Judgment M.Y.Eqbal, J. 1. In this writ application, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the award dated 25-11-94 passed by respondent No. 1, Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad in Reference Case No. 154/90. 2. Petitioners case, inter alia, is that he is a permanent employee posted as Magazine clerk at Chasnala colliery under respondent No. 2, the Management of M/s. Indian iron and Steel Company Limited. The petitioner went on authorised leave from 1-7-74 to 20-9-74. He could not resume duty immediately thereafter and had applied for extension of leave and sent it to the colliery management by post. Respondent No. 2, however, terminated the services of the petitioner by its letter dated 8-10-74 which was made effective from 21-9-74. It is stated by the petitioner that due to unavoidable circumstance, he could not raise his dispute till the year 1987. The management of respondent No. 2 received a letter from the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Dhanbad about raising of dispute by the petitioner. Ultimately, the Central Government Ministry of Labour, in exercise of powers conferred by Clause (d) of Sub-sec. (1) of Sub-section (2-A) of Sec. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act referred $ the following dispute to respondent No. 1, the tribunal for adjudication: Whether the management of M/s. U.S. Com. Ltd. Chasnala Colliery, P.O. Chasnala, Distt. Dhanbad, was justified in terminating the services of Shri Prahlad Singh, Magazine clerk vide their letter No. 2-B(iv)/2008 dt. 8-10-1974? If not, to what relief the workman concerned is entitled.? 3. The management in its written statement filed before the tribunal admitted that the workman was granted leave with effect from 1-7-74 to 20-9-74 and he was required to resume duty on 21-9-74 which he did not do and continued remaining absent without permission and without sending any intimation. The management, thereafter, through a registered letter dated 27-9-74 advised him to resume duty. Thereafter, the services of the petitioner was terminated by letter dated 8-10-74 since the workman had lost lien on his appointment within the meaning of Order 10(f) of the Certified Standing Orders. The managements further case is that under provision of 10(f) of the Certified Standing Orders, loss of lien on appointment was automatic and it was not necessary to issue a letter in this regard to the workman concerned. The managements further case is that under provision of 10(f) of the Certified Standing Orders, loss of lien on appointment was automatic and it was not necessary to issue a letter in this regard to the workman concerned. It was further stated that the dispute is overstate and hence, the workman cannot be granted any relief. 4. It appears from the impugned award that the tribunal has interpreted Section 10(f) of the Certified Standing Orders and has come to the conclusion that the workman lost his lien on his appointment when he did not return within 10 days of the expiry of his leave. According to the tribunal loss of lien being automatic, the workman thereafter did not remain in service and there was nothing illegal as the automatic termination was in accordance with the provisions contained in the Standing Orders which was binding both on the management as well as on the workman. Hence, this writ application by the petitioner-workman challenging the award. 5. Mr. A.K. Sinha, learned Sr. Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner assailed the impugned award as being illegal, contrary to law, facts and evidence on record. Learned Counsel submitted that admittedly no domestic inquiry was held but the tribunal erroneously came to the conclusion that the termination was justified. According to the learned Counsel, the tribunal has totally misconstrued and misinterpreted the provisions of the Certified Standing Orders. It is contended that even if there be such provision in the Standing Orders, that is illegal and unconstitutional inasmuch as there cannot be termination of services on account of unauthorised absence without initiating the domestic inquiry. Learned Counsel relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Uptron India Ltd. V/s. Shammim Bhan -- . Learned Counsel has also relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Delhi Transport Corporation V/s. D.T. C. Mazdoor Congress and Anr. -- . 6. On the other hand, Mr. M.M. Banerjee, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-management, submitted that there is no illegality in the award passed by the Tribunal inasmuch as the tribunal has rightly interpreted the provisions of the Certified Standing Orders . under which termination order was passed. -- . 6. On the other hand, Mr. M.M. Banerjee, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-management, submitted that there is no illegality in the award passed by the Tribunal inasmuch as the tribunal has rightly interpreted the provisions of the Certified Standing Orders . under which termination order was passed. According to the learned Counsel, it is not a case of overstaying the sanctioned leave by the petitioner or remaining absent without reasonable cause so as to initiate a disciplinary proceeding before terminating the services. According to the learned Counsel, when there is voluntary abandonment of service, the workman lost his lien and in that case, the services of the workman can be terminated by giving a notice and without initiating a domestic inquiry. 