Judgment :- K. Narayana Kurup, J. Respondents 5 and 6 in the Original Petition who were the Manager and Headmaster respectively of St. Thomas U.P. School, Vakayar are the appellants. The appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge quashing Ext. P4 and declaring that the appellants/respondents 5 and 6 in the O.P are not entitled to the protection under Art.30(1) of the Constitution of India and holding that the first petitioner is entitled to be considered for appointment as Headmistress in accordance with her seniority and qualification in the vacancy which arose on 1.7.1988. In this appeal the challenge is directed only against the finding of the learned Single Judge on the question of the minority status of the 5th respondent's educational institution. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of the Writ Appeal are as follows: 2. Petitioners/ respondents 5 and 6 in this appeal are the two senior most teachers in the first appellant's school. The aforesaid school was originally started by one P.J. Thomas who subsequently sold the school to Rt Rev. Benedict Mar Gregorious, Arch Bishop of Thiruvananthapuram (Corporate Manager, MSC Schools, Pattom). The first appellant manager of the school requested to treat the school as a separate unit and the Corporate Manager also agreed to treat the school as a separate unit. Thus, the Director of Public Instruction, the second respondent in this appeal passed Ext P1 order by which sanction was accorded to treat the teachers of the school of the first appellant who were in service on the date of transfer as a separate unit as per R.36(A) of Chap. XIV-A K.E.R. from the date of transfer of management. A vacancy of Headmaster arose in the school on 1.7.1988. The 5th respondent first petitioner being the senior most teacher in the school staked a claim to be appointed as Headmistress in accordance with her seniority. But the first appellant appointed the second appellant who was junior to the petitioners. The objection of the first peti-tioner/5th respondent against the appointment of the second appellant was rejected and the 4th respondent Asst. Educational Officer approved the appointment of the second appellant as Headmaster. The matter was taken up revision before the first respondent Commissioner and Secretary to Government, General Education Department who as per Ext. P4 rejected the revision petition and confirmed the approval of appointment of the second appellant. Ext. Educational Officer approved the appointment of the second appellant as Headmaster. The matter was taken up revision before the first respondent Commissioner and Secretary to Government, General Education Department who as per Ext. P4 rejected the revision petition and confirmed the approval of appointment of the second appellant. Ext. P4 was challenged in the Original Petition contending inter-alia that the first appellant manager has no right to appoint the Headmaster at his whim and fancy against the mandate contained in R.44 of Chap. XIV-A KER and that the management is not entitled to the protection under Art.30(1) of the Constitution of India in administering the school and therefore the ordinary rule of seniority need ro be followed in the matter of appointment Of Headmaster. A counter affidavit was filed by the appellants justifying the appointment of the second appellant "based on the minority right and taking into account the educational excellence, discipline, etc." A learned Single Judge on a consideration of the rival contentions, allowed the Original Petition in the manner indicated above and hence this appeal. 3. At the hearing stage, learned counsel for the appellants confined his argument to the minority status of the school managed by the first appellant. According to learned counsel, the school in question managed by the first appellant manager is a minority educational institution entitled to protection under Art.30(1) of the Constitution of India. In support of the aforesaid contention, learned counsel brought to our notice the fact that it was one PJ. Thomas who effected the purchase of the land for the school as per Ext. P5 sale deed and the school in question after its construction by the aforesaid Thomas was managed strictly in accordance with Christian tenets and discipline. He has a further contention based on Ext. P6 sale deed under which the school in question was sold by the aforesaid Thomas to Rt. Rev. Benedict Mar Gregorious that the school was established and managed for the benefit of minority community. Respondents 5 and 6/ petitioners in the O.P have filed a reply affidavit repudiating the stand taken by the appellants. 4. Having considered the rival contentions and having perused the pleadings, we are of the opinion that the appellants are not entitled to succeed in this appeal. Respondents 5 and 6/ petitioners in the O.P have filed a reply affidavit repudiating the stand taken by the appellants. 4. Having considered the rival contentions and having perused the pleadings, we are of the opinion that the appellants are not entitled to succeed in this appeal. It is by now settled by a catena of decisions of the Supreme court and of this Court that in order to claim protection under Art.30(1) of the Constitution of India, it will have to be shown that the institution is established and administered by a religious minority. On the materials placed before us there is nothing to indicate that the school in question was established as a minority school. On the other hand, it has come out on record that the school was established by an individual who is the buyer of the land in question under Ext. P5 document of sale making use of his own personal funds which negatives any intention on the part of the vendee to establish a minority institution. There is no recital in Ext. P5 or Ext. P6 to show that the intention of the parties is to establish and administer a minority educational institution. As already noted, admittedly it was one PJ. Thomas who started the school in his individual capacity after purchasing the property with his own funds. There is no contribution from any