancement, the genetic traits pass on from generation to generation and no one could escape or forget or get them over. The tribal customs are peculiar to such tribe or tribal communities and are still being maintained and preserved. Their cultural advancement to some extent may have modernized and progressed but they would, not be oblivious or ignorant of their customary and cultural post to establish their affinity to the membership of a particular tribe. The tribe or tribal communities, parts of or groups thereof have their peculiar traits. It was further held that Presidential declaration subject to amendment by Parliament is conclusive. No addition to it by way of declaration of castes, tribes or sub-caste, parts of or groups or tribes or tribal community is permissible. After a laborite survey of the constitutional purpose and the relative caste structures, customs, marriages, etc. It was further held that Presidential declaration subject to amendment by Parliament is conclusive. No addition to it by way of declaration of castes, tribes or sub-caste, parts of or groups or tribes or tribal community is permissible. After a laborite survey of the constitutional purpose and the relative caste structures, customs, marriages, etc. It was held that Kolis are Backward Class and Mahadeo Koli is Scheduled Tribes. The Appellants therein being OBCs were held not entitled to status as Scheduled Tribes. 14. The case of S. Suvigaradoes v. Zonal Manager F.C.I. J.T. 1996 (2) S.C. 102, a Bench decision of two learned Judges of the Apex Court may also' be referred to in this context. In that case, the parents of the Petitioner initially belonged to Adi-Dravida caste who had embraced Christianity before the birth of the Petitioner. The case of the Petitioner was what though he was born of Christian parents, with their consent he got converted to Hinduism and on conversion, he became Adi-Dravida and consequently, entitled to the status of a Scheduled Caste. The suit was decreed by the trial court, but reversed in appeal and the reversal was affirmed by the High Court. While dismissing the special leave petition, the Apex Court observed: The Courts, therefore, have no power except to give effect to the notification issued by the President. It is settled law than-the Court would look into the public notification under Article 341(1) or 342(1) for a limited purpose. The notification issued by the President and the Act of the Parliament under Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Order (Amendment) Act, 1976 and the Scheduled appended thereto can be looked into for the purpose to find whether the castes, races or tribes are parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes shall be Scheduled Castes for the purposes of the Constitution. In view of the admitted position that the Petitioner was born of Christian parents and his parents also were converted prior to his birth and no longer remained to be Adi-Dravida, a Scheduled Caste for the purpose of Tirunalveli District in TamilNadu as notified by the President, Petitioner cannot claim to be a Schedule Caste. In the light of the constitutional scheme civil court has no jurisdiction u/s 9 of CPC to entertain the suit. The suit, therefore, is not maintainable. In the light of the constitutional scheme civil court has no jurisdiction u/s 9 of CPC to entertain the suit. The suit, therefore, is not maintainable. The High Court, therefore, was right in dismissing the suit as not maintainable and also not giving any declaration sought for... 15. We may now refer to another Bench decision of two learned Judges of the Apex Court in Pankaj Kumar Saha Vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Islampur and Others. 'The challenge in that case was to the cancellation of a caste certificate that was initially granted to the Petitioner, a 'Saha' by caste, showing him to be member of a Scheduled Caste community, though in the State of West Bengal Sunny excluding Saha was declared to be Scheduled Caste; The writ petition filed by the Petitioner being dismissed, he had approached the Apex Court by way of a special leave petition. Repelling the.contention of the Petitioner who claimed the status as Sunri, a Scheduled Caste, the Bench observed: 6. It is now settled law that though evidence may be admissible to the limited extent of finding out whether a caste which claims the status as Scheduled Caste or Tribe was in 'fact included in the.Presidential notification as amended under 1976 Act, the court is devoid of power to include in or exude from or substitute or declare synonyms to be a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled, Tribe. The courts would only look into the notification issued by the 'president to see whether the name finds place in the notification? Saha caste is expressly excluded from Sunri, a Scheduled Caste notified in the notification issued by the President in relation to the State of west Bengal which is conclusive. The certificate issued to the Petitioner is, therefore,.,clearly unconstitutional and a fraud on the Constitution. The Petitioner cannot be considered to be a Scheduled Caste. 16. The question before the Bench of three learned Judges in the case of A. Chinnappa Vs. V. Venkatamuni and others was whether the status of the Appellant who is a Mondy/Mondigaru can be considered as a:Mundala, a Scheduled Caste, synonym for purpose of election to Legislative Assembly. The Petitioner cannot be considered to be a Scheduled Caste. 16. The question before the Bench of three learned Judges in the case of A. Chinnappa Vs. V. Venkatamuni and others was whether the status of the Appellant who is a Mondy/Mondigaru can be considered as a:Mundala, a Scheduled Caste, synonym for purpose of election to Legislative Assembly. Repelling the contention of the Petitioner the Apex Court observed: 3 Thus it could be seen that since the caste Mondy/Mondigaru does not admittedly find place in the notification issued by the President or as amended by the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribes (Amendment Order) Act, 1976, the status of the Appellant as Mundala cannot be considered to be synonymous of or equivalent to Mondy /Mondigaru as claimed by the Appellant. This Court in a recent judgment in Nityanand Sharma v. State of Bihar (1996) 2 J.T. (S.C.) 117, has' considered the scope 'of the power of the Court to declare the entries of the Presidential notification under Article 342(1) and had held that no Court has power to give such a declaration. The limited scope of enquiry is whether the caste claimed by the candidates finds place in the notification of the President as amended under the Act. The High Court, therefore, was right in its conclusion that the appellant cannot have the status of Scheduled Caste to - contest the said Legislative Assembly election. