The present set of writ petitions was disposed of by a Full Bench of this Court comprising two of us (Binod Kumar Roy, J. and S. K. Phaujdar, J.) as also Honble G. S. N. Tripathi, J. (since retired) on 30-6-1998. Three review applications had been preferred by S/sri Shri Prakash Jain, Ashok Kumar Kakkar and Vinod Kumar Verma. While the review matters were being heard, an ap plication was moved by Sri Umakantshar-ma for rectifying certain clerical errors in giving the serial numbers of the respon dents for whom certain directions were given in the writ petition. All these matters were heard together. 2. The first two review petitioners happened to be respondents No. 12 and 18 in Writ Petition No. 35384 of 1995 in which the impugned judgment was passed. The review petitioner, Vinod Kumar Verma, was, however, the petitioner him self in Writ Petition No. 36493 of 1997, one of the matters in the above set of writ petitions. The grounds taken up by the first two review petitioners are identical while those taken by Vinod Kumar Verma are different from them. S/sri Shri Prakash Jain and Ashok Kumar Kakkar desired a review of the judgment on the ground that they had no knowledge so far the records of the Registry were concerned and so far the decisions taken from time to time by the Full Court/honble the Chief Justice and they could know the true state of af fairs only after the pronouncement of the judgment and could know that the number of vacancies for the relevant recruitment was not properly reported by the Registry and, as such, the Court was misled on im portant facts. It was further argued that the decision of a Full Bench of this High Court in the case of Shri Kant Tripathi & Anr. v. State of U. P. & Ors. 1987 UPLBEC 222 was never placed before the High Court and there had been an error ap parent on the face of record for not follow ing the dictum of the Full Bench in the aforesaid case. The review petitions were accompanied by applications of condona tion of delay on the basis of certain office reports that the petitions had been filed beyond time. The review petitions were accompanied by applications of condona tion of delay on the basis of certain office reports that the petitions had been filed beyond time. We may indicate at the outset that in the writ jurisdiction the Court has an inherent power to review its own judg ment and although the provisions of Order XLII are not applicable in letters, but the broad principles under which a judgment may be reviewed under the provisions of Order XLVII, C. P. C. are ap plicable to the power of review in the writ jurisdiction. A writ petition is not barred on the ground of delay, although the Court may not entertain such a petition on the ground of laches on the part of the petitioner, Similarly, an application for review of a judgment recorded in a writ jurisdiction may not be barred by limita tion, but it would always be open to the scrutiny of the Court if the review petitioner was guilty of laches. 3. The Allahabad High Court Rules provides in Chapter IX, Rule 14 as to what would be the contents of a review applica tion. It requires that a "an application for review on the ground of discovery of new and important matter or evidence shall state in clear terms what such new and important matter or evidence is, the effect or purpose thereof, how the same after exercise of due diligence was not within the applicants knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made and how and when he came to know of it or became able to produce it and the affidavit accom panied it shall be made by the applicant himself. The two review petitioners. S/sri Jain and Kakkar, have averred that the true vacancy position was not reported by the Registry and they could know of it only after the recording of the impugned order. It is clear from the records that these two review petitioners were respondents in the concerned writ petitions. They had been noticed, but they had chosen not to con test. No doubt, they have stated that they had no access to the records of the Registry and as such they could not know the actual vacancy position on the relevant date. They had been noticed, but they had chosen not to con test. No doubt, they have stated that they had no access to the records of the Registry and as such they could not know the actual vacancy position on the relevant date. But absence on their part to appear or contest suggests that there was no diligence on their part to try to know the actual state of affairs. Had they really been interested in knowing the facts, they would have come up and could have made a prayer to the Court for asking the Registry to produce the paper before the Court. There is no averment in their affidavits that despite exercise of due diligence, the facts now pleaded were not known to them. 4. In the writ petitions, that were decided by the Full Bench, the moot point was whether certain vacancies existing in the direct recruit quota could have been converted for the benefit of the prom- otees even with the help of Rule 8 (2) of the U. P Higher Judicial Service Rules. Certain facts were brought to the kno wledge of the Selection Committee and, upon acceptance of those facts, the Selec tion Committee had observed that there were really 19 vacancies for the direct recruits in the relevant selection. The ad vertisement was, however, for only six direct recruitment with a clear indication that the number could be increased. Noth ing was before the Full Bench to infer that this number was ever increased by the Court, Le. in a meeting of the Full Court and as such the Court had given a direction that it will be for the Full Court to consider if the number would be enhanced or not. If there was wrong report to the Selection Committee, the grievance is really against the order of the Selection Committee and not against the judgment. On the ground of absence of averment, as required under Rule 14 in Chapter IX of the Allahabad High Court Rules and on the ground that the attack is really aimed on the finding of the Selection Committee, we are of the view that no review of the judgment is called for on the basis of the new facts, now averred. 