JUDGMENT Panigrahi, J. The appellants were prosecuted for having committed the murder of Abdur Rahaman on or about 9th day of June, 1987 at Paschim Para under P.S. Bhagabangola within Murshidabad District. The learned Additional District Judge, 4th Court, Murshidabad convicted them for having committed murder of the aforesaid person and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The skeletal picture of the prosecution story as narrated in the F.I.R. lodged by P.W.1 Jahura Bewa is as follows:- “That the defacto complainant's husband died about four years prior to the incident. After P.W.1 husband death Abdur Rahaman Molla who happened to be the brother-in-law of the informant used to look after the landed properties of the informant. On the date of incident, i.e., on 9.6.1987 at about 10 p.m. in the night, the victim Abdul Rahaman Molla came to their house for holding a discussion about the landed properties. At that juncture, the appellants entered inside the house being armed with deadly weapons like lathis and indiscriminately assaulted Abdur Rahaman Molla. The victim raised an outcry which engaged the attention of the informant and her children. Many other persons reached at the spot and the appellants after seeing them fled away from the place of occurrence, after sometime they again came armed with different deadly weapons such as 'pasne" in their hands and directed the person assembled there to immediately quit the place. The appellants Niyamat and Rahamat launched murderous assault on Abdur Rahaman Molla by ‘pasne’. The appellant Jakirullah asked the other appellant to keep guard on the door by not allowing anybody to enter. After a while, the appellants thinking the victim dead left the place. Some villagers including the son of the victim came running to the spot after hearing the shriek raised by the victim. Those persons while coming to the house of the informant saw the appellants flee away from the spot. P.W.1 has further stated in the F.I.R. that the witnesses asked the injured who were his assailants to which he uttered the names of his assailants. It is further stated that it wall being a moonlit night they could see clearly the appellant running away from the spot. P.W.1 has further stated in the F.I.R. that the witnesses asked the injured who were his assailants to which he uttered the names of his assailants. It is further stated that it wall being a moonlit night they could see clearly the appellant running away from the spot. The information was lodged at the P.S. at about 12.35 a.m. on 10.6.1987 which was treated as F.I.R. It has been noted in the report that the injured was lying at Lalbagh hospital in an alarming condition, and he subsequently died.” 3. The case was initially registered under Section 304 I.P.C. but in the event of death of the victim it was turned into a case of murder under Section 302 I.P.C. read with Section 34 I.P.C. 4. The appellants pleaded their innocence and claimed to be tried in the case. 5. An important question has to be answered in this case is whether Abdur Rahaman Molla met a homicidal death or a natural death. In the case the prosecution has examined 13 witnesses in all in order to bring home the charge to the appellants. From the evidence of P. Ws. 2, 9, 10 and 11, it has transpired that the victim met a homicidal death. It is also not disputed by the appellants about the nature of death. The only question that has been urged by the appellants is that they have been falsely implicated in this case. 6. Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Advocate appearing for the appellants has strongly contended that the prosecution story in the manner as narrated in the trial Court had in fact not taken place. There has been no ocular witnesses in order to prove the fact-accounts of the prosecution story. The prosecution in order to sustain the charge against the appellants has mainly relied upon the evidence of P. Ws. 2, 9 and 10. The evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.9 is self-contradictor, and it cuts across each other. It is stated in the prosecution case that the incident had taken place on 9.6.1987 at about 10.30 p.m. within the premises of Jahura Bewa, P.W.1. P.W.2 was the son of the deceased and he had scribed the First Information Report which was dictated by P.W.1. It has been submitted by the appellant that the F.I.R. was not sent to the Magistrate forthwith as enjoined under the Code. 7. P.W.2 was the son of the deceased and he had scribed the First Information Report which was dictated by P.W.1. It has been submitted by the appellant that the F.I.R. was not sent to the Magistrate forthwith as enjoined under the Code. 7. P.W.2 had not claimed in his evidence that he could identify, the appellants due to moonlit night, whereas P.W.9 who is another eye-witness of the incident has strongly claimed to have noticed the appellants by the moonlight. The learned Trial Judge has wrongly stated that P.W.2 was non-pulsed at seeing the incident. Although, the prosecution relied upon the alleged dying declaration but there has been no such description in the F.I.R. The evidence of P.W.2 was totally different on material points from the evidence of P.W.9 who was another witness to the incident. P.W.10 who claimed to be an eye-witness deposed in his evidence that no other person, besides himself, was present at the spot. 8. The doctor, on being asked by the Court, had disclosed that the victim with such type of injuries could talk for about an hour. But the appellant's learned Advocate has invited our attention that it is impossible for a person having such type of injuries to talk or relay the information to any other person. Therefore, the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 9, if critically examined, one can safely arrive at the conclusion that they are not coming to the Court with the true story. Their evidence being full of embellishment, exaggeration and contradiction, therefore no reliance should be attacbed on such character of evidence. 