JUDGMENT P. K. MISRA, J. — Defendants are the appellants against a reversing decision. 2. Plaintiff-respondents filed the suit for declaration that they are the tenants/occupancy raiyats over the disputed property which consists of Ac. 20.00 of land appertaining to plot No. 4705, Khata No. 1074 of 1974 Settlement corresponding to Plot No. 1725, Khata No. 918/21 of the 1931 Settlement, in village Gadakana, which is now part of Bhubaneswar municipal area. Ac¬cording to the plaintiffs, the disputed property belonged to Choudhury Keshab Chandra Mohapatra who was the proprietor and raiyat over the same. In 1945, the latter entered into a contract with the plaintiffs and inducted them as tenants and delivered possession and in token thereof executed a lease deed in the year 1948. On and from the date of induction, the plaintiffs demarcated the same and continued to possess the disputed land on payment of rent in the office of the landlord. It is claimed that though the land was recorded jointly in the names of the two plaintiffs, plaintiff No. 1 carried on agricultural operation over Ac. 15.00 of land and plaintiff No. 2 cultivated Ac 5.00 of land and the landlord was aware of the said arrangement. It is claimed that since the original tenancy was recorded in the two names, rent was continued to be paid in joint names. It is stated that plaintiff No. 1 has got 3/4th interest and plaintiff No. 2 has 1/4th interest over the property. After expiry of twelve years from 1945, plaintiffs became the settled raiyats of the village with right of occupancy over the disputed property. After abolition of the estate, rent was paid in the names of the plaintiffs directly to the Government. It is claimed that names of the plaintiffs were mutated in the Jamabandi Register vide Misc. Case No. 13/6 of 1962/63, dated 20.3.1962 by the Tahsil¬dar, Cuttack, and the Tenants Ledger was corrected. Subsequently, village Gadakana was transferred to Puri district from 1972-73 and Settlement operations were in progress during that time. Due to transitory period of transfer of village from Cuttack to Puri district, the records of Tahsildar could not be properly made available to the Settlement authorities and as such the status of the plaintiffs was not properly recorded, but the plaintiffs were shown to the in possession, though the Khata was wrongly recorded in the name of Government. Due to transitory period of transfer of village from Cuttack to Puri district, the records of Tahsildar could not be properly made available to the Settlement authorities and as such the status of the plaintiffs was not properly recorded, but the plaintiffs were shown to the in possession, though the Khata was wrongly recorded in the name of Government. However, Record-of-Rights published in the year 1974 in respect of the disputed village and other vil¬lages were found to be defective and Government cancelled the Settlement and started fresh Settlement proceedings which were in operation at the time of filing of the suit. In view of the wrong noting, the Government authorities refused to accept rent during 1983-84 for which the plaintiffs moved the Tahsildar, but to no avail and the Settlement authorities were trying to mechanically record the Khata in the name of the State Government while noting possession of the plaintiffs. On the aforesaid allegations, the plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration of their tenancy right. 3. Separate written statements were filed on behalf of defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 3. However, the stand taken in both the written statements is similar. The defendants specially denied the execution of the lease in favour of the plaintiffs and claimed that such lease was a forged document. It was stated that the disputed land having been recorded as “Pathar Chatan”, the claim relating to acquisition of land for cultivation could not be a big plot of land and the claim of the plaintiffs did not pertain to any specific parcel and was not clear. While denying the possession of the plaintiffs, it was claimed that the entire plot including the portion claimed by the plaintiffs was within the leasehold area of OMFED, Govt. Press and road leading to Nandan Kanan. It was stated that the so-called settlement of land in favour of the plaintiffs in Misc. Case No. 13/6 of 1962/63 was without jurisdiction. It was further stated that the disputed plot had been rightly recorded in the name of the Government. In the written statement of defendant No. 3, it was specifically stated that there was no case bearing Misc. Case No. 13/6 of 1962/63 in the Office of Tahsildar, Cuttack, and the plaintiffs had never been recognised as occupancy tenants. It was further stated that the disputed plot had been rightly recorded in the name of the Government. In the written statement of defendant No. 3, it was specifically stated that there was no case bearing Misc. Case No. 13/6 of 1962/63 in the Office of Tahsildar, Cuttack, and the plaintiffs had never been recognised as occupancy tenants. It was further stated that Choudhury Keshab Chandra Mohapatra was neither the Proprietor nor a raiyat in respect of the disputed property and he was never in possession of the same. It was stated that origi¬nally the suit plot belonged to Choudhury Chakradhar Mohapatra and others having an area of Ac. 134.25 decimals and after vest¬ing it became the property of the State Government having an area of Ac. 106.78. Plot No. 4705 was recorded as Abadajogya Anabadi in Khata No. 1074. 