V. Navayugarajan v. High Court of Judicature At Madras and Others
1999-04-07
V.KANAGARAJ
body1999
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- V. KANAGARA, J. JThe above writ petition has been filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India with prayers to call for the records from the file of the first respondent regarding the order passed in its proceeding in Roc. No. 2558/92/C1, dated 17-8-1993 and also the order passed by the second respondent in his proceedings Roc. 5620/A/90, dated 20-12-1991 and Roc. 5620/A/90, dated 30-9-1994 and quash the same further directing the respondents to exonerate the petitioner from the charges levelled against him in the charge memo dated 1-10-1990 issued by the Principal District Munsif, Salem and treat the service of the petitioner as unblemished conferring all monetary and service benefits on the petitioner, as if there is no punishment against him even for the period from 19-12-1991 to 9-11-1993 by issuing a writ of certiorarified mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order or direction in the nature of a writ or any other appropriate relief. 2. The history of the case is that the petitioner got appointed as Copyist through his Employment Exchange on 8-4-1979 and subsequently got promoted to the post of the Examiner and then as the Junior Assistant. While so, he got suspended on 7-6-1990 by the Principal District Munsif, Salem, which came to be ratified by the Principal District Judge, Salem based on the enquiry instituted against him on the complaint preferred by one lady Junior Assistant viz. Mrs. Esthar. At the time of the said complaint, both the complainant and the petitioner were working as Junior Assistants in the Court of Principal District Munsif, Salem. 3. The gist of the complaint preferred by the lady Junior Assistant of the Court of Principal District Munsif, Salem is that the complainant, the petitioner/delinquent officer and some others were directed by the Principal District Munsif, Salem to work in the Central Record Room during the then ensuing summer vacation starting from 7-5-1990 to 31-5-1990. Since the petitioner has been conversant with the type of work to be executed and further since the complainant got deputed to the said work from the Magistrate's Court, the Head Clerk, Principal District Court, Salem orally instructed the petitioner to help the complainant in carrying out the new work assigned. 4.
Since the petitioner has been conversant with the type of work to be executed and further since the complainant got deputed to the said work from the Magistrate's Court, the Head Clerk, Principal District Court, Salem orally instructed the petitioner to help the complainant in carrying out the new work assigned. 4. While so, on 9-5-1990, at 5.45 p.m. when the complainant was about to leave the Court for home, the petitioner insisted her to prepare the weekly statements regarding the pending Copy Applications and when the complainant was taking down the Copy Application numbers to the dictation of the petitioner, at 6.30 p.m., the petitioner touching the scar on the left hand of the complainant remarked whether the scar had not yet vanished, as a result of which, the complainant had become shocked and panic-stricken. After sometime, as though checking the correctness of the statement, the petitioner touched the fingers of the complainant and a little later had started closing the shutters of the window. But, the complainant, stating that she wanted to go home and prepare food for the children, started walking towards the veranda. Again, while the complainant was proceeding towards her residence, the petitioner enquiring about the location of her house, further volunteered to drop her in his vehicle. Refusing such offer, the petitioner (complainant) had reached home on her own accord. 5. On 10-5-1990, the complainant had reported to the Head Clerk one Devendran about the misbehaviour of the petitioner. But, the Head Clerk besides consoling her, also asked her not to reveal the matter outside, as a result, she continued to work thereon 10-5-1990 and 11-5-1990. On 11-5-1990, the complainant reported the matter to the District Munsif in the presence of his Assistant Dhanapal and the District Munsif in turn has ordered the Head Clerk not to allocate the complainant the work in the Record Room any more but, instead to make her work in the office. The further case of the complainant is that after summer vacation on 4-6-1990, she gave a written complaint to the District Munsif, stating everything that had happened on 9-5-1990. 6.