9. The prosecution has depended upon the evidence of P.W.2, who is the son of the deceased and also P.W.9, his brother, in order to prove its case. Besides, it has relied upon the dying declaration said to have been made by the deceased immediately before his death. 10. P.W.1, who was the informant in this case did not support the prosecution case at the time of trial. Even she turned hostile to the prosecution, her entire evidence should not be effaced to the around. Besides, it has relied upon the dying declaration said to have been made by the deceased immediately before his death. 10. P.W.1, who was the informant in this case did not support the prosecution case at the time of trial. Even she turned hostile to the prosecution, her entire evidence should not be effaced to the around. In this connection, the prosecution has placed reliance on the reported judgment (1) AIR 1978 Supreme Court page 1096 in the case of Kesoram Bora v. State of Assam, where it has been held:- “While it is true that merely because a witness is declared hostile his evidence cannot be rejected on that ground alone, it is equally well settled that when a witness is declared hostile the prosecution clearly exhibits its intention not to rely on the evidence of such a witness and, hence his version cannot be treated as the version of the prosecution itself.” “It is now well settled that the principle falsus in uno falsus in omnibus does not apply to Criminal trials and it is the duty of the Court to disengage the truth from falsehood, to sift the grain from the chaff instead of taking an easy course of rejecting the prosecution case in its entirety merely on the basis of a few infirmities.” 11. Keeping the aforesaid observations in view, let us now analyse the evidence of P.W.1. From the resume of her evidence it has clearly transpired that the victim Abdur Rahaman Molla entered into her house seeking for help when some miscreants chased him. Therefore, from her evidence the prosecution could prove that the deceased came to her house where the incident has taken place. So far the defence has also not questioned in cross-examination about this aspect. From the evidence of P.W.1, it has been further proved that it was a full-moon night when the occurrence had taken place. She has also narrated the distance between her house and also the house of P.W.2 which is about half a mile. 12. P.W.2, according to the prosecution, is an eye-witness to the incident. He is the son of the deceased. From his evidence it has appeared that his father went from their house around 8.30 p.m. to 9 p.m. being called by the appellant Niyamat Sekh for mediating a 'salish'. 12. P.W.2, according to the prosecution, is an eye-witness to the incident. He is the son of the deceased. From his evidence it has appeared that his father went from their house around 8.30 p.m. to 9 p.m. being called by the appellant Niyamat Sekh for mediating a 'salish'. After an hour of his departure he heard an outcry, immediately, whereafter he came to know that his father had been killed. He, therefore, rushed to the house of P.W. 1, Jahura Bewa. He noticed his father lying with bleeding injuries, who further revealed that the four accused persons had inflicted injuries on his person by a ‘pasne’. P.W.1 rushed to the Police Station, whereafter, the police arrived at the spot. 13. A suggestion was given by the defence that his father’s neck was completely severed from the trunk to which he strongly denied. This witness after recall, had further proved the F.I.R. which was scribed by him. He has also a seizure witness in whose presence blood-stained earth, control earth, one hurricane lamp and other articles were seized. It has been suggested by the defence that the F.I.R. was antedated. It has been further contended by the learned Advocate appearing for the appellants that the F.I.R. was not in fact lodged at the time when it was purported to have been submitted. 14. In the trial Court, the First Information Report which was lodged by the P.W.1 has been marked as Exhibit 2. The Investigating Officer has endorsed the time of receipt of the F.I.R. at 00 35 a.m. on 10.6.1987. Of course, there has been some correction of date in the F.I.R. but it does not materially affect the interest of the defence. According to the prosecution, the victim left for ‘salish’ on the call of the accused persons around 9 p.m. on 9.6.1987. After an hour or so, P.W.2 on hearing the shrieks and shouts proceed to the spot. In the process it is quite likely that P.Ws. 1 and 2 must have gone to the Police Station after midnight. Thus in the above situation the F.I.R., possibly, might have been submitted after midnight. 15. Under Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it is enjoined that the F.I.R. should be sent to the Magistrate forthwith. In the process it is quite likely that P.Ws. 1 and 2 must have gone to the Police Station after midnight. Thus in the above situation the F.I.R., possibly, might have been submitted after midnight. 