Judgment :- C.S. Rajan, J. In a suit for partition of properties belonging to a Marumakkathayam Nair tharwad, the lower Court held that item No. 3 in the plaint schedule was partible. Item No. 3 was purchased by the first defendant in her name. Still the lower Court found that the above item of property is a tharwad property. Therefore, the question is whether the property which stood in the name of the first defendant is really tharwad property and is liable to be shared among the members of the tharwad. 2. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. The plaintiffs who are the daughter and grandchildren of the first defendant filed the suit for partition of three items of properties of which there was no dispute with regard to item Nos.1 and 2. It was contended that defendants 1 to 7 are the mother and brothers respectively of the first plaintiff, and that item No. 3 is the self-acquired property of the first defendant which was obtained as per the assignment deed No. 1317 of 1958. The first defendant sold 75 cents of the above property to the second defendant who is the son of the first defendant in 1987. In Ext. Al partition deed executed on 18.2.1974 as well as in a much earlier partition deed executed on 20.12.61 (Ext. B2 ), item No. 3 property was not included. Therefore, it was strongly contended by the defendants that item No. 3 property was the self-acquired property of the first defendant. 3. Issue No. 2 which was the crucial issue to be decided as framed by the lower Court was as follows: "Whether item No. 3 of plaint schedule is thavazhi property as alleged in the plaint?" After referring to the law on the point, the lower court found that the presumption of law is that all the acquisitions by a member of the family who live in commensality and possessing joint property are to be considered as tharwad or thavazhy property until the presumption is rebutted by evidence that it s a separate property. The onus is shifted to the individual member to prove it as self acquired one. The first defendant, being the senior most family member of the thavazhy, can acquire the property only for the thavazhy. The onus is shifted to the individual member to prove it as self acquired one. The first defendant, being the senior most family member of the thavazhy, can acquire the property only for the thavazhy. This presumption by the lower court with regard to the legal nature of the self-acquired property of a junior member of the tharwad is assailed by the appellants. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the above legal point in detail. 4. The standard works which deal with the principles of Marumakkathayam Law, as administered in Kerala are Hie 'Principles of Marurnakkathayam Law' by Sri. M.P. Joseph and 'A Treatise on Malabar and Aliyasanthana Law' by Sri. P.R. Sundara Aiyar. The former mainly deals with the law available in erstwhile princely State of Travancore and the latter considers the law pertaining to the Marumakkathayam system of inheritance in Malabar. 5. In M.P. Joseph's book a number of decisions of the erstwhile Travancore High Court with regard to the acquisition of a junior member of Hie tharwad have been cited. In Krishnan Sankaran v. Itlup Clieria (2 T.L.R.2), a Full Bench consisting of four Judges (Ramachandra Iyer, C.J. and Ormsby, Kunjen Menoh and Kunji Raman Nair, JJ.) held that where the property stands in the name of a junior member a tharwad who was not in the management at the time of the acquisition, without further evidence as to how it has been acquired or possessed, it must be presumed that such property is the self-acquisition of the said junior member. In Velayudhan Malheven v. Rumen Mallieven (15 T.L.R.33), Justice Krishna Swamy Rao, C.J. and Cosby, J. held that the ordinary presumption of law is that the property acquired in the name of a junior member is his self-acquisition. The onus of proof with regard to the self-acquisition by a junior member was dealt with in Narayanan Ramen v. Govinden Kesaven (26 T.L.R.190 F.B.) by Hund, Sankara Menon and Muthunayagam Pillai, JJ. and Their Lordships held as follows: "We are decidedly of opinion that the burden of proving that the property standing in name of a junior member of a tharwad is not his self-acquisition is always on those who allege it." 6. Having analysed the law as propounded by the eminent judges of the Travancore High Court, now we turn to certain rulings of the Madras High Court. In Govinda Panikkar v. Nani (1911) I.L.R.36, Mad. Having analysed the law as propounded by the eminent judges of the Travancore High Court, now we turn to certain rulings of the Madras High Court. In Govinda Panikkar v. Nani (1911) I.L.R.36, Mad. 304, Benson and Sundara Iyer, JJ. stated as follows: "We do not understand these cases as laying down that there is any presumption of law either way. The presumption is one of fact and whether a presumption in favour of the property being Tharwad property should be drawn or not in any particular case would depend on various circumstances such as the relationship of the member in whose name the title stands to the Kamavan at the time do the acquisition, the possession of private means by the junior member, the existence of any family funds that existed at the time of the acquisition which disappeared after the acquisition." 