The further case of the complainant is that after summer vacation on 4-6-1990, she gave a written complaint to the District Munsif, stating everything that had happened on 9-5-1990. 6. Based on the said complaint on 1-10-1990, issuing the charge memo extracted ibid (para No. 17) to the petitioner, the Principal District Munsif, Salem has directed the petitioner to submit his explanation, which the petitioner did on 3-10-1990, stating thereby that on account of ignorance, the misconduct has taken place and that he had served the department 11 long years in an unblemished manner and had not only pleaded for mercy on ground that it was the first offence but also had prayed to relieve him of the charge. 7. During enquiry, five witnesses have been examined on the part of the complainant as P.Ws. 1 to 5 including the complainant examining herself as P.W. 1. Likewise six witnesses have been examined on the part of the petitioner/delinquent officer as D.Ws. 1 to 6. 8. On the part of the prosecution, the complainant has examined herself as P.W. 1 whereby she has confirmed what she has stated in her complaint to the effect of her working in the Record Room along with the petitioner on 9-5-1990 and the two instances of misbehaviour committed on her person by the petitioner at 5.45 p.m. and 7.30 p.m. on that day and her reporting the occurrence with the Head Clerk Devendran on the subsequent day and about her lodging the complaint on 11-5-1990 orally with the Principal District Munsif, Salem in the presence of his Assistant Dhanapal and ultimately lodging the written complaint with the Principal District Munsif, Salem on 4-6-1990, after completion of the summer vacation. 9. One Mr. Dhanapal, Assistant of the Principal District Munsif, Salem has been examined as P.W. 2 and in his evidence he has spoken about to the effect that on 9-5-1990, after finishing his work, when he was returning home at 6.45 p.m., the Court Hall of the Additional District Munsif was open and that he checked up whether the Assistant of the Additional District Munsif viz.
Alagappan was there and at that time, the petitioner was found at the entrance of the Record Room and in a couple of days thereafter, the complainant lodged the complaint with the Principal District Munsif, Salem in his presence and that the Principal District Munsif, Salem verified with him about her complaint. 10. The Head Clerk of the Principal District Munsif's Court, Mr. Devendran has been examined as P.W. 3 and in his evidence he would speak about the complainant having been deputed to work in the Record Room during summer vacation; that the petitioner was in-charge of the Record Room then; that he left instructions with the complainant to look after the work of the Record Room from 7-5-1990 during morning and evening; that since the complainant did not know how to prepare the statement, he asked the petitioner to help her; that on 9-5-1990, the complainant handed over the key with him and thereafter in 15 minutes, the petitioner came and got the key from him and on the next day, the complainant came and reported to him about the petitioner's misbehaviour with her. The other two witnesses examined on the part of the complainant as P.Ws. 4 and 5 would also speak to the effect that neither on 9-5-1990 nor prior to that there had been any light in the veranda of the District Munsif's Court. 11. Through the said prosecution witnesses, 11 documents would be marked as Exs. P1 to P11. Ex. P1 being the written complaint dated 4-6-1990 by the complainant Smt. R. M. Esther; Ex. P2 being the office order book of the Court of the Principal District Munsif, Salem; Ex. P3 being the written statement dated 4-6-1990 of P.W. 2 given to the Principal District Munsif, Salem; Ex. P4 being the written statement dated 7-6-1990 of P.W. 3; Ex. P5 being the document dated 21-10-1989 showing the payment of Rs. 1, 737/- to the complainant as P.L. Bonus; Ex. P6 being the document dated 7-10-1989 showing the payment of Rs. 1, 396/- as allowance to the complainant; Ex. P7 being the document showing that the complainant received a sum of Rs. 1, 250/- from the Postal Co-operative Bank; Ex. P8 being the document to show that the complainant received Rs. 281/- as G.P.F. final payment relating to her deceased husband; Ex.