15. Under Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it is enjoined that the F.I.R. should be sent to the Magistrate forthwith. The forwarding of the occurrence report is indispensable and absolute and it has to be forwarded with the earliest dispatch which the intension is implicit with the use of word 'forthwith' occurring in Section 157, which means promptly and without any undue delay. It has dual purpose firstly to avoid the possibility of improvement in the prosecution story and introduction of any distorted version by deliberation and consultation and, secondly, to enable the Magistrate concerned to have a watch on the progress of the investigation. Sometime there are valid reasons for the delay in dispatch of the First Information Report which does not constitute always a circumstance on the basis of which the entire prosecution case can be said to be fabricated but it all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case where the circumstances of delay may lead to serious consequences. Keeping the aforesaid principle in mind let us advert to the fact situation of this case. 16. In the F.I.R. it has been noted that the F.I.R was dispatched from the Police Station on 11.6.1987 at 8 a.m. in the morning. It has been contended by the appellants that if it was sent on 11.6.1987 at 8 a.m. why it was not placed before the learned S.D.J.M. till 21st June, 1987 ? We found that within hours of the incident the F.I.R. was lodged at the Police Station and immediately thereafter the police swung into action. On 11.6.1987 the F.I.R. was dispatched to the learned S.D.J.M. If that be so, how could the Investigating Officer explain as to why the F.I.R. could not be placed before the learned S.D.J.M? Furthermore, there is no record to establish that the F.I.R. was not dispatched forthwith. The appellants could not prove that by late dispatch of the F.I.R. any prejudice had been caused to them. Therefore, in this background, we, however, feel that on account of late dispatch of the F.I.R. no prejudice is said to have caused to the appellants. 17. Furthermore, there is no record to establish that the F.I.R. was not dispatched forthwith. The appellants could not prove that by late dispatch of the F.I.R. any prejudice had been caused to them. Therefore, in this background, we, however, feel that on account of late dispatch of the F.I.R. no prejudice is said to have caused to the appellants. 17. P.W.2 has stated that within a few minutes after the occurrence he reached at the spot and found his rather lying on the ground with severe injuries over his neck and other portion of the body. On being asked he made a revelation that the accused persons had assaulted him. It is well settled that as a matter of law a dying declaration can be acted open without corroboration. There is not even any rule of prudence which has hardened into a rule of law that a dying declaration cannot be acted upon unless it is corroborated. The primary effort of the Court is to find out whether the dying declaration is true. If the answer is in negative, then, the question of corroboration arises. It is only if the circumstances surrounding the dying declaration are not cleared or convincing, then the Court may for its assurance, look for corroboration to the dying declaration. 18. P.W. 2 is closely related to the deceased. He has rushed to the spot immediately after learning that his father was severely injured. His evidence is quite spontaneous and natural. He will never make any attempt to falsely implicate any other person unconnected with the offence nor be would allow the assailants of his father scot free. Wherefore, as P.W.2 is the most natural and probable witness who has stated regarding the dying declaration revealed by his father end therefore, his evidence should not be lightly brushed aside. 19. The next question which arises for consideration is whether could the victim make a dying declaration after having such injuries on his windpipe. It has been submitted by the learned Advocate appearing for the appellants that it is not possible for a person to speak or talk having such type of injuries. In this regard, the learned Advocate has placed xerox copies from medical jurisprudence. But to me it appears that such submission has no relevance in this case. Trachea/windpipe which is a cylinder shaped tube situate from the larynx from above the heart. In this regard, the learned Advocate has placed xerox copies from medical jurisprudence. But to me it appears that such submission has no relevance in this case. Trachea/windpipe which is a cylinder shaped tube situate from the larynx from above the heart. From the evidence, the windpipe was cut which has nothing to do with the larynx which is commonly known as the voice box. Assuming the windpipe was cut, that by itself did not affect the power of speech, moreover Dr. Goutam Pal, who conducted autopsy on the dead body has deposed that a patient having such injuries could talk even up to an hour after such incident but in a horse voice. Such statement of the doctor has not been challenged by the appellants. 20. A further question can be considered whether the evidence of the doctor could be rejected on account of the opinion expressed in medical jurisprudence. In this connection we can rely upon a judgment reported in (2) 1971 (3) SCC page 416, in the case of Masji Tato v. Rawool, where it has been held:- "It is not proper and fair to a medical witness to discard his evidence by referring to passages of experts and medical jurisprudence without bringing the reference to the notice of its witness." 