JUDGMENT - B.H. MARLAPALLE, J.:---This is a criminal writ petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and invoking the inherent powers of this Court under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. challenging the legality and validity of the show cause notice issued by the learned Special Judge under section 344 of the Cr.P.C. 1973 for an offence punishable under section 193 of the I.P.C. The facts giving rise, stated in brief, are as under:- 2.Case No. 16/94 came to be tried by the learned Special Judge at Latur, at the instance of the State of Maharashtra for offences under section 3 read with section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act and in the said proceeding the present petitioner was one of the witnesses. The said case came to be decided by the learned Judge by his judgment and order dated 24-3-1999 and in the said judgment the learned Special Judge noticed that the present petitioner who is a wholesale dealer of Kerosene had given false evidence during the trial of the said case and therefore, the learned Judge thought it fit to try the petitioner summarily for giving false evidence in Essential Commodities Act Case No. 16/94. The learned Judge further observed that he thought it necessary and expedient to take action against the petitioner for offence punishable under section 193 of the I.P.C. by way of summary trial as contemplated under section 344 of the Cr.P.C. and accordingly he took cognizance of the offence and directed issuance of the impugned notice. 3.Shri Deshmukh, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has advanced two main legal points namely (1) bar of section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.P.C. 1973 operated in the instant case and the Special Judge had no powers to issue the impugned notice and such a notice can be issued only by a Magistrate on a complaint to him by the concerned Court. The second point that he has advanced is that even if it is presumed that the petitioner is guilty of an offence punishable under section 193 of the I.P.C., the same offence is to be tried and decided by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, only and it is not within the jurisdiction of the Special Judge to try such an offence. In support of his contentions he has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Chandrapal Singh and others v. Maharaj Singh and another)1, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1238 and a judgment of the Patna High Court in the case of (Chandra Kishor Jha etc. v. The State of Bihar)2, 1975 Criminal Law Journal 1939. 4.Shri Gaikwad, learned A.P.P. appearing for the State has opposed the challenge to the impugned order and submitted that the order is legal and does not suffer from any errors apparent on the face of record. He submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case as appeared before the Special Court, he was justified, in invoking his powers under section 343 of the Cr.P.C. for summary trial by taking cognizance on the alleged offence committed by the petitioner during the course of his deposition in the case decided by the learned Special Judge. 5.In the case of Chandrapal Singh (supra) it was alleged that an offence punishable under section 193 of the I.P.C. was committed by filing a false affidavit before the Rent Control Officer and a complaint came to be filed by one of the parties to the proceedings on which cognizance was taken by the Magistrate and process was issued for an offence punishable under the said section of the Code. After analysing the provisions of section 195(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C. and the status of the Rent Control Officer the Apex Court held that invoking the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court was an abuse of the process of law and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, ought not to have taken cognizance of the proceedings on the basis of a complaint filed by one of the parties. It was further observed that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence under section 193 of the I.P.C. on the complaint of one of the parties to the proceedings before the Rent Control Officer. Section 195) makes it clear that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under sections 193 to 196 of the I.P.C. and sections 199, 200, 205 to 211 and 228 when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court except on the complaint in writing of that Court or some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. It was therefore, held by the Supreme Court that cognizance taken by a Magistrate on private complaint by one of the parties to the proceedings could not have been acted upon by the Magistrate to issue the process for an offence under section 193 of the I.P.C. The ratio laid down in the earlier judgment of the Patna High Court in the case of Chandra Kishor Jha (supra) is also to the same effect. It must be noted that both these judgments are not applicable to the facts of the present case and therefore, reliance on these authorities is misplaced. 6.Chapter XIV of the Cr.P.C. sets out conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings and Chapter XXVI of the said Code makes provision as to offences affecting the administration of justice. Section 340 of Cr.P.C. provides for procedure in cases mentioned in section 195 of the said Code and section 344 provides for summary procedure for trial for giving false evidence. The provisions of section 195 and section 344 of the Code are independent to each other and they operate in different circumstances. If for example an offence punishable under section 193 of the I.P.C. is alleged to have been committed in a civil proceedings, the procedure that is required to be followed for trial of such an offence will be governed by the provisions of section 195 of the Cr.P.C. read with section 340 of the said Code. However, if an offence punishable under section 193 of the I.P.C. is alleged to have been committed in a judicial proceeding before the Court of Sessions or a Magistrate First Class, the provisions of section 344 of the Cr.P.C. will come into play and notwithstanding the provisions of section 195 of the said Code, the Court concerned i.e. either Court of Sessions or Magistrate, First Class has the power to initiate summary proceedings as contemplated under section 344 of the Cr.P.C. Such a power of summary-trial is not available to a Civil Court. The intention of the legislature must be read as is reflected from the provisions of the statute concerned and if so read it will have to be held that the Court of Sessions or Magistrate of the First Class has two options before him if an offence punishable under section 193 of the I.P.C. is committed before such a Court or in the presence of such a Court namely either he can forward the complaint to the Magistrate so that the concerned Magistrate will take cognizance under section 195 of the Cr.P.C. and follow further procedure as is set out under section 340 or follow the second alternative namely to start summary proceedings as contemplated under section 344 of the Cr.P.C. This view is duly supported by a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of (Balshiram Rambhau Awate v. The State of Maharashtra)3, 1978 Criminal Law Journal 821. In that case this Court was of the view that at least 3 prosecution witnesses were guilty of committing perjury before the Court of Sessions whose judgment was in appeal and the learned Judge did not take cognizance and did not proceed to issue notices for trying the offence of perjury. It was in this context that the Division Bench in para 6 observed thus: "Two courses were open to him. He could have taken action under section 344 Cri.P.C. summarily and arranged to punish them there and then. It was also open to him to hold a summary inquiry under section 340(1) of the Cr.P.C. and decide whether a complaint should be filed." After the said observations were made the Court noted its satisfaction of the necessity to take action against the three witnesses for having committed the offence of perjury and held a preliminary enquiry in that behalf as contemplated by sub-section (1) of section 340 of the Cr.P.C. 7.The learned Special Judge while issuing the impugned notice has rightly applied his mind to the provisions of section 344 of the Cr.P.C. and the law laid down by this Court in the case of Balshiram Rambhau Awate (supra) and issued notice for summary trial. The challenge to the impugned order is therefore, without any substance and the same is hereby negatived. 8.In the result criminal writ petition is rejected summarily and the interim order passed by this Court on 21-4-1999 stands vacated. The challenge to the impugned order is therefore, without any substance and the same is hereby negatived. 8.In the result criminal writ petition is rejected summarily and the interim order passed by this Court on 21-4-1999 stands vacated. Shri Deshmukh, learned Counsel at this stage made an oral application for the stay being continued for some time. The oral application is rejected. Writ to go forthwith. Petition dismissed. -----