7. The law in question was the subject matter of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Achuthan Nair v. Chinnammu Amma (AIR 1966 SC 411). Subba Rao, J. (as he then was), after analyzing the relevant legal instances of tharwad under the Marumakkathayam Law held as follows: ""Under Hindu law, when a property stands in the name of a member of a joint family, it is incumbent upon those asserting that it is a joint family property to establish it. When it is proved or admitted that a family possessed sufficient nucleus with the aid of which the member might have made the acquisition, the law raises a presumption that it is a joint family property and the onus is shifted to the individual member to establish that the property was acquired by him without the aid of the said nucleus. This is a well settled proposition of law. But the said principle has. not been accepted or applied to acquisition of properties in the name of a junior member of a tharwad (anandravan). It was held that there was no presumption either way; and that the question had to be decided on the facts of each case." 8. The legal principles emerging from the above decisions are as follows: There could not be any presumption that the properties were tharwad properties unless the particular member was shown to have not provided with the means to acquire the property. The legal principles emerging from the above decisions are as follows: There could not be any presumption that the properties were tharwad properties unless the particular member was shown to have not provided with the means to acquire the property. In the absence of any proof of a tharwad nucleus, it cannot be held that all the acquisitions of a junior member pertain the character of tharwad property. Where the source of acquisition is proved, then the onus is thrown on the junior member to show that he either had separate funds or that the property was purchased out of separate funds. He can also show that no family property was in his possession or that even if it was, it was too insignificant to have substantially contributed in the acquisition. Of course, in the case of Karanavan, the situation is different. 9. Bearing these legal principles in mind, we propose to analyse the evidence in this case. According to PW1, the first plaintiff, at the time of Ext. B2 partition deed in 1961, the elder sister of the first defendant was also there. She also admitted that she could not produce any documents to show that at any point of time her mother, the first defendant was the Karanavati of the tharwad. A specific question was asked as to whether Kuttikrishnan Nair, the brother of the first defendant and the uncle of the first plaintiff was the Karanavan of the tharwad, being the eldest male member. There was no answer to the above question. She also candidly admitted that she could not say anything about those things because she was a minor at that time. The other circumstances which go against the plea of the plaintiffs that item No. 3 is the tharwad property are: Neither in Ext. B2 partition deed of 1961 nor in Ext. Al partition deed of 1974, the above property was included. In Ext. Al partition deed of 1974, certain properties were included as common properties which were not partitioned at that time. Item No. 3 was not one among them. PW-1 was also unable to state as to whether item No. 3 property was acquired by any income which the first defendant derived from the, management of any family properties. In Ext. Al partition deed of 1974, certain properties were included as common properties which were not partitioned at that time. Item No. 3 was not one among them. PW-1 was also unable to state as to whether item No. 3 property was acquired by any income which the first defendant derived from the, management of any family properties. Thus, the first plaintiff failed to discharge the burden cast on her to prove that the first defendant acquired item No. 3 property not with her own funds and that it was purchased with the income derived from the tharwad properties. 10. The lower Court has quoted the ruling reported in Achuthan Nair v, Chinnammu Amma, AIR 1966 S.C. 411, but thereafter misdirected itself the question of law and found that the presumption is that a junior member's self acquisition is tharwad property and that the onus is on him to prove that it is self-acquired property. We have no doubt in mind that the lower court erred in taking the above legal position. Therefore, the appeal is allowed. Item No. 3 in the plaint schedule property is declared to be the self-acquired property of the first defendant and therefore is not liable to be partitioned. The decree and judgment of the lower court is modified as indicated above.