5. 5. As regards the decision of the Full Bench in Shri Kant Tripathis case (supra), we find on a reading of the judgment that even if this judgment had been placed before the Full Bench, it would not have affected the judgment in any manner so far interpretation of Rule 8 (2) of the U. P. Higher Judicial Service Rules was con cerned for conversion of some posts in the quota of direct recruits to the quota of promotees. 6. On the question of review of a judgment rendered in a writ petition, we have certain decisions of the Supreme Court before us. In the case of Shivdeo Singh & others v. State of Punjab & others, AIR 1963 SC1909, a five Judges Bench of the Apex Court held, inter alia, that there was nothing in Article 226 of the Constitu tion to preclude a High Court from exer cising its power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable error committed by it. A similar view was expressed by another Full Bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Sardar Begum & Ors. , AIR 1976 SC 1695 . It was observed that patent error, which was, perhaps, due to indifference, could and should have been suo motu corrected by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction even after the expiry of the ordinary period of limitation, if any prescribed for a review application. In a subsequent decision, the Supreme Court again noticed the decision in Shivdeo Singhs case (supra) and held in the case of A. T. Sharma v. A. P. Sharma, AIR 1979 SC 1047 that the power of review may be exer cised on the discovery of new and impor tant matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. The power of review could be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record was found. It could also be exercised on any analogous ground. The power of review could be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record was found. It could also be exercised on any analogous ground. The Supreme Court further went on to say that this power of review could not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appel late power, which may enable an Appel late Court to correct all manner of errors committed by the Subordinate Court. 7. As observed, the two writ petitioners, viz. S/sri Ashok Kumar Kak-kar and Shri Prakash Jain, could not produce materials to show that even after due diligence they could not get the true facts at the time of hearing, rather the records indicated absolute absence of diligence on their part. Moreover, the facts discovered and now proposed to be pleaded are directed against the report of the committee and not really against the judgment as the action of the committee on a particular interpretation of Rule 8 (2) was disapproved by the Full Bench. We have also found and observed that the decision in Shri Kant Tripathis case (supra) would not have affected the find ing of the Division Bench in interpreting Rule 8 (2) of the U. P. Higher Judicial Ser vice Rules. These two review petitions are, therefore, dismissed. 8. So far third review petition is concerned, we find that the petitioner, Sri Vinod Kumar Verma, had pleaded in Writ Petition No. 36493 of 1997 that he is a handicapped person and was at least en titled to be considered in the handicapped quota, which according to the interpreta tion of the rules, should have been 2% (per cent) of the total vacancy and not of the vacancies advertised. The Full Bench had held in its judgment "nothing has been placed before us to indicate that in deter mining the percentage of reservation for physically handicapped candidates, the total number of officers in the cadre is to be considered and not the total number of vacancies in the particular advertisement". The learned Counsel, Sri Govind Krishna, drew our attention of Rule 7 of the U. P. Higher Judicial Service Rules and the notes thereunder and also to the Appen-dix-B, which was a Government Order dated 18-7-1972. The learned Counsel, Sri Govind Krishna, drew our attention of Rule 7 of the U. P. Higher Judicial Service Rules and the notes thereunder and also to the Appen-dix-B, which was a Government Order dated 18-7-1972. It spoke that all services under the State will have a reservation 2% for the physically handicapped candidates. In our view, this aspect of the matter re quires reconsideration in view of the Government Order now placed before us which was existing on the date of judgment of the Full Bench. This review application of Vinod Kumar Verma is, thus, admitted. Let the respondents be noticed and the matter be listed for hearing on 26-2-1999. 9. In so far the application of Sri Umakant Sharma is concerned, we have perused the records. The proposed rec tification is of clerical nature only. The application stands allowed. The judgment of the Full Bench dated 30-6-1998 is amended in so far as the description of the respondents by serial number is con cerned, to indicate that SI. Nos. 3 to 15 relate to respondents in Writ Petition No. 1265 of 1996. Order accordingly. .