4. The trial Court dismissed the suit on the following findings : (i) Ext. 2, the Lease, in favour of the plaintiffs was not genuine and the plaintiffs were not in possession pursuant to the said document; (ii) The story advanced by the plaintiffs that in Vesting Case No. 13/6 of 1962/63 land was mutated in their favour and since then till today they are in possession of the suit land cannot be accepted; (iii) Since the plaintiffs were never in possession and the lease deed and rent receipts filed by them were not genuine, the order of the Tahsildar as per Ext. 7 basing on such unsupportive evidence did not confer any right on the plaintiffs. 5. In appeal, the lower appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial Court and held that Choudhury Keshab Chan¬dra Mohapatra was a relation of Choudhury Chakradhar Mohapatra and as such was the Proprietor of the disputed village. The lease deed, even though unregistered, was admissible for the purpose of collateral purpose of finding about possession, which is support¬ed by payment of rent vide Ext. 3 and Ext. 5 series. Ext. 8, the order in mutation proceeding, also shows that the plaintiffs are in possession of the land. Alternative plea of the plaintiffs that if they did not acquire any right under Ext. 2, they had acquired independent right on the basis of Ext. 4 was also acceptable as the defendants have not shown Ext. 4 to be a forged one. 6. Alternative plea of the plaintiffs that if they did not acquire any right under Ext. 2, they had acquired independent right on the basis of Ext. 4 was also acceptable as the defendants have not shown Ext. 4 to be a forged one. 6. In the second appeal, at the time of admission of the appeal, ground No. 1 of the memorandum of appeal which consists of several sub-paragraphs, was considered to be raising substan¬tial questions of law for determination. For convenience, ground No. 1 along with the sub-paragraphs is quoted hereunder : “1. For that the decision of the learned Addl. District Judge-cum-Special Judge, Bhubaneswar, is contrary to law and involves the following substantial questions of law which need determination by the Hon’ble Court : (a) Whether the finding of the learned lower appellate Court that Choudhury Keshab Mohapatra being the relation of Choudhury Chandrasekhar Mohapatra who has been recorded as the first Khewab in respect of anabadi plot he was the proprietor of the suit village, can be sustained in law, there being no evidence neither regarding the relationship nor it is the case of the plaintiff that Choudhury Chakradhar Mohapatra was the proprietor of the suit land. (b) Whether admittedly in view of Ext. 1 filed by the plain¬tiff that Choudhury Chakradhar Mohapatra was recorded as first Khewab, the purported lease deed Ext. 2 in the year 1948 executed by Choudhury Keshaba Chandra Mohapatra could be treated as the valid transaction to convey occupancy right in favour of the plaintiffs. (c) Whether in view of the finding of the learned trial Court that the report of the Revenue Inspector in Ext. 7 cannot be accepted in absence of the R.I., having been examined, the finding of the lower appellate Court basing on Ext. 7 to hold possession of the plaintiffs can be sustained in law. (d) Whether the finding of the learned lower appellate Court that no adverse inference can be drawn for the non-mention of the extent of lands possessed by each of the plaintiffs in Ext. 2 is sustainable in law specifically in view of the fact that the learned Court has himself held that it is true that there is no identification of the land in Ext. 2. 2 is sustainable in law specifically in view of the fact that the learned Court has himself held that it is true that there is no identification of the land in Ext. 2. (e) Whether the finding of the learned lower appellate Court that the defendants have admitted that Choudhury Keshaba Chandra Mohapatra was the landlord can be sustained in law in view of the specific plea in the written statement and also in the evidence that Choudhury Keshaba Ch. Mohapatra was never the landlord. (f) Whether the finding of the learned lower appellate Court that when the other co-owners do not challenge that Choudhury Keshaba Chandra Mohapatra had no right to indulge the plaintiff as the tenant the defendant has nothing to question about the creation of the tenancy can be sustained in law when the land admittedly has been fixed that the State Government inasmuch as the co-owner has not been made a party to the suit. (g) Whether in absence of the Ekapadia having been filed in favour of the plaintiffs and no zamabandi being there the plaintiffs could be held to be tenants under the ex-intermediary. The plaintiffs having pleaded that they have acquired the independent right on the basis of Ext. 4 the patta issued by the Tahsildar in Misc. Case No. 13/6 of 1962-63, the plaintiffs plea that they were inducted as the tenant by the ex-intermediary could be believed. (h) Whether the Tahsildar has the jurisdiction to pass orders in the Misc. Case No. 13/6 of 1962-63 as in Ext. 4 and whether the documents are genuine. (i) Whether in absence of any evidence that the plaintiffs were the settled raiyat of the village, the learned appellate Court could hold that they have acquired occupancy right over the suit land being in possession for more than 12 years.” 