7. For better appreciation of the contentions of the parties, it is necessary to look into the provisions of the Certified Standing Orders. Order 10(f) and 10(h) which read as under: 10(f)-If a workman remains absent beyond the period of leave originally granted subsequently extended, he shall lose lien on his appointment unless he: (a) returns within ten days of expiry of his leave ; and (b) explains to the satisfaction of the manager his inability to return on the expiry of his leave. In case, the worker loses his lien on the appointment, he shall be entitled to be kept on the badli list. 10(h)-Notwithstanding anything mentioned above, any workman who overstays his sanctioned leave or remains absent without reasonable case will render himself liable for disciplinary action. The Tribunal interpreted the aforesaid provisions by observing that the workman automatically loses lien on his appointment if he remains absent on the expiry of the period of leave originally granted and/or subsequently extended unless he returns within ten days of the expiry of his leave and explains to the satisfaction of the management his inability to return on the expiry of his leave. Accordingly, the tribunal held that the termination of the services of the petitioner by only giving notice was justified. I am unable to accept the finding arrived at by the tribunal. It is not denied by the management that the petitioner was a permanent employee and was on authorised leave from 1-7-74 to 20-9-74. Accordingly, the tribunal held that the termination of the services of the petitioner by only giving notice was justified. I am unable to accept the finding arrived at by the tribunal. It is not denied by the management that the petitioner was a permanent employee and was on authorised leave from 1-7-74 to 20-9-74. When the petitioner did not join after expiry of leave, his services were terminated with effect from 21-9-74 by notice dated 8-10-74 i. e. after waiting for about 16-17 days. Even assuming that order 10(f) speaks about termination of services of permanent employee without initiation of a domestic inquiry, the same is illegal, arbitrary and violative of the principles of natural justice. In a recent case of the Supreme Court in the case of Uptron India Ltd. V/s. Shammim Bhan (supra), a similar question with regard to the validity of the Certified Standing Orders of the management was considered. The fact of that case was that with effect from 7-11-84, the workman, Shammim Bhan proceeded on leave till 29-1-85. Thereafter, she allegedly remained absent with effect from 30-1-85 to 12-4-85. The management informed the workman that his services stood automatically terminated in terms of clause 17(g) of the Certified Standing Orders. The workman raised industrial dispute and made a prayer to the State Government that her case may be referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The State Government by its order dated 18-7-90 referred the dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal by ^ its award held that the termination of services of the workman amounted to Retrenchment within the meaning of Sec. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the other legal requirements have not been followed, the termination was bad and consequently she was entitled to reinstatement with 50% backwages from the date of termination till reinstatement. The management challenged the award in the High Court and ultimately, the matter carne to the Supreme Court. The Apex Court, after considering its earlier decisions observed: Conferment of permanent status on an employee guarantees security of tenure. The management challenged the award in the High Court and ultimately, the matter carne to the Supreme Court. The Apex Court, after considering its earlier decisions observed: Conferment of permanent status on an employee guarantees security of tenure. It is now well settled that the services of a permanent employee, whether employed by the Government or Government Company or Govenrment instrumentality or Statutory Corporation or any other Authority within the meaning of Article 12 cannot be terminated abruptly and arbitrarily, either by giving him a months or three months notice or pay in lieu thereof or even without notice, notwithstanding that there may be a stipulation to that effect either in the contract or service or in the Certified Standing Orders. Their Lordships further observed as follows: In view of the above, we are of the positive opinion that any clause in the Certified Standing Orders providing for automatic termination of services of a. permanent employee not directly related to production in a factory or Industrial Establishment, would be bad if it does not purport to provide an opportunity of hearing to the employee whose services are treated to have come to an end automatically. 8. In the case of Delhi Transport Corporation V/s. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress (supra), the Apex Court was considering a similar question as to the validity of the condition of appointment of service regulations of the Delhi Road Transport Corporation empowering the management for removal of the workman from service without assigning any reason and, held: Thus, on a conspectus of the catena of cases decided by this Court, the only conclusion follows is that Regulation 9(b) which confers powers on the authority to terminate the services of a permanent and confirmed employee by issuing a notice terminating the services or by making payment in lieu of notice without assigning any reasons in the order and without giving any opportunity of hearing to the employee before passing the impugned order is wholly arbitrary, uncanalised and unrestricted violating principles of natural justice as veil as Article 14 of the Constitution. It has also been held consistently by this Court that Government carries on various trade and business activity through the instrumentality of the State such as Government Company or Public Corporations. It has also been held consistently by this Court that Government carries on various trade and business activity through the instrumentality of the State such as Government Company or Public Corporations. Such Government Company or Public Corporation being State instrumentalities are State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and, as such, they are