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant has relied upon The Revenue Officer and others Vs. Prafulla Kumar Pati and others. In that case, admittedly Dhoba is one of the castes recognized by the President as Scheduled Caste in relation to the State of Orissa. Since the Appellant therein claimed the status as a Rajaka in one of the sale deeds. It was sought to deny him the benefits conferred on Scheduled Castes.- This Court had held that since the. President has notified Dhoba to be Scheduled Caste in relation to the State of Orissa, merely because he described himself to be a Rajaka in one of the sale deeds, his status as a Scheduled Caste is not taken away by such description. The ratio therein has no application to the facts in this case. 17. Thus, from the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court, the following position emerges: (i) The Presidential declaration, subject to amendment made therein by Parliament, is conclusive. The ratio therein has no application to the facts in this case. 17. Thus, from the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court, the following position emerges: (i) The Presidential declaration, subject to amendment made therein by Parliament, is conclusive. (ii) Courts have no power except to give effect to the Presidential Order. They cannot go behind the Presidential Order. (iii) Courts cannot add, subtract, include in or exclude from the existing entries or declare synonyms to be a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.. (iv) Ordinarily, no evidence.is admissible to show that a particular castes which claims status of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe was in fact included in the Presidential Order. For example,it is not open to make any modification to show by evidence that though caste A is alone mentioned. Caste B is also a part of caste A and therefore, he deemed to be included in caste A. 18. Having considered the above authorities, we may now revert to the case at hand.' Admittedly, opposite party No. 3 did not consider himself to be a member of the Scheduled Caste community for had he really been one, he would have definitely taken advantage of the benefits available to the members of such a community and would not have applied and assured appointment under the general category which category he got his first promotion. Obviously, he grew wise after the judgment of this Court in: Krushna Chandra Barik's case (supra) and thereafter applied for and obtained a caste certificate showing him to be a member of Dewar caste, In his counter, opposite party No. 3 has not disclosed as to which particular caste or group he belongs. He has pleaded that he has already been accepted as a Scheduled Caste in accordance with the judgment of the High Court dated 19-9-1991, referred to above, and as such, he belongs to Dewar' community which has been included in the list of Scheduled Castes com munity in view of the aforesaid judgment. 19. A rejoinder affidavit was filed by the Petitioner in which it is clearly averred that the Petitioner does not belong to Dewar community, but in fact belongs to community known as 'Radhi'. Annexure-7, a Xerox copy of the Record-of-Right standing in the name 'of the Petitioner which has been filed along with the rejoinder affidavit,' indicates that opposite party No. 3 belongs to Radhi community. Annexure-7, a Xerox copy of the Record-of-Right standing in the name 'of the Petitioner which has been filed along with the rejoinder affidavit,' indicates that opposite party No. 3 belongs to Radhi community. This has not been refuted by opposite party No. 3 byway of any further affidavit. Thus, it is to be-accepted that the Petitioner belongs to Radhi community. 20. In Krushna Chandra Barik's case (supra), the Petitioner claiming to be a member of the Scheduled Caste had approached -the competent authority for grant of a caste certificate.: That application having been rejected, the order of the competent authority was assailed by the Petitioner before this Court placing reliance on a judgment of this Court in Narayan Behera Vs. State of Orissa and Others, wherein 'Keuta' was declared to be synonymous with 'Dewar'. Drawing" an analogy with the ratio' of that case, it was contended that as Krushna Chandra Barik belonged to Radhi community and by caste was a 'Keuta\ he was entitled to 'be declared as. one belonging to Dewar community which was notified to be a Scheduled caste in Orissa by the Presidential Order. This Court while accepting the submission of the learned Counsel held thus: In Narayan Behera Vs. State of Orissa and Others, it has been authoritatively. datively pronounced' that in Orissa 'Kaibartas', 'Keutas', 'Dhibaras' are synonymously -to 'Dewar' community which is included in the Scheduled Caste list. From Purnachandra Odia Bhasakosh and from all annexure as mentioned above, it is clear that though the occupational activities of 'Radhi' communities is 'Cl1udakuta' they are by caste 'Keuta' or 'Kaibarta' which caste is synonymous to that of 'Dewar' and therefore such community comes within the Scheduled Caste list as per the Presidential Order Therefore in our opinion the petition is entitled to be' issued with a Scheduled Caste Certificate as he belongs to Radhi community who are by caste 'Keuta' which has already been declared as synonymous 'of Dewar' by judgment pronounced in Narayan Behera Vs. State of Orissa and Others, from the above, we find that as 'Kauta' was held to be synonymous with 'Dewar', Krushna Chandra Barik, who belonged to Radhi community and was a Keuta by caste, was declared to be one belonging- to Scheduled Caste and entitled to a certificate as such. State of Orissa and Others, from the above, we find that as 'Kauta' was held to be synonymous with 'Dewar', Krushna Chandra Barik, who belonged to Radhi community and was a Keuta by caste, was declared to be one belonging- to Scheduled Caste and entitled to a certificate as such. Therefore, in Narayan Behara's case (supra) and Krushna Chandra Barik's case (supra), this Court has in fact declared some Castes to be Scheduled Castes by holding them to be synonyms of a caste declared to be a Scheduled Caste under the Presidential Order which declaration, in view of the decisions of the Apex Court referred to in the earlier part of this order, cannot be given by the Courts. 21. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the opinion that in view of the recent pronouncements of the Apex Court, the decision of this Court in Narayan Behera's case (supra) and Krushna Chandra Barik's case (supra) needs to be re-considered by a larger Bench. Accordingly, the matter may be placed before the Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice for necessary orders. P. K. Mohanty, J. I agree. Ordered accordingly.