21. Evidently no attempt was made by the accused to bring to the notice of the Medical Officer that it could be impossible for a patient to talk after receiving such injury as it was expressed in the jurisprudence. Therefore, when we get sufficient corroborative evidence from the statement of P.W.2 and P.W.9, there is no reason to base our observation on hypothetical submission advanced by the appellants. Accordingly such contention is liable to be rejected. P.W.2 and P.W.10 being the close relation of the deceased it is quite natural that they had gone to the spot immediately, after hearing about the incident. In this regard, reliance can be placed in a reported judgment (3) 1998 Supreme Court Cases (Criminal) page 1483, where it has been stated :- “Having regard to the fact that the incident took place at an unearthly hour of the night in the house of the deceased, it cannot be gainsaid that P.Ws. 1 and 2 were the most natural and probable witnesses. 1 and 2 were the most natural and probable witnesses. This apart, we find that in spite of searching and lengthy cross-examination the defence could not succeed in eliciting any answer favourable to it. Judged in that context, we do not find any reason whatsoever to disbelieve their testimony that they saw the appellant running away from their house and that the deceased told them that it was the appellant who stabbed him. When these two pieces of evidence are considered along with the medical evidence and the F.I.R. which contains the substratum of the prosecution case and was lodged with utmost dispatch, the only legitimate inference that can be drawn is that the prosecution has been able to conclusively prove that the appellant committed the murder of his uncle.” 22. On the basis of dying declaration conviction can solely be based, provided it is reliable. In this connection we rely on a judgment reported in (4) 1996 SCC (Cr.) 646, where it has been stated :- “The primary question, therefore, is where the prosecution has established the case against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt? The evidence in this case consists of three successive dying declarations of the deceased Guddi. She principally attributed the acts to the respondent, her husband, an abetment by her mother-in-law, Pushpa who stood acquitted. The question, therefore, is : whether the dying declarations are reliable places of evidence? Section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act brings an exception to the rule of hearsay evidence when the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which result in the death, in cases in which the cause of the person’s death comes into question. Therefore, under Section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act, if the statement of Guddi as to the cause of her death is believable as a reliable piece of evidence, it would form basis to convict the accused-respondent. In Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay this Court had held that it is not an absolute rule nor even a rule of prudence that has ripened to a rule of law that dying declaration to sustain the order of conviction, must be corroborated by other independent evidence. The rule of corroboration requires that the dying declaration be subjected to close scrutiny since the evidence is untested by cross-examination. The rule of corroboration requires that the dying declaration be subjected to close scrutiny since the evidence is untested by cross-examination. The declaration must be accepted, unless such declaration can be shown not to have been made in expectation of death or to be otherwise unreliable. Any evidence adduced for this purpose can only detract from its value but does not affect its admissibility. The dying declaration, therefore, may be tested as any other piece of evidence. Once the Court reaches the concluded that the dying declaration is true, no question of corroboration arises. The dying declaration cannot be placed in the same category as evidence of an accomplice or a confession." “It is settled law by series of judgments of this Court that the dying declaration, if after careful scrutiny the Court is satisfied that it is true sad free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, is no legal impediment to form such dying declaration the basis of conviction even if there is no corroboration vide Tarachand Domu Sutar v. Stare of Maharashtra Kusa v. State of Orissa ; Meesala Romakrishan v. State of A.P. ; Goverdhan Raoji Ghyare v. State of Maharashtra and Gangotri Singh v. State of U.P.” 23. Mr. Mukherjee has advanced another contention that if the Investigating Officer has seized the material earth from the place of occurrence why he neglected in getting those material objects examined by the serologist? Therefore, on this account also the prosecution case cannot be believed. To counter-act this submission the prosecution has relied upon the observation reported in the judgment mentioned Supra 1996 Supreme Court, where it has been stated :- "It is equally true that the Investigating Officer P.W.8 committed grave irregularity in omitting to sent the burnt clothes and other incriminating material for chemical examination to land corroboration to the evidence. Mere fact that the Investigating Officer committed irregularity or illegality during the course of the investigation would not and does not cast aside to