1, 396/- as allowance to the complainant; Ex. P7 being the document showing that the complainant received a sum of Rs. 1, 250/- from the Postal Co-operative Bank; Ex. P8 being the document to show that the complainant received Rs. 281/- as G.P.F. final payment relating to her deceased husband; Ex. P9 being the document to show that the complainant started receiving pension of Rs. 444/- with effect from 1-3-1999, on the death of her husband; Ex. P10 being the document to show that on 15-2-1990, the Principal District Munsif, Salem had sanctioned G.P.F. to the complainant and Ex. P11 being the passbook relating to Saving Bank Account of P.W. 1. 12. So far as the defence is concerned, six witnesses have been examined as D.Ws. 1 to 6, among whom, one Jayachandran, Junior Assistant working in the District Court, Salem, examining himself as D.W. 1 would give statement to the effect that on earlier acquaintance with the petitioner, he went in search of him on 9-5-1990, then he saw the petitioner and complainant sitting opposite to each other and twenty days later, he was informed about the complaint lodged by the complainant against the petitioner. 13. One A. Boopathy, who got examined as D.W. 2 would state that he was also deputed for duty in summer in the District Court along with the complainant and the petitioner and at that time on 7-5-1990 and 8-5-1990, it was the complainant, who requested the petitioner to apprise her of the nature of work, since she was not conversant to the same. This witness would also state that later the staff requested with the District Judge to revoke the suspension order passed against the petitioner. 14. One Natarajan, who was working as clerk in the Central Record Room got examined as D.W. 3 and he would state that the complainant requested the petitioner to help her in preparing the statement and that he knew the petitioner from the year 1979. 15. One Palaniswamy, an Advocate clerk, appearing as D.W. 4 would state that his advocate asked him to convey the message to the complainant that she need not have to come for typing, since the original typist has resumed his work and that he met her and conveyed the message.
15. One Palaniswamy, an Advocate clerk, appearing as D.W. 4 would state that his advocate asked him to convey the message to the complainant that she need not have to come for typing, since the original typist has resumed his work and that he met her and conveyed the message. One P. Kannaiyan, Process Server has been examined as D.W. 5 and he would state that on 9-5-1990, he was on guard duty in the District Munsif's Court, Salem and at that time, both the complainant and the petitioner were present and at 5.45 p.m. that day, he came out and in a little while at 6.15 p.m., the complainant came out from the District Court and herself and the petitioner were both engaged in their work; that at that time, the petitioner closing the windows had also locked the doors of the Record Room and then enquired about him and handed over the key with the complainant and handed over a paper with him for being passed on to Kannam in order to be typed and taking his vehicle, he left the place and at the time he closed the doors, it would have been 7.30 p.m. and that he knew that the complainant got the key from the petitioner and handed over with the Head Clerk. 16. One Kannan, a Steno working in the Court who got examined as D.W. 6 would state that on 9-5-1990 after finishing his work, he had gone to the class in the Law College and coming again by 8.00 p.m., received the weekly statement from watchman Kannaiyan and got it typed up to 11.00 p.m. that day and placing the typed materials on the table of the Head Clerk, he left the place. He would also state that there was only one door to the room of the Head Clerk and not three doors and on 9-5-1990, he was typing up to 11.00 p.m.; that he too joined the other staff working in the District Munsif's Court, Salem to make a request with the District Munsif to revoke the suspension order. 17. Based on the above material made available before him, I Additional District Judge, Salem, who has been designated as the Enquiry Officer in this matter conducted enquiry on the two charges viz.