member of the minority community for the purchase of the property. In the aforesaid view, we are of opinion that it was an individual adventure and nothing more. The Corporate Manager purchased the property and the school by paying consideration by registered document, Ext. P6. There also, there is no mention of the fact that the school was establi shed as a minority institution or with the help of any person belonging to the minority community. Therefore, we find no merit in the contention of the appellants that the school in question was established for the benefit of any minority community. The question is no longer res-integra. In State of Kerala v. V.R.M. Provincial (1970 (2) SCC 417) the Apex Court ruled as follows: "8. Art.30(1) has been construed before by this Court. Without referring to those cases it is sufficient to say that the clause contemplates two rights which are separated in point of time. The first right is the initial right to establish institutions of the minority's choice. Art.30(1) has been construed before by this Court. Without referring to those cases it is sufficient to say that the clause contemplates two rights which are separated in point of time. The first right is the initial right to establish institutions of the minority's choice. Establishment here means the bringing into being of an institution and it must be by a minority community. It matters not if a single philanthropic individual with his own means, founds the institution or the community at large contributes the funds. The position in law is the same and the intention in either case must be to found an institution for the benefit of a minority community by a member of that community. It is equally irrelevant that in addition to the minority community others from. other minority communities or even from the majority community can take advantage of these institutions. Such other communities bring in income and they do not have to be turned away to enjoy the protection. 9. The next part of the right relates to the administration of such institutions. Administration means 'management of the affairs' of the institution. This management must be free of control so that the founders or their nominees can mould the institution as they think fit, and in accordance with their ideas of how the interests of the community in general and the institution in particular will be best served. No part of this management can be taken away and vested in another body without an encroachment upon the guaranteed right." This Court had occasion to consider the scope of Art.30(1) of the Constitution in the decision reported in Rev. K.C. Seth v. State of Kerala (1991 (2) KLT 662) in which it was held as follows: "S.2(5) of the Kerala Education Act defines 'minority schools' as not only established and administered, but also schools administered by the minority. The definition of minority school in the Act is wider than what is contemplated in Art.30(1) of the Constitution. Art.30(1) confers on all minorities, whether based on religion or language, the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The words 'established and administered' will have to beheld as ultra vires Art.30(1) of the Constitution of India. Minorities may be based on religion or language but the rights is to establish and then to administer. Art.30(1) confers on all minorities, whether based on religion or language, the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The words 'established and administered' will have to beheld as ultra vires Art.30(1) of the Constitution of India. Minorities may be based on religion or language but the rights is to establish and then to administer. The right is not available to institution not established by the minority but administered by the minority. Art.30(1) also emphasises this requirement. Hence, if Art.30 of the Constitution is the ground norm and if that is to be given effect to, the words "or administered" in S.2(5) of the Kerala Education Act will have to be ignored. S.2(5) of the Kerala Education Act has to be read down in conformity with the requirement of Art.30 of the Constitution and, so read, the words "or administered" occurring in the sub-section will have to be ignored." The aforesaid decision was affirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported in Rev. K.C. Seth v. State of Kerala (1992 (1) KLT 754). 5. In the light of the aforesaid decisions, there is no room for any controversy that the words "established and administered" in Art.30 of the Constitution of India must be read conjunctively. As observed by the learned Single Judge, the mere fact that the educational institution is now being administered by a minority community is not sufficient to claim protection under Art.30(1) of the Constitution of India. It must also be proved that the institution was established by a minority community. The basic fact to be proved is that initially the institution was established by a minority community. Establishment in this context means the bringing into being of an institution. Therefore, it is quite clear that the minority community must have some role to play not only in the subsequent administration of an institution, but also in the initial establishment of the institution. Here the minority institution is nowhere in the picture in the process of establishing the institution. A subsequent entry by the minority community into the area will not help them to claim protection under Art.30(1) of the Constitution of India. Here the minority institution is nowhere in the picture in the process of establishing the institution. A subsequent entry by the minority community into the area will not help them to claim protection under Art.30(1) of the Constitution of India. In the aforesaid view, we are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge was right in allowing the Original Petition, quashing Ext P4 and declaring that the educational institution managed by the first appellant is not a minority institution entitled to protection under Art.30(1) of the Constitution of India. This appeal accordingly fails and we dismiss the same.