7. Ext.2 purports to be the permanent lease executed by Keshaba Chandra Mohapatra. Though there is some dispute as to whether Keshaba Chandra Mohapatra was the proprietor in respect of the disputed property, it may be appropriate to proceed on the footing that he was one of the joint proprietors, as observed by the lower appellate Court. Ext.2 purports to be the permanent lease executed by Keshaba Chandra Mohapatra. Though there is some dispute as to whether Keshaba Chandra Mohapatra was the proprietor in respect of the disputed property, it may be appropriate to proceed on the footing that he was one of the joint proprietors, as observed by the lower appellate Court. If it is found that the plaintiffs were inducted as tenants by the ex-proprietor, after vesting they would be deemed to be tenants under the State in view of the provisions contained in Section 8 (1) of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act (in short, the “O.E.A. Act”), which is extracted hereunder : “8. Continuity of tenure of tenants - (1) Any person who immediately before the date of vesting of an estate in the State Government was in possession of any holding as a tenant under an Intermediary shall, on and from the date of vesting, be deemed to be a tenant of the State Government and such person shall hold the land in the same rights and subject to the same restrictions and liabilities as he was entitled or subject to immediately before the date of vesting.” If the lease in favour of the plaintiffs is found to be prior to 1.1.1946, their tenancy right has to be recognised. However, if the lease if found to be after 1.1.1946, the question as envis¬aged in Section 5(i) of the O.E.A. Act may crop up. 8. The plaintiffs came up with a story that they were in¬ducted as tenants in the year 1945 and subsequently permanent lease was executed in the year 1948. The plaintiffs further claimed that till date of vesting rent was being paid by them in the office of the landlord. Surprisingly, however, as observed by the trial Court, there is no evidence in support of such a claim. The plaintiffs have failed to file a single receipt indicating payment of rent to the ex-proprietor prior to the date of vest¬ing. Plaintiffs claimed that Ac. 20.00 of land was given to them. Plaintiff No. 1, examined as sole witness on behalf of the plain¬tiffs, stated that there was a sketch-map indicating demarcation of the disputed land. The plaintiffs have failed to file a single receipt indicating payment of rent to the ex-proprietor prior to the date of vest¬ing. Plaintiffs claimed that Ac. 20.00 of land was given to them. Plaintiff No. 1, examined as sole witness on behalf of the plain¬tiffs, stated that there was a sketch-map indicating demarcation of the disputed land. It has to be kept in mind that the disputed land is a part of a big plot and as such at the time of induction one would have expected description of either the boundaries or sketch-map indicating the location of the land allegedly given to plaintiffs. In Ext. 2, the lease deed purportedly executed by the ex-proprietor, neither the boundaries had been given, nor any map was attached to identify the disputed land. It seems that for the first time during the enquiry conducted by the Tahsildar in the year 1984-85, on the basis of which order under Ext. 8 was passed, a map has been prepared indicating the loca¬tion of the land claimed by the plaintiffs. Such map which forms part of Ext. 8, indicates that the lands are in two different patches intervened by some other land and plots of some other persons. This itself creates enough suspicion regarding the genuineness of Ext. 2. If the landlord in the year 1945/1948 wanted to give two patches of land to the two plaintiffs, in normal course, it would have been so indicated in Ext. 2 and proper identification could have been given. 9. Plaintiff No. 1 in his evidence has candidly admitted that he does not know the boundaries of the two patches of land, nor does he know anything about the intervening lands and the intervening owners. The plaintiffs have not examined any other witness in support of their claim of possession from 1945/1948. The story of being in possession since 1945 does not receive corroboration from Ext. 2, the lease allegedly executed in the year 1948, inasmuch as there is no recital in such document that the two plaintiffs were already inducted as tenants in the year 1945, as now claimed by the plaintiffs. 