17. Based on the above material made available before him, I Additional District Judge, Salem, who has been designated as the Enquiry Officer in this matter conducted enquiry on the two charges viz. (1) that on 9-5-1990, after 5.45 p.m., when Smt. R. M. Esther, Junior Assistant was ready to leave from the Court, after attending to her vacation Court work, the petitioner/delinquent volunteering to help her in the preparation of the pending copy applications statement got the key from the Head Clerk Devendran and took the said Esther to the Record Room and on the pretext of dictating the statement, with intent to misbehave with her, not only touched her hand but also put off the lights in the Record Room and closed the windows and committed misconduct against her to the extent of outraging her modesty, thus committing an offence under Rule 19(2) of the Tamil Nadu Government Servant's Conduct Rules, 1973; and (2) that on 9-5-1990 at about 5.45 p.m., after the office hours, under pretext of helping Smt. R. M. Esther, Junior Assistant in preparing the Copy Applications statement even after 6.30 p.m. that day, in the absence of any of the staff, making her wait, has acted in violation of the Tamil Nadu Government Servant's Conduct Rules, 1973 and the High Court Circular. In the enquiry, on the part of the complainant 5 witnesses have been examined as P.Ws. 1 to 5 besides marking 11 documents as Exs. P1 to P11 and on the part of the petitioner/delinquent, six witnesses have been examined as D.Ws. 1 to 6 besides marking five documents as Exs. B1 to B5. Apart from these, two other documents have also been marked as Court documents as Exs. C1 and C2. After conducting the enquiry by giving opportunity for both to be heard and following the rules and procedures contemplated by law, ultimately, the Enquiry Officer has found the petitioner/delinquent guilty of both the above charges and has submitted his report as per Roc. No. 5620/A/90, dated 11-11-1991, based on which the Disciplinary Authority, the Principal District Judge, Salem has imposed a punishment of reduction to a lower post from the post of Junior Assistant to the post of Examiner of copies. 18. On appeal against the above finding and punishment, to the High Court, the Registrar, High Court, Madras, stating that the punishment imposed viz.
18. On appeal against the above finding and punishment, to the High Court, the Registrar, High Court, Madras, stating that the punishment imposed viz. reduction to a lower post from Junior Assistant to Examiner without specifying a time-limit or permanently, as it were, is not in accordance with F.R. 29, Rule 2(i) and cannot be sustained, remitted the matter to the disciplinary authority for imposing such punishment, as may be found necessary, in accordance with the Service Rules and the Fundamental Rules, thus allowing the appeal preferred by the petitioner in part, as per his order made in Roc. 2558/92/C1, dated 17-8-93. After remand, the disciplinary authority i.e. the Principal District Judge, Salem, issuing a show cause notice to the petitioner to explain as to why any of the major punishments stipulated under Rule 8 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules r/w. Rule 17(b) should not be imposed as per his proceeding in Roc. No. 5620/A/90, dated 10-12-93 and in consideration of the explanation of the petitioner/delinquent dated 12-1-94 that he had worked as Examiner on reversion from the post of Junior Assistant from 19-12-91 to 9-11-93, passed an ultimate order in Roc. No. 5620/A/90, dated 30-9-94 in D. No. 12017, dated 5-10-1994, thereby limiting the period of reduction in rank to the period already served by the delinquent in the lower rank as Examiner from 19-12-91 to 9-11-93. 19. Aggrieved against even that order passed as above, the petitioner/delinquent has come forward to file the above writ petition praying to call for the records from the file of the first respondent regarding the order passed in its proceeding in Roc. No. 2558/92/C1, dated 17-8-93 and also the order passed by the second respondent in his proceedings Roc. 5620/A/90, dated 20-12-1991 and Roc. 5620/A/90, dated 30-9-94 and quash the same further directing the respondents to exonerate the petitioner from the charges levelled against him in the charge memo dated 1-10-90 issued by the Principal District Munsif, Salem and treat the service of the petitioner as unblemished conferring all monetary and service benefits on the petitioner, as if there is no punishment against him even for the period from 19-12-91 to 9-11-93 by issuing a writ of certiorarified mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order or direction in the nature of a writ or any other appropriate relief. 20.