subject to the observance of fundamental rights embodied in Part III as well as to conform to the directive principles in Part IV of the Constitution. In other words, the Service Regulation or Rules framed by them are to be tested by the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. Further more, the procedure prescribed by their Rules or Regulations must be reasonable, fair and just and not arbitrary, fanciful and unjust. Regulation 9(b), therefore, confers unbridled, uncanalised an arbitrary power on the authority to terminate the services of a permanent employee without recording any reason and without conforming to the principles of natural justice. There is no guideline in the Regulations or in the Act as to when or in which cases and circumstances, this power of termination by giving notice or pay in lieu of notice can be exercised. It is now well settled that the audi alteram partem rule which in essence, enforces the equality clause in Article 14 of the Constitution is applicable not only to quasi judicial orders but to administrative orders affecting prejudicially the parry in question unless the application of the rule has been expressly excluded by the Act or Regulation or Rule which is not the case here. Rules of natural justice do not supplant but supplement the rules and regulations. Moreover, the rule of law which permits our Constitution demands that it has to be observed both substantially and procedurally. Considering from all aspects, Regulation 9(b) is illegal and void as it is arbitrary, discriminatory and without any guidelines for exercise of the power. Rules of law posits that the power to be exercised in the manner which is just, fair and reasonable and not in an unreasonable, capricious or arbitrary manner leaving room for discrimination. Considering from all aspects, Regulation 9(b) is illegal and void as it is arbitrary, discriminatory and without any guidelines for exercise of the power. Rules of law posits that the power to be exercised in the manner which is just, fair and reasonable and not in an unreasonable, capricious or arbitrary manner leaving room for discrimination. Regulation 9(b) does not expressly exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule and as such the order of termination of service of a permanent employee cannot be passed by simply issuing a months notice under Regulation 9 (b) or pay in lieu thereof without recording any reason in the order and without giving any hearing to the employee to controvert the allegation on the basis of which the purported order is made." 9. In the instant case, as a matter of fact, the petitioner remained absent or over-stayed his sanctioned leave and did not resume his duty after expiry of the sanctioned leave. His absence, therefore, became unauthorised absence without any leave. In such circumstance, there cannot be automatic termination of services of the petitioner by issuing simply a notice by the management. Such clause in the Standing Order is arbitrary and unconstitutional. The award of the Tribunal, so far the validity of termination is concerned, is liable to be quashed. 10. Mr. Banerjee, learned Counsel for the management, lastly submitted that the Tribunal has come to a right decision that the reference was stale one inasmuch as after about 10-11 years the petitioner raised industrial dispute. I do not find any force in the submission of the learned Counsel. It is rather surprising as to how Tribunal has expressed opinion of his own when neither such plea was raised before the Tribunal nor the plea of limitation or stale claim was pressed by the management at the time of hearing of the reference case. For better appreciation, para 8 of the award is quoted hereinbelow: The only point that the management has taken up in course of argument is that by virtue of order 10(f) of the Certified Standing Order, the loss of lien on appointment was automatic which came into operation immediately when the workman over-stayed the period of leave granted to him without any intimation and without showing justifiable reason. That being so, no relief can be granted to the workman. 11. That being so, no relief can be granted to the workman. 11. Despite the fact that there was one issue before the Tribunal as to whether the termination of services was justified, the Tribunal has expressed opinion of his own in para 25 of the award which reads as under: There is nothing on the record to show that after the year 1974 when the workman was informed of the loss of lien on his appointment through Ext. W-4, anything was done in this regard by or on behalf of the workman till October 1986. From Ext. W-2, it will appear that it was in December 1987 that the management had received letter from the Asstt. Labour Commissioner (Central), Dhanbad about raising of this dispute to which the management replied by its letter dated 12-4-88. Thus the dispute appears to have been raised in the year 1987, about 13 years after the intimation was sent to the workman through Ext. W-4. This would make the claim to be too stale to grant any relief to the workman at this stage. Even without it, I have already held that the workman had lost his lien on his appointment on his .inability to return on the expiry of the leave. That loss of lien being automatic, the workman thereafter did not remain in service and there was nothing illegal about that. The automatic termination was in accordance with the provisions contained in the Standing Orders which was binding both on the management as well as the workman. 12. Time without number the Apex Court has laid down the law with regard to the objective sought to be achieved by enacting the Industrial Disputes Act. Besides other the main object of the Act is to improve the service conditions of industrial labour so as to provide for them the ordinary amenities of life and by the process, to bring about industrial peace. In a recent decision in the case of Ajaib Singh V/s. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing cum.-Processing Service Society Limited and Anr. 1999 (2) Scale, page 508, the Apex Court held as under: The object of the Act, therefore, is to give succour to weaker sections of the society which is a pre-requisite for a welfare State. In a recent decision in the case of Ajaib Singh V/s. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing cum.-Processing Service Society Limited and Anr. 1999 (2) Scale, page 508, the Apex Court held as under: The object of the Act, therefore, is to give succour to weaker sections of the society which is a pre-requisite for a welfare State. To ensure industrial peace and pre-empt industrial tension, the Act further aims at enhancing the industrial production which is acknowledged to be life-blood of a developing society. The Act provides a machinery for investigation and settlement of industrial disputes ignoring he legal technicalities with a view to avoid delays, by specially authorised Courts which are not supposed to deny the relief on account of the procedural wrangles. The Act contemplates realistic and effective negotiations, conciliation and adjudication as per the need of the society keeping in view the fast changing social norms of the developing country like India. It appears to us that the High Court has adopted a usual approach in deciding the matter apparently ignoring the purpose, aim and object of the Act. 13. In the aforesaid case, before the Supreme Court the facts of the case was that the services of the petitioner were terminated on 16-7-74 allegedly without compliance of the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 . The dispute regarding termination of services was referred to the Labour Court by the appropriate Government on 19-3-82. After hearing the parties, the Labour Court vide its award directed for reinstatement of the workman with full wages. In that case, the issue regarding jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the reference was not pressed by the management. The management challenged the award in the High Court and the learned Single Judge held that the workman was not entitled to any relief as he was allegedly shown to have slept over the matter for 7 years and confronted with the management at a belated stage. When the matter came to the Apex Court at the instance of the workman, the management took the point that the reference as rightly held to be barred by limitation and it was a stale claim. When the matter came to the Apex Court at the instance of the workman, the management took the point that the reference as rightly held to be barred by limitation and it was a stale claim. Their Lordships after considering earlier decisions, have come to the following conclusion: It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay is shown to be existing, the Tribunal, Labour Court or Board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the backwages instead of full back wages. Reliance of the learned Counsel for the respondent-management on the Full Bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Chander Morya V/s. State of Haryana -- , is also of no help to him. In that case, the High Court nowhere held that the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act were applicable in the proceedings under the Act. The Court specifically held "neither any limitation has been provided nor any guidelines to determine as to what shall be the period of limitation in such cases." However, it went on further to say that "reasonable time in the cases of labour for demand of reference or dispute by appropriate Government to labour tribunals will be five years after which the Government can refuse to make a reference on the ground of delay and laches if there is no explanation to the delay." We are of the opinion that the Punjab and Haryana High Court was not justified in prescribing the limitation for getting the reference made or an application under Sec. 37-C of the Act to be adjudicated. It is not the function of the Court to prescribe the limitation where the Legislature in its wisdom had thought it fit not to prescribe any period. The Courts admittedly interpret law and do not make laws. Personal views of the judges presiding the Court cannot be stretched to authorise them to interpret law in such a manner which would amount to legislation intentionally left over by the Legislature. The judgment of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court has completely ignored the object of the Act and various pronouncements of this Court as noted hereinabove and thus, it is not a good law on the point of the applicability of the period of limitation for the purposes of invoicing the jurisdiction of the Courts/ Boards and Tribunal under the Act. 14. Coming back to the instant case as noticed above only one issue with regard to validity of termination was raised by the management before the Tribunal but the Tribunal has expressed his personal view and by mis-interpreting the provisions of law erroneously held that the claim is stale one and no relief can be granted to the workman. The Tribunal ought to have appropriately moulded the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised his demand regarding his illegal termination. 15. Having regard to the entire facts and circumstances of the case and the point of law discussed above, I am of the opinion that it is a fit case where I should exercise extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 16. In the result, this writ application is allowed and the impugned order of termination of services of the petitioner is quashed. The respondent-management is directed to reinstate the petitioner with full backwages from the date when the dispute was referred by the appropriate Government to the Tribunal for adjudication. It is made clear that the petitioner will not be entitled to any other consequential benefits.