10. Plaintiff No. 1 had filed an application on behalf of both the plaintiffs before the Tahsildar on the basis of which subsequent order under Ext. 8 was passed. The said application dated 23.12.1983 has been proved as Ext. C. In Ext. 10. Plaintiff No. 1 had filed an application on behalf of both the plaintiffs before the Tahsildar on the basis of which subsequent order under Ext. 8 was passed. The said application dated 23.12.1983 has been proved as Ext. C. In Ext. C it is stated : “That I alongwith one Sri Kamini Mohan Das son of Lal Mohan Das of Haripur, P.S. Khaira, Dist. Balasore has got the following land schedule at “A” on lease from Tahsildar, Cuttack Sadar vide his Misc. Case No. 13/6 of 1962-63 and obtained Patta and since then in possession of the said property.” In such application purporting to be under Rule 34(e) and (f) under Chapter IV of the Orissa Survey and Settlement Rules, 1962, there is no indication that the plaintiffs had got the property from the ex-proprietor in the year 1945/1948. It is, of course, true that the Revenue Inspector, who furnished a report to the Tahsildar on the basis of the application, reported about the plaintiffs’ possession and the unregistered permanent lease dated 5.3.1948, but the fact remains that in the application, the plaintiffs had never claimed anything about the alleged lease of the year 1948. The lease deed (Ext. 2) itself is on a plain paper and not registered. Plaintiff No. 1 has merely stated that the said lease had been given by Keshaba Chandra Mohapatra, but the signature of Keshaba Chandra Mohapatra had not been proved. Moreover, though plaintiff No. 1 claims in evidence that both the plaintiffs had signed on the lease deed, a bare perusal of such document negatives the plea of the plaintiffs. 11. In view of the aforesaid suspicious features and in the absence of any acceptable corroboration of the claim of the plaintiffs, the trial Court negatived the plea of the plaintiffs regarding possession on the basis of the alleged lease deed. The lower appellate Court simply referred to some of the reasonings of the trial Court, but did not discuss the various facts and circumstances as is expected of a Court of appeal while reversing the decision of the trial Court. 12. Apart from the above aspects, one suspicious feature appears from Ext. 2 as well as Ext. 4. In Ext. 2, it appears that initially the Khata number was mentioned to be 918/41 (in Oriya numericals). A bare perusal of Ext. 12. Apart from the above aspects, one suspicious feature appears from Ext. 2 as well as Ext. 4. In Ext. 2, it appears that initially the Khata number was mentioned to be 918/41 (in Oriya numericals). A bare perusal of Ext. 2 clearly indicates that the number “2” has been overwritten above the number “4” in a differ¬ent ink and what was initially written as 918/41 now purports to be 918/21. Similarly, in Ext. 4, it appears that initially the Khata number was indicated to be 918/4 (again, in Oriya numeri¬cals) and the number “2” has been over-written on number “4” which is again clearly visible. This correction of the number of the Khata in respect of two documents which came into existence about 14 to 15 years apart is, indeed, very suspicious. 13. On behalf of the State Government, Jamabandis of vil¬lage Gadakana had been filed. These documents (Exts. B, E and F) have been maintained in due course of official business and there is no reason to doubt their genuineness. These Jamabandis do not indicate the names of the plaintiffs as tenants in respect of the disputed Khata in the village in question. It is not disputed that the ex-landlord had not submitted Ekpadia in favour of the plaintiffs. If, indeed, the plaintiffs are inducted as tenants on the basis of a permanent lease, in normal course, their names would have found place in Ekpadia and Jamabandis (Exts. B, E and F). Under the provisions of the O.E.A. Act, the ex-landlord would get compensation and if the plaintiffs were really inducted as tenants, the landlord would not have omitted to submit Ekapadia. During the settlement Record-of-Rights of the year 1974, the disputed property was recorded as Anabadi in the name of the State Government. Though the plaintiffs claim that their posses¬sion was noted, they did not produce the copy of the Record-of-Rights. As a matter of fact, the Record-of-Rights which has been produced in this Court and which being a public document is hereby admitted as additional evidence in the interest of justice as the same is required for the just decision in the case, does not indicate anything about the so-called possession of the plaintiffs. As a matter of fact, the Record-of-Rights which has been produced in this Court and which being a public document is hereby admitted as additional evidence in the interest of justice as the same is required for the just decision in the case, does not indicate anything about the so-called possession of the plaintiffs. The non-submission of Expadia in favour of the plain¬tiffs, non-inclusion of their names in the Jamabandis (Tenants Ledger) and the recording of the property in the name of the State Government without any note of possession in favour of the plaintiffs clearly fortify the conclusion of the trial Court that the plaintiffs were not in possession. In the plaint, it was alleged that the plaintiffs were in possession and had cultivated the disputed land. If that were so, plaintiff No. 1 could have at least spoken about the boundaries of the two patches of land claimed by the plaintiffs and at least about the other persons having property in the neighbourhood. 