20. The grounds on which the writ petition is based are in short (i) that there is inordinate delay in lodging the complaint and no proper explanation was offered on the party of the disciplinary and appellate authorities; (ii) that excepting for the fact that on 11-5-90, the complainant orally complained of the offence with the Principal District Munsif and with no one else muchless with those witnesses, who are said to have met her and hence both the authorities below have failed to consider that the complaint was filed by the complainant as a result of afterthought; (iii) that the authorities below have failed to consider that even after the alleged dates of occurrence, on 14-5-1990, the complainant worked along with the petitioner/delinquent without any problem and the complaint had been lodged long after the alleged dates of occurrence and after 14-5-1990; (iv) that so far as charge No. 2 is concerned, there is no pith or substance and it is an open secret that the petitioner being equally placed with the complainant as a Junior Assistant cannot withhold her during late hours nor is it incumbent on her to abide by such conditions; (v) that the order passed by the first respondent-appellate authority is a one sentence order and a non-speaking one, simply upholding the findings of the punishing authority Principal District Judge, Salem and hence the orders passed by both the respondents bristle with arbitrariness and Violating Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India; (vi) that the orders passed by the lower authorities are also against the principles of natural justice, equity and good conscious; (vii) that both the orders passed by the first respondent dated 17-8-93 and that of the second respondent dated 30-9-94 have not been passed fairly and with due opportunity for the petitioner to be heardfully; (viii) that however, the punishment awarded against the petitioner is too grave in nature and hence would pray to issue the writ as prayed for. 21.
21. In the counter-affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents, the respondents would not only specifically deny the questions raised in the Memorandum of writ petition in general and the grounds therein in particular but also would explain the circumstances under which the matter had to be remitted back to the second respondent by the first respondent, since the specific period with which the punishment awarded was confined has not been stated by the punishing authority ultimately ending up saying that in overall consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and the gravity of the offence, for which the petitioner was found guilty, even the second respondent himself has taken a very lenient view and has passed the order treating the period already served in the lower post as reduction in rank and that himself after making a submission to take a lenient view cannot now challenge the same once again and would ultimately pray for dismissal of the writ petition with costs. 22. During arguments, the learned counsel for both laid emphasis on their respective pleading and prayed for the relief respectively sought for by them. 23. So far as the prosecution is concerned, it is a case of male staff outraging the modesty of a female co-worker taking advantage of the fact that the victim female staff had been deputed from the criminal Court and that without assistance of such persons, who are already well acquainted with the method of preparing the Copy Application statements, when the delinquent/petitioner had offered to help the complainant in preparing the Copy Application statements the complainant gave her consent even to work in the late hours during the course of which the delinquent had attempted to make advances towards her sexually, especially taking advantage of the known fact that she was a widow. The case of the prosecution besides being quite natural spontaneously it came to be complained of by the victim/complainant.
The case of the prosecution besides being quite natural spontaneously it came to be complained of by the victim/complainant. From the evidence of the witnesses examined it comes to be known that the circumstances are favouring for an occurrence of that sort to occur and in the absence of any motive being attributed for the act of the complainant in lodging a complaint against the delinquent/petitioner, especially when it is not the case of the delinquent that the complainant is either a character in the habit of indulging in such stunts or a woman of sadist tendencies, so as to magnify minor and ineligible instances adding vigour and viability and hence the big question that is to be answered in the affirmative is why the veracity of the complaint should not be trusted to be true to the facts and circumstances alleged therein when on the part of the delinquent absolutely no iota of evidence has been brought forth motivating the complainant for having come forward to lodge a false complaint against the delinquent. The evidence of the Head Clerk, Devendran, examined as P.W. 3 is gratifying to the effect that such an occurrence had been reported to him on the next day and he is said to have not only pacified the complainant but also requested her not to precipitate the matter. The oral complaint said to have been made with the Principal District Munsif, Salem on 11-5-1990 could not also be branded a lie since he is a Judicial Officer, who initiated measures towards the disciplinary proceedings connecting whom, his subordinate officer (the complainant) cannot utter falsehood to the effect that she lodged an oral complaint on 11-5-1990 with the Principal District Munsif, Salem. When these and such other vital evidences and circumstances are favouring the occurrence to have taken place at the time, place and in the manner alleged, neither the Enquiry Officer nor the appellate authority could close their eyes so as to believe the version of the delinquent/petitioner that no such occurrence took place at all, so as to decide the question in his favour. 24.