record acquittal on that account. It is seen from the panchnama recover, of the incriminating material from the screen of offence that there was an attempt to screen the offence by destroying the evidence. Others were prevented from entering the room. It is seen from the panchnama recover, of the incriminating material from the screen of offence that there was an attempt to screen the offence by destroying the evidence. Others were prevented from entering the room. That by itself indicates an attempt on the part of the accused to destroy the incriminating evidence and to prevent others from saving the life of the deceased. Therefore, the absence of smell of kerosene on the hair sent for chemical examination does not ruder the dying declaration of the deceased suspect nor would it become unbelievable. The High Court, therefore, has not considered the evidence in the proper and legal perspective but felt it doubtful like Doubting Thomas with vacillating mind to accept the prosecution case for invalid reasons and wrongly gave to the respondent the benefit of doubt." 24. From the narration of the testimony of P.W.9, it has however, appeared that he reached the spot within minutes of the occurrence along with P.W.2. A lot of criticism had been advanced to reject the testimony, of P.W.9 on account of the fact that P.W.2 had not disclosed that P.W.9 had also gone with him at that time. On a close scrutiny of the evidence of P.W.2 it has transpired that the witness became bewildered at seeing the ghastly incident about the casualty of his father. It is quite but natural. So, therefore, he might have not closely observed about the presence of P.W.9. But P.W.9 in his evidence has stated that all the appellants fled away with the weapons of offence from the scene of occurrence on seeing them. There was no possibility for any other person to arrive there in the meantime. Therefore, in the above background any reasonable person can safely arrive at the conclusion that it were the appellants who were alone the perpetrators of the crime. From the evidence it does not, however, turn out that there was any enmity between the deceased and the appellants. It is, therefore, safe to rely on the evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.9. further, since, P.W.9 has deposed that he saw the appellants running, away from the place of occurrence and also proved the dying declaration said to have been made by the deceased to him, therefore, his evidence was sufficiently corroborated with the dying declaration. 25. It is, therefore, safe to rely on the evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.9. further, since, P.W.9 has deposed that he saw the appellants running, away from the place of occurrence and also proved the dying declaration said to have been made by the deceased to him, therefore, his evidence was sufficiently corroborated with the dying declaration. 25. There could have been no other possibility that any other person had induced the deceased to make a false statement by implicating the appellants into the offence in this case. The evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.9 sufficiently gains corroboration from the evidence of the Medical Officer who, conducted the post mortem examination. Where may be some minor discrepancy in the evidence of prosecution witness but such contradiction, however, does not detract nor reader the evidence incredible. In this respect, we, however, rely upon a judgment reported in (5) AIR 1981 Supreme Court, page 1390, in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki, where it has been held :- “The second ground on which the High Court refused to place reliance on the evidence of P.W.1 was that there were 'material discrepancies'. As indicated above we have perused the evidence of P.W.1. We have not found any 'material discrepancies' in her evidence. The discrepancies referred to by the High Court are, in our opinion, minor, insignificant, natural and not ‘material’. The discrepancies are with regard to as to which accused pressed the deceased and at which part of the body to the ground and sat on which part of the body; with regard to whether the respondent, Kalki, gave the axe blow to the deceased while the latter was standing or lying on the ground, and whether the blow was given from the side of the head or from the side of the legs. In the depositions of witnesses there are always normal discrepancies however, honest and truthful they may be. These discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental deposition such as shock and horror at the time of the occurrence, and the like. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person. These discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental deposition such as shock and horror at the time of the occurrence, and the like. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person. As indicated above we have not found any material discrepancies in the evidence of the P.W.1.” In view of our discussion in the above paragraphs we are, however, of the view that the trial Court has rightly and meticulously on a close study of the evidence hold the appellants guilty to have committed the murder of Abdul Rahaman Molla and accordingly they had been convicted under Section 302 I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. Therefore, we also, hereby concur and confirm the observation of conviction and sentence. The appeal being devoid of merit, it is accordingly dismissed. Kundu, J. I agree.