14. Ext. 4 itself appears to be a suspicious document. Apart from the over-writing relating to the Khata number, which has already been noticed, the document itself purports to be an original document purporting to be Jamabandi Register or Contin¬uous Khatian. The document produced does not appear to be a certified copy, as there is no endorsement of any authority indicating that it is a certified copy. On the other hand, the document appears to be the original document itself. It is not understood as to how such original document purporting to be the Jamabandi Register would be in the custody of the plaintiffs. On behalf of the State, Ext. A has been produced which does not indicate about the filing of any Misc. Case No. 13/6 of 1962-63. In the Jamabandi produced on behalf of the State, Khata 918/21 does not refer to the present plaintiffs. The genuineness of Ext. 4 had been rightly suspected by the trial Court, but the lower appellate Court has simply glossed over this aspect. Such Ext. 4 itself purports to be based on order in Misc. Case No. 13/6 of 1962-63. It is surprising that the plaintiffs have not filed any certified copy of any order purporting to recognise their rights as tenants on the basis of which such Ext. 4 was purported to be issued. Such Ext. 4 itself purports to be based on order in Misc. Case No. 13/6 of 1962-63. It is surprising that the plaintiffs have not filed any certified copy of any order purporting to recognise their rights as tenants on the basis of which such Ext. 4 was purported to be issued. In order to allay any suspicion, even the application filed by the plaintiffs on the basis of which Ext. 4 was pur¬ported to be issued could have been proved. It is, of course, true that the plaintiffs have produced a few rent receipts. Since the plaintiffs’ very claim of induction as tenants is doubtful, no reliance can be placed on such stray rent receipts as it is not difficult to obtain such rent receipts. Moreover, as rightly observed by the trial Court, it appears that some of the rent receipts though purportedly issued at different times, relate to same period. The plaintiffs are not in a position to clarify about the basis of Ext. 4. In Ext. C, the plaintiffs claim that the property was leased to them by the Tahsildar. If any such order was passed by the Tahsildar, the legal basis of such order is not known. 15. The plaintiffs had also relied upon the order passed in Ext. 8. Ext. 8 is a recommendation by the Tahsildar to the Collector to correct the Record-of-Rights. Ext. D shows that such recommendation has not been accepted by the Collector. Law is well settled that orders in mutation proceedings neither create nor extinguish rights. Unless the plaintiffs are able to establish their prior right, the order or recommendation for mutation as indicated in Ext. 8 cannot confer any title on the plaintiffs. Moreover, as rightly observed by the trial Court, the entire basis of Ext. 8 seems to be on erroneous assumptions relating to the alleged rights of the plaintiffs. 16. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents had inevitably raised the question relating to jurisdiction of High Court while disposing of a second appeal. It is true that a finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court is ordi¬narily binding on the High Court. In the present case, however, the lower appellate Court while reversing the decision of the trial Court had not adverted to many of the reasonings recorded by the trial Court and many of the suspicious features appearing from the record. In the present case, however, the lower appellate Court while reversing the decision of the trial Court had not adverted to many of the reasonings recorded by the trial Court and many of the suspicious features appearing from the record. The lower appellate Court had merely adverted to some of the materials and without discussing the same accepted the same on face value. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, the Second Appeal is allowed and the decision of the lower appellate Court is set aside and the matter is remanded to the lower appellate Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law. It is made clear that the observations made in the present judgment are intended to empha¬sise the flaws in the various findings of the lower appellate Court and not conclusions and the lower appellate Court is free to give its own findings on analysis of all the relevant mate¬rials on record. The parties are directed to appear before the District Judge, Khurda at Bhubaneswar on 10th November, 1999, who may either dispose of the appeal himself or place it before any other Addl. District Judge for disposal within a reasonable period, preferably within four months of the receipt of the records. The L.C.R. be sent back immediately by a special messen¬ger so as to reach the District Judge on or before 10th November, 1999. There would be no order as to costs of this appeal. Appeal allowed and case remanded to lower appellate Court.