24. The Enquiry Officer and punishing authority and the appellate authority have fairly dealt with the offence charged and concluded to the effect of holding the delinquent/petitioner guilty of having committed the offence against the complainant and awarded the punishment of demotion to the lower post for nearly two years that had already undergone by him. It is fitting at this juncture to remark that the punishing authority has been very lenient and curteous towards the delinquent/petitioner in awarding such a lenient punishment for a major offence committed on the part of the delinquent/petitioner. Had it not been for the particular punishing authority in this matter the conclusions arrived at would have attracted more serious punishment than what had been contemplated and awarded. Since either in arriving at the conclusion to hold the delinquent/petitioner guilty of the offence charged or even in awarding punishment the lower authorities have been very fair and gentle, it does not warrant the interference by this Court in any manner nor is it desirable on the part of this Court, sitting as; a Court of review, to assess or reappraise or reappreciate the evidence as an appellate Court, when such exercises are discredited time and again by the Apex Court as seen from the following cases : In State Bank of India v. Samarendra Kishore Endow, reported, the Apex Court held that :- "Disciplinary enquiry - Respondent had put false claim in respect of reimbursement of expenditure on shifting his belongings on transfer - High Court holding that the findings of Enquiry Officer in respect of various charges were based on no evidence - Held that reasoning of High Court was based on misreading of the findings of the Enquiry Officer - Judgment of the High Court set aside."" Disciplinary inquiry - Imposition of punishment - Removal from service - Whether punishment is harsh ?
- Appropriate punishment is within the discretion and judgment of the disciplinary authority - Appellate authority may interfere with the same but not the High Court or the Administrative Tribunal - Matter remitted to the appellate authority to impose appropriate punishment." " Article 226 - Jurisdiction of High Court - Power under Article 226 is one of judicial review - In the matter of imposition of punishment or penalty, which can be lawfully imposed on the proved misconduct of the employee - Tribunal or the High Court has no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the disciplinary authority - High Court or the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to impose any punishment to meet the ends of justice - Supreme Court exercise the equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 and the High Court and Tribunal has no such power or jurisdiction." The above judgment has been followed in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. A. K. Parul : 1998 AIR(SCW) 4029), wherein it has been held that : "Articles 226, 136. - Punishment - Departmental enquiry - Charges proved - Removal from service - Challenge as to - High Court directing reinstatement as punishment found to be not commensurate with gravity of offence, though charges held proved - Held that High Court was not justified in interfering in the order of punishment, which lies in the discretion of the disciplinary authority - High Court orders set aside." The latest judicial thinking especially that of the Apex Court, as revealed in its recently pronounced judgment is that the High Court cannot even interfere with the quantum of punishment awarded by the Enquiry Officer or the appellate authority, thus even limiting the powers of the Court with regard to moulding the relief as seen from the judgment of the Apex Court in Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A. K. Chopra : (1999 Lab IC 918), wherein the following propositions have been established and settled : "High Court normally would not interfere in the findings of disciplinary authority or in the penalty imposed unless findings are perverse or based on no evidence and punishment is impermissible." " In departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole Judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power and jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence.
The High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since, the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority, over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot normally speaking substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even in so far as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty." " The High Court should not have substituted its own discretion for that of the authority. What punishment was required to be imposed, in the facts ad circumstances of the case, was a matter which fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority and did not warrant any interference by the High Court. The entire approach of the High Court has been faulty. The impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained on this ground alone."" That High Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of administrative authority. Even though Judicial Review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet the Court in exercise of the power of judicial review is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at.
Judicial Review, it must be remembered, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process." " The Court while exercising the power of Judicial Review must remain conscious of the fact that if the decision has been arrived at by the Administrative Authority after following the principles established by law and the rules of natural justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case against him, the Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Administrative Authority on a matter which fell squarely within the sphere of jurisdiction of the authority." 25. The next question that rages supreme in the representation of the counsel for the petitioner is that the statutory appeal that the petitioner had preferred with the appellate authority had not been properly dealt with in consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case and in appreciation of the evidence since the appellate authority is the last and final authority on facts, so as to render a reasoned order. The grievance of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the appellate authority has not discussed the merits of the case widely nor had he extensively dealt with the facts and circumstance of the case nor has he appreciated the evidence placed on record in the manner required by law. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the non-speaking order passed by the appellate authority amounts to non-application of mind, which is a clearcut violation of the principles of natural justice. The learned Counsel for the petitioner would further argue that as per Rule 23 of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, the appellate authority is bound to pass a detailed order and also to enter a finding that whether the delinquent is liable to be proceeded with for disciplinary proceedings and whether the punishment imposed is proper. The learned Counsel for the petitioner would, therefore, argue that the impugned order passed by the appellate authority does not specify statutory requirement. 26. In (State Bank of India, Bhopal v. S. S. Koshal), which is a case of compulsory retirement of a Government servant, this question has been considered.
The learned Counsel for the petitioner would, therefore, argue that the impugned order passed by the appellate authority does not specify statutory requirement. 26. In (State Bank of India, Bhopal v. S. S. Koshal), which is a case of compulsory retirement of a Government servant, this question has been considered. The relevant rule which concerns the disposal of the case reads as follows : "The appellate authority shall consider whether the findings are justified and/or whether the penalty is excessive or inadequate. Authority may pass an order confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty or remitting the case to the authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such directions as it deems fit in the circumstances of the case." Their Lordships of the Honourable Supreme Court considering the appellate authority's order held that : "We have already extracted the appellate order in full hereinbefore, which shows that it considered at length the facts of the case including the fact that the appellate authority (sic. disciplinary authority) had differed from the findings of the Enquiry Officer in respect of the two charges. The appellate authority then says that it considered the relevant grounds of appeal and after considering the facts of the case came to the conclusion that there was no substance in the appeal. In view of the fact that it was an order of affirmance, we are of the opinion that it was not obligatory on the part of the appellate authority to say more than this as the order as it is, shows application of mind.
In view of the fact that it was an order of affirmance, we are of the opinion that it was not obligatory on the part of the appellate authority to say more than this as the order as it is, shows application of mind. The order cannot be characterised as a non-speaking order." In this case, initially the appellate authority had passed an order partly allowing the appeal petition and remitting the same for reconsideration by the punishing authority - the Principal District Judge, Salem for imposing such punishment as may be found necessary in accordance with the Service Rules and Fundamental Rules and the Principal District Judge, Salem again in his order dated 5-10-1995 after due opportunity for the delinquent to submit his representation, had ultimately arrived at the conclusion to treat the period of one year ten months and twenty days from 19-12-1991 to 9-11-1993, the particular period in which he had already worked as the Examiner on reversion from the post of the Junior Assistant thus confirming the same as the award of punishment and it cannot be said that the learned District Judge has committed any error nor in the light of the above judgment of the Supreme Court it could be said that the order of remand made by the appellate authority had been arrived at without proper consideration or appreciation of evidence and hence both the orders passed by the punishing authority and the appellate authority were well considered and well merited orders and they do not call for any interference by this Court since the punishment awarded itself is a lenient one. Over and above the decision of the punishing authority on remand, the writ petitioner does not seem to have preferred any appeal before the appellate authority challenging the order of the punishing authority and has directly come forward to prefer the above writ petition before this Court. So far as the power of review and the legal ambit and permissible limits of interference of this Court into the findings of the Enquiry Officer and decision of the punishing authority including that of the remand made by the appellate authority till the ultimate punishment is meted out by the punishing authority in the aforesaid manner, there is no procedural failure or violation of natural justice or patent errors or perversity in approach are seen so as to call for our interference.
Hence, the interference of this Court as sought for by the petitioner is not at all warranted in the circumstances of the case.In the result, the above writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. The order by the first respondent in Roc. No. 2558/92/C1, dated 17-8-1993 and the other order passed by the second respondent in his proceedings Roc. 5620/A/90, dated 20-12-1991 and in Roc. 5620/A/90, dated 30-9-94 are hereby confirmed. However, In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.